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884 N. C. 366 SOUTH EASTERN REPORTER, 2d SERIES 
due to "excusable neglect." The trial court 
denied respondent's motion, concluding 
that her motion was not filed within a 
reasonable time after entry of judgment, 
that she had not shown excusable neglect, 
and that she had not pled a meritorious 
defense. Respondent appeals. 
Legal Services of the Blue Ridge, Inc. by 
Louise Ashmore, Boone, for respondent-ap-
pellant. 
Rebecca B. Knight, Asheville, for peti-
tioner-appellee Buncombe County Dept. of 
Social Services. 
Richard Schumacher, Asheville, for peti-
tioner-appellee guardian ad litem. 
EAGLES, Judge. 
[lJ Rule 60(b)(l) of the North Carolina 
Rules of Civil Procedure allows the trial 
court to relieve a party from a final judg-
ment for "[m]istake, inadvertence, sur-
prise, or excusable neglect." G.S. lA-I, 
Rule 60(b)(1). A Rule 60(b)(1) motion must 
be made within a reasonable time, Brady v. 
Town of Chapel Hill, 277 N.C. 720, 178 
S.E.2d 446 (1971); G.S. lA-I, Rule 60(b)(1), 
and the movant must show both the exist-
enc'e of one of the stated grounds for relief, 
and a "meritorious defense." Howard v. 
Williams, 40 N.C.App. 575, 253 S.E.2d 571 
(1979). Even if we were to assume that 
respondent filed her motion within a rea-
sonable time and had pled a meritorious 
defense, respondent failed to show "excus-
able neglect." 
[2-4J Although the decision to set aside 
a judgment under Rule 60(b)(1) is a matter 
within the trial court's discretion, Sawyer 
v. Goodman, 63 N.C.App. 191, 303 S.E.2d 
632, disc. rev. denied, 309 N.C. 823, 310 
S.E.2d 352 (1983), what constitutes "excus-
able neglect" is a question of law which is 
fully reviewable on appeal. Thomas M. 
McInnis & Assoc., Inc. v. Hall, 318 N.C. 
421, 349 S.E.2d 552 (1986). However, the 
trial court's decision is final if there is 
competent evidence to support its findings 
and those findings support its conclusion. 
Wynnewood C01·p. v. Soderquist, 27 N.C. 
App. 611, 219 S.E.2d 787 (1975). Whether 
~~ the movant has shown excusable neglect 
;) 
:) 
must be determined by his actions at or 
before entry of judgment. Norton v. Saw-
yer, 30 N.C.App. 420, 227 S.E.2d 148, disc. 
rev. denied, 291 N.C. 176, 229 S.E.2d 689 
(1976). Here, the relevant findings of the 
trial court show, as a matter of law, an 
absence of excusable neglect. 
[5,6] When a party is duly served with 
a summons, yet fails to give her defense 
the attention which a person of ordinary 
prudence usually gives her important bUsi-
ness, there is no excusable neglect. East 
Carolina Oil Transport v. Petroleum 
Fuel & Terminal Co., 82 N.C.App. 746, 
348 S.E.2d 165 (1986), disc. rev. denied, 318 
N.C. 693, 351 S.E.2d 745 (1987). The trial 
court found that respondent was personally 
served with the summons, and a copy of 
the petition. Respondent also received an 
enclosed notice, which informed her of her 
right to have a court appointed attorney if 
she could not afford to hire counsel, and 
provided a telephone number for her to call 
to have an attorney appointed. The court 
found that respondent saw the telephone 
number but failed to call, either to get an 
attorney or to request a continuance. The 
trial court also found that respondent was 
unemployed at the time and was receiving 
money, food and gas from police and chari-
table organizations. Respondent returned 
to North Carolina in February 1987, in her 
own car, by obtaining food and gasoline at 
various police stations and churches. The 
court found no evidence that respondent 
was unable to return to North Carolina by 
that method in December or January. 
These findings establish that respondent 
failed to use ordinary prudence to defend 
the action against her. Consequently, the 
trial court properly concluded that respon-
dent did not show excusable neglect. 
Respondent does not argue that the trial 
court's findings are unsupported by the 
evidence. Instead, she contends that the 
court's findings, and other evidence not 
addressed in the findings, regarding her 
poor financial situation and her limited abil-
ity to understand the importance of the 
petition, establish excusable neglect. We 





N.C. 885 ALDERMAN v. CHATHAM COUNTY 
Cite as 366 s.E.2d 885 (N.C.App. 1988) 
The trial court found that respondent Corp. v. SoderquiI;t, supra. The evidence 
was unemployed and was receiving food shows that respondent knew both the na-
and money from charitable organizations. ture of the proceedings against her and her 
Other evidence shows that she was living obligation to return to North Carolina for 
in a trailer, rent-free, was caring for her the hearing. Under the circumstances, re-
nine year old daughter, had lost her driv- spondent's failure to take action to defend 
er's license, had tried calling DSS on two her case is not excusable neglect. 
occasions, a?d had no mone~ to trav~1 to Absent a showing of excusable neglect, 
~orth C~r?hna. Respondent spoor frnan- whether the movant pled a meritorious de-
CIaI condl~lOn, however, d~es not account fense becomes immaterial. Bundy v. Ays-
~~r her faIlure to call or wrIte court author- cue, 5 N.C.App. 581, 169 S.E.2d 87, appeal 
Itles, or to make further attempts t? con- dismissed 276 N.C. 81 171 S.E.2d 1 (1969). 
tact DSS. Moreover the record con tams no Th f' d 't dd 
. ere ore, we nee no a ress respon-eVIdence that respondent made any effort d t' . . t d' th 
to seek local legal counselor attempt to get en . s .remammg argu~en regal' I~g e 
f · . I th . ta f th T admISSIOn of allegedly Irrelevant eVIdence manCIa or 0 er asslS nce rom e ex- . . .. 
D t t f S . IS' th concernmg the meflts of the petItion for as .epar men ? .ocla .ervlces, or . e termination. 
charItable organIzatIOns which were prOVId-
ing her with money, food, and gasoline; Affirmed. 
nor can we speculate that such efforts 
would have been unavailing. In addition, 
her return to North Carolina in February 
belies her argument that she was financial-
ly unable to return for the hearing in Janu-
ary. In fact, respondent testified that she 
could have returned to North Carolina in 
January but did not think about it because 
she was worrying about finding work, car-
ing for her other child, and the termination 
of her relationship with Douglas' father. 
Respondent's financial situation may, in-
deed, have been a difficult one but, under 
the circumstances, it does not constitute 
excusable neglect. 
[7] Respondent's claim that she was 
confused about the summons and what she 
should do in response also fails to establish 
excusable neglect. A party may not show 
excusable neglect by merely establishing 
that she failed to obtain an attorney and 
was ignorant of the judicial process. See 
Gregg v. Steele, 24 N.C.App. 310, 210 S.E. 
2d 434 (1974). Similarly, the fact that the 
movant claims he did not understand the 
case, or did not believe that the court 
would grant the relief requested in the 
complaint, has been held insufficient to 
show excusable neglect, even where the 
movant is not well educated. See Boyd 11. 
Marsh, 47 N.C.App. 491, 267 S.E.2d 394 
(1980). Respondent could read and write 
COZORT and SMITH, JJ., concur. 
John Michael ALDERMAN and Gloria R. 
Alderman; Rupert L. Bynum, Jr. and 
Joyce lU. Bynum; George Bowie and 
Anne Bowie; F.C. Burgner; Elsie C. 
Goff; William C. Fischer and Sandra 
Fischer; Robert P. Blair; James E. 
Pruchniak; Joseph K. Ward and Char-
lotte Ward: George Clark Thompson 
and Carol S. Thompson 
v. 
CHATHAM COUNTY and the Board of 
County Commissioners of Chatham 
County, including Earl D. Thompson, 
Henry Dunlap, Jr., Gus Murchison. Jr., 
C.W. Lutterloh: Carl Thompson and 
Calvin Roberson and Wife, Mary C. Ro-
berson. 
No. 8715SC401. 
Court of Appeals of North Carolina. 
April 19, 1988. 
and there is no evidence she was suffering Surrounding landowners brought suit 
from a mental incapacity. Cf Wynnewood alleging that countv onrt ;'0 h~ __ .J ~P 
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y commISSIoners acted unlawfully in re-
oning tract from Residential Agricultural 
,0-30 to Mobile Home District and sought 
leclaratory judgment that commissioners' 
Lction in that regard was illegal, invalid 
md void. The Superior Court, Chatham 
:;ounty, Thomas H. Lee, J., declared the 
rezoning invalid, and applicants appealed. 
rhe Court of Appeals, Johnson, J., held 
that rezoning amendment constituted il-
legal spot zoning and contract zoning. 
mitted owners to utilize property without 
having to meet subdivision requirements, 
and there was no reasonable basis for 
county's action. 
6. Zoning and Planning <;::=>160 
Affirmed. 
Rezoning amendment, whereby 14.2 
acre tract was rezoned from Residential 
Agricultural 40-30 to Mobile Home Dis-
trict, constituted illegal contract zoning, 
where rezoning was accomplished as direct 
consequence of conditions agreed to by ap-
plicant rather than as valid exercise of 
county's legislative discretion. 
1. Zoning and Planning <;::=>675 
As a legislative function, county's act 
of amending its zoning ordinance is entitled 
to presumption of validity. G.S. 
§ 153A-344. 
2. Zoning and Planning <;::=>21.5, 34, 155. 
156 
Legislative act of enacting or amend-
ing zoning ordinance is invalid if it is un-
reasonable, arbitrary, or unequal exercise 
of legislative power. G.S. § 153A-344. 
3. Zoning and Planning <;::=>35, 162 
Illegal "spot zoning" is defined as zon-
ing ordinance, or amendment, which singles 
ou t and reclassifies relatively small tract 
owned by single person and surrounded by 
much larger area uniformly zoned, so as to 
impose upon small tract greater restric-
tions than those imposed upon larger area, 
or so as to relieve small tract from restric-
tions to which rest of area is subjected. 
See publication Words and Phrases 
for other judicial constructions and 
definitions. 
4. Zoning and Planning <;::=>35 
Spot zoning is beyond authority of 
county or municipality unless there is clear 
showing of reasonable basis. 
This is a civil action by plaintiffs for a 
declaratory judgment invalidating an 
amendment to a zoning ordinance adopted 
by the Chatham County Board of Commis-
sioners. 
Gunn & Messick, by Paul S. Messick, Jr. 
and Robert L. Gunn, Pittsboro, Faison, 
Brown, Fletcher & Brough by Michael 
Brough, Chapel Hill, for defendants-appel-
lants. 
Epting & Hackney by Robert Epting, 
Chapel Hill, for plaintiffs-appellees. 
JOHNSON, Judge. 
Plaintiffs' complaint alleged that defend-
ant Chatham County and its Board of 
County Commissioners had acted unlawful-
ly in rezoning Calvin and Mary C. Rober-
son's 14.2 acre tract from Residential Agri-
cultural 40-30(RA 40-30) to Mobile Home 
District (MH District) for 14 lots and 
sought the court's declaratory judgment 
that defendant commissioners' 17 March 
1986 action in that regard was illegal, inval-
id, and void, on grounds, inter alia, that 
the action of the County Commissioners 
constituted spot zoning and contract zon-
ing. 
5. Zoning and Planning <;::=>167 
Rezoning amendment, whereby 14.2 
acre tract was rezoned from Residential 
Agricultural 40-30 to Mobile Home Dis-
trict, constituted illegal spot zoning, where 
~14.2 acre tract was part of much larger 
:care a of over 500 acres which was zoned RA 
40-30 for low density single fa/nily resi-
...j.dential and agricultural use, rezoning per-
The trial court's findings of fact estab-
lished the following: 
The Robersons are owners of 14.2 acres 
of land located south of State Road 1700 
and west of Mount Gilead Baptist Church 
Road. The 14.2 acre tract is adjacent to 
the south side of Parker's Creek which 
flows into the Parker's Creek impoundment 
1 , 
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on Jordan Lake, where the Parker's Creek Commissioners took further action on this 
campground and recreation areas are locat- request because they failed to present any 
ed. Some of the plaintiffs are owners of surveyor other evidence to support their 
single family homes located on lots which claim that the land was located in an un-
are contiguous with and adjoin the south- zoned township. On 29 September 1983, 
ern boundary of the Robersons' 14.2 acre defendant Calvin Roberson requested that 
property, and the remaining plaintiffs are their 20 acres located west of Mount Gilead 
owners of single family residences located Church Road (including the 14.2 acres at 
on lots in the same nearby vicinity and issue) be rezoned from RA 40-30 to Mobile 
generally south and west of the 14.2 acre Home District. 
tract. On 11 October 1983, before the Planning 
Plaintiffs' lands and the Robersons' 14.2 
acre tract are a small part of a much larger 
area of land totalling 500 acres which was 
originally zoned Residential Agricultural 20 
(RA-20) when the county first adopted its 
zoning ordinance in 1968. 
Prior to defendants' 30 January 1986 re-
zoning request for the 14.2 acre tract, de-
fendant Calvin Roberson had sought to 
have their land (including the 14.2 acre 
tract) rezoned from low density residential 
use to mobile home park use on six differ-
ent occasions. On 23 July 1973. defendant 
Calvin Roberson requested that the county 
rezone 40 acres then zoned RA-20 (includ-
ing the 14.2 acre tract at issue) for a trailer 
park. On 1 October 1973, this request was 
denied by unanimous vote of the defendant 
Chatham County Commissioners. 
On 17 October 1974, defendant Calvin 
Roberson sought to have 20 acres (adjacent 
to the 14.2 acre tract at issue) rezoned to 
mobile home use for a trailer park of 40 
mobile homes. The County Planning 
Board opposed the rezoning on grounds 
that such use could jeopardize the planned 
Parker's Creek impoundment and recrea-
tion area at the Jordan Reservoir. How-
ever, on 9 June 1975, the County Commis-
sioners, by a 3-2 vote, voted to rezone 16 of 
the 20 acres for a mobile home park at a 
density of not more than two trailers per 
acre. 
On 13 September 1983, the Chatham 
County Planning Board considered the Ro-
bersons' request to expand their trailer 
park from the 16 acres rezoned on 9 June 
1975, into the adjacent portion of their 
property south of Parker's Creek, which 
included the 14.2 acre tract at issue. Nei-
ther the Planning Board nor the County 
Board, defendant Calvin Roberson stated 
that the purpose of the request was to 
spread out the existing thirty-two trailer 
lots and add 18 more on larger lots, which 
on its south side bordered the plaintiffs' 
lots and homes. In addition, he stated that 
he had State approval for a package treat-
ment plant to serve the trailer park. 
On 8 November 1983, the Planning 
Board considered the request again. Plans 
submitted at the meeting showed that the 
parcel for which rezoning was requested 
contained sixteen acres. It was learned 
that no approval for a package treatment 
plant to serve the proposed trailer park had 
been given by the State. After the County 
Planner advised the Board that the rezon-
ing request (for twenty-four units on 16 
acres) did not conform to the density rec-
ommended in the Land Development Plan, 
the Board voted 5-3 to deny the request. 
On 9 January 1984, the Chatham County 
Commissioners again considered the rezon-
ing request. At that meeting, defendant 
Commissioner Carl Thompson made the 
motion to deny the rezoning request, and 
"strongly recommended" that the Rober-
sons submit a plan that would provide an 
adequate buffer between their property 
and the adjoining property owners. Two 
commissioners voted to approve the rezon-
ing request and two voted to deny the 
request. Defendant Chairman Earl 
Thompson broke the tie and voted against 
the rezoning request, stating that his con-
cern was a larger buffer zone and the 
potential density in the proposed trailer 
park. 
On 9 April 1985, the Planning Board 
considered their request that a 16.2 acre 
tract (including the 14.2 acre tract at issue) 
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med from RA 40-30 to MH District 
mobile homes. The Planning Board 
this request pending State action on 
"bersons' permit application for a 
~e sewage treatment plant. On 14 
"y 1986, before the Planning Board, 
~ant Calvin Roberson requested that 
zoning request not be taken off the 
30 January 1986, the Robersons sub-
the rezoning request at issue, ask-
tat the 14.2 acres (adjacent on its 
side to plaintiffs' lands, which was 
·act that was part of the property 
ered in the five previous rezoning 
,ts) be rezoned from RA 40-30 to MH 
~t for 14 mobile home lots. On 11 
ary 1986, the Planning Board con-
d the request. At that meeting, de-
Gt Calvin Roberson stated that they 
ed their request from 24 lots to 14 
lecause they felt that the 14 lots 
be more in line with the Land Devel-
lt Plan. He also stated that they 
trying to get a package treatment 
approved by the State to serve the 
rty, including the 32 units already 
ved on the 16 acres which he and his 
owned. 
intiff John Alderman stated that he 
lurchased his lot (adjacent to the 14.2 
tract's south boundary) from the Ro-
ns. Plaintiff Alderman stated that at 
me he purchased his lot, Calvin Rober-
lad verbally promised him that no mo-
lomes would be placed behind Alder-
s lot. The Planning Board voted to 
omend that the 14.2 acres be rezoned 
RA 40-30 to MH District for 14 lots. 
13 March 1986, the Chatham County 
nissioners held a public hearing to 
public comment on the Robersons' 
est. Defendant Calvin Roberson stat-
tat they sought to have the 14.2 acres 
led so that they could expand their 
ing trailer park. He stated that the 
ning Board had approved their request 
that they had met all requirements 
as buffer zones, low density, and sew-
:§ystems. 
a.ny persons spoke in opposition to the 
~sted rezoning change. Plaintiff AI-
) 
derman reiterated his position that he 
would not have purchased his lot but for 
the Robersons' assurance that they would 
not build on the 14.2 acres unless they 
decided to build for their children. Other 
persons had opposition to trailer parks be-
ing built but not individual mobile homes. 
These parties stated that they were against 
an increase in density allowed in MH Dis-
trict; that the expansion of the trailer park 
was unwarranted because the Robersons 
had not utilized the land rezoned in 1975; 
that their attempts to have the land re-
zoned had been denied during the last ten 
years; that there existed no change of cir-
cumstances in condition to warrant the re-
zoning; that there were a number of lots 
off Mount Gilead Church Road zoned for 
mobile homes; that there already existed in 
the community another trailer park in addi-
tion to the Robersons', and that any addi-
tional trailer parks would affect the single 
family character of the area. 
On 17 March 1986, the rezoning request 
was granted by the defendant County Com-
missioners. The minutes of the meeting 
simply indicate that "Commissioner Dunlap 
moved, seconded by Commissioner Murchi-
son and passed unanimously to approve the 
request .... that 14.2 acres on the south 
side of SR 1700 (Mt. Gilead Church Road) 
be zoned from Residential Agricultural to 
Mobile Home District for fourteen lots." 
On 22 April 1986, plaintiffs filed their 
complaint against the respective defend-
ants. On 23 June 1986, defendants filed 
their answers. On 14 October 1986, the 
case was tried by the trial judge, sitting 
without a jury. After reviewing the evi-
dence and stipulations of the parties, and 
after making findings of fact and conclu-
sions of law, the trial court declared that 
the rezoning by the Board of Commission-
ers was invalid and enjoined the Robersons 
from developing a mobile home park unless 
validly rezoned by the Board of Commis-
sioners. From the judgment of the trial 
court, defendants appealed. 
Defendants bring forth three Assign-
ments of Error for this Court's review. 
For the following reasons, we affirm the 
judgment of the trial court. 
1 
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By their first Assignment of Error, de- ants argue that since the 14.2 acres re-
fendants contend that the trial court erred zoned adjoins the Robersons' existing 16 
in concluding that the rezoning of the Ro- acre tract zoned MH District, then the re-
bersons' property was illegal spot zoning. zoning was merely an extension of the ex-
We disagree. isting MH District. Defendant's argument 
[1-3] G.S. sec. 153A-344 expressly is misplaced. 
gives counties the power to amend their 
zoning ordinances. As a legislative func-
tion, the county's act of amending its zon-
ing ordinance is entitled to a presumption 
of validity. A-S-P Associates v. City of 
Raleigh, 298 N.C. 207, 258 S.E.2d 444 
(1979). The legislative act of enacting or 
amending a zoning ordinance is invalid if it 
is unreasonable, arbitrary, or an unequal 
exercise of legislative power. [d. 
"Spot zoning" is defined as: 
[a] zoning ordinance, or amendment, 
which singles out and reclassifies a rela-
tively small tract owned by a single per-
son and surrounded by a much larger 
area uniformly zoned, so as to impose 
upon the small tract greater restrictions 
than those imposed upon the larger area, 
or so as to relieve the small tract from 
restrictions to which the rest of the area 
is subjected, ... 
Blades v. City of Raleigh, 280 N.C. 531, 
549, 187 S.E.2d 35, 45 (1972). 
[4] Zoning generally must be accom-
plished in accordance with a comprehensive 
plan in order to promote the general wel-
fare and serve the purposes of the enabling 
statute. G.S. sec. 153A-341; Godfrey v. 
Union County Bd. of Commissioners, 61 
N.C.App. 100, 300 S.E.2d 273 (1983). Be-
cause it zones a small area differently than 
a much larger area surrounding it, spot 
zoning, by definition, conflicts with the 
whole purpose of planned zoning. 2 Rath-
kopf, The Law of Zoning and Planning 
Section 28.02 (1987). Therefore, unless 
there is a "clear showing of a reasonable 
basis," spot zoning is beyond the authority 
of the county or municipality. Blades, 280 
N.C. at 549, 187 S.E.2d at 45. 
First, defendants argue that a relatively 
small area is required for spot zoning per 
Blades, supra, and that the 14.2 acres in-
volved is part of a larger tract of approxi-
mately 41 acres owned by the Robersons. 
(emphasis supplied). Furthermore, defend-
[5] It is undisputed that at the time the 
application came before the Board, the ROo 
bersons' 14.2 acre tract was part of a much 
larger area of over 500 acres which was 
zoned RA 40-30 for low density single fam-
ily residential and agricultural use. Trailer 
parks were not a permitted use in the RA 
40-30 zone, although individual trailers 
could be used as single family residences 
within the RA 40-30 zone. If mobile 
homes were to be used for single family 
residences, subdivision requirements had to 
be met, which included surveying and plat-
ting the individual lots upon which trailers 
would be placed, and paving the subdivision 
roads. The rezoning of the property by the 
Commission to MH District permitted the 
Robersons to utilize the property without 
having to meet the subdivision require-
ments. Thus, the rezoning singled out a 
"relatively small parcel owned by a single 
person ... so as to relieve the small tract 
from restrictions to which the rest of the 
area is subjected." Blades, supra. 
This was the basis for the trial court's 
finding of fact No. 24 which states: 
The development standards applicable to 
Mobile Home Districts under the Chat-
ham County Zoning Ordinance are differ-
ent from and less stringent than the de-
velopment standards applicable to the de-
velopment of subdivisions under RA 40-
30 zoning; in particular, individual lots 
do not have to be surveyed for develop-
ment in a Mobile Home District, while 
such surveys are required for lots subdi-
vided in a RA 40-30 subdivision; and, in 
an RA 40-30 subdivision with as many as 
four lots, roads would have to be paved, 
while in a Mobile Home District with less 
than 15 lots, the roads do not have to be 
paved. Thus, the March 17, 1986 rezon-
ing of Defendant Roberson's 14.2 acre 
tract from RA 40-30 to MH District for 
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from restrictions to which the remaining 
RA 40-30 area, including the Plaintiffs' 
said properties, were and remain subject-
ed. 
Thus, the rezoning amendment here 
clearly constitutes spot zoning. The re-
zoned area was only 14.2 acres and was 
uniformly surrounded by property zoned 
RA 40-30. The remaining question then is 
whether there was a reasonable basis for 
the county's action in spot zoning the 14.2 
acre land. 
An examination of the record reveals 
that the county has failed to show a reason-
able basis for rezoning the 14.2 acre tract 
from RA 40-30 to MH District. Among 
the factors to be considered when deter-
mining whether there is a reasonable basis 
for spot zoning are: (1) change in condi-
tions, (2) particular characteristics of the 
area being rezoned, and (3) the classifica-
tion and development of nearby land. 
Chrismon v. Guilford County, 85 N.C. 
App. 211, 354 S.E.2d 309 (1987). 
In their brief, defendants give no analy-
sis as to whether there was a reasonable 
basis to justify the rezoning. Neverthe-
less, there is no indication of any change in 
conditions in the immediate area of the 
property which ~ould justify the rezoning. 
The record reveals no increase in Mobile 
Home use within the 500 acre tract with 
the exception of the 16 acre tract adjacent 
to plaintiffs' land. At the time defendants 
were not using all of the 32 spaces allowed 
in their existing trailer park. 
In reference to the particular characteris-
tics of the area being rezoned, G.S. 153A-
341 states that, among other things, zoning 
regulations should be made with reason-
able consideration to "the character of the 
district and its peculiar suitability for par-
ticular uses." An examination of the 
record reveals that there is no indication 
that the 14.2 acre lot was unsuitable for 
residential use for which it was previously 
zoned. In fact, the evidence established 
that: the recommended tract was in an 
area designated, rural and low density, that 
the individual trailers could be used as sin-
gle family residences within the RA 40-30 
zone and that trailer parks were not a 
permitted use in the RA 40-30 zone. 
Finally, in determining whether a rezon-
ing was invalid as spot zoning, our courts 
have also considered the classification and 
development of nearby land. In the case 
sub judice, the majority of the land sur-
rounding the rezoned 14.2 acres was uni-
formly zoned RA 40-30, and consisted of 
500 acres. The classification and develop-
ment of nearby land is not consistent with 
MH District considering the fact that mo-
bile homes may be used as single family 
residences within the RA 40-30 zone. Fur-
thermore, in 1986, the county turned down 
an application to rezone property to MH 
District within two miles of the 14.2 acre 
tract. 
[6] In its second Assignment of Error, 
defendants contend that the trial court 
erred in concluding that the rezoning con-
stituted illegal contract zoning. We dis-
agree. 
A county's legislative body has authority 
to rezone when reasonably necessary to 
do so in the interests of the public health, 
safety, morals or general welfare. Ordi-
narily[,] the only limitation upon this au-
thority is that it may not be exercised 
arbitrarily or capriciously. However[,] 
to avoid contract zoning, all the areas in 
each class must be subject to the same 
restrictions. If the rezoning is done in 
consideration of an assurance that a par-
ticular tract or parcel will be developed 
in accordance with a restricted plan this 
is contract zoning and is illegal. 
Willis v. Union County, 77 N.C.App. 407, 
409, 335 S.E.2d 76, 77 (1985). 
The record establishes that on 9 April 
1985, the Planning Board considered the 
request that 16.29 acres (which included 
the 14.2 acres at issue) be rezoned from RA 
40-30 to MH District for 24 lots for mobile 
homes. Subsequently, on 30 January 1986, 
the Robersons SUbmitted the rezoning re-
quest at issue, requesting that 14.2 acres 
of their remaining land be rezoned from 
RA 40-30 to MH District for 14 mobile 
home lots. 
On 11 February, 1986, before the Plan-
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their request from 24 lots to 14 lots, Calvin 
Roberson stated that he felt the 14 lots PANNILL KNI'ITING COMPANY, INC. 
would be more in line with the Land Devel-
opment Plan. The Land Development Plan 
does not specifically address mobile home 
parks but instead addresses density of land 
. use. Subsequently, on 17 March 1986, af-
ter having denied their five previous rezon-
ing requests the rezoning request was ap-
proved by defendant Board of County Com-
missioners. The record reflects that at 
that meeting, no discussion was made of 
the rezoning request. 
We believe that the record reveals that 
the only justification for allowing the re-
zoning of the property was only if the 
amount of lots was reduced to coincide 
with the density requirements of the coun-
ty. There was no determination that the 
Board based its rezoning on the basis that 
the site was suitable for all uses permitted 
under MH District Zoning. 
The land was rezoned in consideration of 
an assurance that the 14.2 acre tract would 
be developed in accordance with a restrict-
ed plan. The rezoning here was accom-
plished as a direct consequence of the con-
ditions agreed to by the applicant rather 
than as a valid exercise of the county's 
legislative discretion. As a result, such 
action by defendant Commissioners consti-
tuted contract zoning. 
We have reviewed defendants' final As-
signment of Error, and find it meritless 
and without need for discussion. 
For the reasons herein assigned, the 
judgment of the trial court is 
Affirmed. 
WELLS and COZORT, JJ., concur. 
v. 
GOLDEN CORRAL CORPORATION, 
Edenton Housing Partnership, Bernard 
P. Burroughs and wife, Anne J. Bur-
roughs and Thurman E. Burnette, 
Trustee. 
No. 871SC783. 
Court of Appeals of North Carolina. 
April 19, 1988. 
Appeal was taken from judgment 
the Superior Court, Chowan 
George M. Fountain, J., entered in action 
challenging second foreclosure sale of 
property described in deed of trust. The 
Court of Appeals, Orr, J., held that evi-
dence was insufficient to establish that sec-
ond foreclosure sale on portion of property 
described in deed of trust violated statu-
tory provisions. 
Affirmed. 
Phillips, J., filed dissenting opinion. 
Mortgages <P369(7) 
Evidence was insufficient to establish 
that second foreclosure sale on portion of 
property described in deed of trust was 
void on theory it violated statutory provi-
sions; party challenging sale faile' 
present evidence indicating whether {l 
of trust foreclosed upon expressly 
rized trustee to sell property in 
upon default or whether property was actu-
ally described in separate parcels in the 
instrument. G.S. §§ 45-21.8, 45-21.9. 
This case arises out of the second fore-
closure sale instituted under a purchase 
money deed of trust dated 14 January 1982 
from L.F. Amburn, Jr., and William B. 
Gardner to Max S. Busby, trustee for Ber-
nard P. Burroughs, grantee. This deed of 
trust, duly recorded in Book 137, page 672 
of the Chowan County Public Registry, cre-
ated a lien upon all of Amburn's and Gard-
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Elections for New Castle County and leave 
the people of that County without any pro-
vision for exercising their ri,ght of fran-
chise at subsequent general or special elec-
tions heM in that County. On the contrary, 
the provisions of Chapter 182 of Volume 
46 of the Laws of Delaware di'sc\ose the in-
tention of the Legislature to continue in 
existence the Department of Elections for 
New Castle County but to change its mem-
bership from nine members to eleven mem-
bers. The method adopted by the Legisda-
ture to bring about this change having been 
found to be unconstitutional, the Depart-
ment of Elections for New Ca'stle County 
consisting of nine members, as provided for 
by Paragraph 1746, Section 2 of Chapter 
57, of the Revised Code of 1935, as amend-
ed, is still in existence and is the legally 
constituted Department of Elections for 
New Castle County. 
have sufficient bearing on that question to 
require some consideration. Both involved 
the acts of political parties in primary elec-
tions, and in each it was argued that such 
committees were mere private organiza-
tions, not subject to the equal protection 
clause of the Federal Constitution. The 
contentions made were rejected. 
We find the case of Equitable Guarantee 
and Trust Company v. Donahoe, supra, to 
be contrary to the weight of authority in 
this country and for that reason it is here-
by overruled. 
HARRINGTON, Chance.J\or: 
As I view it, the determination of this 
case does not require any consideration of 
the rule stated in Equitable GUarantee and 
Trust Company v. Donahoe, 3 Pennewill 
191,49 A. 372; but if the question is perti-
nent, I agree with the conclusion of the 
majority of the court that it was incor-
rectly decided. 
In Smith v. Allwright, supra, the court 
said [321 U.S. 649, 64 S.Ct. 765]: 
"We think that this statutory system for 
the selection of party nominees for inclu-
sion on the general election ballot makes 
the (political) party which is required to 
follow these legislative directions an agency 
of the state in so far as it determines the 
participants in a primary election. The 
party takes its character as a state agency 
from the duties imposed upon it by state 
statutes; the duties do not become matters 
of private law because they are performed 
by a political party." 
The principle stated in Nixon v. Condon, 
286 U.S. 73, 52 S.Ct. 484, 76 L.Ed. 984, 88 
A.L.R. 458, was, therefore, applied. 
In Rice v. Elmore, supra, the legislature 
had repealed all statutory provisions relat-
ing to holding primary elections by political 
parties, but the court said [165 F.2d 391] : 
I am, however, unable to agree with the 
majority conclusion that Section 3, Chap-
ter 18?, Volume 46, Laws of Delaware, vio-
lated the Constitution, and with their re-
fusal to permit a reargument of that ques-
tion. 
"When these officials participate in what 
is a part of the state's election machinery, 
they are election officers of the state de 
facto if not de jure, and as such must ob-
serve the ,limitations of the Constitution. 
Having undertaken to perform an impor-
tant function relating to the exercise of 
sovereignty by the people, they may not vio-
late the fundamental principles laid down 
by the Constitution for its exercise." 
Applying these cases to the Delaware 
statutory provisions set out in the earlier 
minority opinion, it seems reasonable to 
conclude that the chairmen of the execu-
tive committees of the major political par-
ties, to whom the power to name certain 
statutory officers was given by Section 3, 
Chapter 182, Volume 46, Laws of Delaware, 
are in some respects State agents. If that 
be true, that Act would seem to be con-
sistent with the Constitution even under 
the theory of the majority of the court. 
One of the conclusions in their original 
opinion was that the legislature could not 
provide for the selection of statutory State 
officers by persons having no connection 
with the State government, and that com-
mittees of political parties were mere pri-
vate corporations not within that rule. The 
recent cases of Smith v. Allwright, 321 U. 
S. 649, 64 S.Ct. 757, 88 L.Ed. 987, 151 A. 
L.R. 1110, and Rice v. Elmore, 4 Cir., 165 
F.2d 387, cited by the petitioners in support 
of their motion for a reargument seem to TERRY, J., concurs. 
'1 
l 
ANSCHELEWITZ v. BOROUGH OF BELMAR 
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ANSCHELEWITZ v. BOROUGH OF 
BELMAR. 
No. A-282. 
Supreme Court of New Jersey. 
May 2, 1949. 
I. Municipal corporatio.ns <8=>225(5) 
A municipality cannot act as an individ-
ual does, but it must proceed in conformity 
wi'bh statutes, or in absence of statute 
agreeably ,to the common law by ordinance 
or resolution or motion, and this is espe-
cially so where real property is concerned. 
2. MuniCipal corporations <$=719(4) 
Where borough minute book showed res-
olution authorizing borough attorney to 
draft lease of boardwalk concessions, and 
thereafter lease prepared by concessionaire 
and not by borough solicitor was executed 
by mayor and clerk, and schedule of pay-
ments under lease was never pa:ssed upon 
in public meeting, and municipality never 
expressed itself officiadly 'On termS thereof, 
lease was 'Void, and commission could prop-
erly authorize advertising to lease conces-
sions to others. 
Appeal from former Supreme Court. 
Certiorari proceeding by Leon Anschele-
witz to set aside a resolution of the Bor-
ough of Belmar, a municipal corporation, 
authorizing advertisements for bids to lease 
certain concessions on the Borough's 
boardwallk. From a judgment of the for-
mer Supreme Court, 137 N.J,L. 617, 61 
A.2d 293, prosecutor appeals. 
JUdgment 'affirmed. 
Milton M. Unger and Milton M. & Adri-
an M. Unger, all of Newark, for appellant. 
Ward Kremer, of Asbury Park, and 
Harry R. Cooper, of Belmar, for re-
spondent. 
VANDERBILT, Chief Justice. 
The prosecutor, Leon An:schelewitz, had 
for some years leased fr.om the defendant, 
Borough of Belmar, all of its boardwalk 
concessi.ons and then sublet them at sub-
stantial profit to himself. One of these 
leases was made in March, 1945, for a term 
of three years, expiring November 1, 1947, 
65A.2d-52161 
at a renl:al of $6,700 for the entire term. 
By hi·s own admission the prosecutor con-
ceded that he received more than this sum 
through subletting for merely a single Sum-
mer season. In February, 1947, while the 
1945 lease was sti~l effective, the prose-
cutor requested the borough officials to con-
sider a new lease to him. Pursuant to a 
suggestion of the then mayor and the other 
borough commissioner (the third commis-
sioner having died in January) the prose-
cutor .appeared at a regular meeting of 
the Borough Commission held on Febru-
ary 4, 1947, bringing with him a draft of . 
a new lease for a four year period com-
mencing, singularly, February 4, 1947, and 
terminating February 4, 1951, at a total 
rental of $11,500. The lease was execut-
ed by the mayor and acting borough clerk 
on behalf of the borough and by the prose-
cutor that same evening in a side room 
after the public meeting. 
Although the minute book 'Of the bor-
ough, which was introduced in evidence 
on the taking 'Of depositions in this matter, 
shows a notation 'Of a resoluti'On having 
been passed by the may'Or and his fellow 
commissioner at ,the meeting of February 
4, 1947, authorizing the borough attorney 
to dra ft a lease of the concessions, two 
experienced newspaper reporters, who tes-
tified that they were present fr'Om the 
opening of the meeting until adjournment, 
said that they heard no such resoluti'On 
introduced or adopted. Their accounts 'Of ' 
the meeting published in their newspapers 
bear them out for they c'Ontained no refer-
ence whatever to any such resolution or 
1e:lse. They also attended the next com-
mission meeting held on February 11th and 
listened to the reading of the minutes of 
the meeting of February 4th, but there 
was no mention of the resolution or of the 
lease. All this is significant because of the 
interest in the community in a wideJ1y 
publicized case in nearby Asbury Park 
involving the leasing of certain of its 
boardwalk concessions without adver'tising, 
and in the bearing of that 'litigation 'On the 
same problem in Belmar. The 'Oncoming 
municipal eJ1ection in May was ca.sting its 
shad'Ow before it. 
During the succeeding months a hotly 
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with one of the chief issues centering on 
the practice of the incumbents of leasing 
the boardwalk concessions without adver-
tising for bids. At various campaign meet-
ings and in 'a number of cam.\laign releases 
the then mayor stated only that the con-
cessions leased to the prosecutor were held 
by him under the three-year lease of 
1945, Not once did he mention the .lease 
executed on February 4, 1947. In April, 
one of the opposition candidates, Howard 
H'lyes, sought to e.."Camine the municipal 
minutes and re,cords, but was refused per-
mission by the then mayor until after the 
election on May 13th. Following an appli-
cation by Hayes fOT a writ of mandamus 
to permit such inspection, the mayor cap-
itulated and Hayes and a companion ex-
amined the minute books. Hayes testified 
on the taking of depositions that he looked 
at the minute book with care, but found no 
reference whatever to the February, 1947, 
lease. When he asked the acting borough 
oIerk to show him all leases, ,the 1947 lease 
was not produced. 
The incumbents were defeated at the 
election ,and a new board of commissioners 
took office on May 20, 1947. On the oc-
casion of the organization meeting, the 
1947 lease came to public light for the first 
time, when the acting borough derk turned 
it over to the new mayor with the state-
ment that she had put it in her general 
files at the time of its execution and had 
forgotten to refile it with the other leases 
of the borough and that while dleaning out 
her files preparatory to turning over he'r 
duties to the new borough clerk she had 
just run across it. In her testimony she 
claimed she had forgotten all about it 
when asked by Hayes ,to produce all leases. 
al agreed to be paid by the prDsecutor for 
the full four years under the 1947 lease. 
The prosecutor thereafter applied for 
and was granted a writ of certiorari to re-
view the resolution of March 9, 1948, con-
tending that it was invalid in view of the 
prior commitment made by the borough to 
him under the lease of February, 1947. 
After argument the former Supreme Court 
held (1) that there was no statl1tory re-
quirement that the bOrDugh could lease only 
upon advertisement and bids, {2) that the 
resolution of February 4, 1947 awarding the 
lease to prosecutor "was not publicly and 
legally adopted and therefore of llO force 
and effect," and, (3) that the rule of law 
prohibiting a collateral attack upon 11111-
nicipal ordinances or resolutions did not 
prevent the court in a case involving fraud 
and bad faith "from looking to evidence 
concerning the approval of the resolution 
beyond the minute book of the municipal-
ity," 1948, 137 N.J.L. 617, 61 A.2d 293, 296. 
From this judgment the prosecutor appeals. 
Thereupon the new board. of commis-
sioners, .although recognizing the 1945 lease 
and accepting the prosecutor's tendered 
rental in payment only to the amount due 
on this lease for the summer of 1947, re-
'fused to consider itself bound by the 1947 
lease. On March 9, 1948 the board adopted 
a resolution authorizing the leasing of the 
boardwalk concessions on bids after public 
advertisement and directed the borough 
oIerk to advertise for bids. The bids re-
ceived on all of the concessions in the ag-
gregate for a single year exceeded the rent-
It will serve no useful purpose to re-
view at length all the ex'traordinary cir-
cumstances surrounding the ,lease and the 
resolution of February 4, 1947. Too many 
acts and statements are left unexplained. 
Why execu,te a lease in February, 1947, ef-
fective immediately, w.hen the existing 
lease of 1945 did not expire until Navel11-
ber? The prosecutor explains that he 
wanted securi'ty in order to make improve-
ments on the leased property. The borough 
officials on ,their part, feared another de-
pression. But where in the new aease is 
there any provision for such improve-
ments? Except for dates and amounts 
it is identical with the old lease. The reso-
lution of February 4th authorized the 
borough solicitor to draw up a lease and 
provided for "payments 'Outlined in lease," 
but where is the proof of compliance with 
the resolution? The borough solicitor was 
110t even called as a witness. But why 
such a resolution at all, when the prO'secu-
tor had brought a new lease with him and 
the borough officials had obligingly signed 
it? Why did the borough commissioners fail 
to act on ,the lease at a public meeting? 
Why did the then mayor refuse to permit 
an inspeotion of the minute book and leases 
by an interested citizen until subjected to 
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judicial pressure? Why did the acting mu- to be prepared by the borough solicitor. 
nicipal clerk thereafter conceal the resolu- Apparently the borough solicitor never pre-
tion and the lease unti;! the election waS pared a lease, why not we are not told. 
over and the new commission was about It may weill be he was never asked to d'O 
to organize? Why did the then mayor so. In any event, it is significant that he 
throughout !:he campaign conceal the ex- was not called as a witness. Moreover, 
istence of the 1947 lease? Why if ,the 1947 the resolution goes no f,urther than to au-
lease were to take effect immediately, not- thorize the borough solicitor to prepare a 
withstanding the fact that the 1945 lease lease, which the commission was free toac-
did not expire until November, 194i, was cept or reject. The actual execution of a 
there no release of the unexpired term lease is nowhere aubh-orized by resolution. 
of the 1945 lease? Was the prosecutor to Nor have the schedule 'Of payments under 
pay rent from February to November un- the 1ease, which were to emerge for the 
der each lease? One might continue in- first time in the lease to be prepared bv 
definitely asking pertinent questions n0- the borough solicitor, ever been pas 
where answered by the evidence. upon in public meeting by the bo 
[1,2] We agree wltih the former Su-
preme Court that the lease of February 
4, 1947, with the prosecutor, was illegally 
executed, but we prefer to base our j udg-
ment on the single ground that there never 
was any municipal action authorizing the 
execution of the lease presented to the 
borough commission on February 4, 1947 
and executed by it on that day. A mu-
nicipality cannot act as an individual does. 
It must proceed in conformity with the 
statutes, or in the alYsence of statute agree-
al:ily te the common law, by ordinance 'Or 
resolution or motion. City of Burlington 
v. Dennison, Err. & App. 1880, 42 N.J.L. 
165, N. J. Good Humor, Inc., v. Bradley 
Beach, Err. & App. 1939, 124 N.J.L. 162, 
11 A.2d 113. Especially is this so where real 
property is concerned. The only official ac-
tion that purports to justify the lease of 
February 4th is the res01ution of that date. 
But the resolution did not autfuorize the 
lease brought to the meeting by Anschele-
witz. The resolution merely authorized "the 
borough solicitor to draw up (sic) lease 
with Leon Anschelewitz for the following 
concessions (,listing eight) all located ad-
jacent to the Boardwalk in the BOl'Ough of 
Belmar, New Jersey, for the term com-
mencing February 4, 1947, and expiring on 
February 4, 1951, at the term rental of 
Eleven Thousand Five Hundred ($11,500.-
00) Dollars, payments outlined in lease." 
The lease in controversy is not the lease 
authorized in the resO'lution. The lease in 
controversy was prep.ared by Anschelewitz ; 
the lease the resolution contemplMes was 
commission. That obviously would be 
possible until the borough solicitor submit-
ted his draft of a lease to the commission. 
The schedule of payments of rent ina 
lease is one of its most vital terms. Con-
ceivably the lessee might have had in 
mind p'ayment of the entire rent on the 
last day of the four-year term, the lessor 
on the first day. The municipality has 
never expressed itself officially on one of 
the most impol1tant terms of a lease, nor 
had the prosecutor been ,heard on that sub-
ject. At no time was the municipality 
bound to accept the lease to be submitted 
to it by the borough solicitor. H necessar-
ily follows that the I~ase of February 4, 
194i, prepared by the prosecutm and signed 
by the mayor and aoting borough clerk on 
February 4, 1947 is entirely una,uuhor;-· .. rl 
and therefore void and illegal!. 
Having reached this conclusion O'n 
basis of the inadequacy 'Of the resolution 
February 4, 1947, a conclusion which is 
peculiarly inescapable in view of the many 
suspicions and entirely unexplained cire 
cumstances surrounding the transaction, we 
do not find it necessary to pass at >this time 
on the specific holdings of the former Su-
preme C'Ourt, but they will be reserved 
for later consideration in appropriate cases. 
The judgment below is affirmed. 
For affirmance: Chief Justice VAN-
DERBILT and Justices CASE, OLI-
PI-IANT, BURLING and ACKER-
SON-5. 
For reversal: None. 
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PRIOR HISTORY: Atlantic Beach Property Owners' Assn. v. Town of Hempstead, 1 A D 2d 1028, reversed. 
Page 1 
Appeal, by permission of the Court of Appeals, from a judgment of the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court in 
the second judicial department, entered May 31, 1956, unanimously affirming a judgment of the Supreme Court, en-
tered in Nassau County upon a decision of the court at Special Term (D. Ormonde Ritchie, J.), granting an injunction to 
plaintiffs. 
DISPOSITION: Judgment reversed and matter remitted to Special Term for further proceedings not inconsistent with 
the opinion herein, with costs in all courts. 
CASE SUMMARY: 
PROCEDURAL POSTURE: Appellant town challenged an order of the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court in 
the Second Judicial Department (New York), which affirmed a judgment granting an injunction to respondent associa-
tion in respondent's claim to uphold the restrictive covenants accompanying park land granted to and accepted by the 
town. 
OVERVIEW: The association granted certain land to the town to be used exclusively by its members and to be main-
tained by the town. The association sought enforcement of the restrictive covenant on grounds that the covenant con-
tained in the dedication deed required the town board to maintain these beach areas in perpetuity as a public park district 
for the benefit of its lot owners and to the exclusion of property in other tracts or of other members of the public for 
whose benefit the town board was authorized, in its discretion, to extend the park or the park facilities under statute. The 
appellate court affirmed the judgme.qt in favor of the association and the town sought review. The court reversed the 
judgment and found that the town board could not legally have accepted land for park purposes on condition that the 
board renounce powers and duties which the legislature had conferred upon town boards in the creation, enlargement, or 
administration of town park districts. 
OUTCOME: The court reversed the judgment in favor of the association with costs and dismissed the association's 
complaint without prejudice to any rights which it may have to damages or other compensation by reason of the 
appropriation of easements or other property rights inhering in them under the grant, or to any other and different relief 
to which they may be entitled. 
LexisNexis(R) Headnotes 
186 
3 N.Y.2d 434, *; 144 N.E.2d 409, **; 
165 N.Y.S.2d 737, ***; 1957 N.Y. LEXIS 903 
Governments> Local Governments> Administrative Boards 
Real Property Law> Ownership & Transfer> Transfer Not By Deed> Dedication> Procedure 
Real Property Law> Restrictive Covenants> General Overview 
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[HN1] Hempstead, N.Y., Town Law §§ 190-194 and Nassau County, N.Y. Civil Divisions Act § 222.0 authorize 
enlargement by town boards of the boundaries of park districts and other public districts. Hempstead, NY., Town Law § 
198(4) empowers town boards to sell any property acquired for park purposes and to apply the proceeds to the purchase 
of other property for park purposes, and allows town boards to fix reasonable charges for the use of parks by persons 
other than inhabitants and taxpayers of such districts. 
Governments> Local Governments> Administrative Boards 
Governments> Local Governments> Ordinances & Regulations 
[HN2] Agreements by which the public powers of a municipality are surrendered without express permission of the 
legislature are beyond the powers of the municipality and void. 
Governments> Local Governments> Property 
Real Property Law> Ownership & Transfer> Transfer Not By Deed> Dedication> General Overview 
Transportation Law> Bridges & Roads> General Overview 
[HN3] Grants of land to a town for parks, buildings or structures, or for any other public use are put on a parity. Land 
may be limited in dedication deeds to use for streets, parks, athletic fields and buildings may be dedicated for art galler-
ies, sports or civic center purposes, but the use must be public. A use is not public where public benefit is incidental to a 
private benefit. 
HEADNOTES 
Municipal corporations -- authority over parks -- Town of Hempstead may not be enjoined from permitting 
use of beach areas by persons other than owners or resident tenants of land within beach tract on theory that 
covenants contained in deed to town require town to maintain beach areas in perpetuity as public park district 
for benefit of lot owners only -- gifts may be made to town on conditions but use must be public -- power to ex-
tend park district (Town Law, §§ 190-194; Nassau County Civil Divisions Act, § 222.0) cannot be curtailed by 
conditions in deed to town. 
1. Plaintiff association and its grantor, in 1941, executed and recorded a "declaration" setting aside nine parcels of 
land abutting on the ocean at Atlantic Beach in the town of Hempstead as "beach areas" for the exclusive use of resi-
dents of lots designated on a map of a subdivision developed by the Association's grantor. In 1951 the Association 
deeded these beach areas to the Town of Hempstead for park purposes subject to a covenant by the town not to permit 
use of the park by any persons except owners or resident tenants of lots in the Atlantic Beach tract, their families or 
guests. A town park district was organized as a public district under article 12 of the Town Law. Thereafter, by resolu-
tion of the town board an area known as Inlet Estates, to the east of this park district, was admitted into the park district. 
In this action injunctive relief has been granted solely against the Town of Hempstead and based entirely on the theory 
that the covenants contained in the dedication deed by the Association to the town require the town to maintain these 
beach areas in perpetuity as a public park district for the benefit of lot owners in the Atlantic Beach tract and of them 
alone. The Town of Hempstead has been enjoined from permitting the use of these beach areas by persons other than 
the owners or resident tenants of land within the Atlantic Beach tract. The complaint in this action in which plaintiffs 
sought such an injunction should be dismissed. 
2. Under subdivision 8 of section 64 of the Town Law, gifts may be made to a town upon terms or conditions but 
the use thereof must be public. 
3. The power to extend the park district conferred on the town board by the Town Law ( §§ 190-194) and the Nas-
sau County Civil Divisions Act (§ 222.0) cannot be and is not abrogated or curtailed by the covenants or conditions 
contained in the dedication deed by the Association to the town in 1951. 
4. The dismissal ofthe complaint is without prejudice to any rights which plaintiffs may have to damages or other 
compensation by reason of the appropriation of easements or other property rights inhering in them under the "declara-
tion" or to any other and different relief to which they may be entitled. 
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COUNSEL: John A. Morhous. Town Attorney, for appellant. I. The covenant restricting the use of the beach and bay 
areas cannot be construed to limit such use to the residents of the original district. (Ward v. Union Trust Co .• 172 App. 
Div. 569; People ex rei. City o/New York v. Nixon. 229 N Y. 356.) II. The restrictions in the deed as construed by the 
courts below prevent extension of the park district and are void. (Parfitt v. Ferguson, 159 N Y. 111; Wells v. Village of 
East Aurora, 236 App. Div. 474; Belden v. City of Niagara Falls, 230 App. Div. 601; Witmer v. City of Jamestown, 125 
App. Div. 43.) III. The injunction puts an inequitable burden on the residents of the extended area. 
Charles E. Lapp, Jr., for respondents. I. The threatened action of defendant violated the plain meaning of the covenants 
in the deed. Were the terms of the deed to be considered ambiguous, their purpose, intept and proper interpretation are 
apparent from the nature of the property and the circumstances under which the deed was delivered. (Beth Israel Hosp. 
Assn. v. Moses, 275 N Y. 209; Campbell v. Town of Hamburg, 156 Misc. 134; Wei! v. Atlantic Beach Holding Corp., 
285 App. Div. 1080, 1 NY 2d 20.) II. The covenants and restrictions are valid and enforcible. (Beth Israel Hosp. Assn. 
v. Moses, 275 NY. 209; Campbell v. Town of Hamburg, 156 Misc. 134.) 
JUDGES: Dye, Froessel and Burke, JJ., concur with Van Voorhis, J.; Desmond, J., dissents in an opinion in which 
Conway, Ch. J., and Fuld, J., concur. 
OPINION BY: VAN VOORHIS 
OPINION 
[*436] [**409] [HN1] [***738J Sections 190-194 of the Town Law and section 222.0 of the Nassau County 
Civil Divisions Act authorize enlargement by town boards of the boundaries of park districts and other public districts. 
Section 198 (subd. 4) of the Town Law empowers town boards to sell any property acquired for park purposes and to 
apply the proceeds to the purchase of other property for park purposes, and allows town boards to ftx reasonable 
charges for the use of parks by persons other than inhabitants and taxpayers of such districts. The issue on this appeal 
concerns whether the Town Board of the Town [**410] of Hempstead is deprived of these powers by negative cove-
nants, exclusive easements or restrictions contained in a dedication deed of land for park purposes accepted by the town 
in 1951. 
Plaintiff Atlantic Beach Property Owners' Association, Inc. (hereafter called the Association) and its grantor in 
1941 • executed and recorded what is termed a declaration, setting aside nine parcels of land abutting on the ocean at 
Atlantic Beach in the town of Hempstead, Long Island as "beach areas" for the exclusive use of residents of lots desig-
nated upon a map of a subdivision developed by the Association's grantor. This was a private transaction between pri-
vate individuals and corporations. In 1951 the Association deeded these beach areas to the Town of Hempstead for park 
purposes, but subject to covenant by the town not to permit use of the park by any persons except owners or resident 
tenants of lots in the Atlantic Beach tract, their families or guests. A town park district was organized as a public district 
under article 12 of the Town Law. Several years later a new subdivision was developed by others known as Inlet Estates 
alongside of this park district upon the east. The lot owners oflnlet Estates did not object to helping to pay necessary 
charges for the park district, but they wanted to get into it upon any reasonable terms, consequently they circulated a 
petition for the annexation of Inlet Estates to the Atlantic Beach Park District which was ordered, pursuant to statute, by 
a resolution of the town board admitting [***739] Inlet Estates into this park district on June 9, 1953. The Association 
and some of the owners of lots within the Atlantic Beach subdivision object to the extension of this park district so as to 
annex any land which was not part of the Atlantic Beach [*437] tract. The town board takes the position that the own-
ers oflots in Inlet Estates are citizens and property owners in the town of Hempstead, entitled to the equal protection of 
the laws along with the Association and owners oflots in the Atlantic Beach tract. They contend that the Town Law and 
the Nassau County Civil Divisions Act contemplate that growing communities like the Town of Hempstead will not 
remain static, and that in the wisdom of the Legislature the town board has been empowered to extend and enlarge park 
districts which is its duty if the occasion requires. It is argued that the town board is a public body organized for the 
govemment of the town and the securing of the common interests of the people of Hempstead and of the public. These 
are public officers and their statutory powers, it is contended, cannot be abrogated or curtailed by private agreement. 
Consequently it is asserted that the restrictive covenants contained in the deed by the Association to the town purporting 
to limit these beach areas for the use of people in the Atlantic Beach tract are ineffective to limit the power of the town 
board to extend the park district in the interest of the whole community. 
* In 1942 a similar "declaration" was made respecting certain "bay areas" which are not at issue in this action. 
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The situation thus disclosed resolves itself into several components: by private covenant in the declaration executed 
and recorded in 1941, these beach areas were limited to use by lot owners in the original tract, their families and guests, 
after which the Association appears to have been powerless to devote them to other uses without their consent. This 
declaration was in the nature of a restrictive covenant or a grant of exclusive easements running with the land. Having 
entered into this private agreement with its predecessor in title and the lot owners, the Association could not deed these 
beach areas to the town except subject to these exclusive easements or restrictive covenants. The dedication deed deliv-
ered by the Association to the Town of Hempstead in 1951, by assuming to impose parallel restrictions, probably 
amounted to a conveyance of these areas subject to the declaration made by the Association in 1941 provided that the 
town could legally accept the lands on those tenns. The town had [**411] constructive notice of the declaration from 
its having been recorded. We entertain little doubt that whatever private rights became vested in lot owners in the Atlan-
tic Beach tract by this declaration could have been enforced and perhaps may [*438] yet be enforced against the town 
and against owners oflots in the new subdivision known as Inlet Estates. Neither the Association nor the town board 
could absolve these beach areas from private restrictions to which [***740] they were subject except by the lot owners' 
consents or by condemnation of their exclusive easements to the use of the areas. 
The difficulty with plaintiffs' position in this action, as it seems to us, is that the injunctive relief asked and granted 
is not based on private easements reserved for the benefit of lots in the Atlantic Beach tract by the declaration of 1941. 
That declaration is not mentioned in the complaint nor in the opinion of the trial court. The relief granted is solely 
against the Town of Hempstead and is based entirely upon the theory that the covenants contained in the dedication 
deed by the Association to the town in 1951 require the town board to maintain these beach areas in perpetuity as a pub-
lic park district for the benefit oflot owners in the Atlantic Beach tract and of them alone. It may be that without extin-
guishing these private easements to exclusive use of the beach areas the town board lacked power to form this park dis-
trict in the beginning, or that by extending it in derogation of their rights these property owners became entitled to dam-
ages or to be otherwise compensated for the appropriation of their property rights. The town board could not legally 
have accepted land for park purposes on condition that the board renounce powers and duties which the Legislature has 
conferred upon town boards in the creation, enlargement or administration of town park districts. [HN2] Agreements by 
which the public powers of a municipality are surrendered without express permission of the Legislature are beyond the 
powers of the municipality and void 00 McQuillin on Municipal Corporations [3d ed.], § 29.07, p. 190 et seq.; Parfitt 
v. Ferguson, 159 N Y. 111; Wells v. Village o/East Aurora, 236 App. Div. 474; Belden v. City o/Niagara Falls, 230 
App. Div. 601; Witmer v. City of Jamestown, 125 App. Div. 43). This town board could not divest itself of powers which 
the Legislature has deemed advisable to adapt park districts to the needs of growing communities. Unless power to 
enlarge such a district had been included in these statutes the Legislature might have seen fit to withhold power to form 
park districts, rather than to grant it in such manner as to enable public parks to be limited by agreement to the use of 
particular private individuals. 
[*439] Plaintiffs do not allege any unlawful exercise of power by the town board in establishing the park district 
in the beginning due to these clauses in the private declaration instrument of 1941 imposing restrictions running with 
the land which may have been inconsistent with the acceptance of the property by the town board for a park district at 
the outset; plaintiffs in their complaint assert no right, title or interest in the land, but on the contrary want these areas to 
be used as a public park district with whatever benefits accrue from town maintenance, but they wish this to be done 
exclusively for themselves and others in the Atlantic [***741] Beach tract to the exclusion of property in other tracts 
or of other members of the public for whose benefit the town board is authorized, in its discretion, to extend the park or 
the park facilities under statutes in such case made and provided. 
The relief granted by the judgment appealed from consists, to be sure, in restraining the Town of Hempstead from 
permitting the use of these beach areas by persons other than the owners or resident tenants of land within the Atlantic 
Beach tract, but the opinion of Special Term and the factual allegations in the complaint as well as the stipulation of 
facts on which the action was tried demonstrate that the town is not restrained as a trespasser, or by reason [**412] of 
any right or easement in the land arising from the declaration document, but that the effect is to grant mandatory relief 
to compel the town board to administer these areas as a public park for plaintiffs' private benefit and to the exclusion of 
all others who are entitled to participate under the subsequent action of the town board in admitting Inlet Estates pursu-
ant to power conferred by the Town Law and the Nassau County Civil Divisions Act. 
To be sure, the basis for Special Tenn's decision, affirmed without opinion by the Appellate Division, is section 64 
(subd. 8) of the Town Law, which provides: "Gifts to town. May take by gift, grant, bequest or devise and hold real and 
personal property absolutely or in trust for parks or gardens, or for the erection of statues, monuments, buildings or 
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structures, or for any public use, upon such terms or conditions as may be prescribed by the grantor or donor and ac-
cepted by said town, and provide for the proper administration of the same." 
[HN3] Grants ofland to a town for parks, buildings or structures, or for any other public use are put on a parity. 
Land may be [*440] limited in dedication deeds to use for streets, parks, athletic fields or the like. Buildings may be 
dedicated for art galleries, sports or civic center purposes. But the use must be public, and a use is not public where 
public benefit is incidental to a private benefit (Denihan Enterprises v. O'Dwyer, 302 N Y. 451,458, per Froessel, J.). 
Under section 64 (subd. 8) of the Town Law, for example, a dedication deed ofland to a town could limit its use to 
street purposes, but could not have a condition attached that the street shall be used only by inhabitants of a designated 
tract or subdivision (People v. Grant, 306 N Y. 258). 
It is possible that plaintiff Association and the lot owners in the Atlantic Beach tract might obtain an injunction 
preventing the use of these beach areas for park purposes unless the Town of Hempstead perfects its title by condemn-
ing or otherwise acquiring the exclusive easements which vested in the lot owners by the declaration instrument re-
corded [***742] in 1941. We are not required to pass upon that issue on this appeal. Here plaintiffs have obtained 
what is, in effect, a mandatory injunction compelling the town board to operate these areas as a public park for the bene-
fit of these lot owners alone, being forever prohibited from exercising the statutory power of enlarging the boundaries of 
the park district or admitting others to the use of the park on a suitable financial basis. 
We do not pass upon whether the owners oflots in the Atlantic Beach tract are entitled to damages or compensation 
in some form for the appropriation of whatever exclusive private easements they acquired under the declaration of 1941, 
nor on any question of reversion due to possible breach of condition by the town in enlarging the district. We hold 
merely that the power to extend the park district conferred on the town board by sections 190-194 of the Town Law and 
section 222.0 of the Nassau County Civil Divisions Act cannot be and is not abrogated or curtailed by the covenants or 
conditions contained in the dedication deed by the Association to the town in 1951. 
The judgment should be reversed with costs, and the complaint dismissed without prejudice to any rights which 
plaintiffs may have to damages or other compensation by reason of the appropriation of easements or other property 
rights inhering in them under the declaration of 1941 (Ex. 2) or to any other and different relief to which they may be 
entitled. 
DISSENT BY: DESMOND 
DISSENT 
[*441] Desmond, 1. (dissenting) In 1951 defendant town accepted from the corporate plaintiff, without considera-
tion, a dee,d of certain water-front property. The deed contained this language: 
"This conveyance of the foregoing lands to the Town of Hempstead is made for the [**413] establishment of the 
above described lands as parks within the Atlantic Beach Park District, said District to include all lands shown on the 
aforementioned maps. 
"And the party of the second part does hereby covenant and agree with the party of the first part as follows: 
.. 1. That it will not permit the aforesaid beach areas to be used by any persons except the owners and! or resident 
tenants of land within the district and situated north of the center line of Ocean Boulevard as shown on the aforemen-
tioned map, together with the immediate families and non-paying house guests of the said owners and!or resident ten-
ants; 
"2. That it will not permit the aforesaid bay areas to be used by any persons other than the owners and!or resident 
tenants ofland within the district and situate north of the center line of Ocean Boulevard as [***743] shown on the 
aforementioned map, together with the immediate families and non-paying house guests of said owners and!or resident 
tenants and other than the owners and! or resident tenants of land within the district and situated south of the center line 
of Ocean Boulevard as shown on the aforementioned map, together with the members of any and all beach clubs located 
on said land." 
In direct violation of that covenant the town in 1953 extended the Atlimtic Beach Park District to include a new 
subdivision adjoining the Atlantic Beach area for the benefit of whose residents the above covenants were made. This 
suit is brought to restrain that violation. The courts below validly granted the injunction. 
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3 N.Y.2d 434, *; 144 N.E.2d 409, **; 
165 N.Y.S.2d 737, ***; 1957 N.Y. LEXIS 903 
The facts are undisputed. The Atlantic Beach community was founded in 1926 by the filing of subdivision maps 
including the beach-front lands the use of which is in dispute here. The developer of Atlantic Beach, selling several 
hundred lots, reserved to itself title to the beach. In 1941 and 1942 a corporation which had acquired title to the beach-
front lands executed and recorded a "declaration" restricting the use of those beach areas to the owners and residents of 
lots shown on the Atlantic Beach subdivision maps. Later there was formed by and for the benefit of those property 
owners, plaintiff Atlantic Beach Property Owners' Association, Inc., which took and held title [*442] to the reserved 
properties until 1951. Meanwhile boathouses and other facilities had been built on the beaches for the use of the owners 
and occupants of the benefited area. All other persons were kept off the beaches. The large expense for maintenance of 
these facilities was borne by plaintiff Association but some of the residents of Atlantic Beach failed or refused to pay 
their shares of those costs. Someone thought up the idea of establishing a park district so that title to the beach areas 
would be in a public corporation empowered to assess the Atlantic Beach property owners for their proportions of the 
expense burden. Pursuant to statute (see Town Law, art. 12, and Nassau County Civil Divisions Act, § 222.0) and after 
public hearings, etc., the town board in 1950 established the Atlantic Beach Park District. The new district comprised 
the Atlantic Beach subdivisions. Pursuant to the plan, plaintiff Association in 1951 conveyed the beach front to the 
town, for the park district, by deed containing the restrictions set forth in the first paragraph of this opinion. In 1953 the 
town, acting under section 190 et seq. of the Town Law and section 222.0 of the Nassau County Civil Divisions Act, 
extended the Atlantic Beach Park District to include a new, adjoining subdivision owned by persons not associated in 
interest with plaintiffs. The purpose of the park district extension was, of course, to allow the residents of the newly 
developed residential area to use the beaches in defiance of the restrictive covenants. 
[***744J There is no doubt as to the meaning of those restrictions and there should be no doubt of their validity. 
Express authorization for the acceptance by a town of such a conditional gift is in subdivision 8 of section 64 of the 
Town Law: "8. Gifts to town. May take by gift, grant, bequest or devise and hold real and personal property [**414] 
absolutely or in trust for parks or gardens, or for the erection of statues, monuments, buildings or structures, or for any 
public use, upon such terms or conditions as may be prescribed by the grantor or donor and accepted by said town, and 
provide for the proper administration of the same." Such a grant as this is no new thing (see Campbell v. Town of Ham-
burg, 156 Misc. 134 [1935J, and cases cited). The arrangement made in 1950 did not produce the anomaly ofa "private 
park" maintained by public funds for the use of a few. The Atlantic Beach subdivision lot owners, several hundred in 
number and already owning the right to use the beaches to the exclusion of the public, continued that situation and pre-
served [*443] that right by setting up the park district consisting of their properties only. They themselves continued 
as before to pay the expense, the only difference being that it was now collected through assessments levied by those 
same lot owners against themselves through the park district. The town did not provide them with a park. They pro-
vided it for themselves. The deed to the town was a mere step in accomplishing all this. The town had no interest of its 
own, paid nothing for the deed and has been put to no expense. Plainly, the town in attempting to destroy the restric-
tions by the device of extending the park district is guilty of wrongdoing. 
The attempted justification is that pertinent statutes have always authorized the extension of park districts and that 
the 1950-1951 transaction was subject to that power. But those "Improvement District" sections (§ 190 et seq.) of the 
Town Law must be read with subdivision 8 of section 64 of the Town Law (supra). The latter statute, authorizing the 
town to take a conditional gift of real property, must in common sense and good morals mean that the town is bound to 
comply with the conditions in the grant. For that purpose and to that extent subdivision 8 of section 64 of the Town Law 
must override section 193 of the Town Law when necessary to enforce the conditions of this valid gift. This does not 
mean that the town in accepting the gift voluntarily and illegally surrendered its governmental power to extend this park 
district. It never had any power, governmental or otherwise, to open up the Atlantic Beach water front to newcomers. 
Its general authority to enlarge park districts was by law subject to its obligation to comply with the conditions it had 
agreed to in the grant. The power to extend and the duty to live up to the conditions are here mutually exclusive. Ifwe 
must make a choice, we should hold legal that course of official conduct which is in accord with right and morality. 
[***745] Plaintiffs are entitled to court protection of their rights and injunction is the proper remedy. The injunc-
tion here granted did no more than restrain the town from permitting the use of the beach areas by persons other than 
owners and residents of Atlantic Beach. Such was the burden the town assumed by acceptance of the deed. It is not for 
us to tell the parties how or whether the town by condemnation or otherwise may remove that burden. 
The judgment should be affirmed, with costs. 
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Tax Court indicated that the term was to 
be given its "usual meaning in law," citing 
State Tax Comm. v. Whitehall, 214 Md. 
316, 320, 135 A.2d 298 (1957). The Tax 
Court correctly noted that, contrary to 
MSBA's contention, the issue of the proper 
construction of the term "educational" was 
not addressed by this Court in Md. State 
Fair v. Supervisor, 225 Md. 574, 172 A.2d 
132 (1961). That case involved taxes 
sought to be levied against certain property 
of the Maryland State Fair and Agri-
cultural Society, Inc., which operated the 
Maryland State Fair. It was conceded that 
the Society was an educational institution; 
the concession was based largely on an 
opinion of then Attorney General Hall 
Hammond that the Society was an edu-
cational organization entitled to a sales tax 
exemption under the statute. 36 Op.Att'y 
Gen. 303 (1951). It was there noted that 
the Society, in its conduct of the State Fair, 
was a nonprofit organization incorporated 
"to save the State Fair for the benefit of 
Maryland farmers, breeders and those in-
terested in the conservation of natural re-
sources, as well as of the general public 
and the citizens of the State." ld. at 304. 
The opinion sets forth a number of cases 
throughout the country holding that a 
State Fair is an educational institution or 
organization, notwithstanding its incidental 
amusement programs. Those cases, ac-
cording to the Attorney General, found 
State Fairs to be educational because they 
were planned and managed for the general 
welfare of the people to inform them about 
the resources of the region in matters per-
taining to agriculture and industry, and 
methods by which they may be conserved, 
utilized, and improved. In finding the Soci-
ety exempt from sales tax, the Attorney 
General stressed that the State Fair had 
been exempt from property taxes since 
1867 and that this was a "clear indication 
of a public policy that such organizations 
are entitled to exemption" to further edu-
cational purposes. ld. at 309. Finding no 
such indication of a similar public policy in 
favor of exempting the MSBA, and after 
considering the evidence, the Tax Court 
concluded that that organization was not 
primarily educational. 
While the Tax Court purported to apply 
the "usual meaning in law" of the Word 
"educational," as used in § 326(i), we are 
unable to glean from its opinion what it 
found that meaning to be. In determining 
that the MSBA was not primarily an edu. 
cational organization, the Tax Court em-
phasized that the Association has a "pro-
fessional orientation," that the bulk of its 
services are provided to its own members, 
and that the members pay dues to receive 
them. Upon this premise, the Tax Court 
appeared to make a per se determination 
that the MSBA's educational activities 
were but an incidental by-product of the 
Association's overall function to promote 
and protect the professional interests of its 
members. To apply such a test, we think, 
would constitute an error of law; it would 
propogate too restrictive a view of the "ed. 
ucational organization" exemption of 
§ 326(i), one plainly at odds with the legis. 
lative intention. 
[3] As in Supervisor v. Group Health 
Ass'n, supra, involving the meaning of the 
word "charitable," whether an organization 
is primarily educational requires a careful 
examination of its stated purposes, the ac-
tual work performed by it, and in particular 
the nature and extent of its educational 
activities. Merely because education is 
provided to dues paying members of the 
Association and not directly to the public 
does not, contrary to the intimation in the 
Minnesota State Bar case, disentitle the 
organization to the exemption. In other 
words, because the MSBA's educational ac· 
tivities may be predominantly for its memo 
bers is not alone determinative of whether 
the Association is an educational organiza-
tion in the sense contemplated by § 326(i). 
[4] To be entitled to an exemption 
based solely on the educational organiza-
tion exemption, the organization's focus 
must be shown to be primarily educational. 
In the context of a tax exemption statute, 
Black's Law Dictionary 461 (5th ed. 1979) 
defines "educational purposes" of an edu-
cational organization to encompass "sys-
tematic instruction in any and all branches 
of learning from which a substantial public 






ATTMAN v. MAYOR Md. 1277 
CII. as 552 A.2d 1277 (Md. 1989) 
the general rule that exemption from taxa- The Tax Court's opinion does not indicate 
tion must be for a public purpose. Wilson with any degree of clarity whether it con-
v. Board of Co. Comm'rs, 273 Md. 30, 44, sidered the MSBA's charitable and edu-
327 A.2d 488 (1974); Katzenberg v. Comp- cational activities as a combination, or only 
troller, 263 Md. 189, 197, 282 A.2d 465 separately, in making its decision. We 
(1971); Kimball-Tyler v. Balto. City, 214 think the correct test for measuring an 
Md. 86, 97, 133 A.2d 433 (1957). See also organization's tax exempt status under 
71 Am.Jur.2d State and Local Taxation, § 326(i) is to consider its charitable and 
§§ 307, 362, and 382 (1973). Manifestly, educational activities in combination in de· 
the term "educational institution or orga- termining its exempt status. See City of 
nization" in § 326(i) is not limited to Nome v. Catholic Bishop of No. Alaska, 
schools, colleges or universities. Through 707 P.2d 870, 880 (Alaska 1985). Accord· 
its various functioning parts, the MSBA ingly, the case will be remanded to the Tax 
does provide a measure of systematic in- Court to determine (1) the degree to which 
struction to and for its members to enhance the MSBA conducts educational programs 
their ability to better serve the public good, and activities within the ambit of § 326(i); 
a well·recognized public purpose. And (2) whether education is the Association's 
some of the Association's educational pur- primary purpose; and (3) if the Associa-
suits are aimed more directly at educating tion's focus is not primarily educational, 
the public on law-related matters of sub- whether the combination of its charitable 
stantial public importance. We thus look and educational activities together mount 
to the entity seeking exemption as an edu- up to an organization engaged primarily in 
cational organization as a whole to ascer- educational and charitable pursuits under 
tain its primary or dominant purpose. See, the statute. 
e.g., Annotation, Exemption of Charitable JUDGMENT OF THE CIRCUIT COURT 
or Educational Organization from Sales 
or Use Tax, 59 A.L.R.3d 748-773 (1974); 
Annotation, What are Educational Insti-
tutions or Schools within State Property 
Tax Exemption, 34 A.L.R.4th 698-754 
(1984). And see generally 68 Am.Jur.2d. 
Sales and Use Taxes § 116 (1973). We 
therefore shall direct that the case be re-
manded to the Tax Court to apply the prop-
er legal test to the facts as it finds them in 
making this determination. 
III. 
[5] The MSBA argues that the Tax 
Court also made an error of law in inter-
preting § 326(i) to require that it be primar-
ily charitable or primarily educational, as 
opposed to being primarily a charitable and 
educational organization. In this regard 
the MSBA points out that the parties are in 
agreement that the organization must be 
primarily educational or charitable or a 
combination of both, to be accorded the 
exemption; and that if it spends over half 
its budget on either educational or charita-
ble activities, or both, it is an organization 
which qualifies for the exemption. 
FOR BALTIMORE CITY VACATED; 
CASE REMANDED TO THAT COURT 
WITH DIRECTIONS THAT IT REMAND 
THE CASE TO THE MARYLAND TAX 
COURT FOR FURTHER PROCEEDINGS 
CONSISTENT WITH THIS OPINION; 
COSTS TO ABIDE THE RESULT. 
GILBERT, J., concurs in the result. 
314 Md. 675 
ATTMAN/GLAZER P.E. COMPANY 
v. 
MAYOR AND ALDERMEN OF 
ANNAPOLIS. 
No. 115, Sept. Term, 1986. 
Court of Appeals of Maryland. 
Feb. 8, 1989. 
Motion for Reconsideration Denied 
March 28, 1989. 
Company brought three appeals from 
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tions for conditional use of property and 
denying temporary use and occupancy per-
mit. The Circuit Court, Anne Arundel 
County, James C. Cawood, Jr., J .• affirmed. 
Company appealed to Court of Special Ap-
peals which also affirmed. Petition for 
certiorari was granted. The Court of Ap-
peals. McAuliffe, J., held that while munici-
pality could enter into binding agreement 
concerning aspects of case when case was 
on appeal, it could not lawfully bind itself 
to future zoning or conditional use decision. 
Affirmed. 
1. Zoning and Planning <e:=>13 
Mayor and aldermen could not by 
agreement lawfully bind themselves to fu-
ture zoning or conditional use decision 
since municipality could not contract away 
exercise of its zoning powers. 
2. Estoppel <e:=>62.4 
A municipality is not estopped to as-
sert its own illegal action. 
Steven R. Migdal (Manis, Wilkinson, Sni-
der & Goldsborough, Chartered, on the 
brief) Annapolis, for appellant. 
Gary M. Elson, Asst. City Atty. (Jona-
than A. Hodgson, City Atty., on the brief), 
Annapolis, for appellee. 
Argued before MURPHY, C.J., 
ELDRIDGE, COLE, RODOWSKY, 
COUCH' and McAULIFFE, JJ .. 
CHARLES E. ORTH, Jr., Associate 
Judge of the Court of Al?peals 
(retired, Specially Assigned). 
McAULIFFE, Judge. 
Weare here concerned with the extent to 
which a municipality may "settle" the ap-
peal of a zoning or similar land use case. 
We conclude that although a municipality 
may enter into a binding agreement con-
cerning certain aspects of a land use case 
• Couch. J .• now retired. participated in the hear-
ing and conference of this case while an active 
member of this Court; after being recalled pur· 
suant to the Constitution. Article IV. Section 3A. 
he also participated in the decision and adop-
tion of this opinion. 
on appeal, it may not contract away the 
exercise of its zoning power. 
The property in question is bounded bv 
Northwest, Calvert, and Clay Streets in th~ 
City of Annapolis, and is currently im-
proved by a four-story office building. The 
property has had a rather difficult develop-
ment history, involving the urban renewal 
efforts of the city, litigation between the 
city and the developer, and a cloudy zoning 
classification picture. The property Con-
sists of two parcels, 7D and 17, which were 
acquired and assembled by the city as 3 
part of an urban renewal project. When 
originally placed in the city's Urban Renew-
al Plan,1 parcel 7D was designated for 
neighborhood commercial and business use, 
and parcel 17 for residential use. Att-
man/Glazer P.B. Company (hereinafter 
<lAG") successfully bid for the right to 
develop the land, and in 1977 filed an appli-
cation for a change in the Urban Renewal 
Plan. Proposing construction of a commer-
cial office building, AG asked that the two 
parcels be designated for commercial use 
and that approval be given for construc-
tion. 
AG's 1977 application is not in this 
record. We infer from the records which 
are before us that AG originally sought 
two things: a change in the classification 
of the property in the Urban Renewal Plan, 
and approval of a conditional use. Precise-
ly what effect a change in classification in 
the Urban Renewal Plan was intended to 
have on the underlying zoning classifica-
tion of the property is not clear. It does 
not appear that the various use designa-
tions approved in the Urban Renewal Plan 
ever found their way onto the city's zoning 
map by means of a comprehensive (or oth-
er) map amendment. Rather, it appears 
that at the time, all parties considered the 
changes made in the Urban Renewal Plan 
to be fully effective for purposes of devel-
opment, without the necessity of corre-
1. Code provisions dealing with urban renewal 
were codified at Chapter 20A of the Annapolis 
City Code (1969). Following recodification. the 
current provisions are now contained in Chap. 
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sponding changes to the zoning map, and 
apparently without the necessity of resub-
dividing the property before construction. 
We note that the procedures followed in 
the amendment of the Urban Renewal Plan 
were virtually the same as those prescribed 
for a zoning map amendment. These pro-
cedures involved consideration and recom-
mendation by the Annapolis Planning and 
Zoning Commission, notice to the public, 
and a public hearing before the ultimate 
zoning authority, the mayor and aldermen 
sitting as the city council.2 For purposes 
of this case, we need not decide the current 
zoning classification of this property, or the 
effect of any inconsistency that may cur-
rently exist between the requirements of 
the city's urban renewal code and its zon-
ing code.3 Nor need we decide whether the 
conditional use mechanism was properly or 
necessarily utilized in this case.· The par-
ties proceeded on the assumption that re-
classification of the property in the Urban 
Renewal Plan was sufficient in lieu of for-
mal rezoning, and that conditional use ap-
proval was required. Indulging those 
same assumptions in this case allows us to 
reach the question of a municipality's right 
to "settle" a zoning appeal, and we there-
fore proceed on that basis. 
2. Prior to 1985. the name and style of the mu· 
nicipal corporation was "mayor and aldermen 
of the City of Annapolis." As a result of 
changes in the city charter. the name of the 
municipal corporation is now "City of Annapo· 
lis." 
3. At the time the city approved AG's initial reo 
quest for redesignation. § 22-30(f) of the Code 
of the City of Annapolis provided that in the 
event of an inconsistency between the Urban 
Renewal Plan and the zoning code. the provi· 
sions of the plan would govern. However. that 
language was repealed by Ordinance 12-81. ef-
fective November 17. 1981. 
AG's initial request was granted, and by 
Resolution 58-77 the mayor and aldermen 
amended the Urban Renewal Plan to 
change the designation of Parcels 7D and 
17 to commercial use. The resolution also 
permitted the erection of a professional 
office building, on the condition that the 
owner of the building provide 252 parking 
spaces. Those spaces could be located on-
site, or on other property within 500 feet of 
the building. By Resolution 66-77, a condi-
tional use for the proposed office building 
was approved. That conditional use autho-
rization expired when AG was unable to 
undertake construction within a prescribed 
time. A new application for conditional use 
was filed, and by Resolution 1-81 the ma) 
or and aldermen granted a new conditional 
use, requiring 18 on-site parking spaces 
and 238 additional parking spaces within 
600 feet of the property. The resolution 
further provided that in lieu of providing 
some or all of the 238 additional spaces, the 
owner could make available to the build-
ing's tenants or their employees a compara-
ble number of passes for use on the city's 
shuttle bus system. 
Construction of the building commenced, 
albeit only after AG obtained a writ of 
mandamus from the Circuit Court for Anne 
Arundel County directing the city to issue 
a building permit.s Shortly thereafter, AG 
a permitted use in any particular district or 
districts. Accordingly. in addition to the uses 
Ihat are expressly permitted in each zone. the 
Annapolis zoning code specifies conditional 
uses that may be appropriate in that zone 
certain criteria are met and appropriate con, 
tions imposed. The problem in this case 
from the fact that an office building is a 
4. The term "conditional use" is not defined in 
Article 66B of the Maryland Code (1988 Rep\. 
Vol.). which comprises the grant of authority 
from the State to municipalities to exercise zon· 
ing powers. A conditional use is. however. es-
sentiaJly the same as a special exception. which 
is defined by state law at Article 66B. § 1.00. 
According to the Annapolis City Code. a condi· 
tional use is one which. because of its unique 
characteristics. cannot properly be classified as 
ted use in a commercial district, and is neither a 
permitted nor conditional use in a residential 
zone. The city suggests that at the time permis-
sion was being sought for the construction of 
this office building. the city code required that 
the application be treated as if it were a part of 
a planned development. and thus the condition-
al use process was required. Although § 2.08 of 
Article 66B contemplates that the power to hear 
and decide special exceptions will be reposed in 
a board of zoning appeals. and the City of An-
napolis has created such a board. conditional 
use applications in the city are decided by the 
city council. 
5. The director of planning and zoning had re-
fused to approve the issuance of a building 
permit. for reasons not apparent in this record. 
C 
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sought an amendment to the conditional 
use to permit active use of a portion of a 
basement which had theretofore been ap-
proved only for housing of mechanical 
equipment. The mayor and aldermen ap-
proved the active use of 15,480 square feet 
of the basement, on condition that AG pro-
vide 51 new off-street parking spaces and 
comply with the parking requirements set 
forth in Resolution 1-81. One week later, 
the mayor and aldermen filed a modified 
resolution, declaring that the new condi-
tions and those remaining from Resolution 
1-81 were interdependent and, if any condi-
tion of either resolution were declared in-
valid or modified by any court, the entire 
conditional use would stand rescinded. AG 
appealed, contending that the requirement 
of creating new parking spaces was arbi-
trary, capricious, and impossible to fulfill, 
and challenging the attempt of the mod-
ified resolution to insulate the actions of 
the mayor and aldermen from judicial re-
view.s 
The mayor and aldermen, in their capaci-
ty as the municipal corporation, were 
granted leave to intervene, and filed a de-
murrer and answer. From a memorandum 
of law filed by AG, we learn that it did not 
argue that the requirement of providing 51 
additional parking spaces was arbitrary. 
Indeed, such an argument would likely 
have been futile, because the requirement 
followed § 22-122(21) of the city zoning 
code, which reqqired one off-street parking 
space for each 300 square feet of gross 
floor area of business and professional of-
fice buildings. Rather, AG argued that the 
requirement of providing 51 new spaces 
within 500 feet of the building was unrea-
sonable and virtually impossible to per-
form, due to the lack of land in that area 
which might be purchased and converted to 
off-street parking. AG argued that it had 
produced testimony demonstrating the rea-
sonableness and feasibility of developing 51 
additional but existing off-street parking 
spaces. It pointed out that its tenant, the 
Department of Economic and Community 
Development, a state agency, required the 
6. The in terrorem provision of the modified res· 
olution was subsequently declared invalid by 
the Circuit Court for Anne Arundel County, and 
additional active space in the basement, 
and that the State could probably be per-
suaded to release 51 of the 300 spaces it 
controlled in the county-owned parking ga-
rage directly across the street from AG's 
building. AG claimed the evidence also 
showed that the average occupancy of the 
parking garage was 80 percent of capacity, 
and therefore the allocation of 51 spaces 
for its building would not adversely impact 
the public parking in the area. In re-
sponse, the city pointed to testimony that 
demonstrated a critical need for off-street 
parking in the immediate area of AG's 
building. The city argued that the reason-
ableness of imposing the condition of 51 
new spaces was at least fairly debatable. 
Shortly before the appeal was to be 
heard in the circuit court, AG and the city 
reached an agreement that was designed to 
avoid further court proceedings. The par-
ties cannot now agree concerning the pre-
cise terms of that agreement. Both parties 
concur that they agreed to seek a continu-
ance of the court hearing, and that they 
agreed AG would file a new application for 
a conditional use. They also agree that 
they discussed the feasibility of substitut-
ing the following conditions for the require-
ment of 51 new spaces: 
1. AG would procure a release from the 
State of 25 spaces of the State's 300 
space allocation in the county park-
ing garage across the street from the 
building. 
2. AG would pay $75,000 to the city, to 
be credited to the off-street parking 
capital improvement budget as a con-
tribution toward eventual parking 
improvements in the area. 
AG contends that the city flatly agreed to 
approve the application on th~se conditions, 
and that the requirement for the filing of a 
new application was intended to be a mere 
matter of form. AG finds some succor for 
this argument in the language employed by 
the mayor in his memorandum to the alder-
men proposing the settlement: 
no appeal has been taken from that determina· 
tion. 
A'ITMAN v. MAYOR Md. 1281 
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I .recommend immediate acceptance of the mayor and aldermen should grant the 
thIS o!~er. If accepted, developer will amended conditional use on the terms dis-
expedltJo~sly ap~l! for a formal amend- cussed by the parties, the motion to enforce 
ment of Its condItIOnal use to reflect the the agreement would become moot 
settlement. In addition, the trial would . 
be postponed until the conditional use is The gears of the city's conditional use 
approved at which time developer would p~ocess we~e again engaged. The commis-
dismiss the case, paying the costs. slon ~ade Its recommendation to the city 
The city, on the other hand contends that council (comprised of the mayor and alder-
it agreed only to a postpdnement of the men), .and that. body held a public hearing. 
circuit court hearing to allow AG to at- Th: cIty counCIl t~en ~enied the new appli-
tempt to secure an amended conditional use catJo~, thus leavmg m place the earlier 
upon the conditions discussed by the par- requ~rement of providing 51 new off-street 
ties. It says the mayor and aldermen act- parkmg spaces. Concerning the earlier 
ing solely in their capacity as the municipal agreement, the council acknowledged that 
corporation, thereby signified that they felt the ~a!or and aldermen had reached a 
the proposed conditions were fair and "p~ehmmary understanding" with AG, but 
would likely be approved, but that the may- saId that t~e entire agreement was subject 
or and aldermen did not, and in fact could to the zonmg process, and that the council 
not, enter into a binding agreement that was t~erefore free to exercise its indepen-
!hey, in their capacity as the zoning author- d.ent Judgment on the application. Addi-
Ity, would approve the conditional use on tlOnally, the council found: that the pro-
those terms. posed amendment did not conform to exist-
The amended conditional use was not ing zoning regulations because 51 spaces 
granted on the terms contemplated by the we~e required, a?d those spaces were re-
parties in their agreement. In fact, when qUlred to ,be on-sIte; that the city code did 
AG presented its revised application to the not perr~\1t monetary remuneration in lieu 
Planning and Zoning Commission (a body of . r:qUlred off-street parking; that the 
separate from the mayor and aldermen), bUlld:ng ,;as constructed on land which 
that commission refused to make any rec- re~amed m .the residential zoning c1assifi-
ommendation. Acting on the advice of its cation and It would be inappropriate to 
staff, the commission held that before the enlarge an unlawful use; that the proposed 
application could be approved the property amendment would be detrimental to the 
wo~ld have to be rezoned, and the zoning health, safety, and welfare of the public 
ordmance would have to be amended to because the area was "woefully lacking" in 
permit payment into the off-street parking public parking facilities and any reduction 
fund as an alternative to providing spaces of the 51 new spaces originally required 
otherwise required. The commission said would exacerbate a parking situation that 
the proposed conditional use was illegal, wa~ already over capacity; and, that allo-
and therefore it had no jurisdiction to ac- catmg 25 spaces in the county parking ga-
cept it or to act on it. rage to the use of the tenants of AG's 
AG returned to court, and filed in the building would likely send 25 all-day par-
pending appeal a "Motion to Enforce Set- kers who then used the garage into the 
t1ement Agreement." Judge James C. Ca- stree.ts, thereby aggravating a difficult 
",:,ood, Jr., after first finding that the par- parkmg and traffic congestion problem 
ties had entered into a settlement agree- that had. only grown worse since the origi-
ment, deferred action on the motion to en- nal reqUIrement of 51 new spaces had been 
force that agreement. He held that the imposed two years before. 
Planning and Zoning Commission could not 
refuse to act on the application, and that 
AG should be given a reasonable time to 
secure a court order compelling the com-
mission to proceed. He reasoned that if 
AG filed an appeal from the latest denial, 
and the circuit court consolidated that ap-
peal with the earlier appeal involving Reso-
lution 1-81. In the meantime, a third ap-
peal, involving the action of the city board 
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of appeals in denying a temporary use and 
occupancy permit to AG, had reached the 
circuit court, and was consolidated with the 
other cases for hearing. 
Judge Cawood heard the consolidated ap-
peals, including the motion to enforce the 
settlement agreement. No request was 
made to the court for leave to introduce 
testimony bearing on the terms of the 
agreement, nor was any testimony taken. 
Judge Cawood held that the city was es-
topped from using the zoning of the prop-
erty as a bar to the issuance of an occupan-
cy permit. He also held that unless the 
existence of the settlement agreement com-
pelled a contrary result, the action of the 
city council in 1) requiring 51 new parking 
spaces as a condition to the active use of 
the basement area, and 2) denying the 
amendment which would have substituted 
25 existing spaces and a $75,000 payment 
for the 51 space requirement, would be 
affirmed. Turning to the agreement, 
Judge Cawood again assumed the existence 
of a binding settlement agreement, but 
found that AG had not performed its end of 
the bargain because it had not obtained 
from the State a release in perpetuity of 
the 25 spaces in the parking garage. The 
net result was that AG was found to be 
entitled to continue the use and occupancy 
of the building in accordance with the con-
ditional use granted by Resolution 1-81, 
but was denied its request to conduct any 
active use in the basement area of the 
bUilding. 
AG appealed to the Court of Special Ap-
peals. Although it appealed generally 
from the dispositions made in the three 
consolidated cases, AG limited the scope of 
its appeal by presenting to the intermediate 
appellate court only the question of wheth-
er the circuit court erred in refusing to 
enforce the settlement agreement. The 
Court of Special Appeals, in an unreported 
opinion, affirmed the judgment of the trial 
court. We granted AG's petition for certio-
rari, and we now affirm. 
As we have indicated, there is J serious 
disagreement between the parties I with re-
speet to the terms of their settlement 
agreement. Clearly, there was an agree-
ment of some kind, and the objective of the 
agreement was to settle the controversy. 
The parties made no attempt to reduce 
their agreement to writing, and no one has 
testified concerning what was said. Both 
sides have relied upon a memorandum sent 
by the mayor to the eight aldermen, setting 
forth his understanding of the proposed 
agreement and requesting their concur-
rence. We think the memorandum is am-
biguous with respect to the terms that are 
in dispute. Resolution of the ambiguity is 
not required, however, because the result is 
the same with either of the two possible 
constructions. 
[1] If, as AG contends, the agreement 
was intended to require the city council to 
grant an amended conditional use on the 
conditions specified, the agreement was in-
valid. Without reaching the contentions of 
the city that 1) the mayor and aldermen 
acting in their capacity as the municipal 
corporation could not bind the mayor and 
aldermen acting in their capacity as the 
designated zoning authority, and 2) the ac-
tion was in violation of the state "sun-
shine" law requiring open meetings,7 we 
hold that the mayor and aldermen could not 
by agreement lawfully bind themselves to 
a future zoning or conditional use decision, 
We do so on the familiar premise that a 
municipality may not contract away the 
exercise of its zoning powers. Baylis v. 
City of Baltimore, 219 Md. 164, 170, 148 
A.2d 429 (1959); 10 McQuillin, Municipal 
Corporations, § 29.07 (3d ed. 1981); 2 
Anderson, American Law of Zoning 3d, 
§ 9.21 (1986); 4 Yokley, Zoning Law and 
Practice, § 25-11 (4th ed. 1979). 
AG recognizes the existence of this gen-
eral principle, but argues that it applies 
only to cases involving contract or condi-
tional .zoning, and has no application in 
cases involving conditional uses. It is true 
that the principle most frequently has been 
cited in cases involving the contractual im-
position of conditions or restrictions where 
zoning reclassification has been sought and 
--, 
ATTMAN v. MAYOR Md. 1283 
Cite as 552 A.2d 1277 (Md. 1989) 
conditional zoning was not permitted. This when the zoning code specifically contem-
Court has uniformly condemned the prac- plates the imposition of conditions, as in 
tice of conditional or contract zoning in the the case of special exceptions and condi-
absence of statutory authority for the im- tional uses. We conclude, however, that 
position of conditions. See, e.g., Mont. Co. because one of the several reasons for the 
v. Nat'l Capital Realty, 267 Md. 364, 373- general prohibition against contract or con-
75, 297 A.2d 675 (1972) (reliance by zoning ditional zoning does not apply in conditional 
~utho~ty upo~ a?reement to file .cove?ants use cases, that does not, a fortiori, mean 
Impo~l.ng hmlta.tlOns upon use mvahd as that an entirely separate reason-the prohi-
conditional zomng); Rose v. Paape, 221 bition against contracting away the exer-
~d: 3~9, 375-78, 157 A.2d 6~~ (1960) (mu- cise of zoning power-is similarly inappJica-
mClpahty cannot attach ~ondltlons to p:op- ble. If that were true, where conditional 
erty zone~ or rezoned If those co~dltIo?s zoning is specifically permitted by statute 8 
are not umform throughout the zonmg dls- th . th'ty Id bl' t 'ts If . ... e zomng au on cou olga e I e 
tnct); Baylts v. Ctty of Balttmore, supra, . . 
219 Md. at 170, 148 A.2d 429 (rezonin by advance contract ~ prOVide zonmg .and 
b d ts 
'th . g thereby render meamngless the prescnbed ase on agreemen WI owners are m- . 
-al"d)' Wakefield v Kraft 202 Md 136 zonmg procedures. We hold that the 
~4~50, 96 A.2d 27' (1953) '(condition~1 re: sound policy ~hich proh~bits a .municipali~y 
zoning not permitted). And cf City of from contractmg away Its zomng power IS 
Baltimore v. Crane 277 Md. 198 205-06 as applicable to special exception and condi-
352 A.2d 786 (1976) (ordinance 'grantin~ tion.al use cas~s. as .it is to those involving 
additional density upon dedication of land zomng reclaSSifications. These closely re-
not contract or conditional zoning where lated functions, often grouped generically 
offered to all similarly situated property under the broad topic of zoning, involve the 
owners); Funger v. Mayor of Somerset, exercise of the power of land use regula-
249 Md. 311, 323-29, 239 A.2d 748 (1968) tion that was delegated to the city by Arti-
(agreement by town to make favorable rec- cle 66B of the Maryland Code. Just as the 
ommen dation to county zoning authority zoning authority is required to follow pro-
does not violate the general rule because cedures mandated by statute, West Mont. 
the zoning authority was not a party to the Ass 'n v. MNCP & P Com 'n, 309 Md. 183, 
agreement); Greenbelt v. Bresler, 248 Md. 186, 522 A.2d 1328 (1987), and to exercise 
210, 215-17, 236 A.2d 1 (1967) (same); its unconstrained independent judgment in 
Town of Somerset v. Montgomery County, deciding matters of reclassification, so too 
229 Md. 42, 50-52, 181 A.2d 671 (1962) must the appropriate authority, whether 
(general rule inapplicable because zoning the zoning authority or a duly authorized 
authority clearly did not impose conditions board of appeals, follow required proce-
or rely upon representation of applicant dures and exercise independent judgment 
concerning site development). in deciding requests for special exceptions, 
These cases rest, in part, on the rationale conditional uses, or variances. The careful-
that permitting conditional zoning by con- Iy structured provisions for public notice, 
tract destroys the uniformity that is re- public hearings, and, in many cases, re-
quired in each zoning district. As AG quired consideration of staff or planning 
points out, this rationale does not apply commission recommendations, would be 
8. Conditional zoning, once roundly condemned, 
appears to be in the ascendency. In Maryland, 
the concept has evolved indirectly through the 
use of various zoning devices such as planned 
developments, and has found at least limited 
favor with the state legislature. See Article 66B, 
§ 4.0I(b) permitting a county or municipal cor-
poration to impose certain conditions at the 
time of zoning or_ rezo~ing ~and: ~nd_er cer!ain 
(1987); and Bd. of Co. Comm'rs v. H. Manny 
Holtz. Inc., 65 Md.App. 574, 579-86, 501 A.2d 
489 (1985) (holding that § 4.01(b) of Article 66B 
authorizes the imposition of conditions applica-
ble to structural and architectural character of 
the land and improvements thereon, and does 
not authorize conditional use rezoning). We 
need not, and do not, offer an opinion concern-
ins! the intermediate annellate court's internreta. 
~ 
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stripped of all meaning and purpose if the 
decision-making body had previously bound 
itself to reach a specific result. This princi-
ple is not limited to agreements of ques-
tionable legality, or to those made in 
smoke-filled rooms; it applies as well to 
those made openly, in good faith, and con-
taining terms and conditions that would 
otherwise be appropriate. 
The potential for harm that would be 
present in the absence of the rule is well 
illustrated by the facts of this case. AG 
and the mayor and aldermen undoubtedly 
acted with the best of intentions in at-
tempting to agree upon conditions that 
they believed would not only accommodate 
the needs of the public, but also could be 
reasonably met by the developer. How-
ever, when subjected to the illumination of 
planning commission recommendations, cit-
izen input, current information, advice of 
the city attorney, and careful reflection, 
the conditions once thought appropriate 
were seen by the zoning authority to be 
woefully inadequate. 
We need not reach the question of 
whether the conditions agreed upon in this 
case were themselves legally impermissi-
ble. The prohibition against contracting 
away the exercise of the zoning power ap-
plies whether the conditions were valid or 
invalid. Even if the mayor and aldermen 
agreed to be bound to the conditions dis-
cussed, they had no authority to do so, and 
the agreement cannot be enforced. 
[2] AG further suggests that even if 
the agreement is invalid, we should apply 
the principle of equitable estoppel to pre-
vent the city from relying upon that inval-
idity. The short answer to that contention 
is that a municipality is not estopped to 
assert its own illegal action. Permanent 
Fin. Corp. v. Montgomery Cly., 308 Md. 
239, 247-50, 518 A.2d 123 (1986); Salis-
bury Beauty Schools v. St. Bd. of Cosme-
tologists, 268 Md. 32, 63-65, 300 A.2d 367 
(1973); Berwyn Heights v. Rogers, 228 Md. 
271, 279-80, 179 A.2d 712 (1962). 
9. See the cases collected under the annotation, 
"Power of city, town. or county or their officials 
We turn to the alternative possibility_ 
that the agreement between the parties 
was simply to postpone the trial of the 
zoning appeal in order to permit AG to 
attempt to obtain an amended conditional 
use upon conditions that at first blush ap-
peared to be reasonable to the mayor and 
aldermen. If indeed that was the agree-
ment of the parties, we find no vice in it. 
Settlements of controversies are favored. 
General Motors Corp. v. Lahocki, 286 Md. 
714, 726, 410 A.2d 1039 (1980); Chertkof v. 
Harry C. Weiskittel Co., 251 Md. 544, 550, 
248 A.2d 373 (1968). cert. denied. 394 U.S. 
974, 89 S.Ct. 1467, 22 L.Ed.2d 754 (1969). 
It is not uncommon for the parties in litiga-
tion, particularly after each has had an 
opportunity to carefully review the rele-
vant facts and law, to discover that there 
may be a common meeting ground between 
them. Under certain circumstances, a mu-
nicipality may agree to compromise a con-
tested matter.9 The city in this case clear-
ly had the authority to enter into an agree-
ment to request a postponement of the 
judicial hearing and to entertain a new or 
amended application for conditional use, 
provided it did not surrender or impair the 
right and obligation of the city council to 
independently and impartially consider the 
application in accordance with procedures 
established by law. 
If we accept the city's construction of the 
agreement, which is the construction fa-
vored by law because it results in a valid 
agreement, Garfinkel v. Schwartzman, 
253 Md. 710, 720, 254 A.2d 667 (1969), the 
outcome of this case does not change. The 
agreement was fully performed by both 
sides; nothing remained to be enforced. 
AG was entitled to pursue a new applica-
tion for conditional use, and it did so. 
When the city council denied the applica-
tion, AG was entitled to pursue its original 
appeal, and, if it wished, appeal the rejec-
tion of its latest application. It did both, 
and the Circuit Court for Anne Arundel 
County affirmed the action of the city 
council in each case. On appeal to the 
Court of Special Appeals, and before us, 
to compromise claim," 15 A.L.R.2d 1359. 
~ 
UNITAS v. TEMPLE Md. 1285 
Cite .. 552 A.2d 1285 (Md. 1989) 
AG did not argue that the actions of the 1. Frauds, Statute of *",129(1) 
city council were arbitrary, capricious, or Doctrine of part performance is pecu-
without adequate support in the record. liar to chancery and is not regarded at law 
Rather, it rested its right to relief upon the to take case out of statute of frauds. 
proposition that the city council had obli-
gated itself to grant the amended condi-
tional use upon the conditions set forth in 
the agreement, and upon the notion that it 
was entitled to judicial enforcement of that 
obligation. For the reasons previously 
stated, that contention cannot be sustained. 
2. Frauds, Statute of ~129(1) 
Unless facts relied upon by party seek-
ing to enforce alleged oral contract present 
case for equitable relief, party has no basis 
to argue part performance, and no remedy 
on oral contract. 
C~~~~MENT AFFIRMED, WITH 3. Frauds, Statute of ~129(12) 
Act constitutes part performance, such 
as would warrant enforcement of oral 
agreement to transfer realty, if court can, 
by reason of act itself, without knowin~ 
whether there was agreement or not, find 
parties nnequivocally in position different 
from that which according to their legal 
rights, they would be in if there were no 
contract. 
314 Md. 689 
Anthony J. UNITAS, Personal 
Representative of the Estate 
of Raymond V. Rangle 
v. 
Janet M_ TEMPLE. 
No. 47, Sept. Term, 1988. 
Court of Appeals of Maryland. 
Feb. 9, 1989. 
Woman who had personal and profes-
sional relationship with fiance sought to 
enforce oral contract after fiance's death, 
in which he had allegedly agreed to provide 
financially for her. The Circuit Court, Bal-
timore City, Martin B. Greenfeld, enforced 
oral agreement, and appeal was taken. 
The Court of Special Appeals, 74 Md.App. 
506, 538 A.2d 1201, affirmed. On certiorari 
review, the Court of Appeals, Rodowsky, 
J., held that woman's renewal of profes-
sional and personal relationship with fian-
ce did not constitute part performance 
such as would warrant enforcement of al-
leged oral contract. 
Reversed and remanded. 
4. Frauds, Statute of ~129(12) 
Woman's renewal of professional and 
personal relationship with fiance did not 
constitute part performance such as would 
warrant enforcement of alleged oral con-
tract under which fiance was to provide 
for woman in his will, in that there was 
nothing in woman's acts themselves which 
indicated that they were only referable to 
fiance's alleged promise; woman's acts 
were objectively explainable without refer-
ence to alleged agreement. 
James K. Archibald (Edmund P. 
dridge, Jr., Venable, Baetjer and 
Baltimore), on brief, for petitioner. 
M. Albert Figinski (Franklin Goldstein, 
David R. Sonnenberg, Julie C. Janofsky, 
Melnicove, Kaufman, Weiner, Smouse & 
Garbis, P.A., Baltimore), on brief, for re-
spondent. 
Argued before ELDRIDGE, COLE, 
RODOWSKY, McAULIFFE, ADKINS, 
BLACKWELL, JJ., and CHARLES E. 
ORTH, Jr., Associate Judge of the 
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in the briefs here submitted are noted and 
aligned in their places for or against the 
respectively espoused doctrines. Talia-
ferro v. Travelers' Protective Ass'n, 80 F. 
368, 25 C.C.A. 494, 49 U.S.App. 275, is 
cited as the leading case in the one school 
of thought, while Lovelace v. Travelers' 
Protective Ass'n, 126 Mo. 104, 105, 28 S.W. 
8il, 30 L.R.A. 209, heads the opposition. 
drawn therefrom in his favor. Visaggi v. 
Frank's Bar & Grill, Inc., 4 N.J. 93, 71 
A.2d 638 (1950). In Bachman Choc. Mfg. 
Co. v. Lehigh Wrhse. & T. Co., 1 N.J. 239, 
62 A.2d 806,808 (1949)", It was said: "It is 
well established that a case should be sub-
mitted to a jury unless there are no dis-
puted facts or disputed in ferences to be 
drawn from undisputed facts." 
[1] In our jurisdiction, the decision was 
made and the die cast by Korfin v. Con-
tinental Casualty Co., supra. In the case 
sub judice, therefore, the query is whether, 
under the existing circumstances, the hus-
band should have foreseen that his con-
duct would probably result in his death. 
In denying the appellant's motion, the 
court below observed: 
"Now, the question in this case is wheth-
er or not the deceased should have anti-
cipated the result of his attack upon his 
wi'fe. And our latest decision says, 
"'It is sufficient to render the means 
accidental if the act which precedes the 
injury was something unforeseen, unex-
pected, unusual, although the act be volun-
tary and intentional.' 
"Now, in this case we do not know that 
the husband actually intended to shoot his 
wife, because' there is a question as to 
whether or not the gun was loaded, or 
whether or not he knew it was loaded. 
There is also the further fact that this 
deceased weighed 207 pounds, a man whose 
daily work was that of a mechanic, which 
developed his muscles, he was a man ap-
parently in good health, and it would ap-
pear that he was very much stronger than 
his wife. 
Similar sordid and turbulent outbursts 
had admittedly occurred frequently be-
fore and were an integral part of the final 
culmination. The circumstances as here 
developed, in our opinion, did not as a 
matter of law factually forecast death as 
a natural and probable consequence, as the 
record bespeaks the frequency of parallel 
and almost identical disturbances over a 
long period of time when death was not 
adumbrated nor did it occur. Threats to 
kill were made so often they became com-
monplace and no attention was paid to 
them. "He always did threaten to kill me 
anyhow." 
On the fatal occasion there was a vari-
ation to the established long-term pattern 
-the use of a rifle which the wife "as-
sumed did not work" and "thought was 
out of order." The husband had it "before 
we were married" and "allowed the chil-
dren to play with it." There is no proof 
he knew it was loaded. 
There was also a deviation for the first 
time when the wife attempted to fight back 
and do something about the abuse and 
threats heaped upon her. "I just struggled 
with him trying to get the gun away from 
him. * * * I guess he didn't expect 
that because I was so afraid of him I aI-
ways took everything. l ne\'er tried to 
"There is a question raised by these facts fight him off." 
as to whether or not the deceased could 
have foreseen the result of his act," 
[2 J The rule is settled that upon mo-
tions for a dismissal, the equivalent of mo-
tions ,for a nonsuit or directed verdict un-
der the fonner practice, the court cannot 
weigh the evidence but must take as true 
all evi'dence which supports the view of 
the party against whom the motion was 
made and must give him the benefit of all 
legitimate inferences which are to be 
VI e cannot, under the circumstances 
narrated here, decide as a matter of laW, 
even with the intoxication and his threats, 
that the husband intended to kill his wife 
because a quarrel ensued or that the nat-
ural or probable consequence was that the 
wife, who had submitted docilely to the 
same utterances and abuses over the years, 
would, when she was again threatened and 
assaulted by her drunken husband, unex-
pectedly turn upon him and struggle for 
BECKMANN v. TEANECK TP. N.J. 301 
Cite as 79 A.2d 301 
possession of the gun, resulting in his being 
shot to death. 
[3] Although there is no conflicting 
testimony, nevertheless disputed inferences 
can be drawn from the undisputed facts 
and reasonable men might well differ as 
to the conclusion to be reached. Under the 
circumstances here present, we see no error 
in the submission of the case to the jury, 
whi ch was the course pursued by the trial 
judge below. 
feet from highway, but intervening area 
was zoned for residential uses only, a larg<" 
sign erected in the intervening area to 
advertise nature of business in building 
constituted a business use in violation of 
zoning ordinance. 
The judgment is affi rm "d. 
For affirmance: Ch'ief Justice VAN-
DERBILT, and Justices WACHENFELD, 
BURLING and ACKERSON-4. 
For reversal: Justice HEHER-I. 
6 N.J, 530 
BECKMANN et al. v. TEANECK TP. et aI, 
No. A-78. 
Supreme Court of New Jersey. 
Argued Jan. 29, 1951, Feb. 5, 1951. 
Decided March 19, 1951. 
Suit by George H. Beckmann and others 
against the Township of Teaneck and others 
to compel the township and its officers to 
alter zoning ordinances and to enjoin them 
from interfering with the plaintiffs' use of 
certain premises. From a judgment of the 
Superior Court, Law Dh'ision, Bergen Coun-
ty, in favor of the plaintiffs, the defendants 
appealed to the Superior Court, Appellate 
Division, and the case was certified to the 
Supreme Court. The Supreme Court, Case, 
J., held that wbere contract with township 
had permitted construction of business build-
ing 150 feet from highway, a driveway for 
purpose of ingress and egress over interven-
ing residence area was permissible, but that 
erection of advertising sign in tbat area 
would be in violation of zoning ordinance. 
Judgment modified and, as so modified, af-
firmed. 
I. Municipal corporations ~631(2) 
2. MuniCipal corporations ~631(2) 
Where contract with township permit-
ted erection of business building ISO feet 
from highway, but intervening area was 
zoned for residential uses only, a driveway 
to be used as means of ingress and egress 
was within contemplation of permission to 
erect building and did not constitute a vio-
lation of zoning ordinance. 
3. Appeal and error ~173(IO) 
Where theory of laches was not plead-
ed, was not among issues stated in pre-
trial order and did not appear to have been 
raised at trial, reviewing court could not 
consider that theory of case. 
Warren Dixon, Jr., Hackensack, arguea 
the cause for plaintiffs-respondents. 
Dominick F. Pachella, Hackensack, ar-
gued the cause for defendants-appellants 
(John J. Deeney, Teaneck, attorney). 
The opinion of the court was delivered by 
CASE,]. 
Where contract with township per-
mitted erection of business building ISO 
The Township of Teaneck caused the 
several plaintiffs to be summoned before 
the Municipal Court of the township on 
complaints charging them with violations 
of the local zoning ordinance in that, with-
in a residence zone, they maintained a large 
advertising sign and also a driveway for 
business purposes. Plaintiffs thereupon 
filed their complaint in the Superior Court, 
Law Division, Bergen County, charging 
that the township, in prosecuting its com-
plaints, had breached agreements earlier 
made with the Estate of William WaIte':' 
Phelps, a corporation, and with Garden 
State Developers, Inc., a predecessor of 
the corporate plaintiff George H. Beck-
mann, Inc., and, upon the basis of the al-
leged breach, plaintiffs prayed that the 
township and its officers be directed to 
adopt an ordinance authorizing the matters 
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to grant variances or exceptions with re-
spect thereto, and that they be enjoined 
from interfering with the plaintiffs, their 
successors or assigns, in the use of the 
premises. The court, having by consent 
heard the matter without a jury, made a 
determination of the facts and rendered 
'large part extrinsic to, or at least unneces_ 
sary and confusing in the determination 
of, the issues, and we shall endeavor to 
confine the discussion to what we regard 
as the controlling elements. 
a final judgment which (1) restrained the 
township and its officers from prosecuting 
the summonses and the complaints issued 
thereon, (2) directed that the members of 
the township council , "in the exercise of 
their discretion rezone or consent to a 
variance, or grant an exception, or con-
sent to a non-conforming use, or take other 
effective action to permit the use of the 
site on which plaintiff's office building is 
erected * * *- so as to be lawfully usa-
ble for the transaction of real estate, mort-
gage, insurance and building contractors' 
husiness", and (3) that the township and its 
officers be restrained from interfering with 
the use of plaintiff's property because of an 
alleged "paper" street known as Hancock 
Avenue. The appeal by the township and 
its associated defendants to the Superior 
Court, Appellate Division, was certified to 
us on our own motion. 
The land was originally a part of a tract 
owned by the Estate of William Walter 
Phelps, deceased. On April 15, 1947, fol-
lowing authorizing resolutions, the town-
ship entered into a contract with the estate 
and another contract with Garden State 
Developers, Inc., the prospective purchaser 
and developer of th.$ tract with which we 
are concerned. (Cf. Fraser v. Teaneck 
Township, 137 N.J.L. 119, 58 A.2d 610 
(Sup.Ct.l948), affirmed 1 N.J. 503, 64 A.2d 
345 (1949), which, however, did not Con-
sider or pass upon the issues here present-
ed.) Those contracts contained the fol-
lowing clause bearing upon the proposal 
which was later realized by the construc-
tion of plaintiffs' building : "The Town-
ship will, by rezoning or consent to a vari-
ance, or grant of an exception, or consent 
to a non-conforming use, or by other ef-
fective action, permit the erection of one 
office building on the area lying on the 
southerly side of State Highway Route No. 
4 and easterly of Decatur Avenue if pro-
jected southerly, which is marked on the at-
tached map as 'Business-Proposed Office 
Site,' to be used for the transaction of 
real estate, mortgage, insurance, and build-
ing contractors' business provided how-
ever that no part of any such building shall 
be closer than 150 feet of the center line 
of said State Highway Route No.4. It 
is understood and agreed that the build-
ing shaU not be used for any purposes ex-
cept as an office for the transaction of 
real estate, mortgage, insurance and build-
The Township of Teaneck has consist-
ently endeavored to prevent the invasion of 
business on either side of State Highway 
Route 4 running from George' Washington 
Bridge westerly through the township. 
The corporate plaintiff lawfully construct-
ed, maintains and uses a one and one-half 
story structure for specified business pur-
poses at a distance of at least 150 feet 
southerly from the center line of the high-
way. The territory between the building 
and the highway is zoned for residences 
and against business. The controversy, 
stated in its simplest terms, is whether the 
corporation and the associated plaintiffs 
may (1) erect and maintain adjacent to 
the highway a large business sign an-
nouncing the presence of the building and 
the business conducted therein and (2) 
use for entrance to and exit from the 
building a driveway which the plaintiffs 
have constructed between the highway and 
the building over their lands zoned against 
business use. The arguments present facts 
and contentions which we think are in 
ing contractors' business, and that no con-
struction material shall be stored on the 
site outside the main walls of the building." 
Neither of the agreements had provi-
sion regarding the erection of a sign or 
the construction or use of a driveway. 
The building, when constructed, was so 
placed that the land upon which it stood 
was in an area already zoned with a clas-
sification that permitted the lawful con-
struction and use of the building for its 
business purposes. The highway ran ap· 
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proximately 150 feet to the north of the be frustrated. On or subsequent to June 
building, and the north line of the building 17, 1947, an ordinance was adopted which, 
was coterminous with the north line of the as stated in respondents' brief, rezoned 
area within which the business use was "the entire tract in accordance with the 
permitted. The area between the north agreements". We find it difficult to deduce 
line of the building and the highway is from the exhibits just what changes were 
owned by plaintiffs and was then and is effected from the earlier ordinance in 
noW zoned for residential uses and against order to accomplish that result, but there 
business uses. There, immediately adjacent appears to be no dispute over the two es-
to the highway, is where the sign was sential propositions that the site of the 
erected. It is a structure 8 feet high and business office is so zoned as to permit 
16 feet wide. It proclaims the neighboring that use, and that the land from there 
presence of plaintiffs' business structure north to the highway is zoned against busi-
and the character of business conducted ness and for residences. The only argu-
therein. It is an announcement of, and in ment for the sign is that without it the . 
effect an invitation to do, business. It is traveling public will not be adequately in· 
clearly and exclusively a business struc- formed of the business conducted in the 
ture put to a business use and is a violation building ISO feet away; but such an argu-
of the provisions of the zoning ordinance. ment, generally applied, would quite undo 
Not only so, it is not within the purview the whole purpose in suppressing business 
of the contract provisions and is contrary and its restless distractions in beautiful 
to the spirit thereof. To what point was rural areas. 
the "business site" specifically kept at a 
distance of 150 feet if by signs and ad-
vertising features it was to be projected 
immediately along the highway? We find 
nothing in the agreement which calls upon 
the municipality to do more than to per-
mit the construction of the building which 
is now constructed and to permit the build-
ing, when constructed, to be used for the 
operation of the business that is now being 
conducted there, and we find nothing in the 
agreement inconsistent with the proposi-
tion that the area between the building and 
the highway shall not be used for business 
purposes. No rezoning or consent to a 
variance was necessary to legalize the con-
struction of the building and the use of the 
structure for the designated business pur-
poses. After the agreement was entered 
into, the corporate plaintiff applied to the 
building inspector of the township and, on 
June 11, 1947, obtained a permit for the 
construction. After the construction was 
completed a certificate of occupancy was 
issued and the appropriate use followed 
and is continued. But neither the permit 
to construct the building, nor the certif-
icate of occupancy after construction, may 
be warped into a consent that the town-
ship purpose to keep the lands along the 
highway free of business structures should 
(1] The trial court gave an effect to 
the agreement which we do not give and 
assumed an authority on the part of the 
municipal corporation to contract for the 
exercise of legislative powers and of the 
court to control the municipality in the per-
formance of its legislative functions which 
we do not concede. Cf. McQuillin, Munici-
pal Corporations, 2nd Ed. (Rev.) Vol. 3, 
sec. 1271, p. 1112; 63 c.J.S. Municipal 
Corporations, § 979( c), page 534; Ho-
boken Local No. 2, New Jersey State Pa-
trolmen's Benevolent Ass'n v. City of Ho-
hoken, 44 A.2d 329, 23 N.J.Misc. 334, 340 
(Sup.Ct.194S), affirmed on the opinion be-
low, 134 N.lL. 616, 48 A.2d 917 (E. & A. 
1946); Potter v. Borough of Metuchen, 
108 N.lL. 447, 155 A. 369 (Sup.Ct.l931). 
But whether the matter of the sign be ap-
proached by way of, or without, the agree-
ment, the effect is the same; the claim of 
a right to maintain it in the area conced-
edly and lawfuUy zonen against business 
is without support. It is a business use, 
is a violation of the ordinance and is not 
provided for by the agreement. 
[2) The driveway presents a different 
question. Certainly, for whatever value 
foreknowledge may have, the agreements 
anticipated the erection of a business struc-
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called Hancock Avenue. Hancock Avenue 
has no real existence; it is said to be a 
"paper" street, that is, "laid out on the 
map". The proofs are very hazy to that 
end. Our study of them leads to the con-
clusion that what was once indicated on the 
maps in suggestion of a street has, in this 
vicinity, been obliterated by the lines of the 
state highway and the ramp leading thereto 
and therefrom. 
ture and the conduct of designated busi-
nesses therein and must have anticipated 
that there would be a practical meanS of 
ingress and egress; and the amending or-
dinance was adopted in the light of the 
conditions then shaped for realization. The 
driveway was constructed with permission 
from the State Highway Department, the 
public authority under whose administra-
tion the highway is and the propriety of 
the driveway from an operational stand-
point must therefore be conceded. That 
permission was prefaced by a letter from 
the township manager advising that the 
township was agreeable to the location of 
the driveway. A driveway in itself is 
neutral. It is neither business nor other-
wise. It takes color from the uses permit-
ted by the zoning ordinance of the lands 
in the area. The land between the building 
and the state highway was classified by 
the zoning ordinance as a B Zone, which 
permitted the erection of two family 
houses with the exception of a small por-
tion immediately adjacent to the highway 
which was zoned as a Class A residence 
zone. Thus it would have been consistent' 
with the ordinance for plaintiff to develop 
the intervening tract with houses and in 
connection therewith to build such a drive-
way. It seems clear therefore that the 
existence of a driveway in that location is 
not inevitably to be condemned as a vio-
lation of the ordinance. We reach the 
conclusion that under the circumstances 
of the case and particularly in view of the 
events immediately preceding, concomitant 
with and directly following the consider-
ation and adoption of the ordinance, and 
so connected therewith as to be chapters in 
the same panorama of municipal incidents, 
the reasonable and consistent interpretation 
of the ordinance and its several parts 
negates the charge that the construction 
,and use of the driveway, strictly as a 
means of ingress and egress, without sign 
or advertising matter, are a violation. 
It is said on behalf of the township that 
the driveway as constructed, in leading to 
the state highway from the plaintiffs' lands, 
passes over an intervening dedicated street 
Our answer to the posed questions is that 
the erection and maintenance of the sign 
violate, and !'he construction and Use of the 
driveway merely as a means of ingress and 
egress do not violate, the zoning ordinance. 
[3] Appellants now charge respondents 
with laches; but laches was not pleaded, 
was not among the issues stated in the pre-
trial order and does not appear to have been 
raised at the trial. The court will not now 
hear the appellants on a new and different 
theory or issue than that on which the cause 
was tried. State ex reI. Wm. Eckelmann, 
Inc., Y. Jones, 4 N.]. 207, 214, 72 A.2d 322 
(1950). Estoppel by conduct against the 
township was stated by the pretrial order 
as an issue for trial; but we find negatively 
as to it. 
So much of Paragraph (I) of the judg-
ment under review as restrains and enjoins 
the prosecution of the existing summonses 
and complaints charging a violation by 
reason of the driveway is affirmed; and the 
remaining portions of Paragraph (1) and 
all of Paragraphs (2) and (3) are reversed, 
We are in accord with the finding that there 
is nothing in the alleged existence of Han-
cock A venue that is pertinent to present 
issues and have so indicated; but we dis-
cover no necessity for an injunction to 
enforce that finding. 
The result is that the jndgment below is 
to be modified to conform to our findings, 
and, as so modified, affirmed. Costs are not 
allowed. 
For modification: Chief Justice VAN 
DERBILT, and Justices CASE, HEHER, 
OLIPHANT, W ACHENFELD, BUR-
LING and ACKERSON-7. 
Opposed: None. 
,:,.J~: 
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In reply to the foregoing letter of June 27th, the defendant wrote as 
follows: 
"Seattle, 7'-2-Q8. 
"Chas. S. Brent & Bro., Paris, Kentucky-Gentlemen: Answering your 
furor of the 27tb, we wisb to correct your understanding of our order. This 
called for minimum cur of 15 tons and not for 325 bags. We would like to 
baH~ shipment between August 15th and September 15th providing new crop 
is harvested by that time, but notify ns and send sample before sbipping SQ 
that we will be ready to take care of tbe seed." 
Subsequent correspondence occurred between the parties in rela-
tion to the dispute that arose between tbem, but the contract is to be 
found in the correspondence already set forth, commencing with the 
plaintiff's offer to sell the defendant the seed at "$1.40 per bu., f. o. b. 
cars" Paris, Ky., with a guaranty that the seed would "test 21 pounds 
to the measured bushel." 'What is the meaning of the word "test" as 
here used? There is nothing in the letter expressly indicating its 
meaning. The defendant seems to have understood it as meanin" 
"weight," for in its written requisition or order of June 22d, conlirn~ 
ing its telegram of the same date, it ordered one minimum car load of 
the seed offered "weighing 21 lbs. to the btlShel at $1.40 per bushel. 
£. o. b. cars Paris, Ky. Per your quotation June 17th." The view of 
the court below was that the defendant was bound to "treat fourteen 
pounds as a bushel." because of the plaintiff's letter of June 27th ac-
knowledging receipt of the defendant's requisition or order, and th~ 
latter's failure to make any objection to the description of the thing 
sold therein contained, while calling attention to the fact that the 
order called for one "minimum car of 15 tons and not for 325 bags." 
The letter of the plaintiff to the defendant of June 27th upon the 
point in question is as follows: 
"Yours of tbe 22d (yours No. 7.2(2) confirming purchase of Blue Grass 
Seed frolli us duly to hand and seems to be torr eel. 325 bags Fancy Cleaned 
True Keutucky Blue Grass Seed. testing 21# to the measured busbel, at 
$1.40 ]Jer bu. (14#) f. o. b. cars bere" Paris, Ky, 
The plaintiff knew by the requisition which he received that the 
defendant understood the word "test," as applied to the seed in tlie 
plaintiff's original offer of it, to mean "weight," for the oreler was ior 
one minimum car of seed "weighing 21 Ibs. to the bl1shel at $1.40 
per bushel." There is certainly no ambiguity about that language. 
The court below said in its opinion denying the defendant's motion for 
a new trial that "there can be no question but that the plaintiff at all 
times understood the contract to call for 14 pounds to the bushel." 
\Ve are unable to discoyer any ground for that statement. If the 
plaintiff did not understand the defendant's order, or did not think it 
therein correctly interpreted the word "test" in his original offer of 
the seed for sale, OL1ght he not to have frankly said so? Instead, in 
his letter of June 27th acknowledging receipt of the defendant's order, 
he said that it "seems to be correct," and proceeded to add in his let-
ter: "325 bags Fancy Cleaned True Kentucky Blue Grass Seed, test-
ina- 21# to the measured bushel, at $1.40 per bu. (14#) f. o. b. cars." 
'This is the first time 14 pounds"appeared in the correspondence be-
tween the parties. What did it mean? On the trial it was shown that 
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the defendant had for a number of years issued a seed catalogue in 
which it listed, among other articles, Kentucky Blue Grass Seed as con-
taining H pounds to the bushel; but there was evidence on the part 
of the defendant tending to show that this was inserted only for the 
purpose of informing farmers and others using such seed -that 14 
pounds in weight should be sown where the directions called for the 
sowing of a bushel. It is manifest that such considerations were for 
the jury if the contract was ambiguous. 
When the plaintiff first offered the defendant tbe seed, he said noth-
ing about 14 pounds, but that it would "test" 21 pounds to the busheL 
W11en the defendant gave its order in pursuance of that offer, it or-
dered one minimum car load "weighing 21 Ibs. to the bushel, at $1."10 
per bushel," which interpretation by the defendant of the meaning of 
the word "test," as used in the offer, the plaintiff said in his letter of 
June 27th "Seems to be correct," and made no objection unless it can 
De found in the next succeeding terms, to wit: "325 bags Fancy 
Cleaned True KentUCky Blue Grass Seed, testing 21# to the measured 
bushel, at $1.40 per bu. (1~1#) f. o. b. cars." 
The figures and symbol in parentheses (meaning 14 pounds) so 
mserted by the plaintiff, taken in connection with the preceding cor-
respondence between the parties. and for the first time appearing 
therein, are, in our opinion, ambiguous, and their meaning, taken in 
connection with the balance of the correspondence, should ha\'e been 
left to the determination of the jury, in view of all the facts and cir-
cumstances of the case, under appropriate instructions from the court. 
The judgment is reversed, and the cause remanded to the court be-
low for a new trial. 
BOISE CITY, IDAHO, v. BOISE ARTESIAN HOT & COLD WATER CO., 
Limited. 
(Circuit Court of Appeals, Nintb Circuit. February 6. 1911.) 
NO.1,875. 
1. FaANcrnsEs (§ 2*)-SPECIAI, PRII'ILEGEs-GRAKT. 
jfranchises and special privileges must be construed most strongly 
against tbe grantee Hnd in fa YOl" of tbe governlDe!lt. 
[Ed. Note.-For otber cases, see Francbises, Cent. Dig. § 2; Dec. Dig. 
§ 2."l 
2. MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS (§ 5S*)-DELEGATION OF PO\YEU-CONSTRUCTTON. 
Legislative grants of power to municipal corporations must be strictly 
construed to operate as a surrender of the so,ereigntr of the state no 
further tban is expressl,' declared by the language thereof. 
[Eel. Note.-For otl!er cases, see Municipal Corporations, Cent. Dig. §§ 
145-147; Dec. Dig. § 5S.*] 
3. MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS (§ GS2')-CnARTER-FRAXCI1ISE-GRAXT-ExTENT. 
Where the charter of a cityautllorized it to graut the use of itR streets 
for the laying or water mains to snpply its inbabitants, the cit)" waH 
only autllOrized to gn.nt snch use for a reasonable time and could not 
grant a perpetual franchise under the rule thilt a municipal corporati,)f\ 
may not irrevocably surrender aDr part of its power to control its pub. 
·For other cases see same topic & § NUMB En in Dec. & Am. Digs. 1907 to date, & Rep'r Index,," 
186F.-45 
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lie streets by contract or otberwise witbout tbe express consent or the 
Legislature. 
[Ed. Note.-For otber cases, see Municipal Oorporations, Oent. Dig. § 
14U9; Dec. Dig. § 682. oJ 
4. MUNICIPAL OORPORATIONS (§ 68Z*)-WATERWORKS COMPANY-FRA.NCHISE-
CO" STRUCTIO N-TERM-LICE!': SE FEE-STATUTES. 
Hey. St. Idabo 1887, § 2710, provides tbat no corporation formed to 
stlPply a city witb 'Yflter mny do so unless prey;ously aut.horized by ordi-
nnnee or unless done iu conformity with a contract between tbe corpora-
tion and tbe city or town. and that such contmct sball not deprive tbe 
city or to\\'n of tbe right to re!:;ulate rates, nor sball any exclusire right 
be grnnted or contract or grant made for a term exceeding 50 sears. 
Held that wbere a city granted a franchise to defendant's predecessors 
to use tbe streets for tbe construction of a water system without speci-
fying uny term for tbe continuance of tbe grant, it was not a grant for 
5Q years, but a mere license revocable by the city at wlll, and bence dill 
not depriYe tbe city of the right thereafter to impose on defendant pay-
nlent of a montbly license (ee for tbe use of tbe streets. 
[Jiid. Note.-For otber cases, see Municipal Corporations,'Cent. DIg. § 
1470; Dec. Dig. § 682.*] 
In Error to the Circuit Court of the Unit, . States for the Central 
Didsion of the District of Idaho. 
Action by Boise City, Idaho, against the Boise Artesian Hot & Cold 
\Vater Company, Limited. Judgment for defendant, and plaintiff 
brings error. Reversed, with directions. 
The plaintiff in error was plaintiff in tbe conrt below, where It hrought tlle 
action to recover from tbe defendant certain license fees imposed by one of 
its ordinances, enacted in ~906. Tbe facts of tbe case are undisputed. 'fbey 
sbow, among otber tbings. that tbe plaintiff in error is a municipal corpora-
tion operating under a special cbarter granted by tbe Legislature of tbe ter-
ritory of Idaho during the year 1863. and subsequent amenflllleuts tbereto;' 
tbat on the 3d dao' of October, 1889, tbe city enacted an ordinance entitled 
"An ordinance granting Eustman Brotbers the right to lay water pipes ill 
Boise City," tbe only two sections of wbicb ordinance are as follows: 
"Section 1. H. B. Eastman and B. M. Eastman. and their successors in in-
terest in tbeir watenyorks for tbe supplying of mountain water to the resi-
dents of Boise City, are hereby autborized to lay and repair tbeir water pipes 
in, through, and along ancl across the streets and alleys of Boise City, under 
tbe surface tbereof; but tbey sball at all times restore and leave all streets 
and alleys in. tbrougb. along, and across which they may lay sucb pipes, in 
as good condition as tbey sball find the same, antI shall at all times promptly 
repair all dumage done by them or their pipes, or by w'lter escaping tbere· 
from. 
"Sec. 2. Tbis ordinance sball take effect from and after its passage and 
approyal." Approyed October 3, 1889. 
Tbe Artesian Water & Land Improvement Company baving become organ-
ized as a corporation under the laws of tbe state of Idabo for tbe pnrpose of 
snpplying Boise City and its inhabitants witb wa tel' for public and family 
use, the city, on tbe lOtb day of July, 1890, enacted an ordinance entitled "An 
ordinance granting to tbe Artesian WaleI' & Land Improvement Compauy the 
rigbt to lay water pipes in Boise City," the three sections of wbicb are as 
£ollo,,"s: 
"Se<,tion 1. The privilege of laying down and maintaining water pipes in 
the streets and alleys now laid out or bereafter to be laid out and dedicated 
in Boise City. Idabo, is berel,y granted to tbe ArteSian Water & Land Ill-
provement Company, its successors or assigns. 
"8ec. 2. All water pipes placed in said streets and allcys sball be laid 
down in a "'orkmanlil<e manner, and all excayations made for pipes sball be 
properly filled. aud with all convenient speed. 
-For other cases see same topic & § NUMBSR in Dec, & Am. Digs. 1907 to date. & Rep'r lndexel 
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"Sec. 3. Tbis ordinance shall tal;e effect aud be in force from and after its 
passage." Appron'd July 10, 1890. 
lnulleclintely after the enactment of tbe ordinance in their fa'>or, E.1stman 
Bros. proceeded to construct a system of waterworks, consisting of artesian 
wells and reservoirs, and laid mains aud pipes under and along the streets 
and alleys of Boise Oity, and to supply tbe city and its inbabitants with pure 
mountain water, in accordance with tbat ordinance, expending in such con-
structiou over $20.000 to tbe time tbey sold their interest tberein to an Idaho 
corporation called tbe Artesian Hot & Cold Water Oompany, Limited, here--
inafter mentioned. . 
Immediately after the enactment of the ordinance in fayor of tbe Artesian 
Water & Land Impro'>ement Oompany. it proceeded to sink artesian .,-ells, 
con·truct resen·oirs. and lay pipes under and along tbe streets of the city 
and to supply tbe city and its inbabitants with pure, fresb water for munici-
pal, domestic. and irrigation purposes, under and pursuant to tbe aforesaid 
ordinance in its (avor, expending in the construction, extensiOIl, and iWIJroVe-
ment of its waterworks more tban $50.000 up to tbe time of its sale thereof 
to tbe aforesaid Artesian Hot & Oold Water Company, Limited, as bereinafter 
mentioned. 
Tbe Artesian Hot & Cold Water Company, Limited, was organized under 
the laws of the state of Idabo. and was autborized by its articles cof incor-
poration to supply the plaintiff in error and its inhabitants witb ,,'ater for 
mnnicipal and domestic uses, and to purcbase and acquire the "aterworks, 
wells, reservoirs, pipe lines, properties, rights, and francbises of both tbe 
Eastman Bros., and the Artesian Water & Land Impro'>ement Companr, wbich 
purchase was effected on tbe 28tb day of March, 1891. 
Tbe defendant in error is a corpora tion organized and existing under the 
laws of tbe state of West Virginia, witb its principal place of business at 
Boise City, Ada county, Idaho. Its articles of incorporation autborize it to 
carryon "a waterworl's system, and to sell and rent \yater to tbe inhabitants 
of tbe said Boise City and t.o taIte, purcbase, acquire, hold. operate. and 
maintain rights and privileges of water companies, associations. or corpora-
tions. and to acquire, use, own. and operat.e all properties, franchises, rights, 
claims, privileges, and everytbing belongiug to tbat certain corporation kno>,n 
as the Artesian Hot"" Cold Water Company, Limited, and to be the succes-
sor in every respect of said corporation." 
On the 28th day of August, 1901, the defendant in error acquired by pur-
cbase from tbe Artesian Hot & Cold Water Compnny. Limited, all of its 
rights in and to both of tbe \\'ater systems mentioned, and all of its said wa-
ters, as well as all of the rigbts and prh'i!eges granted by tbe aforesaid or-
dinances. 
Tbe record furtber shows: Tbat between tbe 28tb dar of Marc-b, 1891, 
and tbe 28tb day of August, 1901. the Artesian Hot & CQld Water Oom!Jany, 
Limited, supplied the city and its inbabitnnts with pure, fresb water for 
municipal, domestic. and other useful purposes, and tbat during tbnt period 
the population of tbe city increased from about 3,000 to about 6,000 people, 
the nrea of the city being enlarged by the laying out arid platting of additions 
tbp.reto, wbich were settled upon and occupied. llnd during wbicb period tbe 
Artesian Hot & Cold Water Company. witb tbe city's knowledge and con-
sent. extcnrled its pipe lines nnder tbe streets and alleys of the clty from 
time to time. and snpplied sucb additions with water to meet the demands 
upon it, and laid about 15 miles of additional pipe, constructed two wells 
and one reservoir for cold water, and erected a lar!,(e steam pumping plant 
witb a capacity of 3,000,000 gallons a day. ag:o;re:o;ating in cost more than 
$192.000. 'l'bat at all times since tbe 28tb day of August, 1901, tbe defendant 
in error bas supplied tbe city and its inhabitants "by ,-irtue of said ordinance 
and la IVS, and witb plaintiffs Imowledge, acquiescence, and consent, pure 
fresh wa ter for municipal, domestic, and otber useful purposes, in accordance 
with said ordinances, and in full compliance tberewitb. aud with said la ,,'s 
of Idaho. Tbat since said last-named date tbe population of Boise City bas 
increased from about 6.000 to over 25,QOO inbabitants. and tbis defendant. 
\vith plaintiff's knowledge. acquiescence. and consent, has extended its eold 
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additional mains under tbe streets and alleys or said city, constructed nu-
merous ,<eIls and galleries, acquired by condemnation proceedings additional 
land ior the development of an increased water supply, installed fonr electric 
pumps of an aggregate capacity of six and one-half million gallons of wuter 
pcr day, and bas expended in the improvement and extension of said cold 
water system an additional S11m of mofe tban $140,000. That tbe defelluant 
and its predecessors in interest in and to its waterworks system are now and 
ever since tbe 3d day of October, 1889, have been using the streets and al-
leys of said Boise City in the sale and delil'ery of water to tbe plaintiff, and 
residents and inhabitants of Boise City, tbrough tbe water mains of said 
waterworks systems, and in the laying and repairing of said water pipes ~on­
nee ted with said waterworks systems." 
On tbe 7tl1 day of June, 1906, tbe plaintiff in error enacted an ordinance, 
tbe first and fourtb sections of IYhi~h are as follows: 
"Section 1. That the said Boise .'l.rtesian Hot & Cold Water Company. a 
private corporation organized and existing under and by virtue of the laws 
of the state of west Virginia, tbe successors in interest of the said H. B. 
Eastman anel B. 1\1. Eastman in and to said waterworks now being operated 
under said license granted by snid ordinance of October 3d, 18SD, in said 
Boise City, are herehy required to bereafter pay to said Boise City on the 
firH day of eacb and el'ery month, a nWllthly license fee of $300.00, for the 
pridlege granted by said ordinance of October 3d, 188!l, to lay and repair 
water pipes in tbe streets nnd alleys of snid city tbrough whicb waler Is be-
ing furnished to the inbabitants of said Boise City by said company. • • * 
"Sec. 4. Tbat nothing in this ordinance sha1I be construed or understood 
as granting any privilcp:e or authority for any other term than tbat provided 
for in tbe aforesaid ordinance of October 3d, 1889." 
Tbe action was brougbt to recover tbe aggregate amount of tbree years' 
license fees so imposed, and whieb the defendant refused to pay after de-
mand made. The court below beld tbat tbe ordinance of July 10, 1890, to tbe Artesian 
,Vater & Land Improvement Company. its Sl1ccessors and assigns, having 
been accepted and acted upon by tile grnntee and its successors, created a 
fr:lI1cbise for 50 years, anc1 tbat tbe imposition of tbe license tax provicled 
for by tbe ordiuance of June 7, 190G, was an impairment of such franchise 
and tberefore void. Judgment followed accordingly, and the city brougbt 
this IHit of error. 
Frank B. Kinyon and Cm'anah & Blake, for plaintiff in error. 
Richard H. Johnson, for defendant in error. 
Before ROSS and MORROW, Circuit Judges, and HANFORD, 
District Judge. 
ROSS, Circuit Judge (after stating the facts as above), It will be 
seen from the foregoing statement that the trial court held in effect 
that the ordinance of July 10, 1890, granted to the Artesian \,yater & 
Land Improvement Company. one of the predecessors in interest of 
tl;e defendant in error, a franchise to use the streets and alleys of the 
clty for the purpose of supplying it and its inhabitants with water for 
the period of 50 years. If that be so, then manifestly the. attempted 
imposition by the ordinance of Tune 7, 1906, of the license fees in 
question was of no effect. The court below held that the fact that the 
plaintiff in error was incorporated and exists under a special charter 
does not render inapplicable to it the provisions of section 2710 of the 
Revised Statutes of Idaho of 188'1, and tbat the provisions of that sec-
tion should be read into the ordinance of July 10, 1890, as a part 
thereof, and thereby fixed the life of the franchise or privilege granted 
by that ordinance at 50 years. 
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Section 2710 of the state statutes so referred to reads as follows: 
"No corporation formed to supply any city or town with water must do so 
unless previously autborized by an ordinance of the authoritles tbereof, or 
unless it is done in couformity wit.h a contract entered into betn'cen the cil,. 
or town nnd the corporation. Contracts so made are valid and binding in 
law, but do not take from the city or town tbe right to regulate ttle raLes for 
water. llor must any exC'lusive ri~ht be granted. No contract or grunt must 
be made for a term exceeding fifty years." 
We are unable to give to this statute the effect attributed to it by 
the court below'. Its terms and purposes, we think, seem quite plain. 
Every corporation formed to supply any city or town of the state with 
water is thereby prohibited from doing so unless previously authorized 
by an ordinance of the authorities thereof, or unless done in con-
formity with a contract entered into between snch city or town and 
the corporation. Such contracts are authorized by the statute, subject 
to the express provision that they shall not take fro111 the city or town 
the right to regulate the rates for water, nor, further expressly de-
clares tbe statute, shall any exclusive right be granted, nor shall any 
such contract or grant be made for a term exceeding 50 years, 
This is very far from saying that no such contract or grant shal1 
be made for a shorter period than 50 years. It fixes a maximum be-
yond which no contract or grant is permitted to extend, but leaves the 
matter of time, within that limit, to be fixed by contract or by grant of 
the municipality. 
In the case of 'Water Co. v, Knoxville, 200 U. S. 22, 33, 26 Sup. Ct. 
224, 227 (50 L. Ed. 353), the Supreme Court said: 
"'Grants of franchises and special privileges are always to be construed 
most strongly against tbe dOhet', and in fa 1'01' of tbe pulllic.' Such were the 
words of this court in Turnpike Co, \-. Illinois, 96 U, S, 63, 68 (24 L. Ed. 651J, 
'l'he universal rule in doubtful cases-this court said in Oregon Itailway Co. 
v. Oregoniun Ry. Co .. 130 U. S. 1. 26 If) Sup. Ot. 409, 32 L. Ed. S3i]-is tbat 
't.he constructlon !;hall be against the grantee and in fal'or of tbe go,ern-
ment.' As late as Ooosaw Mining Co. v. South Carolina, 144 D, 8. 550, 562 
[12 Sup, Qt. (;89, 36 L, Ed. 537), this court said: 'The doctrine is firmly es-
tablished that only that which is granted in clear and explicit terms passes 
hy a grant of property, franChises. or pridleges in whicb the gOl'ermnent or 
tue public has an interest. Statuto1', grants of tbat character are to be con-
strued strictly in favor of tbe public, and Whatever is not unequil'ocally 
granted is withbeld; nothing passes b, mere implication. This principle, it 
hus been said, is a \vise one. flS it scn'e~ to defl?nt any purpose concealed by 
the skillful use of terms to accomplish somethil1.g not apparent on tue face 
of the act, and thus sanctions onl"' open dealing with legislntil'e bodies.' Sli-
dell v. Grandjean, 111 D. S. 412, 438 (4 Sup. Ct. 475,.28 L. Ed. 321], We bHe 
never departed from or modified tbese principles, but bave reaffirmed tbem 
in many cases. It is true tbat tbe cases to n'hich we have referred involved 
in tbe main tbe construction of legislative enactments, But tbe principles 
tbey annoullce apply with full force to ordil1tlnCes and contracts by mnnicipal 
corporations in respect of matters tbat concern tbe public. Tbe authorities 
are all agreed tbat a mUlliciJ1~1 corporation, when exerting it;; functions for 
tile general good, is not to bp shorn of its powers by mere implication. If by 
contract or otherwise it may. in particular circumstances. restriet tbe exer-
cise of its public pon·ers. the intention to do so 111ust be manife,l ed by words 
so clear as not to admit of two different or inconsistent meanings." 
Turning to the ordinance of July 10, 1890, it is seen that it only 
granted to the Arte!'ian iVater & Land Improvement Company, one 
of the predecessors in interest of the defendant in error, the privilege 
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of laying down and maintammg water pipes in the streets and alley_ 
then laid out in Boise City or thereafter to be laid out and dedicated' 
with provisions for the proper performance of the work with rca.' 
sonable diligence. In effect the provisions of that ordinance were pre. 
cisely similar to those of the previous ordinance of October 3, 1889 
granting to the Eastman Bros., also predecessors in interest of the de~ 
fend ant in error, similar rights, which were held by this court in the 
case of Boise City Artesian Hot & Cold Water Co. v. Boise City, 123 
Fed. 232, 59 C. C. A. 236, to have conferred on the Ea.stmans a license 
merely, revocable at the pleasure of the city; we there saying: 
"The ordinance of October. 1889. granted permission to the Eastmans and 
to their successor~ in interest to lay and repair their pipes in tbe streets of 
the city. and to furnish water to tbe inbabitants thereof. No term "'as fixed 
for the duration of the prh"Uegc, and no contract was in terms ronae between 
tbe city and the grantees of the privilege. It is plnin tbat the ordinance was 
eitber the grant of a license rel"ocable at tbe will of the grantor. or. by its 
acceptance on tbe part of the grantee, it became an irrevocable and perpetual 
contract. No middle gronnd is tenable between these two constructions. In 
tbe Constitutions of nearly all the states it is provided that no eXclusive or 
perpetual francbises shall be granted, and. irrespecth'e of sncb constitutional 
limitation. it is clear. botb npon reason and authority. that no municipal cor-
poration, in the ahsence of express legislatiye autbority, bas power to grant 
a perpetual francbise for tbe nse of its streets. The ('ity of Boise was incor-
porated by tbe territori,,1 Legislo\ure of Idnho on .January 11. 18SB. It was 
given power 'to provlc1e tbe city with good and wholesome water: and to 
erect or construct 'such wa terworks and reservoirs within the established 
limits of the city as may be necessary or com'enient therefor: Tbere cnn 
be no doubt that under this provision of its charter the city bad the power 
to grant the use of its streets for a fixed reasonahle period of time. eitber to 
an indl,idufl.1 or to a corporation. for the purpo"" of furnishine: a water sur>-
ply to tbe inbabitants. It bad no autbority. how<'ver. to make a perpetual 
contract. A municipal corporation intrusted with the power of control over 
its public streets cannot. D)" contract or otherwise. irrevocably surrender [lny 
part of sucb power without the explicit consent of tbe Le"islature. Cooley's 
Constitutional Limitations (2d E,1.) 205. 210; Dillon on Municipal Corpora· 
tions. §~ 715. 716: Barnett v. Denison. 145 U. S. 135. 13!1. 12 Sup. ct. 819. 36 
L. Ed. '652. And lep:islatiye grants of powers to municipal corporations are 
to be so strictly construed as to operate as a surrender of the soverei"nty of 
tbe state no further than is expressly declared by the lanq;l1age thereof. 
Cbarles River Bridge Co. "1". Warren Bridge. 11 Pet. 426. !l L. Ed. 773. 938: 
Syracuse Water Co. "1'. City of ~)'mcl1se. 116 N. Y. J137. 22 N. E. :181. 5 L. R. 
A. 54G; Lone: Islanll ,Vater 811nniy Co. v. Brookiyn. 1Gr, U. S. 68::;. 6913. 17 
Sup. Ct. 718. '41 L. E,~. J 1R~: ~tein v. Rien,ilie '.Yater Supply Co .. 141 U. S. 
67. 11 Sl1D. Ct. S!l2. :\!'\ L. Eel. 622. From the"p principles and authoritie~ it 
follow. that the Ea"tman" were given no exciusi"l'e or perpetnal right. and 
tbat the ordinance operntc'll to grant them n license oni,. and left the city 
free at any time to re"l'o];e the priyilege granted. or to nut in its own water-
worl<s. or to p:rnnt a franchise to another company. The most tbat tbe Il-
censees could claim under it was that it legn1i7,eo (heir use of the ~treets for 
SUpplying water. nnll gnye them permission to occupy the same until sucb 
time as 'the city might see fit to terminate tbe prh'i1ege." 
If a revocable license only, it does not seem to be questioned that 
the. city might either terminate the license, or impose a license fee as 
a condition of its continued enjoyment. 
It results from what has been said that the j\1dgment must be and 
is reversed. with directions for further proceedings in accordance 
with the views here expressed. 
HANLEY V. UNITED STATES 
HANLEY v. UNITED STATES. t 
(Circuit Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit. February 6, 1911.) 
No.l.814. 
1. PUBLIC LANDS .§ :9')-UNLAWFUL INCLOSURE-PROSECUTION. 
'111 
Whether defell(bnt. wbo was general manager of a large stocl, ranch 
owned by a corpol'ation. on "'hieb there was a fence' wbieb. together 
with natural barrier., inclosed a large quantity of government lund. 
was pers0ually ehargeuule with the offense of maintainiDg such inclosure 
in violation of Act J<'eb. 188,>, c. 149. § 1. 23 Stat. 321 (U. S. Compo st. 
1901, p. 1524), hel.d. under tbe e,idence, a question for the jury. 
[Ed. Note.-For otber cases. see Public Lands, Dec. Dig. § 19.*] 
2. PUBLIC LANDS (§ 100)-PROSECUTION FOR UNLAWFUL INCLOSURE-INSTRUC' 
TIONS. 
The charge of the court in a prosecution for maintaining un unlawful 
inClosure of public lanus in relation to e,-idenee of tbe intention and pur· 
pose with which the fences complained of "'ere built and maintained con· 
sidered. and lIeld. witbout error. 
[Ed. Note.-For otber cases. see Public Lands. Dec. Dig. § 19. oJ 
3. PUBLIC LANDS (§ l!l*)-PnoSECUTlON FOR UNLAWFUL INCLOSURE-INSTRUC-
TIONS. 
Act Feb. 25. 1885. e. 14(). § 1, 23 Stat. 321 (D. S. C<lmp. St. 1901, p. 
1524). probibits the construction or maintenance of any inciosure of pub· 
lic land by one bavin/Z no clnim or color of title tbereto. Section 4 pro-
vides tbat any person viobting the act "whether as owner. part OW11er. 
agent. or who ~btln aid. ahet. counsel. advise or assist in any violation 
tbereaL" shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor. Held that. under an 
indictment cbarging only tl"!e maintenance of such an inclosure. tIle de-
fendant could not he conyicted of bn"ing aided. abetted. counseled. ad· 
vised, or assisted in its maintenance. 
[Ed. Note.-For other cases. see PubUc Lands. Dec. Dig. § 19.'] 
In Error to the District Court of the United States for the District 
of Oregon. 
William Hanley was cO!1\'icted of a criminal offense, and brings er-
ror. Reversed. 
C. E. S. Wood and John TIL Gearin, for plaintiff in error. 
John McCourt, U. S. Atty. 
Before GILBERT and ROSS, Circuit Judges, and HANFORD, Dis-
trict Judge. 
ROSS. Circuit Judge. The plaintiff in error was defendant in the 
court below to an indictment containing two counts, the first of which 
charged him with unlawfully maintaining and controlling certain 
fences, which, together with natural barriers and cross-fences, inclosed 
a large body of public land of the United States situated in Harney 
county, state of Oregon, and the second of which counts charged him 
with unlawfully preventing and obstructing persons from peaceably 
entering upon or establishing a settlement or residence on the tracts of 
public land within the inclosure, and preventing and obstructing their 
passage over and through the public lands so inclosed by means of the 
fences described in the first count, contrary to the provisions of Act 
-For other cases see same topic &: § NUMBER In vee. &; Am. Digs. 1901 to date. & Rep'r lode.:::" 
t Rehearing denied March 10. 1911. 
'" '" ..,
:0. 
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N.J. 127, 132-33,405 A.2d 381 (1979) (citing 
40:550--4). Second, the legislative history 
of "interested party" indicates that a poten-
tial plaintiff must show merely that he has 
been denied the reciprocal benefits of a 
common zoning plan. 
[14] The current definition of "interest-
ed party" first appeared in N.J.S.A. 40:55-
47.1 of the prior municipal land use statute. 
The Legislature intended that section to 
give individuals the same right to an in-
junction afforded municipalities under N.J. 
S.A. 40:55--47. See Assembly Bill 536 of 
1969; see, also, Alpine Borough v. Brew-
ster, 7 N.J. 42, 80 A.2d 297 (1951). Accord-
ingly, an interested party, at most, must 
show the equivalent of what was tradition-
aIly described as "special damages," that is, 
damages "distinct from [those] suffered ... 
in common with the community at large." 
Morris v. Haledon, 24 N.J. Super. 171, 179-
80, 93 A.2d 781 (App.Div.1952). See, also, 
Governor's Message re Assembly Bill 536, 
Dec. I, 1969; Alpine Borough v. Brewster, 
supra 7 N.J. at 52, 80 A.2d 297; Stokes v. 
Jenkins, 107 N.J.Eq. 318, 321, 152 A. 383 
(Ch.1930). 
[15J Plaintiffs have clearly suffered spe-
cial damages. Their proximity to the wind-
mill denies them the equal benefit of enjoy-
ment of their property, and causes them 
injury greater than that suffered by the 
general pUblic. See Stokes v. Jenkins, su-
pra at 322, 152 A. 383. Accordingly, plain-
tiffs are "interested parties" within the 
meaning of N.J.S.A. 40:550-4 and are enti-
tled to an injunction under N.J.S.A. 
40:55D-18. 
[16J Defendants nevertheless contend 
that the windmill ordinance is arbitrary and 
unreasonable. That position is unpersua-
sive. Defendants argue that the ordinance 
violates equal protection guarantees by ar-
bitrarily singling out windmills for noise 
control, and due process because it unrea-
sonably limits windmill noise to 50 dBA 
while other ambient sounds often rise above 
that level. The ordinance, however, is a 
zoning regulation and was promulgated un-
der the police power. Since it is "social" 
legislation it need be justified only by a 
showing that, in any state of facts, it rea-
sonably advances a legitimate state pur-
pose. Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 
485, 90 S.Ct. 1153, 1161, 25 L.Ed.2d 491 
(1970). This same minimal standard satis-
fies the principle of substantive due process. 
See Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502, 54 
S.Ct. 505, 78 L.Ed. 940 (1934); Hutton Park 
Gardens v. West Orange, 68 N.J. 543, 560-
61,350 A.2d 1 (1975). Thus, a showing that 
the ordinance reasonably advances a legiti-
mate state purpose would defeat both 
claims. 
Pursuant to a police power statute, the 
Brigantine ordinance legitimately protects 
public health and welfare by proscribing 
excessive noise. Limiting noise from wind-
miIls indisputably advances that legitimate 
purpose and does so in a reasonable way. 
The claim that "other ambient sounds" may 
exist above 50 dBA ignores the distinction 
between noise (unwanted sound) and natu-
ral ambient sounds. It is not unreasonable 
for Brigantine to classify a windmill's sound 
"noise" and thus limit it. Nor is it unrea-
sonable for the city to attack the noise 
problem "one step at a time," beginning 
with windmills, "addressing itself to the 
phase of the problem which seems most 
acute to the legislative mind." Williamson 
v. Lee Optical Co., 348 U.S. 483, 489, 75 
S.Ct. 461, 465, 99 L.Ed. 563 (1955). Defend-
ant's constitutional claims are thus without 
merit. It must also be r~membered that 
this ordinance is entitled to a presumption 
of validity. That presumption "may be 
overcome by a clear showing that the local 
ordinance is arbitrary or unreasonable." 
Quick Chek Food Stores v. Springfield Tp., 
83 N.J. 438, 447, 416 A.2d 840 (1980). There 
has been no such showing here. 
In conclusion, it is the view of this court 
that, for a variety of reasons, defendants' 
windmill constitutes an actionable nuisance. 
Under the same analysis plaintiffs' heat 
pump does not. An alternative basis for 
granting injunctive relief is defendants' vio-
lation of the municipal zoning ordinance. 
An order should be entered accordingly. 
CARLINO v. WHITPAIN INVESTORS Pa. 1385 
Cite as, 453 A.2d 1385 (Pa. 1982) 
2. Highways ~85 
Peter CARLINO and Elizabeth Carlino, 
His Wife, Appellants, 
v. 
WHITP AIN INVESTORS, Whitpain 
Township, Whitpain Township Board of 
Supervisors and Pennsylvania Depart-
ment of Transportation, Appellees. 
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania. 
Argued Oct. 19, 1982. 
Decided Dec. 23, 1982. 
Although complaint alleging that Com-
monwealth Department of Transportation 
should not have issued driveway permit au-
thorizing construction of access road with-
out adequate preliminary studies and that 
deficiencies existed in the access road which 
would endanger public health, safety and 
welfare contained broad assertion that defi-
ciencies would have unique impact on plain-
tiff, there was failure to specify any indi-
vidual injury attributable to deficiencies in 
roadway itself and in preparatory studies, 
and thus plaintiffs lacked standing to raise 
such objection to DOT's action. 
In an equity action, landowner sought 
preliminary injunctive relief with respect to 
an access road. Complaint was dismissed 
by the Commonwealth Court, 52 Pa. 
Cmwlth. 145, 415 A.2d 461, on preliminary 
objections, and the landowners appealed. 
The Supreme Court, Eastern District, Flah-
erty, J., held that: (1) landowners lacked 
standing to complain of endangering of the 
public health, safety and welfare; (2) alle-
gations asserting nonexistent right to main-
tain existing traffic conditions on avenue 
failed to state cause of action; (3) if de-
fending developer's predecessor in title pro-
cured rezoning of subject land in exchange 
for covenanted use restrictions applicable to 
that land, such restrictions would be unen-
forceable; and (4) any amendment of com-
plaint would be futile. 
3. Highways ~85 
Affirmed. 
Larsen, J., dissented and filed opinion 
in which McDermott, J., joined. 
1. Action ~ 13 
Rule respecting standing is not intend-
ed to bar from relief persons injured by 
breach of public duty merely because many 
others have incurred similar injuries as con-
sequences of that breach, but rather, the 
concern is to distinguish those who have 
suffered some individual injury from those 
asserting only common right of entire pub-
lic that the law be obeyed. 
Allegations that grant of driveway per-
mit by Commonwealth Department of 
Transportation would result in inconven-
ience and annoyance because of presence of 
access road immediately adjacent to plain-
tiff's property, thereby impairing value of 
the property in manner not compensable in 
damages, were an assertion of nonexistent 
right to maintain existing traffic conditions 
on avenue and therefore failed to state 
cause of action. 
4. Contracts ~108(1) 
Individuals cannot, by contract, abridgf 
police powers which protect general welfare 
and public interest but, rather, the other-
wise valid contractual rights of individuals 
must give way to general welfare. 
5. Zoning and Planning ~3, 160 
Police power of municipalities cannot 
be subjected to agreements which restrict 
or condition zoning district classifications as 
to particular properties, and agreement and 
concomitant presentations or stipulations 
which induce changes in zoning district clas-
sifications do not limit effect of those 
changes once enacted. 
6. Pleading ~233 
Pretrial Procedure ~695 
Right to amend pleadings should not be 
withheld where there i~ ~omp rp".on"h]p 
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possibility that amendment can be accom-
plished successfully, but where allowance of 
amendment would be futile exercise, com-
plaint may properly be dismissed without 
allowance for amendment. 
Edward J. Hughes, Norristown, for ap-
pellants. 
Howard Gershman, Blue Bell, for Whit-
pain Tp. and Bd. of Sup'rs. 
J. Peirce Anderson, Norristown, John M. 
Hrubovcak, Asst. Atty. Gen. for Dept. of 
Transp. 
Before O'BRIEN, C.J., and ROBERTS, 
NIX, LARSEN, FLAHERTY, McDER-
MOTT and HUTCHINSON, JJ. 
OPINION OF THE COURT 
FLAHERTY, Justice. 
This equity action was commenced in the 
Court of Common Pleas of Montgomery 
County by the appellants, Peter Carlino and 
Elizabeth Carlino, seeking a preliminary in-
junction against the appellees, Whitpain In-
vestors (hereinafter Developer), Whitpain 
Township (hereinafter Township), and 
Pennsylvania Department of Transporta-
tion (hereinafter PennDOT). Upon motion 
of Penn DOT, the action was transferred to 
Commonwealth Court, and, sustaining ap-
pellees' preliminary objections, Common-
wealth Court dismissed the complaint.' 
The instant appeal ensued. 
Since review is sought of the sustainment 
of preliminary objections in the nature of 
demurrers, the well pleaded factual allega-
tions set forth in the complaint are to be 
regarded as true for purposes of review. 
Papieves v. Kelly, 437 Pa. 373, 263 A.2d 118 
(1970). The facts as alleged by appellants' 
complaint establish the following. Develop-
er is constructing an apartment complex in 
the Township on a 47 acre tract of land 
situated between three roads, one of which, 
Stenton Avenue, is a state highway. Ap-
pellants' residence lies directly across Sten-
ton Avenue from the construction site. De-
veloper's predecessor in title sought to have 
the 47 acre tract rezoned from an R-l 
(single-family) classification to an R-3 
(multi-family) classification to permit con-
struction of residential rental units. At the 
hearing on rezoning of the tract, the then 
owner stipulated that a 300 foot buffer 
would be provided from the right-of-way 
line of Stenton Avenue, and further speci-
fied that no access road from the apartment 
complex to Stenton Avenue would be built. 
In 1973, the requested zoning change was 
adopted by the Township. In 1979, how-
ever, construction of an access road from 
the apartment complex to Stenton Avenue 
commenced, and appellants became aware 
that the land development plan finally ap-
proved by the Township had, at the insis-
tence of the Township, included a provision 
for access to Stenton Avenue, and that in 
1978, a driveway permit authorizing con-
struction of the access road to Stenton A ve-
nue had been issued by Penn DOT. 
[1, 2] Alleging that the driveway permit 
issued by PennDOT to Developer was 
granted without adequate preliminary stud-
ies, and asserting the existence of deficien-
cies in the access road that endanger the 
public health, safety, and welfare, appel-
lants seek an injunction requiring revoca-
tion of the perInit. Established principles 
governing standing to raise issues in the 
public interest, however, bar appelIants' as-
sertion of these claims. In Wm. Penn Park-
ing Garage, Inc. v. City of Pittsburgh, 464 
Pa. 168, 192, 346 A.2d 269, 280-281 (1975), 
our cases dealing with standing were sum-
marized as follows: 
The core concept, of course, is that a 
person who is not adversely affected in 
any way by the matter he seeks to chal-
lenge is not "aggrieved" thereby and has 
no standing to obtain a judicial resolution 
of his challenge. In particular, it is not 
sufficient for the person claiming to be 
"aggrieved" to assert the common inter-
est of all citizens in procuring obedience 
to the law. 
r .................. ,.... 1AC:: Ale:>: h,.,,,, dt:l (IQQ()\ 
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(footnotes omitted). This rule respecting "Respondent, as an abutting property 
standing is not intended to bar from relief owner on a public highway, does not now 
persons injured by breach of a public duty have and has never had any other proper-
merely because many others have incurred ty interest in the public highway other 
similar injuries as a consequence of that than a reasonable right of ingress and 
br:ach; rather, the "concern is to di~tin.- egress, as stated. Respondent has never 
g~llsh t?~se who have suffere~ some lndl- had a property right in the traffic, great 
Vidual lnJU1Y from those assertmg only the or small on the highway nor a right to 
common right of the entire public that the ' '. 
law be obeyed." Id. at 203, 346 A.2d at 287 recover da~ages for a decrease I~ va~ue 
( h · dd d) S· th' t t of her premIses by reason of the dIversIOn emp aSls a e. IUce e IUS an com- . 
plaint, although containing a broad asser- of traffiC away from he.r property, no 
tion that deficiencies in the access road wiIl has she had a property right to have th 
"have a unique impact" on appellants, fails same amount of traf~ic pass ~er property 
to specify any individual injury attributable as before or to have It move m the same 
to deficiencies in the roadway itself and in direction." 
preparatory studies, appellants must be re- (emphasis added). Since appellants' conten-
garded as lacking standing to raise such tion that the access road in question will 
objections to PennDOT's action. cause inconvenience and annoyance is, in 
[3] Appellants further challenge Penn- essence, an assertion of right to maintain 
DOT's grant of the driveway permit on the existing traffic conditions on Stenton 
grounds that presence of the access road Avenue, and since the existence of such a 
immediately adjacent to their property will right has been negated by our holding in 
cause inconvenience and annoyance, there- Wolf, appellants' claim against PennDOT 
by impairing the value of their property in fails to state a cause of action. 
a manner not compensable in damages. We 
regard this assertion as inadequate to state 
a cause of action. In Wolf v. Department 
of Highways, 422 Pa. 34, 220 A.2d 868 
(1966), an eminent domain case, an owner 
of business property abutting a state high-
way alleged that highway improvements 
had diminished the property's value by ne-
cessitating a circuitous route of ingress, 
thereby reducing the number of business 
customers willing to enter the premises. 
Denying the owner's claim for damages in-
sofar as property value diminution occa-
sioned by such a diversion of traffic, this 
Court held that owners of properties abut-
ting state roads have no cognizable legal 
interest in preserving a particular flow of 
traffic on those roads. Thus, in Wolf, 422 
Pa. at 47, 220 A.2d at 875, quoting State of 
Missouri ex reI, State Highway Comm. v. 
Meier, 388 S.W.2d 855, 857 (Mo.1965), the 
rights of an abutting owner were stated as 
folIows: 
2. In Gladwyne Colony, Inc. v. Lower Merion 
Township, 409 Pa. 441, 187 A.2d 549 (1963), it 
was alleged that a landowner gave considera-
tion (parkland) to a municipality in exchange 
E ....... ............ ,. .............. t ""f ........... _ .... _:_ ....... _..Jl_____ Tt.._ 
With respect to Township and Developer, 
appellants seek an injunction requiring the 
former to refrain from conditioning Devel-
oper's construction permit upon provision of 
the access road in question, and requiring 
the latter to eliminate that road and restore 
the 300 foot buffer zone along Stenton A v 
nue. The complaint alIeges that 
er's predecessor in title, pursuant an 
ment with the Township, stipulated as to 
plans to preserve the buffer area and fore-
go an access road to Stenton A venue, there-
by rendering the 1973 rezoning contractual-
ly conditioned upon there being no access 
route traversing the buffer zone. 
[4, 5] The concept of contractually con-
ditioned zoning advanced by appellants 
lacks precedent in this Commonwealth,2 and 
authorities elsewhere differ with respect to 
whether to accord the concept validity. See 
generalIy Nicholson v. TourtelIotte, 110 R.I. 
case did not involve contractually conditioned 
rezoning, however, since no special land use 
limitations or conditions were accepted by the 
property owner in order to secure the rezoning. 
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411, 293 A.2d 909 (1972); State ex rel. Zu-
pancic v. Schimenz, 46 Wis.2d 22, 174 
N.W.2d 533 (1970); 70 ALR 3d 125. The 
proposition has long been recognized in this 
Commonwealth that individuals cannot, by 
contract, abridge police powers which pro-
tect the general welfare and public interest. 
As stated in Leiper v. Baltimore & Philadel-
phia Railroad Co., 262 Pa. 328, 332, 105 A. 
551, 553 (1918), "Where the rights of indi-
viduals under a contract which would other-
wise be perfectly valid are in conflict with 
the 'general well-being of the State: the 
rights of the individuals must give way to 
the general welfare." See also, Municipal 
Authority of Blythe v. Pennsylvania Public 
Utility Commission, 199 Pa.Super. 334, 185 
A.2d 628 (1962). The police power of mu-
nicipalities cannot be subjected to agree-
ments which restrict or condition zoning 
district classifications as to particular prop-
erties. We are in accord with the position 
adopted by the Supreme Court of New Jer-
sey, in Houston Petroleum Co. v. Automo-
tive Products Credit Association, Inc., 9 N.J. 
122, 87 A.2d 319, 322 (1952), wherein the 
Court stated: "Contracts thus have no 
place in a zoning plan and a contract be-
tween a municipality and a property owner 
should not enter into the enactment or en-
forcement of zoning regulations." In Hous-
ton, covenants and restrictions agreed to by 
a landowner as a means of effecting a 
zoning change were held invalid on grounds 
that the purported contract thereby made, 
was, with regard to the municipality, ultra 
vires and contrary to public policy. In so 
holding, the Court relied upon its decision in 
V.F. Zahodiakin Engineering Corp. v. Zon-
ing Board of Adjustment, 8 N.J. 386, 394-
395, 86 A.2d 127, 131 (1952), setting forth 
the following principle, with which we 
agree, governing exercise of municipal zon-
ing power: 
Zoning is an exercise of the police pow-
er to serve the common good and general 
welfare. It is elementary that the legis-
lative function may not be surrendered or 
curtailed by bargain or its exercise con-
3. Since rezoning of the subject tract is held not 
to be validly conditioned upon there being no 
access road to Stenton Avenue. there is no 
trolled by the considerations which enter 
into the law of contracts. The use re-
striction must needs have general applica-
tion. The power may not be exerted to 
serve private interests merely, nor may 
the principle be subverted to that end. 
Accordingly, we reject the view that agree-
ments, and concomitant representations or 
stipulations, which induce changes in zoning 
district classifications limit the effect of 
those changes once enacted. Thus, if it 
were proven, as alleged in the complaint, 
that Developer's predecessor in title pro-
cured rezoning of the subject land in ex-
change for covenanted use restrictions ap-
plicable to that land, such restrictions would 
be unenforceable; hence, proceedings to en-
force the restrictions were properly dis-
missed by the court below.3 
[6] Finally, appellants contend that the 
court below abused its discretion by dismiss-
ing their complaint, while sustaining pre-
liminary objections, without granting leave 
to amend the pleadings in an effort to avoid 
dismissal. As stated in Otto v. American 
Mutual Insurance Co., 482 Pa. 202, 205, 393 
A.2d 450, 451 (1978), "The right to amend 
should not be withheld where therc is some 
reasonable possibility that amendment can 
be accomplished successfully." Where al-
lowance of an amendment would, however, 
be a futile exercise, the complaint may 
properly be dismissed without allowance for 
amendment. Nationwide Mutual Insurance 
Co. v. Barbera, 443 Pa. 93, 277 A.2d 821 
(1971). Appellants submit only that, if 
granted the opportunity to amend their 
complaint, they "would plead ... a suffi-
cient interest to confer standing .. , and 
would assert third party beneficiary rights 
.. , arising out of the stipulation and 
agreement between the Township and the 
Developer and the conditional rezoning of 
the tract." Since the principle of contrac-
tually conditioned rezoning lacks viability, 
and in view of appellants' failure to allege 
what new interest would be asserted as a 
basis for standing, there appears no reason-
need to address PennDOTs claim that munici· 
palities lack authority to deny access to state 
highways. 
CARLINO v. WHITPAIN INVESTORS Pa. 1389 
Cite as, 453 A.2d 1385 (Pa. 1982) 
able possibility that amendment could suc-
cessfully be accomplished. Accordingly, an 
opportunity to amend the complaint was 
rights, should not be left without a remedy 




LARSEN, J., files a dissenting opinion in 
which McDERMOTT, J., joins. 
LARSEN, Justice dissenting. 
I dissent to the majority's conclusion that 
the appellants have no enforceable rights 
against the township and developer. The 
Carlinos apparently were prepared to op-
pose the application for rezoning and, if 
necessary, challenge by appeal any approval 
of a new zoning classification. However, 
the appellants were misled to inaction by 
conduct of the township and the developer's 
predecessor when the property was rezoned. 
The potential flames of opposition were 
doused quickly and efficiently by the sooth-
ing nectar of promises, stipulations and rep-
resentations publicly and officially made by 
township officials and the then owner of 
the premises. There is nothing before us to 
suggest that the Carlinos were other than 
completely assured that the threats to the 
public health and safety, which they per-
ceived, were effectively minimized by the 
establishment of a 300 feet buffer zone and 
the committment that no access road to 
Stenton Avenue would be built. The appel-
lants' good faith beliefs in this regard were 
derived directly from the pacifying actions 
of the township and the former property 
owner. The Carlinos, who were cajoled into 
giving up valuable and legally protected 
Under these circumstances, it may be said 
that the rezoning application with accompa-
nying plan and representations were detri-
mentaly misleading as to the Carlinos. In 
such instances, our courts have said that 
negligent or wrongful official conduct 
which misleads an aggrieved party to his 
detriment can be equated to fraud. See: 
Appeal of Girolamo, 49 Pa.Commw. 159, 410 
A.2d 940 (1980); See also: Visual-EducE 
tion Devices, Inc. v. Springettsbury Town 
ship, 54 Pa.Commw. 529, 422 A.2d 235 
(1980). Although the facts and specific is-
sues in Girolamo and Springettsbury are 
dissimilar to those in the present case, the 
judicial disapproval of deceit and mislead-
ing conduct as a viable principle is applica-
ble to the Carlinos' situation. 
Accordingly, I would hold that the appel-
lants' right to be heard, a right which they 
were wrongfully induced to forego in 1973, 
should be recognized under the facts in this 
case and would, therefore, reverse. 
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Wen Y. CHUNG, as Trustee U/AfD 
June 5, 1986, Appellant, 
ments for rezoning. U.S.CA Const.Amend. 
14; West's F.SA § 163.3215(7). 
v. 
SARASOTA COUNTY, a Political Subdivi-
sion of the State of Florida, and The 
Board of County Commissioners of Sar-
asota County, Florida, and its Commis-
sioners, Wayne L. Derr, Charley Rich-
ards, Robert L. Anderson, David R. 
Mills, and Eugene A. Matthews, in their 
official capacities, Appell ees, 
and 
Elling O. Eide and Holiday Harbor 
Homeowners Association, Inc., 
Intervenors/Appellees. 
Nos. 95-04581, 95-04911. 
District Court of Appeal of Florida, 
Second District. 
Dec. 27, 1996. 
Trustee brought action against county to 
challenge county's denial of his rezoning peti-
tion. The Circuit Court, Sarasota County, 
Peter A. Dubensky, J., vacated stipulated 
final judgment which had obligated county to 
rezone trustee's property subject to numer-
ous stipulations and conditions. Trustee ap-
pealed. The District Court of Appeal, Blue, 
J., held that county's purported settlement 
agreement with trustee constituted invalid 
contract zoning. 
Mfirrned. 
1. Zoning and Planning <1:=>160 
2. Zoning and Planning <1:=>160 
"Contract zoning" refers to agreement 
between property owner and local govern-
ment where owner agrees to certain condi-
tions in return for government's rezoning or 
enforceable promise to rezone. 
See publication Words and Phrases 
for other judicial constructions and def-
initions. 
3. Zoning and Planning <1:=>160, 762 
Contracts have no place in zoning plan 
and contract between municipality and prop-
erty owner should not enter into enactment 
or enforcement of zoning regulations; pur-
ported contract so made is ultra vires and all 
proceedings to effectuate it are coram non 
judice and utterly void. 
Stephen D. Rees and Julie Ginsburg Eller 
of Icard, Merrill, Cullis, Timm, Furen & 
Ginsburg, P A, Sarasota. for Appellant. 
Elizabeth M. Woodford, Assistant County 
Attorney, Sarasota, for Appellee Sarasota 
County and its Commissioners. 
Donald E. Hernke of Carlton, Fields. 
Ward, Emmanuel, Smith & Cutler, P.A.. 
Tampa, for Appellee/Intervenor Eide. 
Daniel J. Lobeck of The Law Offices of 
Lobeck & Hanson, P A, Sarasota, for Appel-
lee/Intervenor Holiday Harbor_ 
BLUE, Judge. 
In these consolidated cases, Wen Y. 
County's purported settlement agree-
ment in zoning litigation, under which county 
agreed to rezone disputed property subject 
to numerous stipulations and conditions, con-
stituted invalid contract zoning, though coun-
ty commission had approved settlement at its 
regular meetings, as settlement bypassed 
more stringent notice and hearing require-
Chung, as trustee, appeals two orders by the 
circuit court. The first order allowed the 
Holiday Harbor Homeowners Association to 
intervene_ Because Holiday Harbor'S sub-
stantial interests were affected and because 
it moved to intervene while a rehearing was 
pending, we affirm this order without further 
discussion. See, e.g., Wilson v. Clm'le, 414 
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Cite as 686 So.2d \358 (Fla.App.2 DiS!. 1996) 
of a determination does not '" occur until Bank, 252 So.2d 1, 4 (Fla.1971). For the 
time expires to file a rehearing petition and 
disposition thereof if filed .... "); Friedland 
v. City of Hollywood, 130 So.2d 306 (Fla. 2d 
DCA 1961) (holding that adjacent property 
owners had standing to challenge rezoning). 
The second order on appeal vacated a stipu-
lated fipal judgment entered in a zoning dis-
pute between Chung and Sarasota County. 
Based on the following analysis, we have 
concluded that Sarasota County's purported 
settlement agreement constituted improper 
contract zoning. Accordingly, we affirm the 
trial court order that vacated the fmal judg-
ment. 
Briefly stated. the facts are these. In 
1990. Chung filed a petition with Sarasota 
County to rezone approximately eleven acres 
of land. After the rezoning petition was 
denied by the Sarasota County Commission, 
Chung filed legal actions in the circuit court. 
Subsequently, Chung and the County en-
tered into a settlement agreement, which 
obligated the County to rezone Chung's 
property subject to numerous stipulations 
and conditions. Based on the settlement, the 
trial court entered a stipulated final judg-
ment and retained jurisdiction over its en-
forcement. An adjacent property owner, Ell-
ing O. Eide, filed a motion to intervene that 
the trial court granted for the limited pur-
pose of a rehearing. The Holiday Harbor 
Homeowners Association also intervened. 
After a healing, the trial court vacated the 
stipUlated final judgment and Chung appeals. 
[1] Chung argues that the trial court 
erred in vacating the stipulated final judg-
ment because counties have the authority to 
enter into contracts and to settle litigation. 
Eide and the Homeowners Association argue 
that the settlement agreement and final 
judgment were invalid as contract zoning and 
as violative of due process and various stat-
utes and ordinances related to zoning_ We 
accept the general rule that uta] stipulation 
properly entered into and relating to a mat-
ter upon which it is appropriate to stipulate 
is binding upon the parties and upon the 
Court" r""J'rJ'YJ Pl","l'V>J..';"",.. r.M_ 
following reasons. however, we have reached 
the conclusion that this zoning dispute was 
not a matter upon which it was appropriate 
to stipulate. 
[2, 3] "Contract zoning" refers to an 
agreement between a property owner and a 
local government where the owner agrees to 
certain conditions in return for the govern-
ment's rezoning or enforceable promise to 
rezone. James D. Lawlor. Annotation, Va-
lidity. Construction, & Effect of Agreenwnt 
to Rezone, or Amendment to Zoning Ordi-
nance, Creating Special Restrictions or Con-
ditions Not Applicable to Other P?-operly 
Similady Zoned, 70 A.L_R.3d 125, 131 
(1976). 
Contracts have no place in a zoning plan 
and a contract between a municipality and 
a property owner should not enter into the 
enactment or enforcement of zoning regu-
lations. . . . [A] purported contract so 
made is ultra vires and all proceedings to 
effectuate ,it are coram non judice and 
utterly void. 
E.C. Yokley. 4 Zoning Law & Practice § 25-
11, at 321 (4th ed. 1979) (footnote omitted). 
In P.C.B. Partnm-ship v. Cit.y of Largo, 549 
So_2d 738 (Fla. 2d DCA 1989), this court held 
that a contract was ultra vires and unen-
forceable because it purported to restrict the 
City's decision-making authority on develop-
ment issues. "The City does not have the 
authori!:'! to enter into such a contract, which 
effectively contracts away the exercise of its 
police powers." 549 So.2d at 740 (citations 
omitted). 
One of the reasons contract zoning is gen-
erally rejected is because "[t]he legislative 
power to enact and amend zoning regulations 
requires due process. notice. and hearings." 
Terry Lewis et aI., Spot Zoning, Contract 
Zoning, & Conditional Zoning, in 2 Florida 
Envi?'onmental & Land Use Law 9-1, 9-13 
(James J. Brown, ed., 2d ed. 1994). 
Assuming that the developer and munici-
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tory, contract zoning is nevertheless illegal 
when they enter into a bilateral agreement 
involving reciprocal obligations. By bind-
ing itself to enact the requested ordinance 
(or not to amend the existing ordinance), 
the municipality bypasses the hearing 
phase of the legislative process. 
Roy P. Cookston & Burt Bruton, Zoning 
Law, 35 U.Miami L.Rev. 581, 589 n. 34 
(1981). In Hartnett v. Austin, 93 So.2d 86 
(Fla.1956), the Florida Supreme Court de-
clared a zoning ordinance invalid because it 
was conditioned upon separate collateral 
agreements with the developer. The court 
also noted: 
If each parcel of property were zoned on 
the basis of variables that could enter into 
private contracts then the whole scheme 
and objective of community planning and 
zoning would collapse. The residential 
owner would never !mow when he was 
protected against commercial encroach-
ment. . .. The adoption of an ordinance is 
the exercise of municipal legislative power. 
In the exercise of this governmental func-
tion a city cannot legislate by contract. If 
it could, then each citizen would be gov-
erned by an individual rule based upon the 
best deal that he could make with the 
goverrii.rig body. 
93 So.2d at 89. We conclude that the Coun-
ty's settlement agreement here presents a 
case of improper contract zoning. Although 
the County Commission approved the settle-
ment at its regular meetings, it bypassed the 
more stringent notice and hearing require-
ments for a rezoning. When it entered into 
the settlement agreement that obligated it to 
rezone Chung's property, the County con-
tracted away the exercise of its police power, 
which constituted an ultra vires act. 
Chung argues that the County must still 
follow the formal requirements to enact the 
zoning amendments and that this process will 
provide the necessary due process opportuni-
ties for notice and a hearing. We reject this 
argument because the hearings that follow 
would be a pro forma exercise since the 
County has already obligated itself to a deci-
sion. See Zoning Board of Monroe County 
v. Hood, 484 So.2d 1331 (Fla. 3d DCA 1986) 
(binding County to stipulated final judgment, 
where the County had agreed to approve a 
development plan and rezone the site; no 
reference to contract zoning but discussing 
potential collateral attacks on the stipulated 
judgment by non-parties). In Molina v. 
Tradewinds Development C0111., 526 So.2d 
695 (Fla. 4th DCA 1988), the Fourth District 
approved a settlement agreement similar to 
the one between Chung and Sarasota County 
and affirmed an order compelling the City to 
comply by rezoning in conformity with the 
agreement. Without discussing the issue of 
contract zoning, the court held that the or-
ders did not abrogate or modify the City's 
obligation to follow applicable zoning laws, 
including requirements for public hearings. 
On this point, we disagree with the Fourth 
District because the County has already 
made its rezoning decision. Its obligation to 
follow applicable zoning laws, including re-
quirements for public hearings, is an obli-
gation that must be exercised prior to the 
decision-making, not afterwards. 
We are concerned about impairing a local 
government's ability to settle litigation. On 
the other hand, we can envision developers 
filing an unacceptable plan for rezoning, ap-
pealing its denial, and then obtaining approv-
al of a modified plan by settlement agree-
ment before satisfying the public notice and 
hearing requirements. While we do not sug-
gest that this happened in the present case, 
the fact remains that the County bound itself 
to enact the requested rezoning before the 
matter was noticed or scheduled for the re-
quired hearings. As a final note, we point 
out an interesting provision in chapter 163, 
Florida Statutes (1995). Aggrieved parties 
are entitled to bring suit to prevent local 
government action that would be inconsistent 
with the comprehensive plan. § 163.3215(1). 
"In any action under this section, no settle-
ment shall be entered into by the local gov-
ernment unless the terms of the settlement 
have been the subject of a public hearing 
after notice as required by this part." 
§ 163.3215(7). In the zoning and land use 
'-';"t 
GANYARD v. STATE Fla. 1361 Clle as 686 So.2d 1361 (Fla.App. 1 Disl. 1996) 
arena, we find reassuring this legislative rec- and he appealed. The District Court of Ap-
ognition of the need to afford due process, peal, Allen, J., held that: (1) defendant has no 
notice and hearing before settlement terms right to be physically present whenever per-
are approved. By prohibiting contract zon- emptory challenges might be exercised and 
ing, the same due process rights have been has only the right to be present when per-
protected in the local exercise of zoning pow- emptory challenges "are exercised," and (2) 
er. defendant was not prejudiced by his absence 
Accordingly, we affirm the trial court's from bench conference when peremptory 
order in this case, which vacated the stipu- challenges were exercised by prosecutor, de-
lated final judgment between Chung and spite claim that he was prejudiced because 
Sarasota County. Further, we certify the his attorney might have exercised challenges 
following question of great public impor- at the conference. 
tance: 
WHETHER A COUNTY OR LOCAL 
GOVERNMENT CAN ENTER INTO A 
SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT IN ZON-
ING LITIGATION WITHOUT FIRST 
ADHERING TO THE DUE PROCESS 
AND STATUTORY/ORDINANCE RE-
QUIREMENTS FOR ENACTING THE 
ZONING CHANGES CONTEMPLATED 
BY THE AGREEMENT? 
SCHOONOVER, A.C.J., and FULMER, 
J., concur. 
James D. GANYARD, Appellant, 
v. 
STATE of Florida, Appellee. 
No. 95-1536. 
District Court of Appeal of Florida, 
First District. 
Dec. 30, 1996. 
Rehearing Denied Feb. 7, 1997. 
Defendant was convicted in the Circuit 
, Court, Leon County, J. Lewis Hall, Jr., J., 
Affirmed and question certified. 
Lawrence, J., filed a specially conCurring 
opinion. 
Webster, J., dissented and filed an opin-
ion in which Mickle, J., joined. 
1. Criminal Law e:>636(3) 
It was error not to have defendant phys-
ically present at bench conference during 
which jury challenges were exercised where 
he never waived his presence or ratified the 
strikes made outside his presence. (Per Al-
len, J., with one Judge concurring and one 
Judge concurring specially.) 
2. Criminal Law e=>U66.14 
Defendant was not prejudiced by his 
absence from bench conference when per-
emptory challenges were exercised by prose-
cutor because challenges were within the dis-
cretion of the prosecutor, despite claim that 
defendant was prejudiced because his attor-
ney might have exercised challenges at the 
conference. (Per Allen, J., with one Judge 
conCurring and one Judge conCurring special-
ly.) 
3. Criminal Law e=>636(3) 
Defendant has no right to be physically 
present whenever peremptory challenges 
might be exercised; he has only the right to 
be present when peremptory challenges "are 
exercised." (Per Allen, J., with one Judge 
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A. 
[8] The Association in Count I of their 
underlying Amended Complaint alleged 
that the County willfully violated the 
FLSA. In United States Fidelity & Guar-
anty Co. v. Fireman's Fund Insurance 
Co., 896 F.2d 200, 203 (6th Cir.1990), the 
court interpreted a similar errors or omis-
sions policy to not cover intentional acts. 
The Fireman's Fund policy did not specifi-
cally exclude intentional acts of the in-
sured. The exclusions in that policy, like 
the exclusions here, were for dishonest, 
fraudulent, criminal or malicious acts. The 
court concluded that the only reasonable 
construction was that the insurance compa-
ny "contracted to provide coverage for neg-
ligent-not intentional acts • • • ." Id. 
A willful violation of the FLSA does not 
constitute a "negligent act or omission." 
Cj City of Fort Pierre v. United Fire & 
Casualty Co., 463 N.W.2d 845, 848 (S.D. 
1990) (holding negligent act, error or omis-
sions policy did not cover city's intentional 
decision to ignore federal government per-
mit requirements). 
Also, the FLSA is a federal statute that 
prescribes criminal penalties for its viola-
tion. 29 U.S.C. § 216(a). Thus, a willful 
violation of the FLSA is a criminal act that 
is excluded under the policy. 
B. 
[9,101 Count II of the Association's 
Amended Complaint alleged that the Coun-
ty breached its members' contract of em-
ployment and breached the County Rules 
and Regulations incorporated in the Collec-
tive Bargaining Agreement. Exclusionary 
provisions in insurance policies will be en-
forced if they are clear and do not violate 
public policy. Jimenez v. Foundation Re-
serve Ins. Co., 107 N.M. 322, 324, 757 P.2d 
792, 794 (1988). As previously noted, the 
exclusions applicable to the Comprehensive 
General Liability Insurance portion of the 
policy were also applicable to the errors or 
omissions section. The Comprehensive 
General Liability Insuranc1 exclusions in-
clude inter alia: : 
This insurance does not apply: 
(a) to liability assumed by the insured 
under any contract or agreement eXcept 
a defined contract: but this exclusion 
does not apply to a warranty of fitness 
or quality of the named insured's product 
if a warranty that work performed by or 
on behalf of the named insured will be 
done in a workmanlike manner; '" 
As defined in the policy, contract means 
"any written agreement, except one per. 
taining to aircraft, under which a named 
insured assumes the liability of others for 
bodily injury or property damage." In 
Commercial Union Insurance Co. v. Ba. 
sic American Medical, Inc., 703 F.Supp. 
629, 632-33 (E.D.Mich.1989), the court in. 
terpreted the following exclusionary Ian. 
guage in a general liability policy: "This 
insurance does not apply: a. to liability 
assumed by the insured under any contract 
or agreement except an incidental contract 
• • • ." The Commercial Union Court 
found that "employment contracts do not 
constitute the type of liability assumed by 
defendants under a contract which would 
bring these contracts within the policy's 
coverage." Id. at 633. In its analysis of 
the issue, the court referred to the follow-
ing discussion of contractual exclusions 
clauses in liability insurance policies con· 
tained in 12 George J. Couch, Couch on 
Insurance § 44A:35, at 55-57 (2d ed. 1981): 
"Such provisions • • • deny the cover-
age generally assumed by a liability polio 
cy in cases in which the insured in a 
contract with a third party agrees to 
save harmless or indemnify such third 
party." (citations omitted). 
The purpose of these contractual ex-
clusion clauses is not to make the insurer 
underwrite its insureds' contracts, but to 
limit coverage to the insured's tort liabili-
ty. 
Commercial Union, 703 F.Supp. at 633. 
We agree with the court in Commercial 
Union, and interpret the similar, clear lan-
guage here to exclude coverage for em-
ployment contracts. The Colonial Penn 
policy does not afford coverage for breach 
of contract or breach of the Collective Bar· 
gaining Agreement. 
()IL 
DACY v. VILLAGE OF RUIDOSO N.M. 793 
Cite as 845 P.2d 793 (N.M. 1992) 
C. 417, 426 (4th Cir.1947), cert. denied, 333 
(111 Count III of the Association's 
Amended Complaint alleged that the Coun-
ty failed to negotiate changes in County 
Rules and failed to pay stand-by time, 
therefore breaching its contract of employ-
ment with members of the Association and 
willfully violating County Rule 312.2. In 
the alternative, it is alleged that the Coun-
ty negligently breached the Collective Bar-
gaining Agreement. The County contends 
that acting upon the advice of its attorney 
and his interpretation of the FLSA, employ· 
ees were not paid for on-call lunch periods. 
The County argues "that a misapprehen-
sion of what the law allows is sufficient to 
constitute an error under the policy." 
Thus, the County contends, the breach of 
contract occurred as a result of a "negli-
gent act, error or omission," and the key to 
determining coverage is not the form of the 
pleading, but the nature of the insured's 
conduct. See Touchette Corp. v. Mer-
chants Mut. Ins. Co., 76 A.D.2d 7, 9, 429 
N.Y.S.2d 952, 954 (1980). 
U.S. 854, 68 S.Ct. 729, 92 L.Ed. 1135 (1948). 
The claims of the Association were prop-
erly viewed as existing only in contract, 
and the Colonial Penn policy excluded 
claims for breach of contract. The County 
made no showing that the essential facts of 
the complaint alleged any "negligent act, 
error or omission." See Wylie, 105 N.M. at 
409, 733 P.2d at 857. Therefore, Colonial 
Penn had no duty to defend or indemnify 
under the policy. 
Under some circumstances, breach of a 
contractual duty may give rise to an inde-
pendent action in tort. Preferred Mktg. v. 
Hawkeye Nat'/ Life Ins. Co., 452 N.W.2d 
389, 397 (Iowa 1990). "Only where a duty 
recognized by the law of torts exists be-
tween the plaintiff and defendant distinct 
from a duty imposed by the contract will a 
tort action lie for conduct in breach of the 
contract." Id.; see Cottonwood Enters. v. 
McAlpin, 111 N.M. 793, 795-96, 810 P.2d 
812, 814-15 (1991) (holding tort of negli· 
gence must be based upon duty other that 
one imposed by contract); W. Page Keeton 
et aI., Prosser and Keeton on the Law of 
Torts § 92 (5th ed. 1984) (describing re-
quirement for separate duty apart from 
contractual duty to give rise to tort action). 
There is no relationship between the Coun-
ty and its employees that gives rise to a 
legal duty to pay overtime which is inde-
pendent of the Collective Bargaining 
Agreement. Even the violation of the 
FLSA evolves from the contract of employ-
ment. The FLSA provisions "are read into 
and become a part of every employment 
contract that is subject to the terms of the 
Act." Roland Elec. Co. v. Black, 163 F.2d 
The judgment of the district court is 
affirmed. 
IT IS SO ORDERED. 
MONTGOMERY and FROST, JJ., 
concur. 
114 N.M. 699 
Wayne DACY and Sandra Dacy, his 
wife, Petitioners-Appellants, 
V. 
VILLAGE OF RUIDOSO, 
Respondent-Appellee. 
No. 20143. 
Supreme Court of New Mexico. 
Nov. 19, 1992. 
Landowners sued village for breach of 
contract after village failed to rezone land-
owner's property. The District Court of 
Lincoln County, Sandra A. Grisham, J., 
found for village. Landowners appealed. 
The Supreme Court, Montgomery, J., held 
that: (1) contract zoning between landown-
ers and village was unenforceable, and (2) 
landowners were not entitled to restitution. 
Affirmed. 
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ming and Planning ¢:>160 
'Contract zoning," properly used, de-
es agreement between municipality 
another party in which municipality's 
deration consists of either promise to 
property in requested manner or actu-
t of zoning property in that manner. 
See publication Words and Phrases 
)f other judicial constructions and 
efinitions. 
ming and Planning ¢:>160 
:;ontract zoning is illegal whenever it 
s from promise by municipality to zone 
~rty in certain manner, such as in bilat-
contract to zone or in unilateral con-
in which municipality promises to re-
in return for some action or forbear-
by other party; in making such prom-
nunicipality preempts power of zoning 
Jrity to zone property according to 
ribed legislative procedures. 
,ning and Planning ¢:>160 
~ontract zoning in form of unilateral 
act in which party makes promise in 
n for municipality's act of rezoning is 
as municipality makes no promise 
;here is no enforceable contract until 
~ipality acts to rezone property; be-
! municipality does not commit itself 
y specified action before zoning hear-
t does not circumvent statutory proce-
, or compromise rights of affected per-
ning and Planning ¢:>160 
Tillage's agreement to rezone land-
rs' property in return for landowners' 
'yance of property needed for right-of-
was unenforceable unilateral contract 
g as village's agreement was an at-
; to commit itself to specific zoning 
I without following required statutory 
dures. NMSA 1978, § 3-21-6, subd. 
ntracts ¢:>136 
'amages are unavailable as relief to 
to illegal contract. 
'unction ¢:>57 
ecific Performance ¢:>55 
leither specific performance nor in-
on wiJI be granted to party to illegal 
lct. 
7. Municipal Corporations ¢:>249 
Landowners who entered into unen. 
forceable contract for zoning with Village 
were not entitled to restitution; landown. 
ers would not suffer disproportionate for. 
feiture absent restitutionary relief, as it 
was questionable whether village had made 
promise to rezone, landowners failed to 
protect themselves against risk of decline 
in value of property and reasonableness of 
landowners' reliance on alleged promise to 
rezone was questionable. 
Sam A. Westergren, Santa Fe, for peti. 
tioners-appellants. 




In this case we deal with an instance of 
so-called "contract zoning." The trial court 
found that the Village of Ruidoso ("the 
Village") had contracted with the appel· 
lants, Wayne and Sandra Dacy, to rezone a 
tract of land conveyed to them in exchange 
for another tract and held that the contract 
was void for illegality. In the Dacys' suit 
against the Village for damages for breach 
of contract, the court after a bench trial 
entered judgment for the Village. The Da-
cys appeal and we affirm, discussing the 
enforceability of a contract to zone proper-
ty and the consequences of a ruling that 
the contract is unenforceable. 
1. FACTS AND ISSUES 
In 1983, the Village desired to acquire 
property owned by the Dacys for use as 
part of a highway right of way. Because 
the Village had neither the time nor the 
money to condemn the Dacys' property, it 
proposed a trade under which the ViJ\age 
would convey certain property, described 
as "Tract A-A," to the Dacys in exchange 
for the property it needed for the right of 
way. The Dacys agreed to this exchange, 
and in October 1983 the parties drafted a 
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lands. The parties executed the agreement The court hel~ a hearing in February 
. January 1984 by exchanging quitclaim 1986 and determmed that, for reasons not 
: ds to their respective parcels. material here, Tract A-A had no zoning 
ee classification. Accordingly, upon agree-
The Village conveyed Tract A-A to the ment of the parties, the court remanded the 
Dacys subject to the restrictive covenants matter to the Planning and Zoning Com mis-
contained in a document entitled "Restric- sion to properly zone Tract A-A. The 
tive Covenants of Gavilan Subdivision," court deferred resolution of the breach of 
which was incorporated by reference into contract and misrepresentation claims 
both the agreement and the Village's deed.1 pending the Village's reconsideration of the 
Both the agreement and the deed, however, zoning issue. 
specifically excepted paragraphs A(2) and In April 1986, the Village zoned Tract A-
A(ll) of the Gavilan subdivision restrictive A as R-2. By that time, however, the 
covenants. These omitted paragraphs, had market in Ruidoso for R-2 property had 
they been included, would have prohibited collapsed. Thus, when the Dacys sold 
subdivision and multi-family use of Tract Tract A-A in June 1986, they received only 
A-A and restricted removal of trees and $150,000 for the property, compared with 
earth. the $405,173 that the court found would 
After the parties exchanged their deeds, 
the Dacys applied to the Village for rezon-
ing of Tract A-A. They requested a 
change in zoning from R-1 (residential sin-
gle-family housing) to R-2 (multi-family 
housing) so that they could build condomin-
iums on the property. After review of the 
application, the Planning and Zoning Com-
mission, an advisory body to the Village 
Council, recommended rezoning Tract A-A 
as R-2. The ViJlage Council then consid-
ered the matter in October 1984 and, declin-
ing to follow the Commission's recommen-
dation, denied the Dacys' rezoning request. 
In November 1984, the Dacys filed suit 
against the Village, seeking reversal of the 
Council's denial of their request and dam-
ages for breach of contract and misrepre-
sentation. The Dacys based their breach 
of contract claim on an alleged promise by 
the Village in the 1983 agreement to rezone 
Tract A-A as R-2. 
I. Tract A-A was located adjacent to the Gavilan 
subdivision but was not a part of that subdivi· 
sion. 
2. The Dacys apparently dropped their misrepre. 
sentation claim, because the breach of contract 
claim was the only issue bef6re the court at the 
April 1989 hearing. 
3. The court's reasoning is not apparent from its 
findings of fact or conclusions of law. Howev-
er, in its letter decision to the parties, the court 
stated: 
I understand [the Village's] argument that all 
the deed purported to do was to allow Dacv to 
have been its fair market value in 1984 had 
it been zoned R-2 at that time. 
The Dacys therefore pursued their 
breach of contract claim against the Vil-
lage.2 The court held a hearing on the 
issue in April 1989 and afterwards entered 
findings of fact and conclusions of law. It 
determined that "[a] fair reading of [the 
1983 agreement and the deed from the 
ViJlage to the Dacys] would support a con-
clusion that was intended to allow the [Da-
cys] to build condominiums." It also found 
that the 1983 agreement "implied the duty 
of the Village to zone the property R-2." 
The court apparently reasoned that, by om-
itting paragraphs A(2) and A(ll) of the 
restrictive covenants from the agreement 
and deed and thereby allowing subdivision 
of the property, the Village impliedly 
agreed to zone Tract A-A as R-2 so as to 
permit multi-family housing.3 
In its findings, the court stated that the 
Dacys had incurred damages of $255,173, 
subdivide the parcel, and did not speak to the 
issue of multi.family use, but I am assuming 
for the moment that the Village did, by impli· 
cation, contract to zone the Tract A-A. R-2, 
and the court would find that the omission of 
the zoning provision from the contract was 
necessarily implied. 
Additionally, at oral argument before this Court, 
counsel for the Dacys stated that the only evi· 
dence supporting an implied promise to zone 
Tract A-A as R-2 was the deletion of paragraphs 
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representing the difference in market value 
of Tract A-A as R-2 property in 1984, 
when the Dacys applied for and were de-
nied rezoning, and June 1986, when the 
Dacys sold the property as R-2 for $150,-
000. However, the court concluded that 
there was no legal basis upon which the 
Dacys could recover those damages, be-
cause the implied contract to zone between 
the Dacys and the Village was unenforcea-
ble. It stated that "[a J contract to zone 
property between a zoning authority and 
an individual is illegal and an ultra vires 
bargaining away of the police power of the 
municipality" and that "[iJllegal contracts 
are void ab initio and the court must leave 
the parties as it finds them." Accordingly, 
the court awarded the Dacys no damages. 
On appeal, the Dacys assert that the trial 
court erred in holding that the contract was 
illegal and unenforceable; they also assert 
that the Village should be estopped to 
claim that the contract was illegal. They 
urge us to reverse the trial court's holding 
of illegality and award them damages in 
the amount the court determined. 
II. LEGALITY OF CONTRACT 
ZONING 
This case presents this Court with our 
first opportunity to discuss in some detail 
the legality of "contract zoning." While a 
few of our previous opinions relate to con-
tract zoning, none provides clear guidance 
on the subject. See Westgate Families v. 
County Clerk, 100 N.M. 146, 148, 667 P.2d 
453, 455 (1983) (because the New Mexico 
Zoning Enabling Act expressly provides for 
zoning by representative bodies, it denies 
an exercise of zoning power by referen-
dum); Mechem v. City of Santa Fe, 96 
N.M. 668, 672, 634 P.2d 690, 694 (1981) 
(dictum) (endorsing validity of contract zon-
ing under certain circumstances); Spray v. 
City of Albuquerque, 94 N .M. 199, 201, 608 
P.2d 511, 513 (1980) (contracts attempting 
to curtail or prohibit a municipality's legis-
lative or administrative authority are uni-
formly invalid). 
A. Definition of Contract Zoning 
At the outset, it is important to explain 
tract zoning has been variously defined by 
courts and commentators and has some-
times been used interchangeably with the 
term "conditional zoning." See, e.g., 2 
Robert M. Anderson, American Law of 
Zoning 3d § 9.21 (1986); 1 Norman 
Williams, Jr. & John M. Taylor, American 
Planning Law §§ 29.01-.04 (rev. ed. 1988). 
Contract and conditional zoning are dis-
tinct, however, and an appreciation of the 
distinction is important to understanding 
our holding today. 
[1J "Contract zoning," properly used, 
describes an agreement between a munici-
pality and another party in which the mu-
nicipality's consideration consists .of either 
a promise to zone property in a requested 
manner or the actual act of zoning the 
property in that manner. Cj Nolan M. 
Kennedy, Jr., Note, Contract and Condi-
tional Zoning: A Tool for Zoning Flexi-
bility, 23 Hastings L.J. 825, 831 (1972) (de-
fining contract zoning in slightly different 
terms). A contract to zone may be in the 
form of either a unilateral contract or a 
bilateral contract. See id. at 837-38. A 
bilateral contract involves reciprocal prom-
ises in which the municipality promises to 
zone property in a certain manner in return 
for some promise from the other party to 
the contract. See id. at 838. A unilateral 
contract, on the other hand, consists of a 
promise by only one of the contracting 
parties; the other party's consideration is 
action or forbearance rather than a prom-
ise. 1 Arthur L. Corbin, Corbin on Con-
tracts § 21 (1963). Thus, in the context of 
contract zoning, a unilateral contract de-
scribes two possible situations: Either a 
municipality promises to rezone in return 
for some action or forbearance by the other 
contracting party, or the other contracting 
party makes a promise in return for the 
municipality's act of rezoning. Cf Kenne-
dy, supra, at 837 (describing unilateral con-
tract zoning only in terms of a promise by 
the other contracting party in return for 
the municipality's action of rezoning; not 
describing the converse situation). 
In comparison, conditional zoning is not 
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involve a promise by either party. Rather, party to a bilateral contract to zone or 
conditional zoning describes the situation in when a municipality is a party to a unilater-
which a municipality rezones on condition al contract in which the municipality prom-
that a landowner perform a certain act ises to rezone in return for some action or 
prior to, simultaneously with, or after the forbearance by the other contracting party. 
rezoning. Id. at .831. T~e absence ~f ~n A contract in which a municipality prom-
enforceable promise by either party dlStm- ises to zone property in a specified manner 
guishes condi~ional zoning from contract is illegal because, in making such a prom-
zoning. See 2d. In .t~e present case, we ise, a municipality preempts the power of 
address only the vali?lty of contra~t zon- the zoning authority to zone the property 
ing; . ,,:e do no~ conSider the proprIety of according to prescribed legislative proce-
condItional zonmg. dures. Our statutes require notice and a 
B. Illegal Contract Zoning 
Numerous courts have criticized contract 
zoning, declaring it invalid per se. See 
Judith W. Wegner, Moving Toward the 
Bargaining Table: Contract Zoning, De-
velopment Agreements, and the Theoreti-
cal Foundations of Government Land 
Use Deals, 65 N.C.L.Rev. 976, 982-83 
(1987). While these courts have advanced 
several grounds for disapproving contract 
zoning, the most common rationale is that 
contract zoning is inherently flawed as a 
"problematic blend of contract and police 
powers." Id. at 982. Their opinions typi-
cally condemn contract zoning as an illegal 
bargaining away or abrogation of the po-
lice power. See, e.g., Hartman v. Buck-
son, 467 A.2d 694, 699-700 (DeI.Ch.1983); 
Hartnett v. Austin, 93 So.2d 86, 89 (Fla. 
1956) (en banc). As one commonly cited 
case states, "Zoning is an exercise of the 
police power to serve the common good and 
general welfare. It is elementary that the 
legislative function may not be surrendered 
or curtailed by bargain or its exercise con-
trolled by the considerations which enter 
into the law of contracts." V.F. Zahodia-
kin Eng'g Corp. v. Zoning Bd. of Adjust-
ment, 8 N.J. 386, 86 A.2d 127, 131 (1952). 
[2] We agree that in most situations 
contract zoning is illegal. However, we do 
not subscribe to a per se rule against all 
forms of contract zoning, nor does our ra-
tionale rest on the "bargaining away" or 
abrogation of the police power. Rather, 
we believe that contract zoning is illegal 
whenever it arises from a promise by a 
rnnnll'ltn<'llittt tn .... ,.. ........ ..... _ ......... _ .... oi..~ !-
public hearing prior to passage, amend-
ment, supplement, or repeal of any zoning 
regulation. NMSA 1978, § 3-21-6(B) 
(RepI.Pamp.1985). The statutes also grant 
to citizens and parties in interest the oppor-
tunity to be heard at the hearing. Id. By 
making a promise to zone before a zoning 
hearing occurs, a municipality denigrates 
the statutory process because it purports 
to commit itself to certain action before 
listening to the public's comments on that 
action. Enforcement of such a promise 
allows a municipality to circumvent estab-
lished statutory requirements to the possi-
ble detriment of affected landowners and 
the community as a whole. See County of 
Ada v. Walter, 96 Idaho 630, 533 P.2d 
1199, 1201 (1975) (oral agreement to allow 
mobile homes on property was invalid be-
cause it did not comply with county 
ordinance); Midtown Properties, Inc. 
Township of Madison, 68 N.J.Super. 197, 
172 A.2d 40, 45-46 (Ct.Law Div.1961) (con-
tract to zone illegal because it circumvent-
ed mandatory zoning procedures), afFd, 78 
N.J.Super. 471, 189 A.2d 226 (Ct.App.Div. 
1963) (per curiam). 
C. Legal Contract Zoning 
[3] The foregoing analysis implies that 
one form of contract zoning is legal: a 
unilateral contract in which a party makes 
a promise in return for a municipality's act 
of rezoning. In this situation, the munici-
pality makes no promise and there is no 
enforceable contract until the municipality 
acts to rezone the property. See 1 Corbin, 
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not circumvent statutory procedures or 
compromise the rights of affected persons. 
Cj Kennedy, supra, at 837 (in a unilateral 
contract to zone, municipality makes no 
binding promise and there is no abrogation 
of the police power). Some courts have 
nonetheless condemned this form of con-
tract zoning on the ground that the con-
tracting party's promise provides improper 
motivation for the municipality's rezoning 
action. See, e.g., City of Knoxville v. Am-
brister, 196 Tenn. 1, 263 S.W.2d 528, 530 
(1953); see also Wegner, supra, at 979 n. 
122 ("The distinction between bilateral and 
unilateral agreements seems problematic 
on policy grounds, however, because even 
unilateral agreements can serve as an in-
centive to government action."). We do 
not find this reasoning persuasive. Private 
interests are inherent in any zoning matter; 
therefore, it is disingenuous to condemn a 
method of zoning because it benefits pri-
vate interests in some way. Moreover, any 
potential misconduct that might occur 
through unilateral contract zoning may be 
corrected through judicial review if the ac-
tion of the zoning authority is improper. 
See Singleterry v. City of Albuquerque, 96 
N.M. 468, 472, 632 P.2d 345, 349 (1981) 
(reviewing court upholds decision of zoning 
authority if not fraudulent, arbitrary, or 
capricious); see also Kennedy, supra, at 
834. 
III. CONSEQUENCES OF ILLEGAL 
CONTRACT ZONING 
14] If we assume the correctness of the 
trial court's finding of fact that the Village 
agreed in the 1983 Agreement to rezone 
the Dacys' property, this case involves a 
form of unilateral contract zoning: The 
Village promised to rezone Tract A-A in 
return for the Dacys' conveyance of prop-
erty that the Village needed for the high-
way right of way. Under the principles set 
out above, this contract is unenforceable 
because the Village attempted to commit 
itself to specific zoning action without fol-
lowing the required statutory procedures. 
The trial court concluded that the con-
tract between the Village and the Dacys 
was illegal and that "[i)llegal contracts are 
void ab initio and the court must leave the 
parties as it finds them." It therefore con. 
cluded that it could award no damages to 
the Dacys. In its letter decision to the 
parties, the court stated that "any remedy 
whether equitable or legal, is foreclosed a~ 
to an illegal contract." While we affirm 
the trial court's denial of relief to the Da-
cys, we explain our reasoning in some de-
tail so as to clarify the legal rules regard-
ing the availability of relief to a party to an 
illegal contract. 
[5,6] The trial court was correct in stat· 
ing that damages are unavailable as relief 
to a party to an illegal contract. See Re-
statement (Second) of Contracts § 346(1) 
(1979) [hereinafter Restatement] ("The in-
jured party has a right to damages for any 
breach by a party against whom the con-
tract is enforceable .,. _") (emphasis add-
ed). Additionally, neither specific perfor-
mance nor an injunction will be granted to 
a party to an illegal contract. See id. 
§ 365 (specific performance and injunction 
are unavailable if act that would be com-
pelled is contrary to public policy). Al-
though the foregoing remedies are unavail· 
able, it is not accurate to say that "any 
remedy ... is foreclosed as to an illegal 
contract." As Corbin states, "A party who 
has rendered part or all of the bargained-
for-exchange, or has otherwise materially 
changed his position in reliance on the re-
turn promise in an 'illegal' bargain, has 
often seemed to deserve and has often been 
given a restitutionary remedy." 6A Cor-
bin, supra, § 1534, at 818. 
[7] Restitution, in the context of con-
tract law, is a remedy that restores to a 
contracting party any benefit that he or 
she has conferred on the other party 
through part performance or reliance. Re· 
statement, supra, §§ 344(c), 370. Restitu· 
tion may be in the form of the specific 
restoration of land or chattels, the repay-
ment of money, or the payment of the 
reasonable value in money of services ren-
dered. 6A Corbin, supra, § 1535, at 821 . 
In the present case, restitution to the Da· 
cys, if granted, would probably take the 
form of a payment to them of the value of 
the land they conveyed to the Village, less 
\ 
I 
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the proceeds of Tract A-A when they sold 
it in 1986.4 (The court could not order the 
Village to return the land to the Dacys 
since it presumably has already been used 
by the Village for the highway right of 
way.) 
The circumstances in which restitution 
will be awarded to a party to an illegal 
contract cannot be easily defined or catego-
rized. [d. § 1534, at 818-19. The Restate-
ment says that restitution is generally un-
available to a party who has rendered per-
formance in return for a promise that is 
unenforceable "unless denial of restitution 
would cause disproportionate forfeiture." 
Restatement, supra, § 197. Whether the 
forfeiture is "disproportionate" depends on 
the extent of the denial of compensation 
compared to the gravity of the public inter-
est involved and the extent to which the 
contract contravenes public policy. [d. 
comment b. Additionally, Corbin identifies 
the following factors (which we assume to 
be a nonexclusive list) as influencing 
whether a court will grant restitution: The 
degree of criminality involved in the illegal 
contract, the comparative innocence or 
guilt of the parties, the extent of public 
harm involved, the moral quality of the 
parties' conduct and the severity of the 
penalty or forfeiture that will result from 
denial of relief. 6A Corbin, supra, § 1534, 
at 818. 
to support such a promise was the omission 
of paragraphs A(2) and A(ll) of the restric-
tive covenants from the agreement and the 
deed. The omission of these paragraphs 
allowed subdivision and possible multi-fam-
ily use of Tract A-A and unlimited removal 
of trees and earth on the land. We see 
nothing in the deletion of these covenants 
that gave rise to an implied promise by the 
Village to rezone the property. In deleting 
these covenants from the agreement and 
deed, the Village authorized the present 
resubdivision of Tract A-A and possible 
future use of the property for multi-family 
housing, but we cannot see that it promised 
to rezone the property.s 
We do not believe that denying restitu-
tion in this case will cause a disproportion-
ate forfeiture. Several factors support this 
conclusion. First, we have serious doubts 
that the Village even made a promise to 
rezone. As stated above, the only evidence 
4. The Dacys did not seek restitution in their 
complaint against the Village asserting breach 
of contract. Even had they requested such re-
lief as an alternative to their claim for damages. 
and even if (contrary to the reasoning in the 
text infra) a court were to find a disproportion-
ate forfeiture absent restitutionary relief. they 
still would have faced Significant problems in 
securing this type of relief. See NMSA 1978. 
§ 37-1-23(A) (RepI.Pamp.1990) (granting gov· 
ernmental entities immunity from actions based 
on contract. except actions based on valid writ· 
ten contract) (emphasis added); Hydro Conduit 
Corp. v. Kemble. 110 N.M. 173. 793 P.2d 855 
(1990) (subcontractor's claim against state for 
restitution. on account of materials furnished to 
general contractor for construction of public-
A second factor influencing our decision 
is our belief that the Dacys bear some 
responsibility for their loss because they 
failed to protect themselves against the 
risk of a decline in the market for R-2 
property. By entering into the agreement 
with the Village without demanding a time 
deadline for the rezoning, the Dacys as-
sumed the risk that the Village would not 
promptly rezone and that the market in 
Ruidoso for R-2 property would drop. The 
Dacys could have expressly provided in the 
agreement that their transfer of land to the 
Village would not be effective unless and 
until the Village rezoned Tract A-A or 
unless the Village rezoned Tract A-A by a 
specified date. In that way, had the Vil-
lage failed to comply with those terms, the 
Dacys would not have suffered any harm. 
By failing so to protect themselves, the 
Dacys undertook the risk that the market 
for R-2 property would collapse and that 
they would lose money on the deal. 
works projects. was "based on contract" and 
hence barred by § 37-1-23). 
5. The district court seems to have shared our 
doubts about the existence of a promise to re-
zone. Although the court stated in its findings 
that "a fair reading" of the parties' agreement 
"would support a conclusion that [it) was in-
tended to allow the [Dacys] to build condomini-
ums" and that the agreement "implied the duty 
of the Village to zone the property R-2." the 
court said in its letter to the parties that it was 
"assuming for the moment" that the Village had 
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A final factor causing us to believe that 
the Dacys have not suffered a dispropor-
tionate forfeiture lies in the at least argua-
ble unreasonableness of their reliance on 
the Village's purported promise to rezone 
Tract A-A. As mentioned previously, the 
Dacys have argued on appeal that the Vil-
lage should be estopped to assert the inval-
idity of the claimed agreement to rezone. 
The estoppel asserted is "equitable estop-
pel," based on cases such as Albuquerque 
Nat'l Bank v. Albuquerque Ranch Es-
tates, Inc., 99 N.M. 95, 101, 654 P.2d 548, 
554 (1982). It is clear, however, that this 
form of estoppel, like other forms," re-
quires the party asserting it to have rea-
sonably relied on the other party's promise 
or representation. See, e.g., id. The rea-
sonableness of the Dacys' reliance on the 
Village's "implied" promise to rezone-in a 
contract covering in considerable detail oth-
er aspects of the parties' transaction-is 
questionable to say the least. 
We do not hold that the Dacys' reliance 
on the Village's putative promise to rezone 
was unreasonable as a matter of law; nor 
do we hold, as a matter of law, that the 
Village did not in fact make such a prom-
ise; nor do we hold-again, as a matter of 
law-that the Dacys assumed the risk that 
the real estate market in Ruidoso would 
collapse during 1985. We hold only that, 
as a matter of law, the Village's promise to 
rezone, if made, was unenforceable and 
that in the circumstances of this case deny-
ing restitution to the Dacys does not result 
in a disproportionate forfeiture. 
The trial court's judgment is therefore 
affirmed. 
IT IS SO ORDERED. 
RANSOM, C.J., and BACA, J., concur. 
6. For example, promissory estoppel. See Re· 
statement, supra, § 90 (promissory estoppel 
may be available if promisor should reasonably 
have expected promise to induce action or for· 
bearance by promisee); Eavenson v. Lewis 
114 N.M. 706 
Susan KIRKPATRICK, d/b/a 
Kirkpatrick & Associates, 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
v. 
INTROSPECT HEALTHCARE CORPO. 
RATION, a New Mexico corporation. 
d/b/a Introspect HeaIthcare of New 
Mexico and Daniel Lopez, Defendants_ 
Appellees. 
No. 19944. 
Supreme Court of New Mexico. 
Dec. 29, 1992. 
Interior designer brought suit against 
corporation, alleging breach of contract 
and several related counts. The District 
Court, Bernalillo County, Burt Cosgrove, 
D.J., dismissed complaint for failure to 
state claim upon which relief can be grant· 
ed. Designer appealed. The Supreme 
Court, Baca, J., held that: (1) written con· 
tract between designer and corporation 
was not contract for sale of goods under 
Article 2 of Uniform Commercial eode 
(UCC); (2) contract between designer and 
corporation unambiguously required corpo-
ration to purchase furnishings from design-
er; (3) dismissal of designer's entire com· 
plaint, without addressing all counts raised 
in her complaint, was error; and (4) trial 
court misapplied rule governing judgment 
upon multiple claims by entering final judg· 
ment as to all designer'S claims. 
Reversed and remanded. 
1. Sales e=>3.1 
Written contract between interior de· 
signer and corporation, which provided that 
fee for design services would be generated 
through markups on furnishings that de· 
signer purchased and resold to corporation, 
was not contract for sale of goods under 
Means, Inc., lOS N.M. 161, 162, 730 p.2d 464, 
465 (1986) (promissory estoppel requires that 
promisee act reasonably in justifiable reliance 
on promise as made). 
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be performed. NMSA 1978, §§ 55-2-101 
to 55-2-725. 8. Contracts e=>143(2) 
2. Sales e=>3.1 
Under "primary purpose" test, Article 
2 of the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC), 
which applies to contracts for sale of 
goods, applies to "mixed contracts" only if 
primary purpose of contract is to sell goods 
rather than to provide services. NMSA 
1978, §§ 55-2-101 to 55-2-725. 
See publication Words and Phrases 
for other judicial constructions and 
definitions. 
3. Licenses e=>8(1) 
Professional and occupational licensing 
statutes for interior designers are intended 
to set standards and requirements for prac· 
tice of and entrance into profession of inte· 
rior design and do not represent legislative 
proclamation that interior design contracts 
are solely service contracts exempt from 
Uniform Commercial Code (UCC). NMSA 
1978, §§ 61-24C-1 to 61-24C-16. 
4. Sales e=>3.1 
Supreme Court determines whether 
Article 2 of Uniform Commercial Code 
(UeC), which applies to contracts for sale 
of goods, applies to given mixed contract 
on case·by·case basis by scrutinizing con-
tract itself to determine whether primary 
purpose of contract is for sales or services. 
NMSA 1978, §§ 55-2-101 to 55-2-725. 
5. Contracts e=>198(2) 
Contract between interior designer and 
corporation, which provided for design ser· 
vices to be rendered to corporation by de· 
signer, unambiguously required corpora-
tion to purchase furnishings from designer; 
contract explicitly stated that fee for de-
signer's interior design services would be 
included in furnishings that would be pur-
chased for facility being built by corpora-
tion. 
6. Contracts e=>176(2) 
Whether or not contract is ambiguous 
is question of law for court. 
Contract is ambiguous only if it is rea-
sonably susceptible to different construc· 
tions. 
9. Contracts e=>147(2) 
When language of contract clearly and 
unambiguously expresses agreed-upon in-
tent of parties, SUpreme Court will give 
effect to such intent. 
10. Appeal and Error e=>842(8) 
For purpose of interpreting contract, 
when resolution of issue depends upon in-
terpretation of documentary evidence, Suo 
preme Court is in as good a position as trial 
court to interpret the evidence. 
11. Contracts e=>I43.5 
To make reasonable interpretation of 
contract, language of entire contract must 
be considered, and selected portions cannot 
support claim of ambiguity. 
12. Appeal and Error e=>842(1) 
Appellate court will not determine 
questions of fact on appeal. 
13. Appeal and Error e=>1178(6) 
Remand to trial court for trial on mer· 
its would be required to determine whether 
corporation breached contract with interior 
designer and to determine resulting dam· 
ages to interior designer in event that cor-
poration was found to have breached con-
tract. 
14. Pretrial Procedure e=>643 
Dismissal by trial court of plaintiff's 
entire complaint for failure to state claim 
upon which relief can be granted, without 
addressing all counts raised in plaintiff's 
complaint, was error; it could not be said 
that plaintiff failed to state claim upon 
which relief can be granted as to alterna-
tive counts without trial court conducting 
separate assessment of each distinct claim. 
SCRA 1986, Rule 1-012, subd. B(6). 
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FORD LEASING DEVELOPMENT COM-
PANY, Plaintiff-Appellant, 
v. 
BOARD OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS 
OF the COUNTY OF JEFFER-
SON, Defendant-Appellee. 
No. 26445. 
'Supreme Court of Colorado, 
En Banc. 
Nov. 11, 1974. 
Rehearing Denied Dec. 9, 1974. 
Developer's predecessor in title filed 
application for rezoning from agricultural 
district to planned development district. 
The board of county commissioners denied 
rezoning. The District Court, Jefferson 
County, Roscoe Pile, J., upheld board's de-
cision and held existing zoning ordinance 
constitutional, and developer, who was sub-
stituted as plaintiff after acquiring title to 
the property, appealed. The Supreme 
Court, Day, J., held that board was not es-
topped to deny the application for rezon-
ing, that board's decision was supported by 
some competent evidence and was thus not 
an abuse of discretion, and that upon find-
ing that developer was not deprived of any 
reasonable use of its property by zoning 
ordinance, district court properly held that 
the ordinance as applied to the property in 
question was constitutional. 
Judgment affirmed. 
I. Zoning e::>192 
Planned development application must 
meet all standards, procedures, and condi-
tions of a planned development ordinance. 
2. Zoning e::>192 
Where planned development applica-
tion stated that one developer would handle 
proposed auto dealership and another de-
veloper would develop and sell townhouses; 
the application did not comply with county 
ordinance, which provided that a planned 
development must be under unified control. 
hood a use which would otherwise not be 
allowed. 
4. Zoning <??151 
Planned development should not usurp 
discretionary function of board of county 
commissioners to deny or grant applica-
tions for rezoning. 
5. Zoning <??194 
Where developer's application for re-
zoning of property from agricultural dis-
trict to planned development district was 
denied by board of county commissioners, 
it was not necessary for the board to im-
pose any final regulations. 
6. Zoning <??151 
Board of county commissioners prop-
erly refused to engage in contract zoning, 
which is illegal, when it refused to inform 
developer of whatever additional require-
ments and regulations were necessary in 
order to approve his applications for re-
zoning of property from agricultural dis-
trict to planned development district. 
7. Zoning e::>21 
Contract zoning is illegal as an ultra 
vires bargaining away of police power. 
8. Zoning e::>161 
Where county planning commISSIOn 
approved proposed planned development 
subject to 17 restrictive recommendations, 
developer complied with only five of such 
recommendations, and developer did not 
strictly comply with county ordinance re-
quiring that planned development must be 
under unified control, board of county 
commissioners was not estopped to deny 
developer its application for rezoning from 
agricultural district to planned development 
district. 
9. Administrative Law and Procedure <??788 
In order for a court to set aside deci-
sion of administrative body on certiorari 
review, there must be no competent evi-
dence to support the decision. Rules of 
Civil Procedure, rules 106, 106(a)(4). 
3. Zoning e::>151 10. Administrative Law and Procedure ~676 
Planned development is not a catchall; On certiorari review of a decision of 
it is not supposed to inject into a neighbor- an administrative body, reviewing court is 
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what appears in the record. 
Civil Procedure, rules 106, 
II. Zoning e:>741 
Supreme Court will not sit as a "su-
per-zoning commission." 
12. Zoning e:>702 
Where question of whether proposed 
planned development was compatible with 
surrounding development was fairly debat-
able, board of county commissioners' denial 
of application for rezoning £r'om agricul-
tural district to planned development dis-
trict was supported by some competent evi-
dence, and thus the denial was not an 
abuse of discretion. 
13. Zoning e:>648, 672 
Zoning ordinances, like other legisla-
tive enactments, are presumed valid, and 
one who challenges them has burden of 
proving beyond reasonable doubt that they 
are invalid. 
14. Zoning e:>27 
Zoning ordinance is unconstitutional if 
it is not substantially related to public 
health, safety, or welfare. 
15. Zoning e:>672 
Developer did not meet its burden of 
proof in his assertion that the zoning ordi-
nance was unconstitutional, where ordi-
nance zoned area in question for agricul-
tural use and application for rezoning to 
planned development district was denied by 
board of county commissioners upon spe-
cific finding, based on fairly debatable evi-
dence, that proposed rezoning was not in 
best interests of health, safety, welfare, 
and morals of citizens of county. 
16. Constitutional Law e:>278(1) 
Zoning ordinance is unconstitutional 
as applied to landowner's property if it 
precludes the use of the property for any 
reasonable purpose and thus constitutes a 
confiscatory taking of property without 
due process of law. 
17. Zoning e:>684 
In order to obtain rezoning to permit 
a use which a landowner seeks, he must 
prove that it is not possible to use and de-
velop the property for any other use enu-
merated in the existing zoning. 
18. Zoning e:>648 
Where record was replete with con-
trasts and contradictions on issue of 
whether developer could use and develop 
property for any use enumerated in exist-
ing zoning, which was for agriculture, de-
veloper, who sought rezoning to planned 
development district, did not meet its bur-
den of proof beyond reasonable doubt that 
zoning ordinance as applied to it was un-
consti tutional. 
19. Zoning e:>684 
Where present zoning of property was 
for agricultural use and developer sought 
rezoning to planned development district, 
developer failed to meet its high burden of 
proof in attempting to show that existing 
ordinance was unconstitutional as applied 
to it, where developer presented no eVl-
dence that there were no reasonable uses 
in the eight intervening zones. 
20. Zoning e:>164 
Proof that it is not possible to use and 
develop land for any uses permitted in 
zones which are in between zone sought 
and existing zone is prerequisite to show-
ing that property has been unconstitu-
tionally confiscated under existing zoning. 
21. Zoning e:>38 
Where developer was not deprived of 
any reasonable use of property by zoning 
ordinance, ordinance as applied to property 
in question was constitutional. Rules of 
Civil Procedure, rules 106, 106(a) (4). 
22. Zoning e:>164 
Where application for rezoning of 
property from agricultural district to 
planned development district had been de-
nied by Doard of county commissioners, de-
veloper who thereafter purchased the prop-
erty and began process of appeals, had full 
and complete notice and knowledge of zon-
ing restrictions on its property, and any 
hardship was self-inflicted. 
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defendant-appellee. The constitutional question was accorded a 
DA Y, Justice. 
We will refer to plaintiff-appellant as 
Ford and the Board of County Commis-
sioners of Jefferson County as the Board. 
The latter denied Ford's application for re-
zoning. The district court upheld that de-
cision. This appeal is from that jUdgment. 
We affirm. 
1. 
Ford's predecessor in title filed an appli-
cation for rezoning from A-2 (Agricultur-
al Two District) to P-D (Planned Devel-
opment District) for approximately 23 
acres located at the southwest corner of 
West Hampden Avenue and South Wads-
worth Boulevard in Jefferson County. 
Ford was to develop and occupy the land. 
The plan was submitted first to the J effer-
son County (J effco) planning commission. 
It approved the proposed planned develop-
ment, subject to 17 restrictive recommen-
dations of which, according to the record, 
Ford complied with only five. The Board 
denied the change. 
Pursuant to c.R.c.P. 106(a)(4), review 
was sought in district court. While the 
matter was still pending, Ford acquired ti-
tle to the property and was substituted as 
plaintiff. 
A two-pronged challenge to the Board's 
action was launched in the district court. 
In the Rule 106 certiorari proceeding, it 
was claimed that the Board was estopped 
to deny the application because Ford had 
complied with recommendations of the 
planning commission on which its approval 
was predicated. As a second string to this 
bow Ford claimed that the Board was arbi-
trary, capricious and showed an abuse of 
discretion. A second claim sought a de-
claratory judgment that the existing zon-
complete trial de novo. At its conclusion, 
the district court affirmed the Board and 
held the zoning ordinance constitutional. 
II. 
The subject property is zoned A-2 (agri-
cultural). The area at the time of the 
original zoning was generally undeveloped. 
Medium and high density residences have 
since been built, as have restricted com-
mercial businesses. 
The most extensive land use in the area 
is the 300 acre Academy Office Park, a 
multi-complex commercial use. However, 
that entire area is protected by extremely 
strict covenants, voluntarily imposed by the 
builder, which last until the year 2000. 
They are designed specifically to preserve 
an open green space motif. The Jefferson 
County Comprehensive Future Land Use 
Plan recommends low density residential 
and light restricted commercial uses for 
the area. 
The planned development submitted by 
the Ford application would be a concen-
trated commercial and medium to high 
density residential use. An auto dealership 
would cover about eight acres. It would 
be buffered from the surrounding commu-
nity by townhouses, which would cover ap-
proximately 13.5 acres. The entire combi-
nation development would be artfully land-
scaped. Ford argued that a heavy com-
mercial use, planned as it is to blend with 
the area, would not be out of place. The 
Board came to a different conclusion. 
III. 
[1] We take up first the question of 
whether the Board is bound to grant the 
change. Ford cites Dillon Companies, Inc. 
v. Boulder, Colo., 515 P.2d 627 (1973), for 
the proposition that the Board is estopped 
v 
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to deny its application for rezoning. We 
do not read Dillon as being that broad. In 
Dillon there were no findings of fact to 
support the city council's decision. Dillon 
also pointed out that a planned develop-
went application must meet all standards, 
procedures and conditions of a planned de-
velopment ordinance. 
[2J In addition to not implementing 12 
of the planning commission's recommenda-
tions, Ford did not strictly comply with the 
Jeffco ordinance. Section 39-B and sec-
tion 39-C-l state in part that a planned de-
velopment must be under unified control. 
The record reveals that F o1'd would handle 
the auto dealership and Broker House, 
which had a contract to purchase the resi-
dential site, would develop and sell the 
townhouses. That is separate, not unified, 
control. 
Moreover, section 39-C-2 states in part 
that P-D parking, height, setback and area 
regulations shall be compatible with the 
su'rrounding development. The Board 
made a specific finding that the Ford pro-
posal was "incompatible with the surround-
ing land uses at the present time." See 
Moore v. City of Boulder, 29 Colo.App. 
248,484 P.2d 134 (1971). 
Ford argues additionally that the Jeffco 
ordinance mandates final compliance regu-
lations and contends that the Board having 
failed to impose any final regulations, 
there was nothing remaining to satisfy. 
The resulting conclusion advanced is that 
Ford has met the county conditions by de-
fault and under the Dillon rule became en-
titled to the rezoning. 
[3-5] Ford's thesis would require that 
any planned development proposal must au-
tomatically be granted by the Board, leav-
ing to it only the power to issue final reg-
ulations. Then-merely by compliance-
the plan would pass, regardless of whether 
the Board wants the design. Such boot-
strapping is clearly obnoxious to the essence 
of planned development zoning. Planned 
development is not a catch-all. It is not 
supposed to inject in a neighborhood a use 
which would otherwise not be allowed. It 
should not usurp the discretionary function 
of the Board. Since Ford's application 
was denied no final regulations were nec-
essary. This would be meaningless rheto-
ric, for there was nothing to comply with. 
[6,7] At the conclusion of extensive 
hearings, Ford requested the Board to in-
form it of whatever additional require-
ments and regulations were necessary in 
order to approve the application. This the 
Board refused to do. To act otherwise 
would be patent contract zoning, a concept 
held illegal in most states as an ultra vires 
bargaining away of the police power. 1 R. 
Anderson, American Law of Zoning §§ 8e 
20-1. 
[8] Thus, looking at the Jeffco statute 
as a whole, we cannot say that the ration-
ale of Dillon applies in this case. The 
Board was not estopped to deny Ford its 
application for rezoning. 
On the other phase of the certiorari re-
view, Ford asserts that the district court 
erred in upholding the Board's arbitrary 
and capriciot!s denial of the requested re-
zomng. 
[9, 10] In order for a court to set aside 
a decision of an administrative body on 
certiorari review, there must be no compe-
tent evidence to support the decision. 
Board of County Commissioners v. Sim-
mons, 177 Colo. 347, 494 P.2d 85 (1972); 
Marker v. Colorado Springs, 138 Colo. 485, 
336 P.2d 305 (1959). The reviewing court 
is limited to what appeared of record, 
which in this case was substantial. It is 
obvious from the record that Ford has 
tried to propose an innovative planned de-
velopment design. It is equally obvious 
that many others contest the feasibility of 
such a plan. 
[11,12] This Court will nDt sit- as a 
"super-zoning commission;" Garrett v. 
City of Littleton, 177 Colo. 167, 493 P.2d 
370 (1972); Baum v. Denver, 147 Colo. 
104, 363 P.2d 688 (1961). The question 
whether the proposed planned development 
was compatible with the surrounding devel-
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New York, 264 U.S. 292, 44 S.Ct. 325, 68 
L.Ed. 690 (1923); Simmons, supra. Con-
sequently, we cannot say that the zoning 
decision of the Board was supported by no 
competent evidence. In such a state of the 
record, it cannot be said there was a clear 
abuse of discretion. 
IV. 
Ford also asked for a declaratory judg-
ment that the zoning ordinance as applied 
to its property is unconstitutional. 
(13] Zoning ordinances-like other leg-
islative enactments-are presumed valid. 
Ford has the burden of proving beyond a 
reasonable doubt that it is invalid. Sim-
mons, supra; Bamn, s1~pra. 
[14,15] There are two methods to es-
tablish that a zoning ordinance is unconsti-
tutional. First, it may be shown it is not 
substantially related to the public health, 
safety, or welfare. Village of Euclid v. 
Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 47 S.Ct. 
114, 71 L.Ed. 303 (1926); City of Engle-
wood v. Apostolic Christian Church, 146 
Colo. 374, 362 P.2d 172 (1961). Relating 
to this, the Board made a speci fic finding 
that the "rezoning [was] not in the best 
interest of the health, safety, welfare and 
morals of the citizens of Jefferson Coun-
ty." As noted above, contentions regard-
ing the Board's actions were fairly debata-
ble. Thus, Ford has not met its burden of 
proof here. 
[16-18] The second method is to show 
that the zoning ordinance precludes the use 
of Ford's property for any reasonable pur-
pose. Village of Euclid, supra; Madis v. 
Higginson, 164 Colo. 320, 434 P.2d 705 
(1967); Baum, supra. A trial de novo 
was held on this point. Considerable evi-
dence and many witnesses were produced 
for both sides. The answers were far 
from uniform. Still, we do not feel that 
528 P.2d-lb 
there has been a confiscatory taking of 
property from Ford without due process of 
law. True, whatever use is available is 
perhaps not the highest and best use. But 
that has never been the test. Madis, supra. 
We have held that in order to obtain re-
zoning to permit a use which the applicant 
seeks, he must prove that it is not possible 
to use and develop the property for any 
other use enumerated in the existing zon-
ing. Garrett, supra; Wright v. Littleton, 
174 Colo. 318, 483 P.2d 953 (1971); Baum, 
supra. The record is replete with con-
trasts and contradictions on this point. 
We cannot say as a matter of law that 
Ford met its burden of proof beyond a rea-
sonable doubt. 
[19,20] Similarly, just because the land 
is unsuited for agricultural use does not 
mean the applicants can skip other inter-
mediate zones up to planned development 
-the most advantageous for its purpose. 
Ford presented no evidence that there were 
no reasonable uses in approximately 8 'in-
tervening zones. Such proof is of crucial 
importance as a prerequisite that property 
is unconstitutionally confiscated. Simmons, 
supra; Garrett, supra. Without it, Ford 
failed to meet its high burden of proof. 
[21] Upon finding that the landowners 
were not deprived of any reasonable use of 
their property by the zoning ordinance, the 
district court was perfectly justified in 
holding that the ordinance as applied to the 
property in question was constitutional. 
[22] We note if there is hardship here 
it is self-inflicted. The application had 
been denied by the Board when Ford 
thereafter purchased the property and took 
up the burden of appeal through the 
courts. Thus, it had full and complete no-
tice and knowledge. Accord Nopro Co. v. 
Cherry Hills Village, 180 Colo. 217, 504 P. 
2d 344 (1972); Madis, supm. 
Judgment affirmed. 
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Henry duPont Ridgely of Ridgely & 
Ridgely, Dover, for defendant Town of 
Camden. 
William S. Hudson of Hudson, Jones, Jay-
work & Williams, Dover, for defendant 
Frank A. Robino, Inc. 
LONGOBARDI, Vice Chancellor. 
On November 6, 1979, David P. Buckson 
and Frank A. Robino, Inc. made an applica-
tion to the Town Council of Camden to 
construct a subdivision of 88 townhouses on 
9.671 acres of land. By letter dated Decem-
ber 26, 1979, the parties were advised by 
the Camden Town attorney that the appli-
cation was subject to compliance with the 
town's zoning ordinance. On January 7, 
1980, Buckson and Robino appeared at a 
Town Council meeting again offering the 
plan without having complied with applica-
ble zoning regulations. The Council reject-
ed the plan. 
Through the winter and spring of 1980, 
the developers altered their plan and on 
June 23, 1980, a plan providing for 53 two-
story townhouses was reviewed by the 
Planning Commission. One problem re-
mained. 
The Camden zoning ordinance required 
the developers to provide a minimum aver-
age of 7,500 square feet of open space per 
residential lot. The revised plan provided 
such an open space area but Buckson re-
served the right to future use of that area 
rather than an outright, unencumbered ded-
ication to its existence as "open space." 
The Planning Commission recommended 
guarantees that the open space remain 
open. Buckson appealed this decision to the 
Town Council. Council upheld the Commis-
sion after a public hearing on August 18, 
1980. 
Buckson subsequently took the position 
that the Camden zoning ordinance, original-
ly passed by the Town Council in December 
of 1975, was void because it was not passed 
in compliance with the requirements of 22 
Del.C. § 304. That statute provides as fol-
lows: 
. .. no such regulations, restrictions or 
boundary shall become effective until af-
ter a public hearing in relation thereto, at 
which parties in interest and citizens shaH 
have an opportunity to be heard. At 
least 15 days notice of the time and place 
of such hearing shall be published in an 
official paper or a paper of general circu-
lation in such municipality. 
In support of his argument, Buckson con-
tends that an examination of the Council 
minutes for the relevant period indicates 
that Camden did not provide for a public 
hearing or for the necessary publication of 
the notice of the hearing. The Council 
countered that the ordinance was enacted 
pursuant to the provisions of the Camden 
Town Charter which only requires the post-
ing of such ordinances in two public places. 
Unfortunately, no one can demonstrate 
compliance even with the Charter provi-
sions. 
Buckson then countered that he was pre-
pared to litigate the invalidity of the zoning 
ordinance. Council, apparently alarmed at 
the prospects of litigation and the inciden-
tal expenses associated with it, entered into 
a "compromise" agreement with Buckson. 
The "compromise" allows the developers 
to place 68 houses on 8.193 acres. Obvious-
ly, this is substantially different from the 
plan approved by Council in August of 1980. 
That plan would have allowed only 53 hous-
es on 10.919 acres. 
Subsequent to the "compromise" agree-
ment, the Plaintiffs brought this action 
against the Defendants seeking an injunc-
tion against any compliance with the Octo-
ber 20th agreement. Defendant Buckson 
has moved for summary judgment asking 
this Court to determine, as a matter of law, 
that the Camden ordinance is, in fact, inval-
id and that the agreement between Camden 
and Buckson is valid. Plaintiffs have 
moved for summary judgment requesting 
that the Camden ordinance be deemed val-
idly enacted, that the agreement between 
Buckson and Camden be deemed invalid 
and asking that Buckson be enjoined from 
building on the property in question until 
T 
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proper approval has been determined and ordinance at the time he attempted to com-
procedures followed. ply with it. 
The Plaintiffs have argued that Buckson Under the provisions of Article II, Sec-
should be estopped or barred by the doc- tion 25 of the Delaware Constitution, the 
trine of laches from challenging the validity State Legislature clearly is empowered to 
of the Camden zoning ordinances. They delegate zoning authority to any political 
insist that his initial compliance with the subdivision of the State. Section 25 pro-
procedure established by the ordinance, i.e., vides: 
applying for building permits, going before The General Assembly may enact laws 
the planning commission, demonstrated under which municipalities and the Coun-
that he recognized the validity of the ordi- ty of Sussex and the County of Kent and 
nance and only challenged it when it did the County of New Castle may adop' 
not provide him with what he wanted. zoning ordinances, laws or rules Iimitinl 
and restricting to specified districts and 
regUlating therein buildings and struc-
tures according to their construction and 
the nature and extent of their use, as 
well as the use to be made of land in such 
districts for other than agricultural pur-
poses; and the exercise of such authority 
shall be deemed to be within the police 
power of the State. 
[1,2J An estoppel arises when a party, 
by his conduct or words, intentionally or 
unintentionally leads another, in reliance on 
such words or conduct, to change his posi-
tion to his detriment. Wilson v. American 
Insurance Company, DeI.Supr., 209 A.2d 902 
(1965); see Wolf v. Globe Liquor Co., Del. 
Supr., 103 A.2d 774 (1954). There is no 
basis on this record for finding that the 
Town of Camden in any way altered its 
position to its detriment due to Buckson's 
initial compliance with the procedure of ob-
taining approval of his plan. 
[3, 4J The doctrine of laches is applica-
ble when an individual's delay in making a 
claim works a disadvantage to another, as 
when an individual alters his position due to 
the delay. McGinnes v. Department of Fi-
nance, DeI.Ch., 377 A.2d 16 (1977); Bovay v. 
H.M. By/Iesby & CQ., DeI.Ch., 12 A.2d 178 
(1940). Additionally, it has been suggested 
that the individual who delays in asserting 
a claim must possess knOWledge that his 
rights have in some way been affected. 
Skouras v. Admiralty Enterprises, Inc." Del. 
Ch., 386 A.2d 674 (1978); Elster v. Ameri-
can Airlines, DeI.Ch., 128 A.2d 801 (1957). 
In this case, there is no indication that 
Buckson was aware of any defects in the 
manner in which the Camden ordinance was 
adopted at the time he proceeded under the 
ordinance. There has been no demonstra-
tion, therefore, that there was a delay suffi-
cient to establish laches by the Defendant 
Buckson because there is no showing that 
Buckson knew about the problems with the 
This constitutional provision is the source 
of any authority to zone which is possessed 
by the Town of Camden. Such authority 
was delegated to Camden under the terms 
of the statute which established the town 
charter in May, 1941. 43 Del.Laws Ch. 159. 
Under the terms of this charter, section 28, 
it was provided that the Camden Town 
Council: 
... may adopt zoning ordinances limit· 
ing and specifying districts and regulat 
ing thereon buildings and structures ac-
cording to their construction and accord-
ing to the nature and extent of the busi-
ness to be carried on therein. 
The powers to be exercised under and 
by virtue of this provision shall be 
deemed to have been exercised under the 
police power and for the general welfare 
of the inhabitants. 
[5J The exercise of zoning authority un-
der the terms of both the charter and the 
provisions of Article II, Section 25 of the 
Constitution of the State of Delaware is 
designed for the protection of the general 
welfare and benefit of the entire public. 
The Town of Camden is empowered by 
section 32 of its charter to enact ordinances 
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r resolutions on any subject within its 
owers. This would include zoning ordi-
ances. Under paragraph 2 of section 32, 
owever, it is provided that" All ordinances 
r resolutions of general character relating 
) the government of the Town shall not be 
f force and effect until the same shall have 
een posted in at least two public places in 
'own." In 1975, the Town Council purport-
d to enact a zoning ordinance under sec-
ion 28 of its charter. Under this ordi-
ance, the minimum average open space per 
esidential unit was established as 7,500 
iuare feet. Apparently, the Council pub-
cly posted the proposed ordinance for thir-
V days prior to the adoption in at least one 
ublic place then adopted the ordinance on 
lecember 1, 1975. Under these circum-
lances, there are questions concerning the 
fficacy of that statute. 
Plaintiffs, who argue for the validity of 
he zoning ordinance, admit that there is no 
lear demonstration that the Council in fact 
osted the ordinance in two public places. 
Inly one public posting can be verified. 
'lain tiffs insist that this defect is not nec-
ssarily fatal. 
[6, 7] The question of invalidity really 
Jrings from the failure of the Camden 
ouncil to follow the procedures provided 
y 22 Del.C. Ch. 3. This is so because the 
own charter is merely the font of delegat-
j legislative authority to zone while Title 
~, Chapter 3 specifies the proced ures and 
rerequisites which must be followed under 
:ate law to make the exercise of that au-
lOrity effective. Admittedly, the Town 
larter was promulgated subsequent to the 
litial enactment of 22 Del.C. Ch. 3. How-
fer, the charter provision on zoning is the 
egislative grant to zone while 22 De/.C. 
h. 3 provides the specific prerequisites for 
aplementing that power. The charter pro-
sion relative to the enactment of any or 
I ordinances is not inconsistent in this 
!slJ.ect with section 302 but only supple-
iWtaI. Under 22 Del.C. Ch. 3, if the mu-
i~ality does zone by district, section 304 
l!DJires "at least 15 days notice" prior to 
Ie holding of a public hearing on the plan 
and provides for publication of this notice in 
a local paper before the ordinance can take 
effect. Clearly, this requirement was never 
satisfied by the Town of Camden. Just as 
clearly, Camden did not comply with its 
charter provision requiring the posting of 
proposed ordinances in two public places. 
The fact that the Town charter was en-
acted after the initial enactment of 22 
Del.C. Ch. 3 is not evidence of a legislative 
intent to excuse Camden from complying 
with the purpose or prerequisites of Chap-
ter 3. Nothing in the charter concerning 
the implementation of zoning ordinances is 
inconsistent with Chapter 3. It is only that 
Chapter 3 provides additional protection for 
the public in the form of notice and oppor-
tunity to be heard. 
[8] The two statutes, therefore, should 
be construed together so that effect is given 
to every provision because there is no irrec-
oncilable difference between them. Green 
v. County Council of Sussex Cty., DeI.Ch., 
415 A.2d 481, 484 (1980), afl'd., DeI.Supr., 
447 A.2d 1179 (1982); Sands: Sutherland 
Statutory Construction, 4th Ed., § 5102. 
Camden could have complied with the no-
tice requirements of 22 Del.C. § 304 and 
with the public posting requirements of sec-
tion 38(2) of its charter. 
[9, 10] Plaintiffs suggest that there is a 
conclusive presumption that the ordinance 
was properly enacted and that the ordi-
nance cannot be chalIenged as defective 
years after it has been accepted and relied 
on by the public. The authorities they cite 
for this proposition, however, deal with sit-
uations in which (1) the party chalIenging 
the statute has not in fact demonstrated the 
defect in enactment, or (2) where there has 
been such a delay, generalIy between ten to 
twenty years, in chalIenging the statute, 
that the Court felt it inequitable to under-
mine the reliance placed on the statute by 
the public. See Taylor v. Schlemmer, Mo. 
Supr., 353 Mo. 687, 183 S.W.2d 913 (1944); 
Struyk v. Samuel Braen's Sons, N.J.Supel'., 
17 N.J. Super. 1, 85 A.2d 279 (1951); North-
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Lake, Mich.Ct.App., 43 Mich.App. 424, 204 the division of a community into zones or 
N.W.2d 274 (1972); Edel v. Filer Township, districts. See 82 Am.Jur.2d Zoning & Plan-
Manistee County, Mich.Ct.App., 49 Mich. ning § 79; Anderson, American Law of 
App. 210, 211 N.W.2d 547 (1973). In the Zoning § 9.01 (2nd Ed.); see also Sant-
present case, there is no doubt that the myers v. Town of Oyster Bay, N.Y.Supr., 10 
Town of Camden failed to comply with 22 Misc.2d 614, 169 N.Y.S.2d 959 (1957). This 
Del.C. Ch. 3. Moreover, the five years that agreement, in fact, creates a cognizable dis-
passed before this chalIenge was made to trict in which the erection "construction 
the ordinance is not a sufficient period to ... or use of buildings, structures or land" 
bar chalIenge to the statute under the total- is determined. See 22 Del.C. § 303. The 
ity of circumstances in this case. This is fact that only one district was created does 
particularly so since there is no question not make it any less an exercise of zoning 
that the statutory prerequisites were not authority. The Town Council "may divide 
satisfied and, therefore, the presumption of the municipality into districts of such num-
validity has been effectively countered. Cf. ber, shape and area as may deemed 
82 C.J.S. Statutes §§ 82-83. Council may best. ... " Id. Here, it chose to create 
not ignore statutorily mandated procedures. only one. 
Green v. C~U?ty Council of Sussex Cty., 415 [12,13] While there is no doubt about 
A.2d 481, cltmg WelIdon v. Capano Realty, the Town's ability to compromise claims, 
Inc., DeI.Ch., 225. A.2d 486 (1966~ and Green there is no question that the Town can only 
v. County P/annmg & Zon. Com n of Suss,ex compromise particular types of claims like 
Cty., DeI.Ch., 340 A.2d 852 (1974), aff'd., those "claims which exist in its favor or 
without opinion, DeI.Supr., 344 A.2d· 386 against it and which arise out of a subject 
(1975). matter concerning which the municipality 
[1I] The Defendants have argued that has the general power to contract." Anno-
the Town of Camden was acting properly in Municipal Claims-Power to Compromise, 
entering into a contract with Buckson. The 15 A.L.R.2d 1359. It may not, under the 
"compromise", they contend, was an appro- guise of compromise, impair a public duty 
priate exercise of Camden's inherent au- owed by it. 56 Am.Jur.2d Municipal Corpo-
thority to compromise claims against it. ration, Etc. § 806. By entering into the 
See 17 McQuillen, Municipal Corporation, contract in question, Camden bargained 
3rd Ed., § 48.17. The Court cannot agree, away part of its zoning power to a private 
however, that the contract between these citizen. It simply does not possess the au-
parties is anything but a private agreement thority to normally contract such authority 
to create a particular zoning district for the and the fact that this agreement was in 
benefit of Buckson. The agreement itself furtherance of a compromise, an attempt to 
refers to the plot plan submitted in Novem- avoid Buckson's threats to sue, does not 
ber, 1979, as the basis for the street plan make it any more valid. See 82 Am.Jur.2d 
and layout; to Town subdivision regula- Zoning & Planning § 17; see Andgar Asso-
tions which were deemed applicable; to the ciates, Inc. v. Board of Zoning Appeals, 
developer's responsibility for on-site im- N.Y.Supr., 30 A.D.2d 672,291 N.Y.S.2d 991 
provements in particular areas; to the (1968). As aptly put in one case concerning 
agreement between the parties that the "contract zoning", that is, the contracting 
Camden Commons plot plan attached to the by a zoning authority to zone for the bene-
agreement is to be the plan accepted except fit of a private landowner: 
for "minor or insignificant adjustments in Zoning is an exercise of the police pow-
property lines and street locations" as re- er to serve the common good and general 
quired. (See' 18 of the agreement.) Over- welfare. It is elementary that the legis-
alI, the agreement meets, in this Court's lative function may not be surrendered or 
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trolled by the considerations which enter 
into the law of contracts. The use re-
striction must needs have general applica-
tion. The power may not be exerted to 
serve private interests merely, nor may 
the principle be subverted to that end. 
V.F. Zahodiakin Eng. Corp. v. Zoning Board 
of Adjust., N.J.Supr., 8 N.J. 386, 86 A.2d 
127, 131 (1952). 
[14,15] When possible, cases should be 
disposed of by summary judgment for the 
result is a prompt and economical way of 
disposing of litigation. Dat7s v. University 
of Delaware, DeI.Supr., 240 A.2d 583 (1968). 
Summary judgment will be granted when 
there is no reasonable indication that a ma-
terial issue of fact exists and the moving 
party is entitled to judgment as a matter of 
law. See Tew v. Sun Oil Co., DeI.Super., 
407 A.2d 240 (1979); see also, Vanaman v. 
Milford Memorial Hospital, Inc., DeI.Supr., 
272 A.2d 718 (1970). In this case, the par-
ties have stipulated at oral argument that 
there are no additional facts that could be 
produced on the issue of how the zoning 
statute was enacted. As a matter of fact, 
the parties have agreed that there is no 
factual dispute on the evidence relative to 
that issue. On that basis, the exercise of 
deciding the motion for summary judgment 
was commenced. 
For the foregoing reasons, the Defend-
ants' motion for summary judgment is 
granted to the extent that the Camden 
zoning ordinance is determined to have 
been invalidly enacted but denied to the 
extent that it requests a determination that 
the contractual agreement between Cam-
den and Buckson is valid. Plaintiffs' mo-
tion is granted in that the contractual 
agreement is deemed an invalid ultra vires 
exercise of municipal authority. 
[16,17] The Plaintiffs' claim for injunc-
tive relief has been placed before the Court 
in the context of a motion for summary 
judgment. The question can be decided as 
a matter of law since no genuine issues of 
fact have been found and nothing more is 
to be submitted in support of the motion. 
To demonstrate a right to injunctive relief, 
the moving party must show (1) irreparable 
harm; (2) a likelihood of success on the 
merits, and (3) that the injury Plaintiffs 
will incur if the injunction is denied out-
weighs any injury to the non movant if the 
injunction is granted. Gimbel v. Signal 
Companies, Inc., DeI.Ch., 316 A.2d 599, 602 
(1974), afl'd., DeI.Supr., 316 A.2d 619 (1974). 
Based on the entire analysis above, the 
Plaintiffs have demonstrated more than a 
likelihood of success on the merits of their 
case. They have, in fact, prevailed. 
Due to the imminent injury to both (1) 
the policies for zoning underlying 22 Del.e. 
Ch. 3 and the Camden charter, and (2) the 
interests of adjoining landowners, irrepara_ 
ble injury has been shown. A balancing of 
the equities shows that Buckson is not seri-
ously injured since he has recourse to the 
Camden authorities like anybody else for 
approval of a new plan. Buckson is, there-' 
fore, currently enjoined from building on 
his property. The injunction will be effec-
tive until such time as he receives a proper 
approval of a plan submitted and reviewed 
under a validly enacted zoning ordinance. 
IT IS SO ORDERED. 
Alan G. EMSLEY, Petitioner, 
v. 
Patricia G. EMSLEY (Bellezza-Aures), 
Respondent. 
Family Court of Delaware, 
New Castle County. 
Submitted: April 29, 1983. 
Decided: July 21, 1983. 
Mother petitioned for child support 
from father. The Family Court, Newcastle 
County, Poppiti, J., held that: (1) amount 
EMSLEY v. EMSLEY Del. 701 
Cite as 467 A.2d 700 (Del.Fam.Ct. 1983) 
paid for premiums on life insurance policies father, could not be deducted from father's 
naming children as beneficiaries, required income for purposes of determining amount 
by court order, could be deducted from in- of child support to be paid. 
come used to compute amount of child sup- . 
port to be paid; (2) travel expenses of chil- 6. Parent and ChIld cg:,3.1(l) 
dren relating to visitation, expenses which 
were paid for by father, could not be de-
ducted from his income for purposes of 
determining child support; (3) business loss-
An individual's child support obligation 
comes first and may reduce one's ability to 
acquire and hold marketable assets, not the 
other way around. 
es which involved no out-of-pocket expendi- 7. Parent and Child cg:,3.3(7) 
tures could not be deducted from computa-
tion of income used to determine amount of 
child support; and (4) mother was entitled 
to attorney fees. 
So ordered. 
1. Parent and Child cg:,3.1(8) 
Although in certain cases inclusion of 
capital gains or losses may be appropriate 
in computation of income for purposes of 
determining amount of child support to be 
paid, family court recognizes agreements of 
parties to exclude them from calculations. 
2. Parent and Child cg:,3.3(7) 
Amounts paid by spouses for premiums 
on life insurance policies required to be 
maintained for children should be deducted 
from income for purposes of determining 
amount of child support to be paid. 
3. Parent and Child cg:, 3.3(7) 
While, ordinarily, the only allowable 
deductions from gross income for child sup-
port purposes are taxes, FICA, and other 
required or necessary expenses or pay-
ments, if the deductions claimed are re-
quired by law or by employer or directly 
benefit the children, they may be con-
sidered. 
4. Parent and Child cg:, 3.3(7) 
Key to whether payments by party 
may be deducted from gross income for 
purposes of determining child support is 
whether claimed expenditures reasonably 
and directly benefit the children. 
5. Parent and Child cg:, 3.3(7) 
Travel expenses of children relating to 
visitation, expenses which were paid for by 
Family court is not restricted to tax 
law determinations as to what necessary 
and proper business expenses are deducted 
from income for purposes of determir· 
amount of child support to be paid, ~ 
purposes and policies of Internal 
Code are far different from those of stat-
utes pertaining to child support. 13 DeLC. 
§ 501 et seq. 
8. Parent and Child cg:,3.3(9) 
Order entered regarding arrears in 
child support payments may be in form of 
judgment recordable and enforceable 
through the Superior Court. 
9. Parent and Child cg:, 3.3(7) 
Since mother's application for award of 
attorney fees was for fees incurred in peti-
tioning for child support, court did not have 
to find that mother lacked available funds 
to engage and pay counsel but, rather, sup-
port obligor could be ordered to pay fees in 
order that neither estate of children nor 
estate of mother would be depleted by 
of legal action. 
10. Parent and Child cg:, 3.3(7) 
In proceeding on petition for child sup-
port, attorney fees for representation be-
fore master and court, as well as costs, 
could be awarded to mother, since positions 
taken by father regarding business losses 
and visitation expenses were previously ad-
dressed by family court, and mother was 
substantially successful before master and 
before court regarding business loss issue. 
11. Parent and Child cg:,3.3(7) 
Order entered regarding attorney fees 
in child support proceeding may be in form 
86 Fla. 
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paint spray; Hardin's Bakeries, Inc., v. 
Ranager, 1953, 217 Miss. 463, 64 So.2d 70S, 
holding that a baker's disability, caused 
by an allergy resulting from his contact 
with a mitten he was required to use in 
handling hot pans of bread as they came 
from the oven, resulted from "accidental 
injury", and cases therein cited; Schnei-
der, Workmen's Compensation, Vol. 4, 
Sec. 1.328; Larson, Workmen's Compen-
sation, Vol. 1, Sec. 12.20. 
of the Fu\I Commission is quashed with 
directions to remand the cause to the 
Deputy Commissioner for the entry of 
such an award upon an appropriate find-
ing of fact. 
It is so ordered. 
TERRELL, C. J., and DREW and 
THORNAL, JJ.. concur. 
Under the facts, as found by both the 
Deputy Commissioner and the Full Com-
mission, claimant's pre-existing tubercular 
condition was accelerated or aggravated 
by his continued work and failure to have 
care and rest, togetltel· with his inhalation of 
dltst and fumes to which the publiC ge1;-
erally is 1I0t Ol·dinarily exposed. There 
was thus found to be a direct causal con-
nection between claimant's injury and the 
exposure to a danger not ordinarily risked 
by the public (the inhalation of dust and 
fumes) even though this was not found 
to be the sole cause of his disability. 
Fred HARTNETT, as Mayor and Commis-
sioner of the City of Coral Gables, Florida, 
W. Keith Phillips, Lucille Neher, Robert L. 
Searle and John M. Montgomery, Members 
of the City Commission in and for the City 
of Coral Gabies, Florida, Appellants, 
(2) We re-affirm the rule of Alexander 
Orr, Jr., Inc., v. Florida Industrial Com-
mission, supra, 176 So. 172, that "exces-
sive exposure may be found to have been 
the direct cause cif the injury, though op-
erating upon other conditions of common 
exposure", and we agree with the deci-
sions from other jurisdictions, cited above, 
holding in effect that the fundamentally 
accidental nature of the injury is not al-
tered by the fact that, instead of a single 
occurrence, it is the cumulative effect of 
the inhalation of dust and fumes to which 
a claimant is peculiarly susceptible that 
accelerates a claimant's pre-existing dis-
ability. 
N The claimant in the instant case is en-
I\,.)titled to an award of compensation for 
:.V that proportion of the acceleration or ag-
, gravation of his tubercular condition that 
is reasonably attributable to his inhala-
tion of dust and fumes in the course of 
his employment. Accordingly, the order 
v. 
W. P. AUSTIN and Wilmeth F. Austin, 
his wife, Appellees. 
Supreme Court of Florida, en Bane. 
Dec. 5, 1950. 
Action attacking validity of zoning or-
dinance. The Circuit Court for Dade 
County, Grady L. Crawford, J., determined 
that the ordinance was invalid. Defend-
ants appealed. The Supreme Court, Thor-
nal, J., held tha,t where effectiveness of 
provisions of municipal zoning ordinance 
was conditioned upon necessity for subse-
quent execution of contract by municipal-
ity with private parties, such ordinance 
was invalid, because of absence of re-
quired degree of clarity and certainty. 
Affirmed. 
Roberts, J., dissented. 
I. Municipal Corporations ¢:::>III(I) 
A municipal ordinance should be clear, 
definite, and certain in its terms. 
RARTNETT v. AUSTIN Ji1a. 87 
Cite as. Fla., 93 So.2d 86 
2. Municipal Corporations tS=>111(1) 
An ordinance which is so vague that 
its precise meaning cannot be ascertained 
is invalid, even though it may otherwise 
be constitutional. 
3. Municipal Corporations ¢:::>601(7) 
Although authority to exercise power 
to enact zoning ordinances, when delega-
ted by the state, is generally recognized, 
nevertheless, the restriction on property 
rights must be declared as a rule of law in 
the ordinance and not left to the uncer-
tainty of proof by extrinsic evidence 
whether parol or written. 
4. Municipal Corporations e=>601(15) 
A municipality has no authority to en-
ter into a private contract with a property 
owner for the amendment of a zoning 
ordinance subject to various covenants and 
restrictions in a collateral deed or agree-
ment to be executed between the city and 
property owner. 
5. Municipal Corporations ¢:::>589 
A municipality cannot contract away 
the exercise of its police powers. 
6. Municipal Corporations ¢:::>601(15) 
When a zoning ordinance is amended 
by changing the classification of partic-
ular property, such amendment must be 
justified by change in the use value of the 
property involved. 
7. Municipal Corporations ¢:::>III(I) 
\Vhere effectiveness of municipal zon-
ing ordinance was conditioned upon ne-
cessity for subsequent execution of a con-
tract by municipality with private parties, 
such ordinance lacked degree of clarity 
and certainty required of municipal legis-
lation and was invalid. 
8. Municipal Corporations ¢:::>601(5) 
In exercising zoning powers a munic-
ipality must deal with weB-defined classes 
of uses. 
9. Municipal Corporations tS=>I06(1) 
Adoption of an ordinance is the exer-
cise of municipal legislative power, and in 
the exercise of such a function city can· 
not legislate by contract. 
10. Municipal Corporations ¢:::>645 
Plaintiffs, who occupied homes im-
mediately across street from proposed 
parking lot authorized by change in zon-
ing ordinance approving such commercial 
development, and who relied on existing 
zoning conditions when they bought their 
homes, had a right to continuation of 
those conditions and could maintain suit to 
enforce them. 
Edward L. Semple, Miami, for appel-
lants. 
Gustafson, Persandi & Vernis, Coral Ga-
bles, and Anderson & Nadeau, Miami, for 
appellees. 
M. L. Mershon and W. O. Mehrtens 
and Evans, Mershon, Sawyer, Johnston & 
Simmons, Miami, amici curiae. 
THORNAL, Justice. 
Appellants, Hartnett and others, who 
were defendants below, seek reversal of a 
final decree holding a zoning ordinance of 
the City of Coral Gables to be invalid. 
Several points are assigned for reversal. 
The determining question, however, is the 
validity of a zoning ordinance which is 
made contingent upon the subsequent ex-
ecution of a contract between the city and 
private parties. 
BUl·dines, Inc., alleging itself to be the 
holder of an option to purchase the prop-
erty in question, requested the City Com-
mission to change the zoning classification 
of the property from single-family residen-
tial use to commercial use. The change 
was necessary in order to enable Burdines 
to construct a large shopping center with an 
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adjoining parking lot. The City Commis-
sion, after hearing, adopted Ordinance No. 
g:;l7 undertaking to amend its original zon-
ing ordinance which was numbered 271. 
showing as to invalidity, the ordinance 
should be upheld; that at most, need for the 
change in the zoning is "fairly debatable" 
and that therefore the decision of the City 
Commission should not be disturbed. 
Ordinance 897, which is here under at-
tack, provided that the requested change 
should be made. However, the ordinance 
expressly provided that "all of the re-zon-
ing is subject to and dependent upon the 
full and complete observance of the limita-
tions, restrictions and other requirements 
imposed as hereinafter set forth". Follow-
ing this provision a number of contingen-
cies were prescribed as conditions to the 
effectiveness of the amendatory ordinance. 
In summary these conditions were: (1) a 
"Bay Point type wall" shall be placed around 
the perimeter of the property not less than 
40 feet inside the property line abutting 
certain streets; (2) the 40-foot strip shall 
at all times be kept and maintained in a 
condition prescribed by the City Commis-
sion at the expense of the property owner; 
(3) suitable contracts shall be entered in-
. to between the city and the property owner 
covering the above requirements and also 
providing for control of lights on the prem-
ises in order to bring about "as little glare 
'l.nd disturbance" as possible to the people 
in the neighborhood (this expense was to 
be borne by the property owner); (4) the 
property owner should furnish and pay for 
adequate police protection within the re-
zoned area; (5) to submit to the City Com-
mission for approvel plans and specifica-
tions of any proposed building; and (6) 
the property owner shall not open access 
to certain abutting streets. 
Appellees contend that the ordinance is 
clearly invalid; that they purchased their 
property in reliance upon the then-existing 
zoning ordinance; that they have a right 
to a continuance of the then-existing regu-
lations in the absence of a showing of a 
change in the area that justifies the amend-
ment; that there has been no such showing, 
and that further, the ordinance by its very 
terms is made contingent upon the subse-
quent execution of a contract with private 
parties and this results in a degree of in-
definiteness and uncertainty that destroys 
the ordinance as a valid municipal enact-
ment. 
By very able briefs, the parties have 
raised for our consideration numerous 
questions. The point which we consider 
fatal to the ordinance disposes of the neces-
sity to discuss all of the incidental ques-
tions. 
The appellees, Austin, who owned and 
occupied a home across the street from the 
area proposed to be re-zoned, filed a com-
plaint seeking an injunction against the en-
forcement of the ordinance. The Chancel-
lor agreed that the ordinance was invalid 
and permanently enjoined its enforcement. 
[1,2] It is a rule long recognized by the 
precedents that a municipal ordinance 
should be clear, definite and certain in its 
terms. An ordinance which is so vague 
that its precise meaning cannot be ascer-
tained is invalid, even though it may oth-
erwise be constitutional. The reason for 
the rule is the necessity for notice to those 
affected by the operation and effect of the 
ordinance. The provisions of a municipal 
ordinance which conditions its effectiveness-
upon the necessity for the subsequent exe-
cution of a contract with private parties 
such as was done in the case at bar cannot 
be held to provide the degree of clarity and 
certainty that is required of municipal leg-
islation. See McQuillan on Municipal Cor-
porations, 3d Ed., Vol. 5, Sec. 15.24. 
~eversal of this decree is now sought. 
:; Appellants contend that the ordinance 
Jwas a valid exercise of the zoning powers 
of the citv; that in the absence bf a clear . , 
The above announced rule is particularly 
applicable to the exercise of the zoning 
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[3] The above announced rule is par-
ticularly applicable to the exercise of the 
zoning power which is an aspect of the 
police power. While the authority to ex-
ercise this power, when delegated by the 
State, is generally recognized, neverthe-
less, the restriction on property rights must 
be declared as a rule of law in the ordi-
nance and not left to the uncertainty of 
proof by extrinsic evidence whether parol 
or written. Johnson v. City of Hunts-
ville. 1947,249 Ala. 36. 29 So.2d 342. 
glare and disturbance; and (5) if the prop-
erty owner paid for police protection. All 
of these "ifs" were to be included in a 
proposed collateral private contract to be 
executed in the future. If the City Com-
mission, after appropriate hearing, had de-
termined that the highest and best use value 
of the land had changed from residential 
to commercial, then the "fairly debatable" 
rule might have a sphere of applicability. 
This was not done. 
[4-6] A municipality has no authority 
to enter into a private contract with a 
property owner for the amendment of a 
zoning ordinance subject to various cove-
nants and restrictions in a collateral deed 
or agreement to be executed between the 
city and the property owner. Such col-
lateral agreements have been held void 
in all of the cases to which we have been 
referred. Snow v. Van Dam, 291 Mass. 
477, 197 N.E. 224; V. F. Zahodiakin Eng. 
Corp. v. Zoning Board of Adjust., 8 N.J. 
386, 86 A.2d 127; Houston Petroleum Co. 
v. Automotive Prod. C. Ass'n, 9 N.J. 122, 
87 A.2d 319; Rathkopf on The Law of 
Zoning and Planning, 3d Ed., Vol. 2, p. 
392. Any contrary rule would condone a 
violation of the long established principle 
that a municipality cannot contract away 
the exercise of its police powers. When a 
zoning ordinance is amended by changing 
the classification of particular property, 
such amendment must be justified by a 
change in the use value of the property in-
volved. 
[7] We are not here receding in any 
fashion from our established rule that if 
the need for a change in a zoning ordi-
nance is "fairly debatable" the decision of 
the governing authority will be given the 
benefit of the doubt. Here the ordinance 
expressly recognized that the change was 
justifiable only: (1) if the Bay Point Wall 
was built; (2) if there was a 40-foot set-
back; (3) if the sct-back area was land-
scaped and maintained; (4) if surrounding 
property owners were protected against 
93 So.2d-G'h 
[8] In exercising its zoning powers the 
municipality must deal with well-defined 
classes of uses. If each parcel of property 
were zoned on the basis of variables that 
could enter into private contracts then the 
whole scheme and objective of community 
planning and zoning would collapse. The 
residential owner would never know when 
he was protected against commercial en-
croachment. The commercial establish-
ments on "Main Street" would never know 
when they had protection against inroads 
by smoke and noise producing industries. 
This is so because all genuine standards 
would have been eliminated from the zon-
ing ordinance. The zoning classifications 
of each parcel would then be bottomed on 
individual agreements and private arrange-
ments that would totally destroy uniformity. 
Both the benefits of and reasons for a 
well-ordered comprehensive zoning scheme 
would be eliminated. 
[9] The adoption of an ordinance is 
the exercise of municipal legislative power. 
I n the exercise of th is governmental func-
tion a city cannot legislate by contract. 
If it could, then each citizen would be 
governed by an individual rule based upon 
the best deal that he could make with the 
governing body. Such is certainly not 
consonant with our notion of government 
by rule of law that affects alike all similar-
ly conditioned. 
This opinion is not to be construed as 
being adversely critical of the policy adopt-
ed by appellants in this instance. Con-
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dound to the economic benefit of the com-
munity. We have dealt here solely with 
a question of municipal power, not policy. 
'\lVhen the nub of the problem is isolated 
and subjected to the criterion of municipal 
power to act in the manner here revealed, 
we are compelled to reach the conclusion 
which we here announce. We find no au-
thorities to the contrary. 
[10] We encounter no difficulty in con-
cluding that the appellees were entitled to 
bring the suit. They occupied their homes 
immediately across the street from the pro-
posed parking area. They relied on the 
exlst1l1g zoning conditions when they 
bought their homes. They had a right to 
a continuation of those conditions in the 
absence of a showing that the change 
requisite to an amendment had taken place. 
They allege that the contemplated change 
would damage them and that it was con-
trary to the general welfare and totally 
unjustified by existing conditions. This 
gave them a status as parties entitled to 
come into court to seek relief. True their 
rights were subject to the power of the 
city to amend the ordinance on the basis 
of a proper showing. Nonetheless, they 
have a right to insist that the showing be 
made. 
We point out in passing that the appli-
cant Burdines was not appealing to a 
Board of Adjustment for a variance on the 
basis of any hardship. They were seek-
ing an outright change in the zoning ordi-
nance by amendment. In this regard they 
were mere optionees of the property. Not 
being owners thereof, they would hardly 
have any standing before a Board of Ad-
justment on the basis of an alleged hard-
ship. What we have here held might not 
be applicable to a proper application for 
a variance by an owner based on hardship. 
This is a point which we are not called 
upon to decide. For limitations on the au-
thority to "amend" under the guise of a 
"variance" see Yolkey on Zoning Law and 
Practice, 2d Ed., Sec. 140, and many cases 
there cited. 
As poihted out above, our solution to the 
vital question discussed disposes of the 
controversy. We deem it unnecessary to 
prolong our discussion by delving into the 
other points raised. 
The Chancellor ruled correctly in hold-
ing the ordinance invalid and his decree 
is-
Affirmed. 
DREW, C. J., TERRELL and O'CON-
NELL, JJ., and WALKER, Associate Jus-
tice, concur. 
ROBERTS, J., dissents. 
Edlse M. THOMPSON, Appellant, 
v. 
Edmund B. THOMPSON, Appellee. 
Supreme Court of Florida, 
Special Division A. 
Feb. 27, 1957. 
Proceedings under Uniform Reciprocal 
Enforcement of Support Law Act by wife, 
who had been awarded $20 per week for 
alimony and support of her minor child by 
divorce decree of the Circuit Court of 
Volusia County, but who was a resident of 
Connecticut at the time of proceedings. 
The Circuit Court, Duval County, Claude 
Ogilvie, j., entered order of dismissal and 
wife appealed. The Supreme Court, 
Roberts, J., held that since the Act was 
designed to provide a remedy enti rely sep-
arate from and independent of any remedy 
existing under other applicable provisions 
of law, the Circuit Court of Duval County, 
the place of ex-husband's residence had 
jurisdiction of the proceedings and could 
THOMPSON v. THOMPSON 
Cite as, Fla., 93 So.2d 90 
FIe.. 91 
enforce the duty of support decreed by a 
sister county. 
Reversed and remanded. 
I. Judgment €=>585(5) 
Res judicata is not a defense in a 
subsequent action where the law under 
which the first judgment was obtained is 
di fferent from that applicable to the second 
action. 
.2. Husband and Wife e=>303, 315 
Parent and Child €=>3(3) 
While the purpose of the 1953 Florida 
Uniform Support of Dependents Law was 
to secure support for "dependent wives and 
children" only, the 1955 Uniform Reciprocal 
Enforcement of Support Law applies to 
any persons to whom a duty of support is 
owed, and judgment of dismissal under 
1953 Act was not res judicata on proceed-
ings brought under 1955 Act. F.S.A. §§ 
88.011 et seq., 88.031 (6); Acts 1953, c. 
27996, § 1 ct seq. 
3. Husband and WIfe €=>303 
Parent and Child €=>3(3) 
The Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement 
of Support Law was intended to provide 
a simplified two-state procedure by which 
the obligor's duty to support an obligee 
residing in another state may be enforced 
expeditiously and with a minimum of ex-
pense to the obligee. F.S.A. §§ 88.011 et 
seq., 88.041, 88.281 
4. Husband and WIfe €=>308 
Parent and Child 1$::>3(3) 
Where wife had obtained divorce in 
Volusia County, Florida, but later became a 
resident of Connecticut and brought pro-
ceedings under Connecticut law and 1955 
Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Sup-
port Law, which by its terms was designed 
to provide a remedy entirely separate from 
and independent of any remedy existing 
under other applicable provisions of law, 
the Circuit Court of Duval County, the 
place of ex-husband's residence had juris-
diction of the proceedings and could en-
force the duty of support decreed in the 
divorce proceedings by a sister county. 
F.S.A. §§ 88.oI 1 et seq., 88.041, 88.281. 
Richard '\IV. Ervin, Atty. Gen., and 
Reeves Bowen, Asst. Atty. Gen., for appel-
lant. 
Joseph C. Black, Jacksonville, for appel-
lee. 
ROBERTS, Justice. 
This is an appeal from an order 
in a proceeding brought under the Uniform 
Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Law, 
Ch. 29901, Acts of 1955, appearing as Ch. 
88, Fla.stat.l955, F.s.A. (the "1955 Florida 
Act" hereafter). 
The facts are not controverted and are 
as follows: the appellant and the appellee 
were divorced in 1953 by a decree 6f the 
Circuit Court of VoJusia County, Florida, 
the decree providing for the payment to the 
appellant wife of $20 per week for alimony 
and support of the minor child of the 
parties pursuant to an agreement of the 
parties. The appellant is a resident of the 
State of Connecticut and the appellee re-
sides in Jacksonville, Duval County, Flor-
ida. Connecticut has a Uniform Reci' 
Enforcement of Support Law, Ch. . 
Conn.Gen.Stat., 1953 Supp. (referred 
hereafter as "the Connecticut Law") sub-
stantially similar to the 1955 Florida Act, 
supra. 
In 1954 the appellant sought to utilize 
the provisions of the Connecticut Law and 
the Florida Uniform Support of Depend-
ents Law, Ch. 27996, Acts of 1953 (then 
in effect but since repealed by the 1955 
Florida Act, supra), to enforce the appel-
lee's duty of support decreed by the 1953 
Volusia County divorce decree. Her peti-
tion was referred by the Connecticut court 
to the Circuit Court of Duval County (the 
place of appellee's residence) and was by 
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reached by the Court. None of these come 
within the purview of the petition to re- Odfs F. HAYMON and Clark W. Taylor, 
hear. Rule 32 provides in part: Complainants, Appellants, 
"A rehearing will be refused where no 
new argument is made, and no new au-
thority adduced, and no material fact is 
pointed out as overlooked." 
As we observed in Sullivan v. Harpeth 
Development Corporation, 218 Tenn. 107, 
401 S. W.2d 195, 199 [1966J : 
"Now, the office of petition to rehear 
is to call to the attention of the Court mat-
ters overlooked; not to re-argue those 
things which the losing party supposes 
were improperly decided, after the Court 
has given the same full consideration. 
This Court has said, and says again, that 
a petition for a rehearing should never 
be used for the purpose of re-arguing 
the case on the points already considered 
and determined; unless some new and 
decisive authority has been discovered, 
which was overlooked by this Court." 
The burden of proof is of concern to the 
appellants. They admit they had the bur-
den of proving wilful intentional conduct 
by the deceased under Section 50-910, T. 
c.A. On the issue of whether the original 
injury was the proximate cause of the sub-
sequent death of plaintiff-appellee's hus-
band, appellants insist the burden should 
have been cast upon the plaintiff; how-
ever, as we held in our opinion, the evi-
dence reveals that the death of the de-
ceased directly resulted from his on-the-job 
injury. Defendants argued that his con-
duct amounted to an "independent inter-
vening cause", the burden of proof of 
which was upon the appellants, but which 
they failed to carry. 
The petition to rehear is denied . 
DYER, C. J., CHATTIN, J., and 
LEECH, Special Justice, concur. 
FONES, J., dissents. 
513 S.W.2d-12'/z 
v. 
CITY OF CHATTANOOGA et al. 
.COUl·t of Appeals of Tennessee, 
Eastern Section. 
Nov. 23, 1973. 
Certiorari Denied by Supreme Court 
Feb. 4, 1974. 
Owners of apartment building brought 
an action against city, its mayor, and its 
commissioners to enjoin the city from en-
forcing a stop-work order against the con-
struction of more apartments being added 
to the existing building. The Chancery 
Court, Knox County, Herschel P. Franks, 
c., dismissed the action and the apartment 
owners appealed. The Court of Appeals, 
McAmis, Special Judge, held that where 
the owners' predecessors had entered into a 
covenant with board of zoning appeals that 
if board would rezone the land from R-2 
to R-3, the owners would maintain a buff-
er zone of 200 feet between apartments 
and the nearest property owner and the 
owners, without knowledge of the cove-
nant, obtained amendment to zoning ordi-
nance, enacted pursuant to the covenant, re-
ducing the buffer zone to 100 feet, the 
covenant and the ordinance were void as 
against public policy but that the owners 
who had access to the recorded covenant 
and who had expended $35,000 in planning 
new apartments were not entitled to erect 
the apartments on the basis of building 
permit issued under authority of the ordi-
nance or on the basis of equitable estoppel. 
Affirmed. 
f. Zoning @::>160 
Where owners of land entered into a 
covenant with board of zoning appeals that 
if the board would rezone the land from 
R-2 to R-3, the owners would maintain a 
buffer zone of 200 feet between apart-
22S 
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ments on the land and the nearest property 
owner and subsequent owners, without 
knowledge of the covenant, obtained 
amendment to zoning ordinance reducing 
the buffer zone to 100 feet, the covenant, 
the ordinance enacted in consideration 
thereof, and the amending ordinance were 
void as against public policy as was build-
ing permit issued to the subsequent owners. 
2. Contracts PI26 
Contracts made for the purpose of un-
duly controlling or affecting the exercise 
of legislative, administrative and judicial 
functions, are opposed to public policy. 
3. Municipal Corporations P621 
A building permit is not a contract 
and may be changed or entirely revoked 
even though based upon valuable consider-
ation if necessary in the exercise of the 
police power. 
4. Estoppel P54 
As a general rule it is essential to the 
application of the principle of equitable es-
toppel that the party claiming to have been 
influenced by the conduct or declarations 
of another to his injury, was himself not 
only destitute of knowledge of the state of 
facts, but was also destitute of any conve-
nient and available means of acquiring the 
knowledge, and that where the facts are 
known to both parties, or both have the 
same means of ascertaining the truth, there 
can be no estoppel. 
5. Estoppel P62.1 
The doctrine of estoppel generally 
does not appiy to acts of public authorities. 
6. Estoppel <1P62.4 
Even though landowners had expended 
$35,000 in planning and laying foundations 
of new apartment building in reliance on 
building permit issued on the basis of ordi-
nance amending prior ordinance, which 
had been passed in consideration of pre-
vious owners' covenant of record to main-
tain a buffer zone between their apartment 
. building and the nearest property owner, 
where building inspector had indicated that 
there might be a covenant restricting the 
erection of the apartments in space be-
tween existing apartments and other prop-
erty, the owners had at least constructive 
notice of the covenant and city was not es-
topped from revoking the permit. 
Shattuck & Payne, Chattanooga, for ap-
pellants. 
Eugene N. Collins City Attorney, and 
Randall L. Nelson, Chattanooga, for appel-
lees. 
OPINION 
McAMIS, Special Judge. 
Odis F. Haymon and Clark W. Taylor, 
owners of an apartment known as Chateau 
Royale, brought this action in the Chan-
cery Court of Hamilton County against the 
City of Chattanooga, its Mayor and its 
Commissioners to enjoin the City from en-
forcing a stop-work order against the con-
struction of twenty-eight apartments which 
complainants were in the process of adding 
to the existing apartment. 
Defendants answered the bill asserting 
that at a time when the land in question 
was zoned R-2 complainants' predecessors 
in title appeared before the Board of Zon-
ing Appeals and entered into an agreement 
to execute a covenant, to run for a period 
of 25 years, that, if the Board would re-
zone the property R-3, a buffer zone of 
vacant property 200 feet in width would be 
left between the apartment and the nearest 
property owner; that this covenant was to 
run with the land and bind subsequent 
owners not to build apartments on the 
buffer strip; that such a covenant was 
duly executed and placed of record in the 
Office of the Register of Deeds for Ham-
ilton County and has ever since remained 
of record and that in 1963, acting on this 
covenant, the Board, over the objection of 
neighboring property owners, after two 
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Nothing further was done to develop attempting to enforce the Covenant, which 
the property until after it was purchased is in derogation of the City's Zoning Ordi-
by complainants. Some time prior to 1971, nance. The Court agrees with counsel for 
complainants constructed one hundred the City that a Zoning Ordinance is not 
apartments on the land, leaving intact and controlled or changed by restrictive cove-
unimproved the buffer strip 200 feet in nants running with the land, which may be 
width. privately enforced; however, the City can-
On May 25, 1971, complainants had the 
title searched professionally but t'he cove-
nant for some reason was not discovered. 
Ignoring and possibly being ignorant of 
the covenant except that they were advised 
by the building inspector that there might 
be such a covenant in existence, complain-
ants made application to the Board to re-
duce the buffer strip to 100 feet to permit 
the construction of twenty-eight additional 
apartments. A new Board in the mean-
time having assumed office and being 
without knowledge of the covenant, passed 
an amendment to zoning ordinance reduc-
ing the buffer zone from 200 feet to 100 
feet and the building inspector thereupon 
issued a building permit to effectuate the 
amendment. 
Complainants then had plans drawn and 
entered into a contract for the construction 
of the new apartments and claim to have 
expended in drawing plans and laying 
foundations for the apartments approxi-
mately $35,000.00. At that juncture, appar-
ently being advised of the covenant and its 
then current violation, the City revoked the 
building permit, precipitating the filing of 
this action. 
(1] The Chancellor in a well reasoned 
opinion concluded that both the covenant 
and the ordinance passed in consideration 
thereof are void as a matter of law and 
that neither can be enforced. On this sub-
ject the Chancellor reasoned: 
"The City, by entering into the agree-
ment with the covenantors to rezone in 
consideration of the Covenant, should the 
Court uphold the Covenant, has placed it-
self in an untenable position of, on the one 
hand, finding through its Commi5sioners 
that the property should be rezoned to al-
low further construction, and, on the other, 
not maintain conflicting positions, i. e., on 
one hand, that it covenanted with the pri-
vate individuals to maintain certain zoning 
on this property and, on the other, subse-
quently and within the time covenanted en-
act an Ordinance contrary to its Covenant. 
The Court concludes that the Covenant and 
the Ordinance passed in consideration 
. thereof are void, as a matter of law. See 
Osborne v. Allen, 143 Tenn. 343, 226 S.W. 
221; City of Knoxville v. Ambrister, 196 
Tenn. 1,263 S.W.2d 528; Baylis v. City of 
Baltimore, 219 Md. 164, 148 A.2d 429; 
Hartnett v. Austin, Fla., 93 So.2d 86; State 
ex reI. Zupancic v. Schimenz, 46 Wis. 
2d 22, 174 N.W.2d 533. 
"Ordinance 6302, which undertook to 
amend the Ordinance held void, is likewise 
void. 
"The building permit issued to plaintiffs 
was issued under authority of said Zoning 
Ordinance and is likewise void. (See 
Taylor v. Shetzen, 212 Ga. WI, 90 S.E.2d 
572.) " 
Weare in agreement with the Chancel-
lor and affirm the decree. 
We think the question at issue is ruled 
by the two Tennessee cases cited by the 
Chancellor. The principle underpinning 
both is so well stated in Whitley v. White, 
176 Tenn. 206, 140 S.W.2d 157, 159, cited by 
the Court in Knoxville v. Ambrister that 
we can do no better than quote the 
pertinent portion of that opinion, which 
affirmed the decision of this Court: 
[2] "Contracts made for the purpose of 
unduly controlling or affecting official 
conduct of the exercise of legislative, ad-
ministrative and judicial functions, are 
plainly opposed to public policy. They 
strike at the very foundations of govern-
ment and intend to destroy that confidence 
2?7 
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in the integrity and discretion of public ac-
tion which is essential to the preservation 
of civilized society. The principle is uni-
versal and is applied without any reference 
to the mere outward form and purpose of 
the alleged transaction." 
However, more directly controlling is the 
holding of ollr Supreme Court in the Am-
brister case. 
In that case the Luttrell Estate made 
certain agreements af fecting its property 
for a period· of 50 years upon condition the 
City of Knoxville would re-zone certain of 
its property to permit the construction of 
an apartment building in an area zoned 
residential and, upon demand by the City, 
to convey the land to it for park and recre-
ational purposes. Thereafter, the City 
filed its bill for a decree declaring that the 
land had been dedicated to the City in con-
sideration for the re-zoning of the proper-
ty. 
After citing Osborne v. Allen, supra, and 
citing and quoting the above portion of the 
opinion in Whitley v. White, the Court, in 
the concluding portion of the opinion said: 
"In the instant case the offer was to 
dedicate at a future date certain property 
in the City to public park purposes, or to 
convey it to the City for such purposes on 
condition that the City amend its zoning 
ordinance, a police measure, so as to meet 
the wishes of the offerors. Upon receipt 
of this offer the City Council did amend 
its zoning ordinance so as to meet those 
wishes. There seems to be no escape from 
the conclusion that the case falls within 
the facts of Osborne v. Allen, supra, and 
within the facts stated in the rule there ap-
plied. Hence, this illegal agreement will 
not be enforced at the instance of the City 
of Knoxville, who was a party to it." 
Hickerson v. Flannery 42 Tenn.App. 329, 
302 S.W.2d 508, cited in the brief is inappo-
site. There the property owner only bound 
himself to acts of a nature beneficial to 
the general public, such as landscaping and 
the like. The only principle common to 
I. Nothing in this opinion is to be construed as 
holding that a planning commission, without 
that case and this seems to us to be that 
the covenant ran with the land, a principle 
which we do not understand to be here seri-
ously questioned.! 
The same rule with respect to the validi-
ty of contracts to influence zoning seems 
to prevail in numerous other jurisdictions, 
the consensus being that contracts entered 
into in consideration of concessions made or 
to be made favoring the applicant are 
frowned upon as being against public poli-
cy which dictates that zoning is an instru-
ment of public authority to be used only 
for the common welfare of all the people. 
See generally Law of Zoning, Metzen-
baum, Second Edition, pp. 967, 973, 1072, 3. 
(3] It seems proper to note here that a 
building permit is not a contract and may 
be changed or entirely revoked even 
though based upon a valuable consideration 
if necessary in the exercise of the police 
power. Howe Realty Co. v. City of Nash-
ville, 176 Tenn. 405, 141 S.W.2d 904; Law 
of Zoning, supra, p. 1158. See also Moore 
v. Memphis Stone & Gravel Co., 47 Tenn. 
App. 461, 339 S.W.2d 29. 
It is strongly contended, however, that a 
court of equity should hold the City es-
topped to revoke the building permit after 
complainants have expended I~rge sums of 
money relying upon the validity of the per-
mit. While we are not unsympathetic with 
the plight in which complainants find 
themselves, we can not accede to this con-
tention. 
The principle is well established that 
where both parties have the same means of 
ascertaining the true facts there can be no 
estoppel. Crabtree v. Bank, 108 Tenn. 483, 
67 S.W. 797; Parkey v. Ramsey, 111 Tenn. 
302,76 S.W. 812. 
[4] "It is essential, as a general rule, to 
the application of the principle of equitable 
estoppel, that the party claiming to have 
been influenced by the conduct or declara-
tions of another to his injury, was himself 
not only destitute of knowledge of the 
a covenant, can uot prescribe reasonable con-
ditions for the benefit of the general public. 
??A 
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SHARP v. STATE 
Cite as 513 S. \Y .2d 189 
Tenn. 189 
state of the facts, but was also destitute of 
any convenient and available means of ac-
quiring such knowledge, and that where 
the facts are known to both parties, or 
both have the same means of ascertaining 
the truth, there can be no estoppel." Crab-
tree v. Bank, supra; Hankins v. Waddell, 
26 Tenn.App. 71, 167 S.W.2d 694. 
(5) It is proper to add that, generally, 
the doctrine of estoppel does not apply to 
acts of public authorities. State v. Wil-
liams, 207 Tenn. 695, 343 S.W.2d 857. 
[6] The record suggests, as above not-
ed, that the building inspector said enough 
to put complainants upon inquiry as to the 
existence of the covenant. In any event 
the instrument creating the covenant and 
making it run with the land was of record 
and complainants had constructive notice of 
its existence. It seems to be unquestioned 
that to narrow the buffer sttip would be to 
the disadvantage of nearby owners of resi-
dential property. We fail to see why they 
should suffer loss under all the circum-
stances of this case. 
Affirmed and remanded for enforcement 
of the decree. Complainants and sureties 
will pay all costs. 
PARROTT and SANDERS, ]J., concur. 
Gary SHARP, Plaintiff·ln.Error, 
v. 
STATE of Tennessee, Defendant·in·Error. 
Court of Criminal Appeals of Tennessee. 
March 7, 1974. 
Certiorari Denied by Supreme Court 
.lune 17, 1974. 
Uehearing Denied July 15, 1974. 
Defendant was convicted in Circuit 
Court, Sevier County, George R. Shepherd, 
J., of murder in second degree, and he ap-
pealed in error. The Court of Criminal 
Appeals, Galbreath, J., held that testimony 
of credible and corroborated witnesses was 
sufficient to support conviction; that stat-
ute dealing with punishment for murder in 
first degree which had been declared un-
constitutional, had no bearing on case in 
that defendant was convicted of second-de-
gree murder; that there was no error in 
instructing jury in accord with statute 
which provided for jury fixing minimum 
and maximum terms of convicted defend-
ants; and that it was not error to deny 
motion for mistrial on ground that arrest-
ing officer testified that he found a knife 
on defendant, even though knife had not 
been made available for inspection by de-
fense counsel prior to trial as required by 
statute, since all evidence on weapon caus-
ing death related to straight razor and fact 
that defendant had small pocket knife 
when arrested had no bearing on his guilt . 
or innocence. 
Affirmed. 
Oliver, J., concurred except to last 
paragraph. 
I. Homicide <e:::=>254 
Testimony of credible and corrobo-
rated witnesses that they saw defendant 
walk up behind victim, grab him by back 
of head, and split his throat open with 
straight razor, was sufficient to support 
conviction of second-degree murder. 
2. Homicide <e:::=>i46, 152 
All killings are presumed to be murder 
in second degree, and jury may infer malice 
from use of deadly weapon. 
3. Constitutional Law <e:::=>49 
Fact that statute dealing with punish-
ment for murder in first degree had been 
declared unconstitutional had no bearing 
on case wherein defendant was convicted 
of second-degree murder. Pub.Acts 1973, 
c. 192. 
4. Criminal Law <e:::=>796 
Since it was valid function of legisla-
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err in denying plaintiff's counsel the right 
of summation? 
be answerable for any breach of the COn_ 
tract. 
The complaint seeks damages for the 
anticipatory breach of an alleged oral con-
tract made between the parties on May 5, 
19-18, for the purchase of newsprint to be 
delivercd in the futu-re, it being claimed that 
the oral contract was confirmed by the 
plaintiff on the following day. Immediately 
on receipt of the letter of confirmation the 
defendant, on May 7, advised plaintiff it 
had not agreed to accept delivery on the 
terms mentioned therein, that of billing it 
on a basis of gross weight for net weight. 
Plaintiff's source of supply in Holland 
steadfastly refused the net weight type of 
billing but plaintiff later agreed to reim-
burse the defendant for the difference. 
'vVhile the question of gross for net billing 
was still open the plaintiff kept seeking 
and asking the defendant for the "specifica-
tions" for the paper. This went on for 
several months, the negotiations between 
the parties being open for further agree-
ment, and were never furnished or agreed 
upon. The necessity for such an agree-
ment is amply evidenced by the cabled re-
quests for the specifications sent from Hol-
land to the defendant, by letters, and by 
the fact that the newsprint was never com-
pleted or shipped. 
[3,4] There was a sharp conflict in the 
testimony presented and the trial COurt 
had the opportunity and advantage of ob-
serving the witnesses and was in a position 
to evaluate their credibility to a greater 
extent than can an appellate tribunal. His 
findings of fact are entitled to great weight. 
The credibility of witnesses is an important 
consideration in the determination of fac-
tual issues. Gellert v. Livingston,S N.J. 
65, i8, 73 A.2d 916 (1950). While an ap-
pellate court is not bound by a finding of 
fact made by the trial court it is required to 
give due regard to the opportunity of that 
court to observe the demeanor of a witness 
and to judge of his credibility. In re Per-
rone's Estate, 5 N.J. 514, 523, 76 A.2d 518 
(1950). 
(1,2] It is fundamental that the essen-
tial element to the valid consummation of a 
contract is a meeting of the minds of the 
contracting parties and that until there is 
such a meeting of the minds either party 
may withdraw and end all negotiations. 
Water Commissioners of Jersey City v. 
Brown, 32 N.J.L. 504 (E. & A.l866); Wil-
son v. Windo!ph, 103 N.J.Eq. 275, 143 A. 
346 (E. & A.l928); P. Ballantine & Sons v. 
Gulka, 117 N.J.L. 84, 186 A. 722 (Sup.Ct. 
1936). "So long as negotiations are pend-
ing over matters relating to the contract, 
and which the parties regard as material 
to it, and until they are settled and their 
minds meet u!'on them, it is not a contract, 
aithough as to some matters they may be 
agreed", Tansey v. Suckoneck, 98 N.J.Eq. 
669, 671, 130 A. 528, 529 (E. & A.1925). 
I f the defendant had furnished specifica-
tions which the plairtiff could not meet at 
!he price fixed surely the plaintiff would not 
[5] We are convinced there was ample 
evidence to support the holding below that 
no contract existed between the parties. 
The point briefed and argued that the 
plaintiff was denied his right of summation 
merits little consideration under the facts 
exhibited. 
After the completion of testimony the 
trial court reserved decision and directed 
counsel to submit briefs, advising them 
that oral argument would be permitted fol-
lowing the submission of briefs, if nec-
essary or desirable, at such time as might 
be suitable. Later plaintiff's counsel by 
letter stated to the court that he requested 
permission to file a reply brief or in thc 
alternative that he be permitted to argue 
the matter orally to which the court replied 
that due to the pressure of time the matter 
could not be argued orally but that counsel 
might file a reply brief. 
[6) It wiII thus be observed that plain-
tiff asked for oral argument only in tbe 
alternative, i. e., in lieu of the opportunity 
to file a reply brief. He was given this 
opportunity and did so. No complaint that 
opportunity was not given to argue orally 
was made below and no objection made to 
the course taken. It is only on appeal that 
for the first time plaintiff complains that 
he was denied the right of summation. Cf. 
Roberts Electric Inc. v. Foundations & 
HOUSTON PETROLEUM CO. v. AUTOMOTIVE PROD. C. ASS'N N. J. 319 
Cite as 87 A.Zd 319 
Excavations, Inc., 5 N.J. 426, 75 A.2d 858 Superior Court, Chancery Division, reinstat-
(1950). Whatever rights plaintiff's counsel ed and affirmed. 
had were expressly waived by him. Vanderbilt, C. J., and Wachenfeld. J., 
Having reached the aforesaid .conclusions dissented. 
we are not called upon to decide the de-
fendant's point that the action was barred 
by the statute of frauds, there not being a 
sufficient memorandum in writing to meet 
the requirements of that statute. 
The judgment is affirmed. 
For affirmance: Justices HEHER, OLI-
PHANT and W ACHENFELD_3. 
For reversal: Chief Justice V ANDER-
BILT and Justice BURLING-2. 
9 N.J. 122 
HOUSTON PETROLEUM CO. v. A.UTO-
MOTIVE PRODUCTS CREDIT 
ASS'N, Inc. 
No. A-80. 
Supreme Court of New Jersey. 
Argued Feb. 18, 1952. 
Decided March 17, 1952. 
Action by the Houston Petroleum Co., a 
corporation of the State of New Jersey, 
against Automotive Products Credit Associa. 
tion, Inc., a corporation, for an injunction 
and speeific performance of an agreement 
creating covenants restricting use of realty. 
The Superior Court, Chancery Division, en. 
tered judgment dismissing the complaint, 
11 NJ.Super. 357, 78 A.2d 310, and plain-
tiff appenled. The Superior Court, Appel. 
late DiviSion, 15 N.J. Super. 215, 83 A.2d 239, 
reversed and set aside the judgment, of the 
Chancery Division, and defendant filed a pe-
tition for certification with the Supreme 
Court which was granted, 8 N.J. 248, 84 A.2d 
669. The ,Supreme Court, Burling, J., held 
that under the circnmstances of the case 
the restrictive Covenants were not enforce-
able by the plaintiff. 
Judgment of the Superior Court, Appellate 
Division, reversed, and the judgment of the 
I. Municipal Corporations ~01(15) 
Agreement between city and parties' 
common grantor for the reclassification of 
certain tracts so that they should <:ome 
within and be subject to provisions of 
light industrial district of zoning ordinance 
of city and that when zoned as light indus-
trial district premises should he subject to 
oCertain covenants and restrictions set forth 
in agreement constituted an abuse of zoning 
power by city and therefore agreement was 
ultra vires, illegal and void. 
2. MunicIpal Corporations ¢::>601(1, 7) 
The zoning power may not be exerted 
to serve private interests merely nor may 
the principle be subvertcd to that end, and 
a purported contract so made is ultra vires 
and all proceedings to effectuate it are 
coram non judice and utterly void. 
3. Municipal Corporations ¢::>601 (5) 
A contract between a municipality and 
a property owner should not enter into the 
enactment or enforcement of zoning regu-
lations. 
4. MUnicipal Corporations ¢::>601(15) 
\'lhere contract between city and par-
ties' common grantor for rezoning of tract 
as light industrial provided that when zoned 
as light industrial district tract would be 
subject to certain covenants and restrictions 
and covenants were imposed not only for 
purpose of obtaining rezoning of tract but 
were themselves limited in duration to 
period of time during which premises re-
mained zoned for light industry and agree-
ment provided for rel~ase or modification of 
covenants at any time by agreement to 
which city was made a necessary party, 
covenants in themselves exhjbit~d a plan 
in contravention of public policy incorpo-
rated in constitutional and statutory pro-
visions relating to zoning, and restrictive 
covenants, being violative of public policy 
of State, were illegal, and, agreement es-
tablishing covenants being void, plaintiff 
was not entitled to their enforcement. 
320 N.J. 
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5. contracts @:::>I08(1) 
of the 
be en-
ported modification of agreement and to en-
force restrictions against balance of tract 
was a corruption of apparent purpOSe of 
restriction and to that extent attempted en-
forcement was in restraint of competition 
and for such purpose plaintiff had no stand-
ing to enforce the restrictive covenants. 
A contract in contravention 
public 'Policy of the state will not 
forced. 
6. Municipal Corporations @:::>601(15) 
Agreement entered into between par-
ties' common grantor and city which pur-
ported to modi fy previous contract between 
common grantor and city under which 
common grantor agreed that tract should be 
subject to certain covenants and restric-
tions when tract was zoned as light in-
dustrial district, by which modification com-
mon grantor agreed to ·bind his remaining 
lots; was in violation of public policy im-
plicit in zoning laws and illegal and there-
fore plaintiff's right against defendant 
could not be enforced based on the modi-
fication agreement. 
7. Covenants @:::>49 
A restrictive covenant is a contl'act 
dependent on reciprocal or mutual burdens 
and benefits shared by each lot owner 
brought within scheme thereof. 
12. Injunction @:::>62(1) 
Courts of equity do not aid one man to 
restrict another in use to which he may 
lawfully put his property unless right to 
such aid is clear. 
William C. Nowels, Maplewood, argued 
the cause for defendant-appellant (Stein 
& Stein, Jersey City, attorneys; Frederick 
Z. Feldman, Jersey City, on the brief). 
Samuel Koestler, Elizabeth, argued the 
cause for plaintiff-respondent (Koestler & 
Koestler, Elizabeth, attorneys). 
The opinion of the court was delivered by 
BURLING, J. 
8. Covenants @:::>77 
Any neighborhood scheme of restrictive 
covenants to be enforceable must apply to 
all lots of like character brought within 
This is a civil action. The plaintiff in-
stituted the suit by -complaint against the 
defendant in the Superior Court, Chancery 
Division, seeking the remedy of injunction 
for the enforcement of certain restricti"~ 
covenants relating to real property. After 
trial, the Superior Court, Chancery Di-
vision, entered judgment dismissing the 
complaint. 11 N.J.Super. 357, 78 A.2d 310 
(Ch.Div.1951). The plaintiff pursued an 
a-ppeal to the Superior Court, Appellate 
Division, 15 N.J.Super. 215, 83 A,2d 239 
(App.Div.1951) and that court reversed and 
set aside the judgment of the Chancery 
Division. Thereupon the defendant filed 
a petition for certification with this court, 
which was granted. Houston Petroleum 
scheme. 
9. covenants @:::>77 
Where plaintiff's lot, which was re-
leased from restrictive covenants applying 
to other lots in tract, was of like character 
with remainder of tract, and attempted re-
lease of plaintiff's premises was effected for 
benefit of agent for plaintiff, restrictive 
covenants would not be enforceable by 
plaintiff against defendant. 
10. Injunction @:::>I09 
A plaintiff who has by his own conduct 
defeated the object and purpose of a re-
strictive covenant applying to a tract of 
realty is not entitled to injunctive relief 
for its enforcement. 
II. covenants @?77 
Where provision in original agreement 
for application of restrictive covenants to 
tract was applicable to entire tract and in-
cluded no permission for release of one 
portion or more of tract from those restric-
tions, attempt to release one portion by pur-
Co. v. Automotive Products Credit Asso-
ciation, Inc., 8 N.J. 248, 84 A,2d 669 (1951). 
There is little controversy here as to the 
facts which became the -fonndation of this 
suit. The plaintiff in its complaint claimed, 
and the defendant in the pretrial order 
admitted, that one Lotta D. Byrn~ and 
others, partners trading as Byrnes Realty 
Company (hereinafter called Byrnes), being 
the owners of a tract of land (including the 
premises in question) located in the City 
HOUSTON PETROLEUM CO. v. AUTOMOTIVE PROD. C. ASS'N 
Cite us 87 A.2d 219 
N.J. 321 
of Linden, County of Union and State of 
New Jersey, on the northwesterly side of 
New Jersey State Highway No. 25 (also 
known as Edgar Road) entered into a cer-
tain agreement in writing with the City of 
Linden dated April 15, 1947, recorded April 
17, 1947 in Book 1620 of Deeds for Union 
C<'ullty at page 434, etc., which included the 
following pertinent language: "Whereas, 
Byrnes Realty Company has applied to the 
Mayor and Common Council of the City of 
Linden, in the County of Union, to reclassi-
fy said premises so that the same shall come 
within and be subject to the provisions of 
Section 6--E (light industrial district) of the 
zoning ordinance of the said City of Lin-
den; and whereas, Byrnes Realty Company 
in connection with its said application has 
agreed that said lands and premises if and 
when zoned as a light industrial district, 
shall be subject to the covenants and re-
strictions hereinafter set forth; * * *." 
agreement. It was also daimed and ad-
mitted that on March 29, 1948 Byrnes con-
veyed ail the said tract, subject to the cove-
nants and restrictions contained in the 
aforesaid agreement, to Industrial Land 
Corporation, which in turn on the same 
date and likewise subject to said covenants 
and restrictions conveyed all land and 
premises to Clifford J. Colville and others 
trading as Macner Realty Company (here-
inafter referred to as Macner). In the 
pretrial order it was stipulated that the 
deeds for said conveyance contained the 
following language: "This conveyance is 
made subject to * '" * covenants and 
restrictions imposed upon said premises by 
a certain agreement made between the 
grantor and the City of Linden, dated 
April 15, 1947, * * *." 
The covenants and restrictions contained 
in the aforesaid agreement included a set-
back of 75 feet from the northerly line of 
the right-of-way of State Highway No. 25 
and a provision that the area between the 
northerly line of the right-of-way of said 
highway and the setback line be "seeded 
and suitably planted, excepting, however, 
such part of said area (not to exceed fifty 
(50%) per cent thereof) as shall be con-
structed and used for driveways and park-
ing space." 
It was further provided that said cove-
nants and restrictions should become effec-
tive on the rezoning of the area as re-
quested by Byrnes and continue in effect 
so long as the premises remained so zoned 
or until April 1, 1977, provided that they 
might be released or modified at any time 
by agreement in writing between the City of 
Linden and the owner or owners of all or 
all portions of said land and premises. 
The City of Linden, by ordinance adopted 
on the same date (April 15, 1947) rezoned 
the Byrnes tract described' in the above 
mentioned agreement to include said lands 
and premises in "Section 6-E (light indus-
trial district)." It is clear from the evi-
dence introduced at the trial of this cause 
that this rezoning was effected on con-
Sideration of the making of the afnrpo,;ri 
It was further claimed and admitted that 
on July 1, 1949 Macner, then being owners 
of the entj re tract, entered into an agree-
ment in writing with the City of Linden 
modifying the agreement of April 15, 1947 
as to a certain 300 feet of the frontage of 
said tract 011 State Highway No. 25, so as 
to relieve that portion of the tract of the 
setback and seeding and planting covenants 
and restrictions, and that this modification 
agreement was recorded on July 22, 1949. 
Macner thereafter, by deed dated August 
1, 1949 and duly recorded, conveyed the 
aforesaid portion of said tract which had 
been released from the restrictions to one 
Sand who subseql1ently conveyed the same 
portion to Houston Petroleum Co., a New 
Jersey corporation (hereinafter called the 
plaintiff); Macner also conveyed an ad-
joining portion of the tract, subject to re-
strictions and conditions of record, to the 
plaintiff on May 16, 1950. By deed dated 
June 12, 1950 and duly recorded, Macner 
conveyed, likewise subject to restrictions 
and conditions of record, to Automotive 
Products Credit Association, Inc., a New 
Jersey corporation (hereinafter called the 
defendant) a portion of the Byrnes tract 
immediately adjoining the plaintiff's addi-
tional portion of the tract, aforesaid, and 
also fronting on State Highway No. 25. It 
was further admitted in the pretrial order 
that on July 11, 1950 the building inspector 
.... £.l.t.._ r", 
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power by the City, and was therefore 
ultra vires, illegal and void. With this con-
a building permit for the construction upon 
its portion of the tract a large gasoline 
sen-ice station in conformity with plans and tention we agree. 
specifications which showed that the de- .. 
fendant intended to seed and plant less [2.J The latest expos~tlOn of the law 
than 10 per cent of the land area, between appltcable. to the foregolJ1g conclusion is 
the line of State Highway No. 25 and the contalJ1ed m V. F. Zah~dlaklJ1, etc., Corp. v. 
7S-foot setback line, and to pave 90 per Zonll1g Board of Adjustment of_ City of 
cent of the said land area with bituminous Sumnnt, 8 N.J. 386, 86 A.2d 121 (1952). 
pavement and concrete slabs, in clear vio- ~llls court there held, 8 N.J .. at pages 394-
lation of the covenants and restrictions ,,95,86 A.2d 127 that the zonmg power may 
hereinabove quoted, and that the defendant not be exerted to ser~e private interests 
commenced to place gasoline pumps on the merely nor may the pnnc.ple 'be subverted 
premises in positions designated in the to that end, that a purported contract so 
a fore said plans. made was n!tm vtres and all proceedings to 
TI I"ff fil d . I" I' effectuate It were coram non judice and 
1e p awtl _e Its c~mp alnt In t .115 utterly void. 
cause on J Illy 11, 1950 In the Supenor 
Court, Chancery Division seekino- to have The same principle is implicit in the de-
the defendant enjoined f~om violating the ds.ions of this court in Beckmann v. Town-
covenants and restrictions imposed on its ship of Teaneck, 6 N.J. 530, at page 535, i9 
said property 'by the aforesaid agreement of A.2d. 301 (1951) ,:~ere~n the asserted au-
April 15, 1947 between Byrnes and the thonty of a mumclpahty to contract for 
City of Linden, and by supplemental com- the. exercise of legislative powers was 
plaint filed October 5, 1950 sought a judg- demed by the c,aurt and Anschelewitz v. 
ment in the nature of a mandatory injunc- Borough of Belmar, 2 N.J. 178, 183, 6S 
tion to require the defendant to remove such A.2d 825, 827 (1949) wherein the court 
part of its construcl~on as was violative said: "A municipality cannot act as an in-
of said covenants and restrictions. An in- dividual does. It must 'Proceed in ;:on-
terlocutory injunction was denied by the formity with the statutes, or in the ab-
trial court on July 31, 1950. After trial sence of statute agreeably to the com~o!1 
firal judgment was entered on January 29, l~w, by ordmance or resolutIOn or motlOll. 
195 I in the Superior Court, Chancery Di- * * * .Especi'ally is this so where real 
vision, in favor of the defendant and dis- property IS concerned. * * *" 
missing, the plaintiff's complaint: On the [3-5) Contracts thus have no place in 
plamtlff s appeal to the SuperIOr Court, a zoning pial} and a contract between a 
Appellate Division, the judgment was re- municipality and a prope;ty owner should 
versed and remanded, on August 30, 1951, not enter into the enactment or enforcement 
with direction that a mandatory injunction of zoning regulations. See Bassett on Zon-
be Issued dHectmg the removal of the Im- ing, p. 184 (1940). Compare Speakman v. 
provcments vJOlatlng the covenant. The Mayor & Council of North Piainfield, 8 
defenda~t filed ":ith this court its petition N.J. 250, 257, 84 A.2d i15 (1951); Lynch v. 
for certificatIOn LO the Appellate DIVlslon Hillsdale, 136 N.J.L. 129, 134, 54 A.2d 723 
to. revie;r. said judgment of re\:ers~l, and (Sup.Ct.l947), affirmed per curiam 137 
saId petItIOn was granted resultmg m thIS N.J.L. 280, S9 A.2d 622 (E. & A.l948); 
lppeal as aforesaid. N. J. Good Humor, Inc., v. Borough of 
[1] The defendant asserted below and Bradley Beach, 124 N·lL. 162, 164-165, 
~serts here among its questions involved 168-169, II A.2d 113 (E. & A.l940); 
111 appeal that the covenants and restric- Friedman v. Maines, 151 A. 472, 8 N.J. 
ions sought by plaintiff to be enforced are Misc. 703 (Sup.Ct.l930), affirmed per 
~1Vaiid and unenforceable for the reason, curiam, 110 N.J.L. 454, 166 A. 148 (E. & A· 
inter alia, that the agreement of April 15, 1933). The covenants in question not only 
1947, between Byrnes and the City of were imposed on the land for the purpose 
Linden constituted an abuse of the zoning of obtaining rezoning of the Byrnes tract, 
... f-' 
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but are themselves limited in duration to (the purported "modification agreement" of 
the period of time during which the prem- July 1, 1949) to bind his remaining land, the 
ises remain zoned for light industry. Thus plaintiff's rights should be enforced. And 
they seem related not to the benefit of in- the second is whether there was created by 
dividual portions of the tract but to zoning the common grantor a neighborhood plan 
for the entire tract. In addition, the re- or scheme to the enforcement of which the 
corded agreement provides for release or plaintiff is entitled. It was upon these 
modification of the covenants at any time by propositions that the Superior Court, Ap-
an agreement to zr.;hich the City of Linden pellate Division, principally rested its judg-
is made a necessary party. This again is ment. The common grantor's purported 
referable to zoning, and is within the par- modi-fication agreement of July 1, 1949, ap-
ticular condemnation of the law as stated in proved by resolution of the Common Coun-
the Zahodiakin case, supra. Thus it may cil of the City of Linden on July 19, 1949, 
be concluded that the covenants in them- is subject to the same condemnation as has 
selves exhibit a plan in contravention of been hereinabove addressed to the original 
the public policy incorporated in the con- agreement between Byrnes and the .city, 
stitlltional and statutory provisions relating and is void as against public policy. 
to zoning. The former Supreme Court of 
this State in Sharp v. Teese, 9 N.J.L. 352, 
354 (Sup.Ct.l828) held: "The attempt to 
contravene the policy of a public statute is 
illegal. Nor is it necessary to render it 
so that the statute should contain an ex-
press prohibition of such attempt. It al-
ways contains an implied prohibition; and 
to Stich attempt the principles of the com-
mon law are invariably and deadly hostile, 
not always by an interference between the 
parties themselves, or by enabling the one 
to recall from the other, where in pari 
deliclo, what may have been obtained; but 
by at all times refusing the aid of the law 
to carry into effect or enforce any contract 
which may be the result of such intended 
contravention." And this court has reiter-
ated the rule that a contract in contraven-
tion of the public policy of this State will 
not be enforced .. Lobek v. Gross, 2 N.J. 
100, 102, 65 A.2d i44 (1949). We there-
fore conclude that the restrictive covenants 
in qUestion,being violative of the public 
policy of this State implicit in our zoning 
laws, are illegal. Compare Driscoll v. 
Burlington-Bristol Bridge Co., B N.5- 433, 
86 A.2d 201 (1952); Stack v. P. G. Garage, 
Inc., 7 N.J. 118, 121-122, 80 A.2d 545 
(\951). The agreement establishing the 
covenants being illegal and void, the plain-
tiff is not entitled to their enforcement. 
[6] Among the questions involved are 
two further propositions. The first of 
these is whether upon the 'basis of the com-
mon grantor's express agreement in writinlT 
[7-10] The principles upon which the 
existence of a neighborhood scheme de-
pen-ds are so firmly established that no 
repetition here is deemed necessary. Act-
ing upon the premise that a neighborhood 
scheme was created by the common gran-
tors, independent of the illegal municipal 
agreement, it is unenforceable by the plain-
tiff. It is settled that a restri-ctive covenant 
is a contract dependent upon reciprocal or 
mutual burdens and benefits shared by each 
lot owner brought within the scheme there-
of. Weinstein v. Swartz, 3 N.J. 80, 86, 68 
A.2d 865 (1949). The mutual and recip-
rocalburdens and benefits of the original 
neighborhood plan (effected 'by the Byrnes 
covenants) were so altered by the purported 
modification agreement as to render them 
unenforceable by the plaintiff for lack of 
mutuality. Compare Weinstein v. Swartz, 
supra; Welitoff v. Kohl, lOS N.J.Eq. 181, 
147 A. 390, 66 A.L.R. 1317 (E. & A.1929). 
Upon the Byrnes conveyance to Macner the 
scheme established by Byrnes was und; s-
turned, for the entire tract was the sub-
ject of the conveyance. The plaintiff 
argues to the effect that the neighborhood 
scheme that became established is not the 
result of the Byrnes agreement, but of the 
Macner modification agreement, and there-
fore the plaintiff is entitled to the protec-
tion of the covenants, on the settled prin-
ciples that the common grantor mayor may 
not bind himself by the restrictions, Clarke 
v. Kurtz, 123 N.J.Eq. 174, 177, 196 A. 777 
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vent its appropriation to purposes which 
will impair the value or diminish the enjoy_ 
ment of the land which he retains. The 
only restriction on this right is, that it 
shall be exercised reasonably, with due re-
gard to public policy, and without creating 
any unlawful restraint of trade.' " 
formity 0 f the restdctions over the entire 
tract subject to the scheme is not required, 
Weinstein v. Swartz, 3 N.r. 80, 86, 68 A.2d 
865 (1949). To this argument defendant 
interposes the established rule that any 
neighborhood scheme to Qe effective and en-
forceable must apply to all lots of like 
character brought within the scheme. Ibid. 
There is no doubt, under the circumstances 
of this case, that plaintiff's lot which was 
released from the restrictions was "of like 
character" with the remainder of the tract. 
It is also settled that a plaintiff who has 
by his own conduct defeated the object and 
purpose of a covenant of this nature is not 
entitled to injunctive relic f for its en force-
ment. Compare Dalstan v. Circle Amuse-
ment Co., 130 N.J.Eq. 354, 356,22 A.2d 245 
(E. & A.l94l); DeGray v. Monmouth 
Beach Co., SO N .J .Eq. 329, 24 A. 388 (Ch. 
1390), affirmed 67 N.J.Eq. 731, 63 A. 1118 
(E. & A.189.:!). The plaintiff in the present 
case has not proved its right to the applica-
tion of the doctrine of the Clarke case, 
supra. The record shows that the common 
grantor, Macner, accepted title subj ect to, 
and was bound by, the covenants in the 
Byrnes agreement. Assuming -but not de-
ciding that Macner, being owner of the 
entire tract, could alter the neighborhood 
scheme previously established and eliminate 
its own premises therefrom without destruc-
tion of the scheme, it does not. appear that 
such was the course followed. The at-
tempted release of the plaintiff's premises 
was effected for the ,benefit of Sand who 
was acting as agent for the plaintiff. We 
find that under the circumstances of this 
case the restrictive covenants would not he 
enforceable by the plaintiff. 
[11] We find that restrictions were 
placed on the enti1'c tract and were not 
designed for the purpose now asserted. 
The provision for release or modification is 
applicable to the entire tract and includes no 
permission for release of one portion or 
more of the tract from those restrictions. 
This is evident from the text of the clause. 
The attempt to release one portion by the 
purported "modification agreement" and to 
en force the restrictions aga inst the balance 
of the tract is a corruption of the apparent 
purpose of the restrictions. To this extent 
the attempted enforcement was admittedly 
in restraint of competi tion. It is obvious 
upon this view of the matter that for such 
purpose the plaintiff has no standing. Com-
pare Hrewer v. Marshall and Cheeseman, 
19 N.J .Eq. 537 (E. & A.IS68); Irving In-
vestment Corp. v. Gordon, 3 N.;' 217, 221, 
69 A.2d 725 (1949). 
An additional question presented by the 
defendant on this appeal is whether a plain-
tiff may enforce the covenants involved in 
this litigation for the purpose of stifling 
competition. The source of the defend-
ant's contention lies in the law approved 
by the former court of Chancery in the 
case of Coudert v. Sayre, 46 N,J.Eq. 386, 
389, 19 A. 190, 191, (Ch.1890) namely: 
" 'Every owner of real property has a right 
to so deal with it, as to restrain its use by 
his grantee, within stich limits as to pre-
[12] The defendant's fifth and final 
question involved on this appeal presents 
the general argument that courts of equity 
do not aid one man to restrict another in 
the uses to which he may lawfully put his 
property unless the right to such aid is 
clear. This is a recognized rule in this 
State. Howland v. Andrus, 81 N .J.Eq. 175, 
181, 86 A. 391 (E. & A.l913). Under the 
circumstances of this case the plaintiff is 
not entitled to enforcement of the restric-
tive covenants against the defendant. 
For the reasons stated, the judgment of 
the Superior Court, Appellate Division is 
reversed, and the j ucigment of the Superior 
Court, Chancery Division, is reinstated and 
affirmed. 
For reversal: Justices HEHER, OLI-
PHANT and BURLING---3. 
For affirmance: Chief Justice VAN-
DERBILT and Justice WACHENFELD 
-2. 
D N.J. 134 
REIMJI..NN v. MONMOUTH COlqSOLIDATEJ 
Cite as 87 A..2d 325 
REIMANN v. MONMOUTH CONSOLIDAT. had been est 
basis, the 5, 
turn that rul 
required to I 
ED WATER CO, 
No. A-73. 
Supreme Court of New Jersey, 
Argued Feb. 4, 1952. 
Decided Feb. 14, 1952. 
Herman Reimann, individually and for-
merly trading as Oahhurst Recreation Cen-
ter, brought action agai nst the Monmouth 
Consolidated Water Company. a hody cor-
porate, to recover for fire loss allegedly due 
to lack of water and pressure at fire hydrants 
sen'ed by defendant. The Superior Court, 
Law Division, Monmouth County, entered 
judg'ment for defendant, and plaintiff ap-
pealed, and the appeal was certified to the 
Supreme Court on its own motion. The Su-
preme Court, Case, J., held that defendant 
as public utility furnishing water in town-
ship was not liable to plaintiff as owner of 
reerea tion center which was destrOYed by 
fire allegedly because water "olume and pres-
sure at fire hydrants were insufficient to com-
bat t.he fire, in absence of any contract be-
tween defendant and plaintiff that defendant 
would furnish sufficient water for fire pro-
tect.ion. 
Judgment affirmed. 
Vanderbilt, C. J., and Heher, J., dissented. 
I. Waters and Waler Courses cE=>206 
Public utility furnishing water in town-
ship was not liable to owner of recreation 
center which was destroyed by fire alleged-
ly because public utility's water volume 
and pressure at /ire hydrants were insuffi-
cient to combat the fire, in absence of any 
contract between public utility and owner 
of recreation center that public utility 
would furnish sufficient water for fire pro-
tection. 
2, Courts cE=>90(1) 
Where decision of Court of Errors and 
Appeals holding that a public water com-
pany is not liable to an individual for loss 
by fire resulting from insufficient supply 
of water at insufficient pressure at fire hy-
drants to extinguish a fire, in a·bsence of 
Contract between parties for sufficient sup-
ply at sufficient pressure, stood for nearly 
40 years without having been attacked or 
Weakened, and rates of ",.ater companies 
David Gol 
the cause for 
the New Yor 
brief; Gold. 
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Appeal from the United States District Court for the Central District ofCalifomia. D.C. No. CV-03-04890-CAS. 
Christina A. Snyder, District Judge, Presiding. 
CASE SUMMARY: 
PROCEDURAL POSTURE: Defendant city entered into a settlement agreement with defendant congregation allow-
ing it to operate a synagogue in a residential-zoned area. Plaintiff neighbors sued alleging that the settlement agreement 
was void because a conditional use permit was granted without providing notice and a hearing to the affected commu-
nity. The U.S. District Court for the Central District of California dismissed the action with prejUdice. The neighbors 
appealed. 
OVERVIEW: The court rejected the district court's analysis--a comparison between a traditional conditional use permit 
(CUP) and the settlement agreement--because it ignored the plain language of Los Angeles, Cal., Municipal Code § 
12.08. The congregation sought, and the settlement agreement granted, permission to operate a synagogue in a residen-
tial zone even though congregational worship was considered a conditional use under Los Angeles, Cal., Municipal 
Code § 12.24, and required a permit. The court held the city impermissibly circumvented the procedural and substantive 
limitations contained in Los Angeles, Cal., Municipal Code § 12.24. Because the city did not satisfy those formalities 
when it entered into the settlement agreement, the agreement was invalid and unenforceable under state law. The court 
rejected any argument that the city could have circumvented its zoning procedures by referencing its general authority 
to settle litigation under Los Angeles, Cal., City Charter § 273(c). Absent a fmding that federal law was violated or 
would be violated, the district court could not approve the settlement agreement that authorized the city to disregard its 
own zoning ordinances. ' 
OUTCOME: The dismissal of the neighbor's collateral attack on the settlement agreement was reversed and the case 
was remanded for further proceedings. 
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LexisNexis(R) Headnotes 
Civil Procedure> Pleading & Practice> Defenses, Demurrers, & Objections> Failures to State Claims 
Civil Procedure> Appeals> Standards of Review> De Novo Review 
Page 2 
[RNl) A circuit court of appeals reviews de novo a district court's dismissal of claims under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). 
All facts alleged in the complaint are assumed true. 
Civil Procedure> Settlements> Settlement Agreements> General Overview 
[HN2) A federal consent decree or settlement agreement cannot be a means for state officials to evade state law. State 
officials can not agree to terms which would exceed their authority and supplant state law. Some rules oflaw are de-
signed to limit the authority of public officeholders. They may chafe at these restraints and seek to evade them, but they 
may not do so by agreeing to do something state law forbids. 
Governments> Local Governments> Ordinances & Regulations 
[HN3) In California, a duIy enacted local ordinance has the same binding force as a state statute. 
Real Property Law> Zoning & Land Use> General Overview 
[HN4) Los Angeles, Cal., Municipal Code § 12.08(A) limits the use of buildings or structures in an Rl residential zone 
primarily to one or two-family dwellings. 
Real Property Law> Zoning & Land Use> General Overview 
[HN5] See Los Angeles, Cal., Municipal Code § 12.08(A). 
Real Property Law> Zoning & Land Use> Special Permits & Variances 
[HN6] Among the conditional uses requiring approval under Los Angeles, Cal., Municipal Code § 12.08(A) are the 
operation ofChurcheslHouses of worship. Los Angeles, Cal., Municipal Code § 12.24(T)(3)(b). 
Real Property Law> Zoning & Land Use> Special Permits & Variances 
[HN7] The procedure for reviewing conditional use permit (CUP) applications requires an initial decision by the Zoning 
Administrator, public notice, and a public hearing. Los Angeles, Cal., Municipal Code § 12.24(C), (D). Furthermore, 
the decision-maker must issue a series of factual findings before granting a CUP. § 12.24(E). Any aggrieved person may 
administratively appeal the decision of the Zoning Administrator to the Planning Commission and, if still unsatisfied, to 
the City Council. § 12.24(1). 
Real Property Law> Zoning & Land Use> General Overview 
[HN8) Municipalities may not waive or consent to a violation of their zoning laws, which are enacted for the benefit of 
the public. Cal. Civ. Code § 3513. Any such agreement to circumvent applicable zoning laws is invalid and unenforce-
able. 
Real Property Law> Zoning & Land Use> Nonconforming Uses 
Real Property Law> Zoning & Land Use> Special Permits & Variances 
[HN9) Los Angeles, Cal., Municipal Code § 12.08(A) states that all conditional use is forbidden in an RI zone unless 
approved pursuant to the provisions of Los Angeles, Cal., Municipal Code § 12.24. 
23,S 
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Governments> Local Governments> Police Power 
Real Property Law> Zoning & Land Use> Special Permits & Variances 
[HN1O] Land use regulations involve the exercise of the state's police power, and it is settled that the government may 
not contract away its right to exercise the police power in the future. 
Real Property Law> Zoning & Land Use> Special Permits & Variances 
[HNI I] Departures from standard zoning by law require administrative proceedings, including public hearings, fol-
lowed by fmdings for which the instant density exemption might not qualifY. Both the substantive qualifications and the 
procedural means for a variance discharge public interests. Circumvention of them by contract is impermissible. 
Civil Procedure> Settlements> Settlement Agreements> Validity 
Governments> Local Governments> Claims By & Against 
[HNI2] Los Angeles, Cal., City Charter § 273(c) generally empowers the city council to approve or reject settlement of 
litigation that does not involve only the payment or receipt of money. This provision does not purport to authorize con-
tractual exemptions from zoning requirements. Such exemptions are illegal, and § 273(c) cannot grant the city more 
authority than is permitted under California law. 
Constitutional Law> Supremacy Clause> Federal Preemption 
[HN13J Once a court has found a federal constitutional or statutory violation, a state law cannot prevent a necessary 
remedy. 
Civil Procedure> Settlements> Settlement Agreements> Validity 
Constitutional Law> Supremacy Clause> Federal Preemption 
[HNI4J Upon properly supported fmdings that such a remedy is necessary to rectifY a violation offederal law, a district 
court can approve a consent decree which overrides state law provisions. Without such fmdings, however, parties can 
only agree to that which they have the power to do outside oflitigation. 
COUNSEL: Leslie M. WerIin, McGuire Woods, Los Angeles, California, for the plaintiffs-appellants. 
Susan S. Azad, Latham & Watkins, Los Angeles, California, for defendant-appellee Congregation Etz Chaim. 
Tayo A. Popoola, Los Angeles, California, for defendants-appellees City of Los Angeles, James K. Hahn, and Rocky 
Delgadillo. 
JUDGES: Before: Barry G. Silverman, William A. Fletcher, and Richard R. Clifton, Circuit Judges. 
OPINION BY: Barry G. Silverman 
OPINION 
[*1053J 
SILVERMAN, Circuit Judge: 
An Orthodox Jewish congregation applied for a conditional use permit to operate a synagogue in an area zoned 
solely for residential use. Neighbors of the proposed synagogue objected and, ultimately, the City of Los Angeles de-
nied the application. The Congregation then filed a federal lawsuit alleging that the denial of the permit violated its fed-
eral and state constitutional rights. All these claims were later dismissed. However, while the lawsuit, was pending, 
Congress passed the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act ("RLUIPA"), 42 u.s.c. § 2000cc. Con-
cerned about the force [**2J of this new federal law and seeking to avoid further litigation, the City entered into a set-
tlement agreement that allowed the Congregation to operate the synagogue under certain conditions. 
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Neighbors of the synagogue brought the present action, alleging that the Settlement Agreement is void because, in 
settling the lawsuit as it did, the City effectively granted the Congregation a conditional use permit without providing 
notice and a hearing to the affected community. This, they say, violated state law and their right to due process. 
We agree with the neighbors on their state law claim. To paraphrase Justice O'Connor in a different context, the 
pendency of litigation is not a blank check for a city when it comes to the rights of its residents. In the Settlement 
Agreement, the City granted a conditional use right without first giving affected persons notice and an opportunity to be 
heard, thereby violating state law. A settlement agreement cannot override state law absent a specific determination that 
federal law has been or will be violated. Since no such findings were made here, the Settlement Agreement is invalid 
and unenforceable. 
I. Background 
Congregation Etz Chaim, an Orthodox Jewish [**3] congregation, acquired property on Highland Avenue in the 
Hancock Park [*1054] neighborhood of Los Angeles. In light of the area's designation as an "RI" residential zone un-
der Los Angeles Municipal Code § 12.08, the Congregation sought from the City a conditional use permit ("CUP") to 
allow for congregational religious worship and services on the property. In October 1996, the City's Zoning Administra-
tor denied the application and the requested variances. This action was later upheld by the Board of Zoning Appeals and 
the Los Angeles City Council. 
Then, in 1997, the Congregation brought a federal action under 42 U.S.C § 1983, alleging that the City's denial of 
its CUP application violated state and federal law. In June 1998, while this federal action was pending, the Congrega-
tion petitioned for a writ of mandate in Los Angeles Superior Court, seeking to overturn the City's denial of the CUP. 
The Superior Court upheld the denial and the California Court of Appeal affrrmed. 
Shortly thereafter, the Congregation filed an amended complaint in the federal action to include an alleged violation 
ofRLUlPA. RLUIPA's effective date was September 22,2000. Pub. L. No. 106-274, 114 Stat. 803 (2000). Citing [**4] 
to the preclusive effect of the state court proceedings, the district court granted summary judgment to the City on all 
issues raised by the Congregation in its original complaint. However, the court denied the City's motion for summary 
judgment with respect to the newly added RLUIP A claim. 
On September 27, 200 I, the City and the Congregation settled. The City denied any violation offederal law on its 
part. However, the Settlement Agreement authorized the use of the Highland property for congregational worship, sub-
ject to several restrictions. It restricted the number of congregants and the number of cars at the property during ser-
vices. Moreover, the Congregation could not hold weddings, funerals, banquets, fund-raising events, or offer day care 
services. Finally, the Congregation had to maintain the property's residential exterior and could not post signs, posters, 
or flyers on the premises. 
Pursuant to the Agreement, the district court dismissed the Congregation's federal action with prejudice on Febru-
ary I, 2002, with the court retaining jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties for a period of five years. I The 
League of Residential Neighborhood Advocates and individual [**5] Hancock Park homeowners (collectively, "the 
League"), none of whom were parties to the first federal court action, filed a complaint under 42 U.SC § 1983 against 
the City, Mayor James Hahn, City Attorney Rocky Delgadillo (collectively, "the City"), and the Congregation. 2 The 
League argued that local zoning ordinances denied the City authority to enter into such an agreement. It also asserted 
federal and state constitutional violations. 
I The City and the Congregation have since been involved in litigation over the scope and enforcement of the 
Settlement Agreement. See Congregation Etz Chaim v. City of Los Angeles, 371 F.3d J J 22 (9th Cir. 2004). Ad-
ditionally, while the district court initially agreed to retain jurisdiction over the Settlement Agreement and the 
parties for five years, on September 6, 2006, the court entered a joint stipulation and order extending its jurisdic-
tion until February 1,2012. 
2 This action was originally assigned to the Honorable Harry L. Hupp. On February 2,2004, it was reassigned 
to the Honorable Christina A. Snyder following the death of Judge Hupp. 
On December 22, 2003, the district court granted the Congregation's motion to dismiss with prejudice. The [**6] 
court found that the Settlement Agreement did not create a CUP, and that the privileges granted to the Congregation did 
not run with the land and were created by contract against a threat oflitigation. Further, the court [* 1055] found, these 
privileges would be enforced through contractual, and not criminal, sanctions. Therefore, the court held, the City did not 
have to comply with the standards and procedures outlined in the local zoning ordinances for the granting of a CUP. 
237 
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The district court later granted the City's motion for judgment on the pleadings with leave to amend, concluding 
that "the law of the case established by the December 22,2003 order ... bar[red] any claim predicated on the theory 
that the Settlement Agreement is a de facto CUP." The League thereafter amended its complaint against the City, which 
the district court dismissed with prejudice under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6}. 
The League appealed. We remanded the case to the district court for reconsideration of its ruling in light of Trancas 
Property Owners Ass'n v. City 0/ Malibu, 138 Cal. App. 4th 172, 41 Cal. Rptr. 3d 200 (2006). In Trancas, the California 
Court of Appeal invalidated a city's decision to settle a lawsuit by granting the functional [**7] equivalent of a zoning 
variance without complying with statutory zoning procedures. Id. at 181-82. Having previously held that the Settlement 
Agreement did not grant a de facto CUP, the district court found Trancas distinguishable and affirmed its earlier order. 
n. Jurisdiction 
The district court had subject matter jurisdiction over the League's constitutional claims under 28 U.s. C. § § 1331, 
1343(a}, and over its state claims under 28 u.s. C. § 1367(a}. Furthermore, the district court retained subject matter ju-
risdiction over the Settlement Agreement for the purpose of issuing any order construing, modifYing, enforcing, termi-
nating, or reinstating its terms. See Flanagan v. Arnaiz, 143 F.3d 540, 544-45 (9th Gir. 1998). We have jurisdiction pur-
suant to 28 u.s.c. § 1291. 
III. Standard ()f Review 
[RN1] We review de novo the district court's dismissal of the League's claims under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6}._See 
Holcombe v. Hosmer, 477 F.3d 1094,1097 (9th Cir. 2007). All facts alleged in the complaint are assumed true. Id. 
IV. Discussion 
[HN2] A federal consent decree or settlement agreement cannot be a means for state officials to evade state law. 
See Keith v. Volpe, 118 F.3d 1386, 1393 (9th Gir. 1997) (holding [**8] that state officials "could not agree to terms 
which would exceed their authority and supplant state law"); Perkins v. City 0/ Chicago Heights, 47 F.3d 212, 216 (7th 
Cir. 1995) ("'Some rules oflaw are designed to limit the authority of public officeholders .... They may chafe at these 
restraints and seek to evade them,' but they may not do so by agreeing to do something state law forbids. ") (internal cita-
tion and alteration omitted). [HN3] In California, a duly enacted local ordinance has the same binding force as a state 
statute. See, e.g., Empire Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Bell, 55 Cal. App. 4th 1410, 1419, 1422, 64 Cal. Rptr. 2d 749 
(1997). We must therefore review the validity of the City's action under state law before examining any possible inter-
action with federal law. 
A. The Settlement Agreement was not authorized by state law 
[HN4J Los Angeles Municipal Code § 12.08(A) limits the use of buildings or structures in an RI residential zone 
primarily to one or two-family dwellings: 
[HN5] A. Use. No building, structure or land shall be used and no building or structure shall be erected, 
structurally altered, enlarged or maintained except for the following uses .... 
[*1056] 6. Conditional uses enumerated in Sec. 12.24 when [**9] the location is approved pursu-
ant to the provisions of said section. 
[HN6] Among the conditional uses requiring approval are the operation of "ChurcheslHouses of worship." Los Angeles 
Municipal Code § 12.24(T)(3)(b). 
[HN7] The procedure for reviewing CUP applications requires an initial decision by the Zoning Administrator, 
public notice, and a public hearing. Id. § 12.24(C), (D). Furthermore, the decision-maker must issue a series of factual 
findings before granting a CUP. Id. § 12.24(E). Any aggrieved person may administratively appeal the decision of the 
Zoning Administrator to the Planning Commission and, if stilI unsatisfied, to the City Council. Id. § 12.24(1). 
[HN8) Municipalities may not waive or consent to a violation of their zoning laws, which are enacted for the bene-
fit of the public. See Hansen Bros. Enters., Inc. v. Bd. o/Supervisors, 12 Cal. 4th 533, 48 Cal. Rptr. 2d 778,907 P.2d 
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1324,1343 (Ca/. 1996); Trancas, 138 Cal. App. 4th at 181-82; see also Cal. Civ. Code § 3513. Any such agreement to 
circumvent applicable zoning laws is invalid and unenforceable. See Smith v. City oJSan Francisco, 225 Cal. App. 3d 
38,55,275 Cal. Rptr. 17 (1990). 
The League contends that the Settlement Agreement did just that; it granted use permission to the Congregation 
[**10] outside of the required statutory processes and, therefore, is void. The district court rejected this argument be-
cause it determined that the Settlement Agreement was not a CUP. It was created by agreement and its obligations did 
not run with the land. Enforcement would not be accomplished through criminal law, but through contractual remedies. 
Therefore, because the Settlement Agreement was something less than a traditional CUP, the procedures and standards 
mandated by Los Angeles Municipal Code §§ 12.08, 12.24 were never triggered. 
We disagree. The district court's analysis -- a comparison between a traditional CUP and the terms of the Settle-
ment Agreement -- ignores the plain language of [HN9] Los Angeles Municipal Code § 12.08: All "conditional use" is 
forbidden in an Rl zone unless "approved pursuant to the provisions of [Section 12.24]." The question is not whether 
the Congregation has been granted, in all respects, the de facto equivalent of a CUP. The question, rather, is whether, 
within the framework ofthe City's zoning ordinance, the Congregation could engage in the uses permitted by the Set-
tlement Agreement without first obtaining a CUP. Therefore, we need only ask whether the [** 1 1] Settlement Agree-
ment grants the Congregation permission to engage in a "conditional use" as defined by the ordinance that is forbidden 
in the absence of a valid CUP. If so, the statutory framework is triggered in full. 
Here, the answer is evident. The Congregation sought, and the Settlement Agreement granted, permission to oper-
ate a synagogue on the Highland property. In an Rl zone, congregational worship is considered a "conditional use" un-
der Section 12.24, and requires a permit. Before allowing such a use, the City was required to comply with the ordi-
nance's procedural formalities. Because the City did not satisfy those formalities when it entered into the Settlement 
Agreement, the Agreement is invalid and unenforceable under state law. 
The California Court of Appeal's recent decision in Trancas confirms our conclusion. There, the City disapproved a 
developer's tract maps and the developer filed suit. 138 Cal. App. 4th at 176-77. In order to settle the claims, the City 
approved, in a closed session, a written agreement to rescind the disapproval [* 1057] and exempt the developer from 
all present and future zoning density restrictions that would otherwise block the development. Id. at 178-79. 
The [**12] Trancas court invalidated the agreement on two grounds. 
First, it held the provision exempting the developer from all future density restrictions to be unlawfuI.ld. at 181. 
[HNIO] "'Land use regulations ... involve the exercise of the state's police power, and it is settled that the government 
may not contract away its right to exercise the police power in the future.''' Id. (quotingAvco Cmty. Developers, Inc. v. 
S. Coast Reg'l Comm'n, 17 Cal. 3d 785, 132 Cal. Rptr. 386, 553 P.2d 546,556 (Cal. 1976)}. 
Second, the court focused on another provision that exempted the developer from existing density limitations in the 
zoning code. Id. at 181 (summarizing provision as an "agreement that the development need not comply with density 
limitations different from the density set forth in the covenant"). The court held: 
This contractual exemption from an element of the city's zoning is indistinguishable from the one con-
demned by Avco. Moreover, it functionally resembles a variance. Such [RNl 1] departures from standard 
zoning, however, by law require administrative proceedings, including public hearings, followed by fmd-
ings for which the instant density exemption might not qualify. Both the substantive qual(fications and 
the procedural means [** 13] Jor a variance discharge public interests. Circumvention oj them by con-
tract is impermissible. 
Id. at 182 (emphasis added and citations omitted). 
Here, the Settlement Agreement violated both principles of Trancas. The City did bargain away its right to exercise 
its police power over the Highland property so long as the Congregation is in existence. It is now contractually obli-
gated to tolerate the conditional use approved in the Agreement and may not enforce Section 12.08 or any other zoning 
ordinance to the extent that they deviate from the Agreement's provisions: 
Moreover, in doing so, the City impermissibly circumvented the procedural and substantive limitations contained in 
Los Angeles Municipal Code § 12.24. It granted the Congregation a right to use property in a residential neighborhood 
for congregational worship without going through the necessary procedures and issuing the requisite factual findings. 
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Finally, we reject any argument that the City may circumvent its zoning procedures by referencing its general au-
thority to settle litigation under § 273( c) of the city charter. [HNI2] Section 273( c) generally empowers the city council 
"to approve or reject settlement oflitigation that does [**14] not involve only the payment or receipt of money." This 
provision does not purport to authorize contractual exemptions from zoning requirements. Trancas clearly holds that 
such exemptions are illegal, and § 273(c) call11ot grant the City more authority than is permitted under California law. 
See Elysian Heights Residents Assn., Inc. v. City o/Los Angeles, 182 Cal. App. 3d 21, 40, 227 Cal. Rptr. 226 (1986) 
("Local legislation in conflict with general law is void.") (citation and alteration omitted). 
We hold that Settlement Agreement is invalid and unenforceable as a matter of California law. 
B. There was no judicial determination that federal law had been or would be violated 
Our inquiry is not yet complete. The City might not have to comply with the procedural and substantive limitations 
set [*1058] forth in its zoning ordinances ifthere has been a violation offederal law or if compliance will result in 
such a violation. Cj Perkins, 47 F.3d at 216 ("[RNI3] Once a court has found a federal constitutional or statutory viola-
tion, however, a state law cannot prevent a necessary remedy. "). 
The district court validated the Settlement Agreement by referencing RLUlP A, 42 u.s. C. § 2000cc: "[The Settle-
ment Agreement] was negotiated [**15] against the background not only of City zoning law, but federal law which 
might or might not be held valid after long and expensive litigation." On this theory, the City had the right to settle the 
Congregation's claim rather than litigate over RLUIPA's uncertain legal landscape. 
This logic contains one critical flaw. By placing its imprimatur on the Settlement Agreement, the district court ef-
fectivelyauthorized the City to disregard its local ordinances in the name ofRLUIP A. Such judicial action is authorized 
only when the federal law in question mandates the remedy contained in the settlement. See Keith, 118 F.3d at 1393 
("Under the Constitution, the district court could not supersede California's law unless it conflicts with any federal 
law. "). As summarized by the Seventh Circuit: 
[HNI4] [U]pon properly supported findings that such a remedy is necessary to rectify a violation 0/ 
/ederallaw, the district court can approve a consent decree which overrides state law provisions. Without 
such fmdings, however, parties can only agree to that which they have the power to do outside of litiga-
tion. 
Perkins, 47 F.3d at 216; see also Cleveland County Ass'n/or Gov't by the People v. Cleveland County Ed. o/Comm'rs, 
330 U.S App. D.C 20, 142 F.3d 468, 477 (D.C. Cir. 1998). 
Here, [** 16) the district court held that a potential violation of federal law allowed a settlement agreement author-
izing the City to disregard its zoning regulations. This was incorrect. Before approving any settlement agreement that 
authorizes a state or municipal entity to disregard its own statutes in the name of federal law, a district court must frod 
that there has been or will be an actual violation of that federal law. 3 
3 Even if such a finding is made, a district court would then have to consider the appropriateness of the agreed-
to remedy under federal law. 
Such a fmding could not have been made in this case. While a district court would not be bound by the parties' 
stipulation that a violation offederal law had occurred or would occur, the district court here was presented with a set-
tlement agreement that specifically reiterated the City's denial of all of the allegations of the complaint, and disclaimed 
any "admission ofliability ... under any federal, state, or local law, including [RLUIPA)." 
Absent a finding that federal law was violated or would be violated, the district court could not approve a settle-
ment agreement that authorized the City to disregard its own zoning ordinances. [** 17] Since no such finding was 
made, the Settlement Agreement is invalid and unenforceable. 4 
4 In light of this holding, we decline to reach any of the League's constitutional claims. 
V. Conclusion 
2 ·1l 0 'f '. 
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We reverse the district court's dismissal of the League's collateral attack on the Settlement Agreement and we re-
mand the case to the district court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
REVERSED AND REMANDED FOR FURTHER PROCEEDINGS. 
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MONTGOMERY COUNTY, 
Maryland et al. 
v. 
REVERE NATIONAL CORPORATION, 
INC. 
No. 118, Sept. Term, 1994. 
Court of Appeals of Maryland. 
Feb. 6, 1996. 
Billboard company sought to hold county 
in contempt and to enforce settlement agree-
ment with county allowing billboard company 
to maintain its existing billboards for ten 
years. The Circuit Court, Montgomery 
County, J. James McKenna, J., vacated set-
tlement agreement. Appeal was taken. The 
Court of Special Appeals reversed. After 
writ of certiorari was granted, 101 Md.App. 
731,101 Md.App. 734, the Court of Appeals, 
Eldridge, J., held that: (1) order incorporat-
ing settlement agreement was final judgment 
which ordinarily could not be revised in ab-
sence of fraud, mistake or irregularity; (2) 
settlement agreement was not invalid at-
tempt to obligate district council by advance 
contract for particular zoning; (3) county 
zoning regulations flatly prohibiting all bill-
boards did not preclude enforcement of set-
tlement agreement, absent compliance with 
state statute requiring compensation for any 
sign required to be removed by county; (4) 
provisions of settlement agreement stating 
that agreement would supersede conflicting 
law and enlarging jurisdiction of sign review 
board were unenforceable; and (5) county 
could not rely on invalid provision of settle-
ment agreement, which had been waived by 
billboard company in order to excuse coun-
ty's failure to perform its obligations under 
agreement. 
Judgment of Court of Special Appeals 
vacated and remanded with directions. 
1. Judgment <?;::::>301 
Order incorporating settlement agree-
ment between county and billboard company 
was final judgment which ordinarily could 
not be revised in absence of fraud, mistake or 
irregularity, even if order did not provide 
ruling on merits of underlying challenge to 
validity of county's zoning regulations; set-
tlement agreement ended case by granting 
billboard company right to maintain its exist-
ing billboards for ten years after which coun-
ty could fully implement its total ban against 
billboards. Md.Rule 2-535(b). 
2. Zoning and Planning <?;::::>131, 351 
District council's zoning enactments un-
der authority of Regional District Act are not 
subject to approval or veto of county execu-
tive and, thus, do not constitute legislation 
within meaning of State Constitution and 
county charter; county council acts as ad-
ministrative agency when it sits as district 
council in zoning matters. Const. Art. ll-A, 
§ 1 et seq.; Code 1957, Art. 28 § 8-101 et 
seq.; Acts 1992, c. 643, § 1; Montgomery 
County, Md., County Charter § 208. 
3. Counties <?;::::>129 
Municipal Corporations <?;::::>254 
Counties and municipalities are normally 
bound by their contracts to same extent as 
private parties and, thus, are not afforded 
defense of governmental immunity in con-
tract actions against them. 
4. Zoning and Planning <?;::::>4, 160 
Local government.is generally prohibit-
ed from contracting away exercise of zoning 
power or obligating itself by advance con-
tract to provide particular zoning. 
5. Zoning and Planning <?;::::>81 
Settlement agreement between county 
and billboard company, allowing billboard 
company to maintain its existing billboards 
for ten years after which county would be 
able to fully implement total zoning ban 
against billboards, was not invalid attempt to 
obligate district council by advance contract 
for particular zoning; agreement contemplat-
ed no action whatsoever by district council. 
6. Public Contracts <?;::::>14 
As general matter, executive discretion 
in enforcement and execution of laws can be 
limited by contract. 
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7. Counties e=>126 
County government executive branch's 
entry into contract, in carrying out laws and 
functions of government, is exercise of execu-
tive discretion and, thus, requirement that 
government adhere to that exercise of discre-
tion by being held to its contract ordinarily 
does not constitute unlawful interference 
with executive discretion. 
8. Counties e=>124(I) 
Settlement agreement with county al-
lowing billboard company to maintain its ex-
isting billboards for ten years was not ren-
dered unenforceable as illegal contract by 
existence of county zoning ordinance flatly 
prohibiting all billboards, in light of unen-
forceability of ordinance absent any offer by 
county to compensate billboard company in 
compliance with state statute expressly re-
quiring payment of fair market value for any 
outdoor advertising required to be removed 
by county. Code 1957, Art. 25, § 122E(b); 
Montgomery County, Md., Code § 59-F-
1.65. 
9. Compromise and Settlement e=>9 
Provision of settlement agreement be-
tween county and billboard company stating 
that agreement would supersede conflicting 
law was contrary to law and unenforceable. 
10. Compromise and Settlement e::>9 
Provision of settlement agreement be-
tween county and billboard company allowing 
billboard company to appeal denial of bill-
board relocation request to county sign re-
view board was invalid attempt to enlarge 
subject matter jurisdiction of board by con-
tract. Montgomery County, Md., Ordinance 
§ ~1l5. 
11. Compromise and Settlement e::>20(1) 
Billboard company waived any contrac-
tual entitlement under invalid provision of 
settlement agreement between county and 
billboard company, providing for appeal to 
county sign review board for denial of re-
quest to relocate billboard, and thus, county 
could not rely on invalid provision to excuse 
county's failure to perform its obligations 
under settlement agreement. 
Frank E. Couper, Senior Assistant County 
Attorney, (Marc P. Hansen, Acting County 
Attorney; Alan M. Wright, Senior Assistant 
County Attorney, on brief), Rockville, for 
Petitioners. 
Walter E. Diercks (Damn N. Sacks, Eric 
M. Rubin, Rubin, Winston, Diercks, Harris & 
Cooke, on brief), Washington, DC, for Re-
spondent. 
Argued before ELDRIDGE, 
RODOWSKY, CHASANOW, KARWACKI, 
BELL and RAKER, JJ. 
ELDRIDGE, Judge. 
The issue in this case is whether Mont-
gomery County is bound by the provisions of 
a settlement agreement incorporated in a 
circuit court judgment. The agreement, end-
ing sixteen years of litigation between the 
County and the owner of a billboard compa-
ny, granted to the owner the right to main-
tain its billboards within the County for a 
period of ten years, despite a County zoning 
regulation prohibiting all billboards. Mont-
gomery County contends that the agreement 
was void from its inception because it imper-
missibly undermined legislative and execu-
tive discretion in the enactment and enforce-
ment of the County's zoning regulations. 
1. 
In 1968, the Montgomery County Council, 
sitting as a district council, amended its zon-
ing regulations concerning outdqor signs and 
billboards. The new regulatory language 
governed the placement, height and width of 
billboards within the County. The 1968 reg-
ulations provided that any existing billboards 
not conforming with the new standards were 
required to be removed at the end of a 
period of two years from the effective date of 
the regulations or four years from the date 
the billboards were erected, whichever oc-
curred later. After the expirations of the 
time periods provided for in the regulations, 
controversies arose between Montgomery 
County and Rollins Outdoor Advertising, 
Inc., over billboards owned by Rollins. 
Montgomery County contended that the bill-
boards did not comply with the standards set 
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forth in the 1968 regulations and that they 
should be removed. 
In 1974, Rollins filed an action against 
Montgomery County, the County Executive 
and the Council,l in the Circuit Court for 
Montgomery County, challenging the validity 
of the 1968 billboard regulations and seeking 
injunctive and declaratory relief.2 The bill of 
complaint alleged that Rollins, which operat-
ed and maintained billboards in Montgomery 
County, had been denied permission to erect 
a new billboard and that the denial was 
"based upon the discriminatory setback pro-
visions" of the 1968 regulations.s The bill of 
complaint also alleged that Rollins had been 
ordered, without an offer of just compensa-
tion, to remove numerous existing billboards 
which did not conform to the location specifi-
cations set forth in the 1968 regulations. 
Rollins asserted that Montgomery Coun-
ty's enactment and enforcement of the 1968 
regulations violated Articles 17 and 24 of the 
I. Hereinafter. the defendants will be referred to 
collectively as "Montgomery County." or simply 
as "the County." 
2. After the suit was filed in 1974. Rollins was 
sold to Reagan Outdoor Advertising, Inc .. which 
was later sold to Revere National Corporation. 
Revere, the named party in the present proceed-
ing. is the successor-in-interest to Rollins and 
Reagan. 
3. The setback provisions stated: 
"No billboard shall be closer than one hundred 
(IOO) feet to any property line nor located 
closer than six hundred sixty (660) feet to the 
right-of-way line of any highway which is part 
of the interstate highway system, nor closer 
than two hundred (200) feet to the right-of-way 
line of any other street or road." 
4. Article 17 of the Maryland Declaration of 
Rights states: 
"That retrospective Laws. punishing acts 
committed before the existence of such Laws, 
and by them only declared criminal, are op-
pressive, unjust and incompatible with liberty; 
wherefore. no ex post facto Law ought to be 
made; nor any retrospective oath or restriction 
be imposed, or required. II 
Article 24 of the Declaration of Rights states: 
"That no man ought to be taken 01' impris-
oned or disseized of his freehold. liberties or 
privileges, or outlawed, or exiled. or, in any 
manner, destroyed, or deprived of his life, lib-
erty or property, but by the judgment of his 
peers. or by the Law of the land." 
Maryland Declaration of Rights,4 as well as 
the Fourteenth Amendment to the United 
States Constitution. Specifically, Rollins 
maintained that the billboard regulations 
constituted prohibited retrospective legisla-
tion, that they violated "substantive" due 
process and equal protection principles, and 
that they deprived Rollins of property with-
out just compensation. 
In 1986, while the above-described litiga-
tion was still pending, the district council 
amended the zoning regulations to prohibit 
all billboards within the County.a Neither 
the 1986 amendment, nor the 1968 regula-
tions, provided for compensation to the own-
ers of billboards. Rollins amended its bill of 
complaint, adding contentions that the Coun-
ty's ban on billboards violated state statutes 
mandating just compensation when a govern-
mental subdivision requires the removal of 
billboards, as well as Article III, § 40, of the 
Maryland Constitution.6 Rollins also main-
At the time Rollins's bill of complaint was filed in 
1974. the present Article 24 of the Declaration of 
Rights had been numbered Article 23. We shall 
use the current numbering. 
5. Section 59-F-~_65 of the Montgomery County 
code. as adopted by the district council in 1986. 
stated: 
"Commercial signs or structures that advertise 
products or businesses not connected with the 
site or building on which they are located are 
prohibited. " 
6_ Rollins relied on Maryland Code (1957. 1994 
RepLVoL), Art. 25. § 122E, which states as fol-
lows: 
"§ 122E. Compensation for removed out-
door advertising sign. 
"(a)(1) In this section the following words 
have the meanings indicated. 
(2)0) 'Fair market value' means a value. de-
termined by a schedule adopted by the Depart-
ment of Transportation. that includes the value 
of integral parts of an outdoor advertising sign. 
less depreciation. 
(ii) 'Fair market value' does not include a 
value for loss of revenue. 
(3)(i) 'Outdoor advertising sign' means an 
off-premises outdoor sign: 
1. Commercially owned and maintained; 
and 
2. Used to advertise goods or services for 
sale in a location other than that on which the 
sign is placed. 
(ii) 'Outdoor advertising sign' includes signs 
composed of painted bulletin or poster panel, 
and usually referred to as billboards. 
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tained that Montgomery County's regula-
tions violated the Fifth and Fourteenth 
Amendments to the United States Constitu-
tion by denying just compensation to Rollins 
and violated the First Amendment to the 
United States Constitution by restricting 
Rollins's ability to disseminate speech. 
In April 1990, sixteen years after the filing 
of the original bill of complaint, Rollins's 
successor-in-interest, Reagan Outdoor Ad-
vertising, Inc., entered into a written settle-
ment agreement with Montgomery County. 
In addition to being signed by the county 
attorney and county and Reagan officials, the 
agreement was signed by the trial judge 
below the words, "SO ORDERED." The 
circuit court's docket entry for April 11, 1990, 
reads as follows: "Stipulated Consent Agree-
ment (McKenna, J.) Granted .... " 
The settlement agreement permitted Rea-
gan to continue "maintain[ing) within the 
County ... forty-seven [billboards)" for a 
period of ten years. Reagan could replace 
and relocate billboards to a new location if 
either U(i) a lease for the premises on which a 
sign is located is not to be continued, or (ii) 
an outdoor advertising structure has been 
destroyed or has deteriorated to the point 
that it is no longer in a safe condition." 
Relocation of billboards was limited to not 
"more than five signs within any calendar 
year," with Reagan having the sole discretion 
as to which signs were to be relocated. The 
agreement placed certain restrictions on 
where billboards could be relocated but stat-
ed that "in no event shall the County utilize 
procedures or fees to impair Reagan from 
exercising its rights under this Agreement." 
In the contract, the parties expressly agreed 
upon the "dismissal of any and all pending 
litigation between the County and Rea-
gan .... " Finally, the agreement stated that 
"[i]n the event either party fails to perform 
its obligations under this Agreement the oth-
(b) A county or municipality shall pay the 
fair market value of an outdoor advertising 
sign, removed or required to be removed by 
the county or municipality, that was lawfully 
erected and maintained under any State, coun-
ty, or municipal law or ordinance." 
Rollins also relied on Maryland Code (J 977, 
1993 RepI.Vol.), § 8-737 of the Transportation 
Article, which also prohibits a governmental sub-
division from requiring the removal of a bill-
er party shall be entitled to seek an orde 
the Court to enforce the Agreement., 
In March 1992, Revere National COrpl 
tion, the successor-in-interest to Rea! 
sought the County's permission to conso 
a replacement billboard pursuant to the I 
visions of the settlement agreement. 
request was denied in May 1992 becaL 
according to the County, the settlem 
agreement entered into by the parties v 
"void ab initio," and Revere was requesti 
"to build a prohibited sign," whereas t 
county regulations banned all billboards. 
Upon the County's denial of its reque 
Revere filed in the Circuit Court for MOl 
gomery County a "Motion to Adjudicate D 
fendants In Contempt of Court and For l: 
Order to Enforce Stipulated Consent Agre 
ment." After setting forth the pertineJ 
facts, Revere's Motion asserted that the dl 
fendants "have violated the April 11, 199 
Order of this Court." Revere sought to hav 
the defendants adjudicated in contemp1 
sought an order requiring the defendants t 
comply with the settlement agreemen 
''which was entered as an order of the [cir 
cuit] Court," and requested compensator: 
damages. 
In response, the County filed a "Motion T 
Vacate The Stipulated Consent Agreement 0 
April 11, 1990," as embodied in the court' 
order. The County asserted that the settle 
ment agreement "is void ab initio because i 
purports to permit what the Montgomer: 
County Zoning Ordinance prohibits, namel: 
the existence of 47 billboards in Montgomer; 
County." The County went on to state tha 
it "has no authority to make such an agree 
ment or to consent to a court order whic} 
violates the Zoning Ordinance's prohibitioJ 
on billboards .... " The County requestel 
the court to find that the settlement agree 
ment "is void ab initio and order that it hi 
board contiguous to a federal aid primary high 
way without paying just compensation. 
Article III, § 40, of the Maryland ConstitutioJ 
states: 
"The General Assembly shall enact no Lav 
authorizing private property, to be taken fo 
public use, without just compensation, a 
agreed upon between the parties, or awarde. 
by a Jury, being first paid or tendered to thl 
party entitled to such compensation." 
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vacated." The County filed a separate an- ment terminating the action instituted by 
swer to Revere's motion, also asserting, inter Revere's predecessor in 1974. The interme-
alia, that the settlement agreement was void. diate appellate court further held that Mont-
The circuit court, after a hearing, denied 
the County's motion to vacate the settlement 
agreement and, without ruling on Revere's 
motion, stated that the denial of the County's 
motion to vacate the settlement agreement, 
as embodied in the 1990 court order, was 
final and appealable. Montgomery County 
then noted an appeal to the Court of Special 
Appeals. In Apri11993, the Court of Special 
Appeals, in an unreported opinion, dismissed 
the appeal on the ground that the appeal was 
premature because the trial court had not yet 
ruled on the pending motions from Revere 
and thus a final judgment did not exist. See 
Maryland Rule 2-602(a). 
After receiving additional memoranda and 
holding another hearing, the circuit court on 
November 18, 1993, entered an order grant-
ing the County's motion to vacate the settle-
ment agreement and denying Revere's mo-
tion to enforce the agreement and to hold the 
defendants in contempt. The circuit court 
expressed the view that the April 11, 1990, 
order approving the settlement agreement 
was not a final judgment terminating the 
action brought by Revere's predecessor in 
1974, and that, therefore, the April 1990 or-
der remained subject to revision at anytime 
under Maryland Rule 2-602(a).7 The circuit 
court further held that the settlement agree-
ment and April 1990 order should be vacated 
because Montgomery County had no power 
to enter into an agreement contrary to its 
zoning regulations. 
Revere appealed, and the Court of Special 
Appeals reversed the circuit court's order in 
another unreported opinion. The Court of 
Special Appeals held that the settlement 
a~e~ment, as embodied in the April 1990 
Clrcmt court order, constituted a final judg-
7. Rule 2-602(a) states as follows: 
. "(a) GeneraJly.-Except as provided in sec· 
~on. ~) of this Rule, an order or other form of 
£ eCISIon, however designated, that adjudicates 
ewer than all of the claims in an action 
(whether raised by original claim, counter· 
claIm, cross-claim or third-party claim) or that 
ad~udicates less than an entire claim,' or that 
adjudIcates the rights and liabilities of fewer 
than all the parties to the action: 
gomery County had not shown any valid 
basis to set aside the 1990 judgment. The 
Court of Special Appeals explained: 
"[Montgomery County] maintains that it 
had no ability to agree to the terms con-
tained in the agreement because the Coun-
ty Executive and executive branch officials 
who are obligated to enforce the Zoning 
Ordinance cannot implement an agreement 
that violates the Zoning Ordinance. We 
shall not address that contention, however; 
it is of no consequence in this case. 
''When an agreement is incorporated 
into an enrolled decree, an attack may not 
be made upon the agreement without si-
multaneously challenging the validity of 
the decree.... Inasmuch as the Stipu-
lated Consent Agreement was incorporat-
ed into the court's judgment, appellee's 
attack in the lower court was upon an 
enrolled decree. To set aside an enrolled 
decree, it is necessary to demonstrate 
fraud, mistake or irregularity. Maryland 
Rule 2-535. 
* * * * * * 
"In summary, since the order vacated 
was a final, enrolled judgment, the court 
erred in vacating it, absent fraud, mistake, 
or irregularity, on the grounds that the 
agreement incorporated therein was void 
ab initio because one of the parties had no 
authority to enter into it." .. 
Montgomery County filed in this Court a 
petition for a writ of certiorari which we 
granted. Montgomery County v. Revere Na-
tional Corp., 336 Md. 705, 650 A.2d 295 
(1994). Montgomery County argues that the 
Court of Special Appeals erred in holding 
that the April 11, 1990, order constituted a 
final judgment. The County asserts that the 
(1) is not a final judgment; 
(2) does not terminate the action as to any of 
the claims or any of the parties; and 
(3) is subject to revision at any time before 
the entry of a judgment that adjudicates all 
of the claims by and against all of the par 
ties." 
?4h 
6 Md. 671 ATLANTIC REPORTER, 2d SERIES 
April 1990 order did not dispose of all the 
underlying issues in the case, was therefore 
not fInal, and is subject to revision at any 
time pursuant to Rille 2-{)02(a)(3). Alterna-
tively, Montgomery County contends that if 
the April 1990 order was a final judgment, 
the judgment can still be set aside because 
ultra vires acts of a county or municipality, 
even if embodied in a final court judgment, 
are "void." Finally, the County argues that 
the settlement agreement, as incorporated in 
the April 1990 order, exceeds the authority of 
Montgomery County because it violates the 
County's zoning regulation that prohibits all 
billboards. Thus, according to the County, 
the circuit court did not err in vacating the 
1990 order. 
Revere, on the other hand, asserts that the 
Court of Special Appeals correctly held that 
the April 1990 order was a final judgment. 
Moreover, because the April 1990 order was 
a final judgment, Revere contends that the 
circuit court was prohibited from revising the 
judgment absent fraud, mistake, or irregular-
ity, and that there was no fraud, mistake or 
irregularity in the present case. See Rille 2-
535. Finally, Revere argues that the County 
did not exceed its authority in entering into 
the settlement agreement. 
II. 
We shall fIrst address the issue of whether 
the April 1990 order constituted a final judg-
ment. If the April 1990 order was not a fInal 
judgment, it "is subject to revision at any 
time before the entry of a [fInal) judg-
ment .... " Rille 2-{)02(a)(3). If the April 
1990 order was a final judgment, however, it 
would ordinarily be subject to revision only 
during a thirty-day period after the entry of 
8. Maryland Rule 2-535 provides as follows: 
"REVISORY POWER 
(a) Generally.-On motion of any party 
within 30 days after entry of judgment, the 
court may exercise revisory power and control 
over the judgment and, if the action was tried 
before the court, may take any action that it 
could have taken under Rule 2-534. 
(b) Fraud. Mistake. Irregularity.-On mo-
tion of any party filed at any time, the court 
may exercise revisory power and control over 
the judgment in case of fraud, mistake or irreg-
ularity. 
(c) Newly Discovered Evidence.-On motion 
of any party filed within 30 days after entry of 
the order on April 11, 1990. Rule 2-535(a). 
After the thirty-day period, Rille 2-535(b) 
authorizes revision of a judgment only "in 
case of fraud, mistake or irregularity." S 
The County maintains that the settlement 
agr~ement, as incorporated in the April 1990 
court order, "did not resolve any of the con-
stitutional or statutory issues raised in the 
Amended complaint" and "granted none of 
the relief prayed for." (County's brief in this 
Court at 33-34). For this reason, according 
to the County, the April 1990 order was not 
final. A similar argument was recently re-
jected by this Court in Horsey v. Horsey, 329 
Md. 392, 401-402, 620 A.2d 305, 310 (1993), 
where we stated: 
"Contrary to the view expressed by the 
defendant ... in this case, a trial court's 
order sometimes may constitute a fInal 
appealable judgment even though the or-
der fails to settle the underlying dispute 
between the parties. Where a trial court's 
order has 'the effect of putting the parties 
out of court, [it] is a final appealable or-
der.' Houghton v. County Comm'rs. of 
Kent Co., 305 Md. 407,412,504 A,2d 1145, 
1148 (1986), and cases there cited. See, 
e.g., Wilde v. Swanson, 314 Md. 80, 85, 548 
A.2d 837, 839 (1988) ('An order of a circuit 
court ... [may bel a final judgment with-
out any adjudication by the circuit court on 
the merits'); Doehring v. Wagner, 311 Md. 
272, 275, 533 A,2d 1300, 1301-1302 (1987) 
(trial court's order 'terminating the litiga-
tion in that court' was a fInal j~dgment); 
Walbert v. Walbert, 310 Md. 657, 661, 531 
A.2d 291, 293 (1987) (circuit court's unqual-
ified order was a final judgment because it 
'put Denise Walbert out of court, denying 
judgment, the court may grant a new trial on 
the ground of newly-discovered evidence that 
could not have been discovered by due dili-
gence in time to move for a new trial pursuant 
to Rule 2-533. 
(d) Clerical Mistakes.-Clerical mistakes in 
judgments, orders, or other parts of the record 
may be corrected by the court at any time on 
its own initiative, or on motion of any party 
after such notice, if any, as the court orders. 
During the pendency of an appeal, such mis-
takes may be .so corrected before the appeal is 
docketed by the appellate court, and thereafter 
with leave of the appellate court." 
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her the means of further prosecuting the 
case at the triallevel'); Houghton v. Coun-
ty Com'rs of Kent Co., 307 Md. 216, 221, 
513 A.2d 291, 293 (1986); Concannon v. 
State Roads Comm., 230 Md. 118, 125, 186 
A.2d 220, 224-225 (1962), and cases there 
cited." 
See also M oare v. Pomory, 329 Md. 428, 432, 
620 A2d 323, 325 (1993) (dismissal without 
prejudice, although not an "adjudication on 
the merits," was a final and appealable judg-
ment). 
[1] Thus, an order entered on the docket 
pursuant to Rule 2--601, and having the effect 
of terminating the case in the circuit court, is 
a final judgment. Montgomery County's po-
sition, that all of the issues and claims in a 
case must be resolved on the merits in order 
that there be a final judgment, would under-
mine the effectiveness of settlement agree-
ments as a mechanism for ending' litigation. 
It is clear that, upon the entry of the 
settlement agreement as an order of the 
court on April 11, 1990, the case begun by 
Revere's predecessor in 1974 was over. The 
settlement agreement, which comprises the 
substance of the April 1990 order, discloses 
that the parties intended to terminate over 
sixteen years of litigation. There was noth-
ing further for the court to resolve after the 
agreement was executed and entered as an 
order. Section 4(a) of the agreement speci-
fies that, "[iln consideration of the Agree-
ment reached herein, Reagan and the County 
hereby release each other from any claims or 
obligations which arise from the complaint in 
the above-captioned matter." Section 5(a) of 
the agreement states tlJat agreement be-
comes effective "upon execution ... and in-
corporation of th[e] Agreement into a final 
judgment .... " The parties agreed to the 
"dismissal of any and all pending litigation 
between the County and Reagan." 
Moreover, in a real sense the agreement 
did dispose of the claims and issues raised by 
the parties. In lieu of the relief which it 
sought in the litigation, namely having the 
challenged zoning regulations invalidated un-
der state statutes and/or on constitutional 
grounds and receiving compensation or dam-
a?es, the billboard company received tlJe 
nght to maintain its 47 existing billboards for 
a ten-year period. Although the County did 
not receive a judicial ruling on the validity of 
the regulations, nevertheless tlJe County did 
not have to pay compensation, was able to 
limit the billboard company to 47 billboards, 
and could fully implement the ban on the 
company's billboards after the ten-year peri-
od. The settlement agreement was a typical 
compromise with respect to the claims, is-
sues, and positions of the parties. The bill-
board company gave up its claims for relief 
against Montgomery County in return for 
what it received under tlJe agreement. 
Therefore, we agree with tlJe Court of 
Special Appeals that the April 11, 1990, order 
was a final judgment. Moreover, we agree 
witlJ the Court of Special Appeals that there 
was no fraud, mistake or irregularity, within 
tlJe meaning of Rule 2--535(b), so as to autho-
rize revision of the judgment under that rule. 
See, e.g., Tandra S. v. Tyrone W., 336 Md. 
303, 315--318, 648 A.2d 439, 445-446 (1994); 
Autobahn Motors v. Mayor & City Council 
of Baltimore, 321 Md. 558, 583 A.2d 731 
(1991); Hamilos v. Hamilos, 297 Md. 99,465 
A.2d 445 (1983); Weitz v. MacKenzie, 273 
Md. 628, 331 A.2d 291 (1975); Schwartz v. 
Merchants Mort. Co., 272 Md. 305, 322 A.2d 
544 (1974); Household Finance Corp. v. Tay-
lor, 254 Md. 349, 254 A.2d 687 (1969), and 
cases tlJere cited . 
III. 
Montgomery County contends tlJat, even if 
the April 11, 1990, order was a final judg-
ment, the County exceeded its legal authority 
in entering into the settlement agreement 
and tlJat this is a valid basis for vacating the 
judgment. The County argues that a final 
judgment is not binding or preclusive, and is 
subject to collateral challenge, when a county 
or municipality exceeds its legal authority in 
entering into a settlement agreement that is 
incorporated in a final judgment. 
The cases have recognized certain unusual 
and narrowly linIited situations when final 
judgments based on consent of the parties, 
altlJough not subject to revision under rules 
like Maryland Rule 2-535, have been deemed 
non-preclusive or subject to collateral attack. 
See, e.g., Green v. Sollenberger, 338 Md. 118, 
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131, 656 A.2d 773, 779 (1995) (final adoption 
decree, not authorized by adoption statutes, 
is subject to collateral attack and voidable); 
Varsity Amusement Company v. Butters, 
155 Colo. 330, 339, 394 P.2d 603, 607 (1964) 
("a judgment entered by agreement or con-
sent does not have a [res judicata] effect 
where to give that effect would render impo-
tent another important public policy"); Bla-
zek v. City of Omaha, 232 Neb. 562, 565, 441 
N.W.2d 205, 207 (1989) ("Except where an 
important public policy would be violated, 
judgments entered by agreement or consent 
are generally given a conclusive effect and 
are res judicata.") 
The leading case in this area appears to be 
Kelley v. Town of Milan, 127 U.S. 139, 8 
S.Ct. 1101, 32 L.Ed. 77 (1888). There, earli-
er litigation between the Town and holders of 
the Town's bonds had been-terminated when 
the Town's officials consented to a decree 
adjudging the bonds to be valid obligations of 
the Town. In a subsequent lawsuit between 
the Town and the bondholders, the Supreme 
Court concluded that the Town was not 
bound by the earlier judgment. The Court 
held that, because the Town lacked authority 
under the laws of Tennessee to issue the 
bonds, the Town officials had no right to bind 
the Town by a settlement agreement incor-
porated in a final judgment. The Supreme 
Court explained (127 U.S. at 159, 8 S.Ct. at 
1111, 32 L.Ed. at 85): 
"The declaration of the validity of the 
bonds, contained in the decree, was made 
solely in pursuance of the consent to that 
effect contained in the agreement signed 
by the (parties]. The act of the Mayor in 
signing that agreement could give no valid-
ity to the bonds, if they had none at the 
time the agreement was made. The want 
of authority to issue them extended to a 
want of authority to declare them valid. 
The Mayor had no such authority. The 
decree of the court was based solely upon 
the declaration of the Mayor, in the agree-
ment, that the bonds were valid .... 
"The adjudication in the decree cannot, 
under the circumstances, be set up as a 
judicial detennination of the validity of the 
bonds. . . . This was not the case of a 
submission to the court of a question for 
its decision on the merits, but it was 
consent in advance to a particular decisi4 
... [which] gave life to invalid bonds ... 
Consequently, under the KeUey principle, tl 
act of placing a settlement agreement mac 
by a local government in the fonn of a cOUl 
judgment, in an effort to give it the force an 
effect of a final judgment, will not cure th 
lack of fundamental power in the governmen 
tal entity to make the agreement. 
The cases, in considering whether loca 
governments are bound by final consen1 
judgments reflecting agreements which thE 
governments had no authority to make, have 
generally reached the same conclusion as 
Kelley v. Terum of Milan, supra, although the 
courts have used various approaches and rea-
sons. Several cases rely on public policy. 
See, e.g., Blazek v. City of Omaha, supra, 232 
Neb. at 565,441 N.W.2d at 207. One court 
has viewed a final judgment embodying a 
governmental settlement agreement as "con-
structive fraud" when the officials entering 
into the agreement lack the authority to bind 
the municipality as to matters contained 
therein. See, Connor v. Morse, 303 Mass. 42, 
47-48, 20 N.E.2d 424, 426-427 (1939). An-
other court has theorized that, since govern-
mental officials are trustees of the municipal 
entity, and thus represent the citizens of that 
entity, their lack of authority as to matters 
agreed upon in a settlement agreement can-
not be binding on their trustors, even if 
incorporated in a final judgment. See, Un-
ion Bank v. Commissioners of Oxford, 119 
N.C. 214, 226, 25 S.E. 966,969 (1896) ("when 
parties act in a representative capacity, such 
judgments do not bind the cestuis que trus-
tent unless the trustees had authority to act 
... "). 
A number of cases have simply stated that 
a municipality's lack of authority regarding 
the matters stipulated in a settlement agree-
ment incorporated in a final judgment is a 
sufficient basis for either vacating a judg-
ment or not applying the doctrine of res 
judicata. See, e.g., State v. Great Northern 
Ry. Co., 134 Minn. 249,256, 158 N.W. 972, 
975 (1916) ("The parties could not accomplish 
[pursuant to a consent judgment] what they 
had absolutely no power to accomplish in any 
manner ... "); Martin v. Territory, 5 Okla. 
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188 48 P. 106 (1897); Mellette County v. 
A~old, 76 S.D. 210, 214, 75 ~.W.~ 641, ~3 
IV. 
(1956) ("a consent judgment ill which offictals 
Presenting a county or other governmental re . . 
a ency assume obligations agamst It unau-
;orized by law is void"); Coolsaet v. City of 
Veblen, 55 S.D. 485, 490, 226 N.W. 726, 729 
(1929) ("consent decree was not beyond the 
power of the city's officials and attorneys"). 
As explained by the Supreme Court of 
Minnesota in City of St. Paul V. Chicago, St. 
P., M. & O. Ry. Co., 139 Minn. 322, 326, 166 
NW. 335, 336-337 (1918), 
"[a] judgment against a municipality, not 
rendered as the judicial act of a court, but 
entered pursuant to a stipulation of the 
officers of the municipality, is of force and 
effect only so far as such officers had 
authority to bind the municipality. The 
fact that by consent of the municipal offi-
cers an agreement or stipulation made by 
them has been put in the form of a judg-
ment, in an attempt to give it the force and 
effect of a judgment does not cure a lack of 
power in the officers to make it, and if 
such power be lacking the judgment as 
well as the stipulation is void." 
Regardless of the various theories em-
ployed, underlying these decisions is the rec-
ognition that the fundamental public policy of 
a state may sometimes require that a final 
consent judgment be vacated or not given 
preclusive effect. 
We need not in the present case, however, 
explore or decide the scope and limits, under 
Maryland law, of the principles discussed in 
Kelley v. Town of Milan, supra, and the 
other above-cited cases. We shall assume, 
arguendo, that it would have been proper to 
vacate the settlement agreement and judg-
ment of April 11, 1990, if the agreement were 
clearly ultra vires as contended by Mont-
gomery County. Nevertheless, for the rea-
sons set forth in Part IV below, we do not 
agree that the substance of the agreement 
was clearly ultra vires. 
9. Code (1957, 1995 RepI.Vol.), Art. 66B, relating 
to zoning, is generally not applicable to char-
tered counties. See Art. 66B, § 7.03. 
10. Legislation enacted by the County Council 
pursuant to the Montgomery County Charter, the 
A. 
Before addressing Montgomery Count; 
argument that the April 1990 settleme 
agreement exceeded the County's authori! 
it would be useful to review certain gener 
principles of Maryland law concerning zonir 
in Montgomery County and contracts of loe: 
governments. 
Unlike most other home rule chartere 
counties in Maryland which receive their ba 
sic zoning authority from Article XI-A of th 
Maryland Constitution, the Express Power: 
Act, Code (1957, 1994 Repl.Vol.), Art. 25A 
§ 5(x), and their county charters, the exclu· 
sive source of Montgomery County's zoning 
authority is the Regional District Act, Code 
(1957, 1993 Repl.Vol., 1995 Supp.), Art. 28, 
§ 8-101 et seq. See, e.g., Mossburg V. Mont-
gomery County, Md., 329 Md. 494, 502-503, 
620 A.2d 886, 890 (1993); Chevy Chase View 
v. Rothman, 323 Md. 674, 685, 594 A.2d 1131, 
1136 (1991). See also Narthampton v. Pro 
George's Co., 273 Md. 93, 327 A.2d 774 (1974); 
Pro Gearge's CO. V. Md.-Nat'l Cap., 269 Md. 
202,306 A.2d 223, cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1068, 
94 S.Ct. 577, 38 L.Ed.2d 473 (1973).9 
[2] The Regional District Act specifies 
that the Montgomery County Council, sitting 
as a district council, "may by ordinance adopt 
and amend the text of the zoning ordi-
nance .... " Art. 28, § 8-101(b)(2). The Re-
gional District Act sometimes refers to the 
zoning enactments of a district council as 
"ordinances," sometimes refers to them as 
"regulations," and sometimes uses the phrase 
"ordinance regulations" (e.g., § 8-101(c». 
The zoning enactments of the district council 
in Montgomery County are no longer subject 
to the approval or veto of the County Execu-
tive, Ch. 643, § 1, of the Acts of 1992.10 
Thus, the district council's zoning enactments 
do not constitute legislation within the mean-
ing of Article XI-A of the Maryland Consti-
tution and the Montgomery County Charter. 
Express Powers Act, and Article Xl-A of the 
Constitution, however, is subject to the County 
Executive's veto authority. See § 208 of the 
Montgomery County Charter. 
2::;0 
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See Biggs v. Md.-Nat 'I Cap. P. & P. 
Comm'n, 269 Md. 352, 354-355, 306 A.2d 220, 
222 (1973) (zoning enactment of a district 
council "was not subject to the Charter provi-
sions respecting referendum and emergency 
legislation"). Instead, "when it sits as the 
District Council in a zoning matter the Coun-
ty Council is an 'administrative agency' .... " 
Co. Council v. Carl M. Freeman Assoc., 281 
Md. 70, 74, 376 A.2d 860, 862 (1977). See 
also Mont. Co. v. Woodward & Lothrop, 280 
Md. 686, 711, 376 A.2d 483, 497 (1977), cert. 
denied, 434 U.S. 1067, 98 S.Ct. 1245, 55 
L.Ed.2d 769 (1978); Mont. Co. v. Nat'l Capi-
tal Realty, 267 Md. 364, 376, 297 A.2d 675, 
681 (1972); Hyson v. Montgomery County, 
242 Md. 55, 67, 71-72, 217 A.2d 578, 585-586, 
588 (1966). 
[3J Turning to government contracts gen-
erally, under Maryland law counties and mu-
nicipalities are normally bound by their con-
tracts to the same extent as private entities. 
See, e.g., Fraternal Order of Police v. Balti-
more County, 340 Md. 157, 665 A.2d 1029 
(1995); American Structures v. City of Bal-
to., 278 Md. 356, 364 A.2d 55 (1976). Thus, 
Maryland law has never recognized the de-
fense of governmental immunity in contract 
actions against counties and municipalities. 
Board v. Town of Riverdale, 320 Md. 384, 
389, 578 A.2d 207, 210 (1990); Md.-Nat'l 
Cap. P. & P. Comm'n v. Kranz, 308 Md. 618, 
622, 521 A.2d 729, 731 (1987); American 
Structures v. City of Balto., supra, 278 Md. 
at 359-360, 364 A.2d at 57. This Court has 
repeatedly held that, "as long as the execu-
tion of the contract [is] within the power of 
the governmental unit," the local government 
is answerable in damages for breaching that 
contract. American Structures, 278 Md. at 
359-360, 364 A.2d at 57, and cases there 
cited. Under some circumstances, courts 
have ordered that local governments specifi-
cally perform their contracts. See, e.g., Co-
hen v. Baltimore County, 229 Md. 519, 523-
525, 185 A,2d 185, 187-188 (1962); Bd. of Co. 
Comm. v. MacPhai4 214 Md. 192, 199-200, 
133 A.2d 96, 101 (1957). 
B. 
[4] There is a type of contract, particu-
larly relevant to Montgomery County's argu-
ment in this case, which is ordinarily beyond 
the authority of local government entities. 
Local governments are generally prohibited 
from "contracting away the exercise of zon-
ing power," Attman v. Mayor, 314 Md. 675, 
686, 552 A.2d 1277, 1283 (1989). "[TJhe zon-
ing authority [cannot] obligate itself by ad-
vance contract to provide zoning," ibid. 
Attman v. Mayor, supra, involved a con-
troversy between a developer and the City 
of Annapolis concerning a "conditional use 
authorization" for an office building to be 
constructed by the developer. Under the 
Annapolis City Code, a "conditional use au-
thorization" could only be issued by the city 
council, composed of the mayor and alder-
men. The developer was granted a condi-
tional use by the city council and began 
construction of the office building. Later, 
the developer sought a modification of the 
conditional use authorization which would 
permit the basement of the building to be 
used for purposes other than the housing of 
mechanical equipment. The city council 
granted the requested modification on the 
condition that the developer provide certain 
additional parking spaces. The developer, 
claiming that these new parking require-
ments were "arbitrary, capricious, and im-
possible to fulfill," challenged the city coun-
cil's action by filing a lawsuit in the circuit 
court. Shortly before a scheduled circuit 
court hearing, the parties reached an oral 
agreement. Nevertheless, a dispute soon 
arose concerning the terms of that oral 
agreement. It was clear that both sides had 
agreed to seek a continuance of the court 
hearing and agreed that the developer 
should file a new application with the city 
council for a conditional use. The developer 
contended that the city council had agreed 
that it would grant the new application with 
certain specified less onerous parking re-
quirements. The city council, howeve~. 
maintained that it simply had agreed to con-
sider these parking requirements, but that it 
did not purport to bind itself to grant the 
application with the less onerous parking re-
quirements. Thereafter, the city council re-
jected the developer's new application for a 
conditional use authorization. The developer 
filed, in the pending circuit court proceeding, 
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MONTGOMERY COUNTY v. REVERE Md. 11 
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a motion to enforce the oral agreement. Af- future." (County's brief in this Court at 13). 
ter some further procedural skirmishes, the The County asserts that "[t]he principles 
circuit court denied relief to the developer, stated by this Court in Attman ... apply 
and this Court affirmed. equally to this case." Ibid. According to the 
This Court's opinion in Attman v. Mayor, County, the county government is powerless 
314 Md. at 685-686, 552 A.2d at 1283, initially to "cede legislative authority ... over zoning 
pointed out that the city council's grant of a matters that is specifically granted by state 
conditional use authorization was similar to law and County Charter." (ld. at 14). 
new zoning or rezoning for purposes of the 
principle that a government ordinarily cannot 
obligate itself by advance contract to provide 
a particular zoning. The Attman opinion, 
written by Judge McAuliffe for the Court, 
went on to review our prior cases involving 
this principle, including those invalidating 
agreements and those upholding agreements 
relating to zoning. The Court reasoned that 
it is only where "the zoning authority ... 
obligate[s] itself by advance contract to pro-
vide zoning" that the principle is applicable. 
314 Md. at 686,552 A.2d at 1283. The Court 
explained that, if such contracts were upheld, 
they would "render meaningless the pre-
scribed zoning procedures" and would violate 
the requirement that the zoning authority 
"exercise its unconstrained independent 
judgment in deciding matters of reclassifica-
tion ... [and] in deciding requests for special 
exceptions, conditional uses, or variances." 
314 Md. at 686-687, 552 A2d at 1283. 
We concluded in Attman that, if the devel-
oper's version of the oral agreement was 
correct, the agreement would be invalid as an 
attempt to bind the city council in advance to 
render a particular zoning decision. On the 
other hand, the Court held that, if the terms 
of the oral agreement were as contended for 
by the city council, and if the agreement "did 
not surrender or impair the right and obli-
gation of the city council to independently 
and impartially consider the application in 
accordance with procedures established by 
law," then the agreement would be valid. 
314 Md. at 688-689, 552 A.2d at 1284. 
In the case at bar, Montgomery County 
principally relies upon the Attman opinion. 
The County, citing Attman, argues that it 
has no "legal authority to amend or repeal 
provisions of the Zoning Ordinance or to 
relinquish the District Council's authority un-
der state law and County Charter over bill-
board zoning matters for 10 years in the 
Preliminarily, to the extent that the Coun-
ty relies upon legislative authority pursuant 
to the Montgomery County Charter, the reli-
ance is misplaced. As previously discussed, 
the provisions of the Montgomery County 
Charter granting legislative authority have 
no application to zoning enactments of the 
district council. 
[5] The County's reliance upon the Att-
man opinion is also misplaced. The settle-
ment agreement in this case did not obligate 
the district council to rezone or amend the 
zoning regulations. In fact, unlike either 
version of the oral contract involved in Att-
man, the written settlement agreement in 
the case at bar contemplated no action what-
soever by the district council. This was sim-
ply not a contract providing for any type of 
decision by the zoning authority. 
C. 
Montgomery County also complains that 
the settlement agreement limited executive 
authority and discretion in the enforcement 
of the County's laws. The County contends 
that it may not, by contract, "relinquish the 
County Executive's legal obligation to en-
force the ... laws and ordinances of the 
County." (County's brief in this Court at 
13). The County asserts that no county con-
tract "can cede ... executive enforcement 
authority over zoning matters .... " (l d. at 
14). 
Of course, under certain circumstances and 
in some contexts, an attempt by a govern-
ment to linllit future executive discretion by 
contract would be invalid. See, e.g., Frater-
nal Order of Police v. Baltimore County, 
supra, 340 Md. at 169-171, 665 A.2d at 1034-
1036, and cases there cited. For example, a 
contract by a Governor purporting to limit 
the Governor's constitutional authority and 
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discretion in the future appointment of 
judges would clearly be unenforceable. 
[6J Nevertheless, as a general matter, ex-
ecutive discretion in the enforcement and 
execution of the laws can be limited by con-
tract. See, e.g., Fraternal Order of Police v. 
Baltimore County, 340 Md. at 168, 171, 665 
A.2d at 1034-1036; Funger v. Mayor of Som-
erset, 249 Md. 311, 328, 239 A.2d 748, 757 
(1968); Greenbelt v. Bresler, 248 Md. 210, 
215-217, 236 A.2d 1, 4-5 (1967); Cohen v. 
Baltimore County, supra, 229 Md. at 523-
525, 185 A.2d at 187-188; Bd. of Co. Comm 
v. MacPhai~ supra, 214 Md. at 199-200, 133 
A.2d at 101. In fact many, if not most, 
government contracts limit to some extent 
executive discretion in carrying out the laws 
and functions of government. If future exec-
utive discretion could not lawfully be limited 
by contract, a great many government con-
tracts would be unenforceable. As pointed 
out earlier, however, governments are gener-
ally bound by their contracts. 
This Court's opinion in Bd. of Co. Comm. 
v. MacPhai~ supra, 214 Md. 192, 133 A.2d 
96, specifically rejected an argument by a 
local government that a contract, entered 
into by that government, was unenforceable 
because it limited or interfered with execu-
tive discretion. The MacPhail case involved 
a contract between the County Commission-
ers of Harford County 11 and Larry Mac-
Phail, the owner of a large farm in Harford 
County. Under the terms of the contract, 
the County Commissioners agreed to grade 
and pave a four-mile county public road 
which ran to and through the farm. In 
return, Mr. MacPhail agreed to forebear 
from filing a threatened lawsuit against the 
County, based on earlier alleged undertak-
ings by the County Commissioners regarding 
the road. Mter entering the contract, the 
County Commissioners refused to perform, 
arguing, inter alia, that the contract was 
beyond their authority and interfered with 
the future exercise of discretion by the coun-
ty government. The circuit court rejected 
this argument and issued an injunction re-
11. "County Commissioners, under Art. VII, § L 
of the Maryland Constitution, largely 'act as ad-
ministrators or in an executive capacity' .... " 
Legislative Redistricting, 331 Md. 574, 621 n. 6, 
629 A.2d 646, 670 n. 6 (1993), quoting City of 
quiring the County Commissioners to pel 
form the contract. This Court, in an opinio 
by Judge Hammond, affirmed, stating (21· 
Md. at 199-200, 133 A.2d at 101): 
"The chancellor, noting that generally a 
court will not interfere with the discretion 
of public officials and, so, ordinarily will 
not tell the County Commissioners what 
roads to select for improvement or how 
improvements should be made, held that in 
the case before him, '* * * the Commis-
sioners exercised their discretion by agree-
ing to improve the road under consider-
ation.' He added: 'The purpose of this 
proceeding, therefore, is not to interfere 
with the County Commissioners in the ex-
ercise of their .discretion but to require 
them to perform and carry out any agree-
ments which they made in the exercise of 
their discretion. The Court is of the opin-
ion that an injunction will lie under such 
circumstances.' We concur. We think the 
evidence warranted the action the chancel-
lor took since the agreement he required 
to be executed was sufficiently definite and 
certain properly to be the subject of what, 
in effect, was specific perforniance, and 
since the fixing of the amount of a judg-
. ment for breach of contract would be al-
most impossible and a judgment would not 
be a duplicate or substantial equivalent of 
the promised performance.... The de-
cree merely directed the County Commis-
sioners to construct the MacPhail road, as 
they had agreed to do .... " 
[7] Thus, as the MacPhail oplIllon ex-
plains, when the executive branch of the 
county government, in carrying out the laws 
and functions of government, enters into a 
contract, such action constitutes the exercise 
of executive discretion. A requirement that 
the government adhere to that exercise of 
discretion, and be held to its contract, ordi-
narily does not constitute an unlawful inter-
ference with future executive discretion. 
Bowie v. County Comm'rs, 258 Md. 454. 461, 267 
A.2d 172, 176 (1970). See also Boswell v. Prince 
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MONTGOMERY COUNTY v. REVERE Md. 13 
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D. 
Finally, Montgomery County argues that 
implementation of the settlement agreement 
would clearly be in violation of law because 
the local zoning regulations flatly prohibit all . 
billboards. Relying upon Hanna v. Bd. of 
Ed. of Wicomico Co., 200 Md. 49, 53-58, 87 
A.2d 846, 848-850 (1952), Montgomery Coun-
ty asserts that a "public contract must com-
ply with law or be declared null and void," 
(County's brief in this Court at 16). 
In determining whether implementation of 
the settlement agreement would involve ac-
tivity in violation of law, however, it is nec-
essary to examine all of the applicable law 
and not simply the district council's zoning 
regulations. Although a particular activity 
Inight be prohibited under local zoning regu-
lations viewed in isolation, when all of the 
applicable law is considered, including pre-
vailing state or federal law, the local zoning 
prohibition may be invalid or superseded. 
See, e.g., Harrison v. Schwartz, 319 Md. 360, 
572 A.2d 528, cert. denied, 498 U.S. 851, 111 
S.Ct. 143, 112 L.Ed.2d 110 (1990); People's 
Counsel v. Maryland Manne, 316 Md. 491, 
560 A.2d 32 (1989). See also Kirsch v. 
Prince George's County, 331 Md. 89, 626 
A.2d 372, cert. denied, - U.S. --, 114 
S.Ct. 600, 126 L.Ed.2d 565 (1993); Md.-
Nat'l Cap. P. & P. Comm'n v. Chadwick, 
286 Md. 1, 405 A.2d 241 (1979). Local zon-
ing ordinances, regulations or determina-
tions frequently are unenforceable in light of 
enactments by the General Assembly. See, 
e.g., Mossburg v. Montgomery County, su-
pra, 329 Md. 494, 620 A.2d 886; Chevy 
Chase View v. Rothman, supra, 323 Md. 
674, 594 A.2d 1131; West Mont. Ass'n v. 
MNCP & P Com'n, 309 Md. 183, 196, 522 
A.2d 1328, 1329 (1987) ("[Montgomery] 
County enjoys no inherent power to zone or 
rezone, and may exercise that power only to 
the extent and in the manner directed by 
the Legislature"); Crozier v. Co. Comm. Pro 
12. Although § 122E was placed in the article of 
th~ ~ode which primarily deals with county com-
mISSIoners, it seems clear from the statutory ref-
erence to municipalities, as well as counties, that 
§ 122E is not limited to county commissioner 
counties. Moreover, § 122E is contained in a 
two-section subtitle in Art. 25, entitled "Outdoor 
~dvertising," and the other section in that subti-
t e relates exclusively to a single county which is 
George's Co., 202 Md. 501, 506, 97 A.2d 296, 
298 (1953). 
[8] When all of the applicable law is con-
sidered, it is not at all clear that Revere's 
contractual right under the settlement agree-
ment to maintain its 47 billboards for ten 
years was in violation of law. Rather, it is 
Montgomery County's position in this case 
which appears to be in violation of law. In 
arriving at this conclusion, we need not reach 
the federal and state constitutional provisions 
invoked by Revere. Montgomery County's 
argument entirely overlooks Code (1957, 
1994 RepI.Vol.), Art. 25, § 122E(b), enacted 
by the Maryland General Assembly in 1983. 
This statute unequivocally mandates that "[a] 
county or municipality shall pay the fair mar-
ket value of an outdoor advertising sign, 
removed or required to be removed by the 
county or municipality .... " 12 
Neither the district council's 1986 regula-
tions prohibiting all billboards, nor any other 
enactments by Montgomery County which 
have been called to our attention, provide for 
compensation to the owner of pre-existing 
lawfully erected billboards. Insofar as the 
record in this case discloses, Montgomery 
County has never offered compensation to 
Revere or its predecessors. Instead, prior to 
the April 1990 settlement agreement, Mont-
gomery County resisted the demands by Re-
vere's predecessors for compensation. 
The district council's regulations purport-
ing to ban billboards must be considered in 
conjunction with Art. 25, § 122E. As point-
ed out by this Court in Hanna V. Bd. of Ed. 
of Wicomico Co., supra, 200 Md. at 57, 87 
A.2d at 850, a case relied upon by Montgom-
ery County, "no [government agency] ... 
has the right to ignore or circumvent the 
mandate of the Legislature." Under 
§ 122E, Montgomery County has no authori-
ty to ban pre-existing lawfully erected bill-
a chartered county. The Court of Special Ap-
peals, in Chesapeake v. City of Baltimore, 89 
Md.App. 54, 64-67, 597 A.2d 503, 508-510 
(1991), after reviewing the language and legisla-
tive history of the statute, held that "it is clear 
that § 122E was intended to apply to all counties 
as well as 'to all municipalities, including Balti-
more City .... " 
~:.ro~:thout pa~ng ::1 f:::~::PO:::~2:~:::t oou", not penn;t any , 
of the billboards. In light of § 122E and the sign which was prohibited by the zoning r 
facts disclosed by the record in this case, the regulations. A section of the 1968 sign reg- i 
trial court erred in holding that Revere's ulations adopted by the district council ("01'- I 
right under the settlement agreement to dinance No. 6-115"), captioned "Right of Ap-
maintain 47 billboards for ten years was peal," provided for an appeal by the sign 
clearly contrary to law. Considering all of owner to the Sign Review Board when an 
the applicable law and the circumstances, the application for a sign permit was denied by 
agreement allowing Revere to maintain its 47 county officials but "where a variance may 
pre-existing billboards for ten years ap- be permitted" under the regulations. 
peared to be a reasonable, lawful compromise The 1990 settlement agreement specifically 
and resolution of the dispute. . authorized Revere to apply to the Sign Re-
E. 
There are two provisions of the 1990 set-
tlement agreement which, as Montgomery 
County correctly argues, are in violation of 
law. Both provisions, therefore, are unen-
forceable. 
[9] The first of these provisions is a 
clause in the settlement agreement which 
recites that "[t]his Agreement ... shall su-
persede conflicting law." Of course, neither 
government officials nor private parties may 
validly contract to "supersede" applicable 
law. A contractual provision which is con-
trary to law is invalid. See, e.g., Larimore v. 
American Ins. Co., 314 Md. 617, 552 A.2d 
889 (1989); Lee v. Wheeler, 310 Md. 233, 528 
A.2d 912 (1987); Maryland Cl. Emp. Ass'n v. 
Anderson, 281 Md. 496, 508, 380 A.2d 1032 
(1977), Hanna v. Bd. of Ed. of Wicomico Co., 
supra, 200 Md. at 53-54, 87 A.2d at 848 
(1952).· 
The second of these provisions grants to 
the sign owner a remedy before an adminis-
trative agency known as the "Sign Review 
Board." Montgomery County argues that 
this provision is both invalid and non-severa-
ble. Consequently, according to the County, 
the invalidity of this provision requires the 
invalidation of the entire settlement agree-
ment. 
In a 1968 regulation adopted by the dis-
trict council, referred to as "Ordinance No. 
6-114," the district council created a "Sign 
Review Board" with delineated jurisdiction 
and powers. One limitation on the Board's 
13. In fact, under the Regional District Act, Code 
(1957, 1993 RepI.Vol.), Art. 28, § 8-11O(a), it 
appears that the jurisdiction of the Sign Review 
view Board when Revere believed that a sign 
request should be granted under the terms 
of the settlement agreement. Montgomery 
County argues that, under the district coun-
cil's zoning regulations, the Sign Review 
Board's jurisdiction is limited to the situation 
where a sign is permitted under a variance 
and that the Board has no jurisdiction to 
permit a prohibited billboard. Montgomery 
County states that "[tJhe Stipulated Consent 
Agreement purports to confer jurisdiction on 
the Sign Review Board to permit or approve 
billboards while the Zoning Ordinance pro-
hibits such jurisdiction," (County's brief in 
this Court at 20). The County asserts that 
the jurisdiction of an administrative agency 
is delineated by law and "cannot be enlarged 
. .. by private agreements or by litigation 
settlements between parties." (fd. at 21). 
[10] We agree with Montgomery County 
that the subject matter jurisdiction of an 
administrative agency ordinarily cannot be 
enlarged by agreement. See, e.g., Attorney 
Griev. Comm'n v. Hyatt, 302 Md. 683, 690, 
490 A.2d 1224, 1227 (1985). We further 
agree with Montgomery County that the 
1990 settlement agreement improperly pur-
ports to enlarge the jurisdiction of the Sign 
Review Board,l3 We do not agree with 
Montgomery County, however, that this one 
provision renders invalid the entire settle-
ment agreement. 
[l1J The provisions in the sign regula-
tions for an appeal by the sign owner to the 
Sign Review Board, and the invalid clause in 
the settlement agreement allowing Revere to 
Board must be limited to the matter of special 
exceptions and variances. 
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mthority was that it could not permit any 
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linance No. 6-115"), captioned "Right of Ap-
)eal," provided for an appeal by the sign 
)wner to the Sign Review Board when an 
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)e permitted" under the regulations. 
The 1990 settlement agreement specifically 
luthorized Revere to apply to the Sign Re-
new Board when Revere believed that a sign 
request should be granted under the terms 
)f the settlement agreement. Montgomery 
County argues that, under the district coun-
cil's zoning regulations, the Sign Review 
Board's jurisdiction is limited to the situation 
where a sign is permitted under a variance 
and that the Board has no jurisdiction to 
permit a prohibited billboard. Montgomery 
County states that "[tJhe Stipulated Consent ! 
Agreement purports to confer jurisdiction on 
the Sign Review Board to permit or approve 
billboards while the Zoning Ordinance pro-
hibits such jurisdiction," (County's brief in 
this Court at 20). The County asserts that 
the jurisdiction of an administrative agency 
is delineated by law and "cannot be enlarged 
. .. by private agreements or by litigation 
settlements between parties." (ld. at 21). 
[10J We agree with Montgomery County 
that the subject matter jurisdiction of an 
!ldministrative agency ordinarily cannot be 
~nlarged by agreement. See, e.g., Attorney 
';riev. Comm'n v. Hyat~ 302 Md. 683, 690, 
190 A2d 1224,'--1227(1985). We further 
Lgree with Montgomery County that the 
.990 settlement agreement improperly pur-
• orts to enlarge the jurisdiction of the Sign 
~eview Board.13 We do not agree with 
iJ.ontgomery County, however, that this one 
rovision renders invalid the entire settle-
lent agreement. 
[11] The provisions in the sign regula-
ons for an appeal by the sign owner to the 
19n Review Board, and the invalid clause in 
Ie settlement agreement allowing Revere to 
Board must be limited to the matter of special 
exceptions and variances. 
HARLEY v. STATE Md. 
Cite as 671 A.2d IS (Md. 1996) 
seek a remedy from the Sign Review Board, 
constitute an additional procedural remedy 
for the benefit of the sign owner. Revere in 
the present case did not attempt to avail 
itself of the invalid procedural remedy. Re-
vere ''waived'' any contractual entitlement 
purportedly granted by the settlement agree-
ment to appeal to the Sign Review Board. A 
party to a contract ordinarily may waive a 
contractual provision intended for its benefit. 
If the party does so, the other party cannot 
rely on the provision to escape liability under 
the contract. The provision is treated as 
severable under the circumstances. Twining 
v. Nat'l Mortgage Corp., 268 Md. 549, 302 
A.2d 604, 607 (1973). See also, e.g., Univer-
sity Nat'l Bank v. Wolfe, 279 Md. 512, 523, 
369 A.2d 570, 576 (1977); Shoreham v. Ran-
dolph Hills, 248 Md. 267, 274-276, 235 A.2d 
735,740-741 (1967). 
Consequently, the invalid provision in the 
settlement agreement, giving the sign owner 
a right to appeal to the Sign Review Board, 
would not excuse Montgomery County's fail-
ure to perform its obligations under the 
agreement. 
JUDGMENT OF THE COURT OF SPE-
CIAL APPEALS VACATED, AND CASE 
REMANDED TO THE COURT OF SPE-
CIAL APPEALS WITH DIRECTIONS TO 
VACATE THE JUDGMENT OF THE CIR-
CUIT COURT FOR MONTGOMERY 
COUNTY AND REMAND THE CASE TO 
THAT COURT FOR FURTHER PRO-
CEEDINGS NOT INCONSISTENT WITH 
THIS OPINION. COSTS IN THIS 
COURT AND IN THE COURT OF SPE-
CIAL APPEALS TO BE PAID BY MONT-
GOMERY COUNTY. 
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Peter Donald HARLEY 
v. 
STATE of Maryland. 
No. 160, Sept. Term, 1993. 
Court of Appeals of Maryland. 
Feb. 6, 1996. 
Defendant was convicted in the CirCl 
Court, Prince George's County, James I 
Rea, J., of first-degree felony murder, BE 
ond-degree murder, robbery with dead 
weapon, attempted robbery with dead 
weapon, and use of handgun in commission' 
felony. Defendant appealed. The Court 4 
Special Appeals remanded. Defendant file 
pro se petition for writ of certiorari. T1l 
Court of Appeals, 831 Md. 87, 626 A2d 371 
denied relief. On remand, the Circuit CoUl 
upheld state's use of peremptory challengel 
Defendant appealed. After grant of certiorll 
ri, 333 Md. 650, 636 A.2d 1027, the Court 0 
Appeals held that prosecutor provided suffi 
cient race-neutral reasons for exercise of per 
emptory challenges against four African 
American prospective jurors. 
Affirmed. 
1. Criminal Law ~1l58(3) 
Trial judge's findings in evaluating Bai 
son challenge are essentially factual and ac 
corded great deference on appeal and, thm 
trial judge's determinatiot\. as to sufficienc: 
of reasons offered for peremptory strikes wi 
not be reversed unless it is clearlyerroneoUl 
U.S.C.A Const.Amend.14 . 
2. Constitutional Law ~221( 4) 
Jury ~33(5.15) 
In determining whether reason offere 
for peremptory strike is valid or satisfacto~ 
questions before trial judge are whether re~ 
son is pretext for purposeful discriminatio 
and whether reason itself does not den 
equal protection. U.S.C.A Const.Amend. l' 
3. Jury ~33(5.15) 
Prosecutor provided sufficient race-nel 
tral reasons for exercise of peremptory cha 
\)\1( 
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Kevin Delray ROBINSON, Appellant, 
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STATE of Florida, Appellee. 
No. 1002-1142. 
District Court of Appeal of Florida, 
First District. 
June 6, 2002. 
An appeal from the Circuit Court for 
Alachua County. R.A. "Buzzy" Green, 
Judge. 
Appellant, pro se. 
Robert A. Butterworth, Attorney Gener-
al, Tallahassee, for Appellee. 
PER CURIAM. 
AFFIRMED. See Luckey v. State, 811 
So.2d 802 (Fla. 1st DCA 2002). 
WOLF, VAN NORTWICK AND 
POLSTON, JJ., concur. 
2 
James POUGH, Appellant, 
v. 
STATE of Florida, Appellee. 
No. 1002-1145. 
N District Court of Appeal of Florida, 
(J1 First District. 
~ June 6, 2002. 
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ORANGE COUNTY, Appellee. 
No. 5D01-2621. 
Distlict Court of Appeal of Florida, 
Fifth District. 
June 7, 2002. 
Real estate developer brought breach 
of contract and promissory estoppel claim 
against county arising out of developer's 
attempt to develop 437 acres locate in 
county into primary residential, mixed·use 
land development. The Circuit Court. 
Orange County, Ted P. Coleman, J., dis-
missed complaint. Developer appealed. 
The District Court of Appeal, Griffin. 3" 
held that: (1) developer was not entitled to 
recover on breach of contract claim, and 
(2) developer was entitled to amend to 
attempt to seek some other remedy or 
plead some other cause of action after 
dismissal. 
Mfirrned in part; reversed in part; 
and remanded. 
MORGRAN CO., INC. v. ORANGE COUNTY 
Cite as 818 So.2d 640 (Fla.App.5 Dis!. 2002) 
Fla. 641 
1. counties ~ 129 
Zoning and Planning <3:=>160 
Real estate developer was not entitled 
to recover on breach of contract claim 
brought against county arising out of de-
veloper'S attempt to develop 437 acres lo-
cate in county into primary residential, 
mixed-use land development, where con-
tract was "contract zoning"; as part of 
development agreement county had obli-
gation to "support" developer's request for 
rezoning, and thus, if board of county com-
missioners had contracted to support de-
I'cloper's request for rezoning, it had in-
validly contracted away its discretionary 
legislative power as final decisionmaking 
authority. West's F.S.A. §§ 163.3220-
163.3243. 
2. Pretrial Procedure <3:=>695 
Real estate developer that brought 
promissory estoppel claim against county 
arising out of developer's agreement to 
develop 437 acres locate in county into 
primary residential, mixed-use land devel-
opment was entitled to amend to attempt 
to seek some other remedy or plead some 
other cause of action after dismissal of 
initial complaint. West's F.S.A. 
§§ 163.3220--163.3243. 
3. Estoppel <S=>62.1 
Estoppel cannot be applied against a 
governmental entity to accomplish an ille-
gal result. 
4. Estoppel <S=>85 
A party cannot reasonably rely upon a 
promise, the enforcement of which would 
be contrary to established public policy. 
5. Pleading <S=>233.1, 241 
Deborah L. Martohue and George L. 
Hayes, III, of Hayes & Martohue, P.A., St. 
Petersburg, for Appellant. 
Gary M. Glassman, Vivien J. Monaco 
and Marc Peltzrnan, Assistant County At-
torneys, Orlando, for Appellee. 
GRIFFIN, J. 
Morgran Company, Inc. ["Morgran"] 
sued Orange County for breach of contract 
and promissory estoppel and appeals the 
dismissal of its complaint. Although we 
affirm, we write because Morgran con-
tends the decision represents a misapplica-
tion of the law of contract zoning. This 
case may also serve as a cautionary tale 
for anyone who enters into a contract with 
Orange County. 
Morgran is a developer of real estate. 
Leave to amend should be granted 
unless allowing amendment would preju-
dice the opposing party, the privilege to 
amend has been abused, or amendment 
Would be futile. 
Its complaint against Orange County re-
lated to its attempt to develop 437 acres 
located in Orange County into a primlllily 
residential, mixed-use land development. 
The complaint alleges that the property 
was originally zoned agricultural; that 
Morgl'an was required to apply for an 
amendment to the County's Comprehen-
sive Policy Plan ["CPP"] in order to devel-
op the property as desired; that the prop-
erty also had to be rezoned to the Planned 
Development t"PD"] classification; that 
the amendment to the CPP was approved 
by Orange County's Board of County 
Commissioners in November of 1998; that 
following the amendment to the CPP, the 
County entered into a "Developer's Agree-
ment" providing that the County would 
adopt an amendment to the CPP, and 
would "support and expeditiously process" 
Morgt'an's rezoning application in ex-
change for Morgran's agreement to donate 
50 acres to the County for use as a park 
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Morgran submitted its application for re-
zoning on March 8, 2000, but the County 
breached its obligation to "support and 
expeditiously process" the request for re-
zoning by, instead, affIrmatively advocat-
ing the denial of the application; and that 
their application for rezoning was ulti-
mately denied by the County in a hearing 
before the Board of County Commission-
ers. Morgt'an seeks to recover damages, 
including the difference in the value of the 
property if zoned PD, delay damages, ex-
penditures associated with the rezoning 
application and attorney's fees. 
Apparently, the cause of Orange Coun-
ty's decision to renege on its agreement 
was a subsequent edict by then County 
Chairman, Mel Martinez, that the county 
reject any development requests for rezon-
ing in areas where the Orange County 
School Board considered the schools to be 
overcrowded. When Morgran sought to 
have Orange County abide by its agree-
ment, the county disavowed the contract as 
a void effort to engage in contract zoning.! 
[1] Contract zoning is, in essence, an 
agreement by a governmental body with a 
plivate landowner to rezone property for 
consideration. This practice has long been 
disapproved in Florida in cases such as 
Hartnett v. Austin., 93 So.2d 86 (Fla.1956) 
and Chung v. Sarasota County, 686 So.2d 
1358 (Fla. 2d DCA 1996). Orange Coun-
ty's position is that its agreement to "sup-
port and expeditiously process" Morgran's 
rezoning application is unambiguously void 
as a matter of law, since this agreement 
I. Orange County also contended that suit was 
precluded by virtue of the terms of paragraph 
3(0 of the Developer's Agreement: 
Notwithstanding the County's agreement to 
support and expeditiously process the re-
zoning of the Property as set forth above, 
Developer understands that such rezoning 
process is subject to all County ordinances 
and regulations governing rezoning, includ-
with Morgran requires the County to 
tract away its police powers. 
In Hartnett, Burdine's DePartlllent 
Store wanted to buy land and bUild 
shopping center. It asked the city ~. 
change the zoning classification of th 
'al e property to commerCl use. The city reo 
fused to make the change unless Bur-
dine's: (1) built a wall; (2) maintained a 
40' setback; (3) landscaped the setback. 
(4) protected the neighbors against glar; 
and disturbance; and (5) paid for addition. 
al police protection. The ordinance reo 
quired reference to extraneous contract~ 
between the city and the developer. Aus. 
tin, who owned property across from the 
proposed development, opposed the rezon. 
ing. The Supreme Court agreed that the 
ordinance which provided that the change 
would be made, if the conditions were met, 
was invalid, explaining: 
A municipality has no authOrity w 
enter into a private contract with a 
property owner for the amendment of a 
zoning ordinance subject to various cov-
enants and restrictions in a collateral 
deed or agreement to be executed be· 
tween the city and the property owner. 
Such collateral agreements have been 
void in all of the cases to which we have 
been referred. Any contrary rule would 
condone a violation of the long estab· 
lished principle that a municipality can· 
not contract away the exercise of its 
police powers. 
93 So.2d at 89. The Hm-tnett court noted 
that "[iJf each parcel of property were 
zoned on the basis of variables that could 
ing, but not limited to, review by the Devel· 
opment Review Committee ("ORe"). all ap' 
plicable public hearings, and approval by 
the Board of County Commissioners. Fur' 
ther, Developer understands and concedes 
that the County will not and cannot by law 
waive the requirements governing the re· 
zoning process. 
MORGRAN CO., INC. v. ORANGE COUNTY Fla. 643 
Cite as 818 So.2d 640 (Fla.App. 5 Dist. 2002) 
. into private contracts then the whole 
ente1 •• f 't I e and objectIve 0 commUnI y p an-
~he:nd zoning would collapse." Id. 
nmg 
R lying on cases such as Hartnett and 
I 
e,n Orange County reasons that if the 
CllO"", 
C unty cannot be bound to approve the 
r:zoning application, it likewise cannot be 
bound to support that application. Mor-
an responds that there is a distinction 
fel;\~een an obligation to support the re-
quest for rezoning and an obligation to 
approve the request. They urge that both 
parties, aware of the law of contract zon-
ing, developed this carefully worded, high-
ly negotiated contract language that "does 
not purport, either impliedly or expressly, 
to restrict or any way interfere with, the 
exercise of the Board of County Commis-
sioner's police power as the final zoning 
authority in the County." 
This argument, we fear, draws too fine a 
distinction. Morgran entered into its De-
veloper's Agreement with "Orange County, 
a political subdivision of the State of Flori-
da." The governing body of Orange Coun-
ty is the Board of County Commissioners. 
The agreement was executed by Mel Mar-
tinez, "Orange County Chairman," on be-
half of the Board of County Commission-
ers. Orange County's zoning decisions are 
made by the Planning and Zoning Com-
mission and the Board of Zoning Adjust-
ment. See §§ 501 and 502 of the Orange 
County Code. However, review of these 
initial zoning decisions are taken to the 
Board of County Commissioners, which 
considers the issue de novo and which has 
final authority. 
applicable to a property in exchange for 
public benefits." Brad K. Schwartz, Devel-
opment Agreements: Contracting for 
Vested Rights, 28 B.C. Envtl. Aff. L.Rev. 
719 (Summer 2001). Florida law permits 
local governments to impose "conditions, 
terms and restrictions" as part of these 
agreements, where necessary for the pub-
lic health, safety or welfare of its citizens. 
§ 163.3227(1)(h), Fla. Stat. (1999). The 
problem in this case lies with Orange 
County's obligation to "support" Morgran's 
request for rezoning, as part of that devel-
opment agreement. If the Board of Coun-
ty Commissioners has already contracted 
to "support" Morgran's request for rezon-
ing, it has invalidly contracted away its 
discretionary legislative power as the final 
decisionmaking authority. The clause in 
the contract which provides that the "re-
zoning process is subject to all County 
ordinances and regulations governing re-
zoning," does not cure the problem. In 
Chung, in rejecting a similar argument, 
the court noted that any hearings regard-
ing the issue of rezoning would ''be a pro 
forma exercise since the County has al-
ready obligated itself to a decision." 686 
So.2d at 1360. The court rejected Molina 
V. Tradewinds Development Corp., 526 
So.2d 695 (Fla. 4th DCA 1988) to the 
extent it implied that an obligation to com-
ply with applicable zoning regulations pre-
cluded a finding of illegal contract zoning. 
Development agreements are expressly 
permitted by the Florida Statutes. See 
§§ 163.3220-.3243, Fla. Stat. (1999). A de-
velopment agreement has been defined as 
"a contract between a [local government] 
and a property owner/developer, which 
prOvides the developer with vested rights 
by freezing the existing zoning regulations 
We have found one court only that has 
distinguished a contract for support of an 
activity from a contract to rezone. In 
Prock V. Town of DanviUe, 655 N.E.2d 553 
(Ind.Ct.App.1995), a case not cited by ei-
ther party, the court found that an agree-
ment between the Town of Danville and a 
waste disposal company, which owned land 
annexed by the town, whereby the town 
agreed to actively "support" the waste dis-
posal company's operation of the landfill, 
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landfill, was not an invalid contract for 
zoning. The court reasoned that: 
Although pursuant to the RCA the 
Town agreed to actively support Waste 
Management's operation of the landfIll 
as well as any efforts it may make in the 
future to expand the landfill, the Town 
was not contractually bound to zone the 
property in a particular way or to prom-
ise that in the future it would rezone the 
property to expand the landfill. Fur-
ther, the Town did not promise to sup-
port Waste Management's efforts re-
gardless of whether those efforts were 
in compliance with the Town's statutory 
zoning procedures. Thus, we cannot 
agree with the Plaintiffs' contention that 
by promising to support Waste Manage-
ment's efforts regarding the landfIll, the 
Town bartered away its decision making 
authority regarding zoning for the land-
fill. 
Id. at 560. The court noted that the Town 
had already rezoned the annexed propelty 
when it entered into the agreement to 
"SUPPOlt" future efforts to expand the 
landmI. Even this case, therefore, by neg-
ative inference, supports the County's po-
sition. We also note that Florida appears 
to take a stricter view of contract zoning 
than many other jurisdictions. 
Morgran urges that the contractual 
provision that binds the County to sup-
POlt rezoning means only County staff, 
not the Board. First, given the absence 
of language of such pivotal importance in 
the agreement, we decline to find a latent 
ambiguity, Second, we doubt it would 
matter.2 Morgran seemingly draws a dis-
tinction between the Board acting in its 
executive (governing) capacity and the 
Board acting in its quasi-judicial capacity 
in zoning cases. We find this distinction 
2. It is also doubtful that an agreement for 
county staff support only could support a 
to be unworkable. Whichever hat it . 
wearing, the County is still the Coun; 
[2-4] Morgran next complains that th 
trial court erred in the dismissal with pl'e~ 
udice of its claim for promissory estopp!l. 
The rule, however, is that estoppel cannot 
be applied against a governmental entit 
to accomplish an illegal result. Branca:' 
City of Mimntar, 634 So.2d 604 (Fla.1994). 
It has been specillcally held that estoppel 
cannot be used by a landowner to enforce 
a contract which constitutes "contract zon-
ing." P.C.B. Partnership v. City of Largo, 
549 So.2d 738, 741-42 (Fla. 2d DCA 1989) -
("A party entering into a contract with a 
municipality is bound to know the extent of 
the municipality's power to contract, ane! 
the municipality will not be estopped to 
assert the invalidity of a contract which it 
had no power to execute."). Additionally, 
a party cannot reasonably rely upon a 
promise, the enforcement of which would 
be contrary to established public policy. 
Brine v. Fertitta, 537 So.2d 113 (Fla. 2d 
DCA 1988). 
[5] The only remaining question in this 
case is whether Morgran should have been 
given leave to amend to attempt to seek 
some other remedy or plead some other 
cause of action. Morgran was not given 
leave to amend after dismissal of its initial 
complaint and claims the right to do so. 
Morgran has failed to identify another via-
ble cause of action, however, in its brief 
and was no more specillc at oral argument. 
See Dacy v. Village of Ruidoso, 114 N.M. 
699, 845 P.2d 793 (1992); P.C.B. Leave to 
amend should be granted unless allowing 
the amendment would prejudice the oppos-
ing party, the privilege to amend has been 
abused, or amendment would be futile. 
State Fat"ln Fire & Cas. Co. v. Fleet Fin. 
Corp., 724 So.2d 1218 (Fla. 5th DCA 1998). 
provable damage claim, even one for restitu· 
tion. 
~ .. _.,,_'2C""" ,'i!5WfItl'tiM 
WELCH v. COMPLETE CARE CORP. Fla. 645 
CIt.as818 So.2d 645 (FI •. App.2Dlst. 2002) 
The trial court apparently concluded, 
based on the undisputed facts, that leave 
to amend would be futile, and it may prove 
'ghl. We conclude, however, that Mor-
n b' gran should e gwen one more opportunity 
to attempt to state a claim or seek a 
different remedy, if it chooses. We ex-
press no opinion about the viability of any 
such claim at this stage, however. 
AFFIRMED in part; REVERSED in 
part; and REMANDED. 
SAWAYA and ORFINGER, R. B., JJ., 
coneUl'· 
Michael P. WELCH, as assignee of 
David J. and Adele Pinkster, Howard 
Pinkster d/b/a A.T.I.M.A. Prime Prop-
erties, and American Rental Dealers 
Insurance, Appellant, 
v. 
COMPLETE CARE CORPORATION 
and Professional Business Owners 
Association, Inc., Appellees. 
No. 2DOO-5250. 
District Court of Appeal of Florida, 
Second District. 
June 7, 2002. 
and principals may have had against em-
ployer and its insurer, and employee 
brought action against employer and insur-
er asserting claims for declaratory relief, 
contractual indemnity, common law indem-
nity, contribution, and equitable subroga-
tion. The Circuit Court, Pinellas County, 
Frank Quesada, J., dismissed all counts 
except for those seeking declaratory relief 
and damages based on contractual indem-
nillcation, on which summary judgment 
was granted for employer and insurer_ 
Employee appealed. The District Court of 
Appeal, Northcutt, J., held that: (1) em-
ployee could not assert claims of equitable 
subrogation against employer and its in-
surer; (2) record did not show any legal 
relationship between employer and land-
lord which would render landlord vicari-
ously, constructively, derivatively, or tech-
nically liable to employee because of some 
negligence or fault on employer's part, 
which precluded imposition of common law 
indemnity on employer; (3) employee's al-
legations that employer's landlord was pas-
sively rather than actively negligent, were 
not equivalent of pleading vicarious liabili-
ty; (4) genuine issue of material fact as to' 
whether landlord was not legally or factu-
ally responsible for employee's injuries 
sustained while attempting to repair ga-
rage door precluded summary judgment 
on contractual indemnification claim 
against employer; and (5) employer's liabil-
ity insurance contract, which provided that 
insurance . did not cover liability assumed 
under contract, precluded imposition of 
any liability on insurer for employer's lia-
bility to employee, as assignee of employ-
Employee brought action against em-
ployer's landlord and its principals after he 
was injured when garage door on storage 
unit malfunctioned and as part of settle-
ment, landlord' and its principals assigned 
to employee all legal and equitable rights 
of action, claims, and interest, including 
indemnity and contribution that landlord 
er's landlord, under contractual indemnity 
theory. 
Mfirmed in part and reversed in part. 
1, Subrogation e:>1 
Equitable subrogation is generally ap-
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Page I 
PRIOR HISTORY: [*** I) APPEAL FROM THE Circuit Court for Prince George's County, David G. Ross, Judge. 
DISPOSITION: JUDGMENT REVERSED; CASE REMANDED TO CIRCUIT COURT FOR PRINCE GEORGE'S 
COUNTY WITH INSTRUCTIONS TO VACATE ORDER OF DISTRICT COUNCIL AND REMAND TO 
DISTRICT COUNCIL FOR FURTHER PROCEEDINGS IN ACCORDANCE WITH THIS OPINION; COSTS TO BE 
PAID BY APPELLEES. 
CASE SUMMARY: 
PROCEDURAL POSTURE: Defendant county council approved, subject to certain specified conditions, an appli-
cant's plan for the rezoning of a I 86.2-acre tract of land within the county. Plaintiffs plan opponents chaIIenged the plan 
approval. The Circuit Court for Prince George's County (Maryland) affirmed the county council's action, and the plan 
opponents sought review. 
OVERVIEW: The plan opponents claimed that the county council failed to make the required detailed findings offacts 
and conclusions, that its action was in violation of the existing area master plans, and that its action was not based upon 
substantial evidence. The plan opponents also claimed that approval of the plan as amended constituted an unlawful 
conditional zoning. The court agreed, and reversed and remanded the lower court's judgment. The court found that both 
Md. Ann. Code art. 28, §8-123 Imd Prince George's County, Md., Code § 27-141 required plan approval to be based 
upon specific written findings of basic facts and conclusions. The court held that the county council's blanket adoption 
of the county planning board's recommendations did not comply with the clear requirements of these provisions. The 
court also found that Prince George's County, Md., Code § 27-1 95( c )(2) prohibited conditional zoning, but that the plan 
amendment clearly violated this proscription. Although the court upheld the right of a plan applicant to amend its plan, 
the court held that this right of amendment could not be exercised in such a manner as to violate the prohibition against 
conditional zoning. 
OUTCOME: In an action that chaIIenged a county council's approval of a rezoning plan, the court reversed the lower 
court's judgment that affirmed the approval of the plan, and remanded the case for further proceedings. 
LexisNexis(R) Headnotes 
79 Md. App. 537, *; 558 A.2d 742, **; 
1989 Md. App. LEXIS 120, *** 
Environmental Law> Zoning & Land Use> Comprehensive & General Plans 
Governments> Public Improvements> Community Redevelopment 
Page 2 
[HN1] Prince George's County, Md., Code § 27-195(b) provides, in part, that: (1) Prior to the approval of the applica-
tion and the Basic Plan, the applicant shall demonstrate to the satisfaction of the District Council that the entire devel-
opment meets the following criteria: (A) The proposed Basic Plan shall either conform to: (i) The specific recommenda-
tion of a General Plan map, Area Master Plan map, or urban renewal plan map; including the principles and guidelines 
of the plan text which address the design and physical development of the property, the public facilities necessary to 
serve the proposed development, and the impact which the development may have on the environment and surrounding 
properties; or (ii) The principles and guidelines described in the plan (including the text) with respect to land use, the 
number of dwelling units, intensity of nonresidential buildings, and the location of land uses. (B) The economic analysis 
submitted for a proposed retail commercial use shall adequately justify a use of the size and scope shown on the Basic 
Plan. 
Governments> Public Improvements> Bridges & Roads 
Governments> Public Improvements> Community Redevelopment 
Transportation Law> Public Transportation 
[HN2] Prince George's County, Md., Code § 27-195(b) provides in part as follows: (C) Transportation facilities (includ-
ing public streets and public transit) which are existing, under construction, or for which construction funds are con-
tained in either the first six (6) years of the adopted County Capital Improvement Program or the first five (5) years of 
the adopted State Highway Administration Construction Program shall be adequate to carry anticipated traffic. The uses 
proposed shall not generate traffic which would lower the level of service anticipated by the land use and circulation 
systems shown on approved General or Area Master Plans, or urban renewal plans; (D) Other existing or planned pri-
vate and public facilities which are existing, under construction, or for which construction funds are contained in the 
first six (6) years of the adopted County Capital Improvement Program (such as schools, recreation areas, water and 
sewerage systems, libraries, and fire stations) shall be adequate for the uses proposed; (E) Environmental relationships 
reflect compatibility between the proposed development and surrounding land uses, so as to promote the health, safety, 
and welfare of the present and future inhabitants of the Regional District; and CDZ applications filed after October 31, 
1978. 
Environmental Law > Zoning & Land Use> Comprehensive & General Plans 
Governments> Local Governments> Administrative Boards 
[HN3] Prince George's County, Md., Code § 27-195(b) provides, in part, as follows: (2) Notwithstanding Subpara-
graphs (C) and (D), above, where the application anticipates a construction schedule of more than six (6) years (§ 27-
179), public facilities (existing or scheduled for construction within the first six (6) years) shall be adequate to serve the 
development proposed to occur within the first six (6) years. The Council shall also find that public facilities probably 
will be adequately supplied for the remainder of the project. In considering the probability of future public facilities 
construction the Council may consider such things as existing plans for construction, budgetary constraints on providing 
public facilities, the public interest and public need for the particular development, the relationship of the development 
to public transportation, or any other matter that indicates that public a [sic] private funds will likely be expended for the 
necessary facilities. 
Environmental Law> Zoning & Land Use> Comprehensive & General Plans 
[HN4] Prince George's County, Md., Code § 27-195(c)(l) authorizes the District Council, in approving a zoning map 
amendment, to impose reasonable requirements and safeguards (in the form of conditions) which it finds are necessary 
to either: (A) Protect surrounding properties from the adverse effects which might accrue from the Zoning Map 
Amendment; or (B) Further enhance the coordinated, harmonious, and systematic development of the Regional District. 
Prince George's County, Md., Code § 27-195(c)(2), however, provides that in no case shall the conditions waive or 
lessen the requirements of, or prohibit uses allowed in, the approved zone. 
Environmental Law> Zoning & Land Use> Comprehensive & General Plans 
?h1 
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Real Property Law> Zoning & Land Use> Ordinances 
Real Property Law > Zoning & Land Use> Special Permits & Variances 
Page 3 
[HN5] Md. Ann. Code art. 28, § 8-123 states: In Prince George's County, no application for a map amendment or spe-
cial exception, which is contested, may be granted or denied except upon written findings of basic facts and written 
conclusions. Prince George's County, Md., Code § 27-141 requires a final decision of the Council in any zoning matter 
to be supported by specific written findings of basic facts and conclusions. 
Environmental Law> Zoning & Land Use> Conditional Use Permits & Variances 
Real Property Law> Zoning & Land Use> Zoning Methods 
[HN6] Conditional zoning is a zoning reclassification subject to conditions not generally applicable to land similarly 
zoned. It occurs when an area of land is rezoned from one classification to another, and such change is not outright but 
subject to some type of conditions. 
Environmental Law> Zoning & Land Use> Statutory & Equitable Limits 
Real Property Law> Zoning & Land Use> Special Permits & Variances 
Real Property Law> Zoning & Land Use> Zoning Methods 
[HN7] Conditional zoning is inconsistent with the principle that, while zoning regulations may vary from one district or 
classification to another, within a district or classification they should be uniform. Conditional zoning tends to destroy 
that uniformity; it subjects some land within a district or classification to restrictions that are not applicable to other land 
within the same district or classification and thus tends to create unique mini-districts not provided for in the general 
zoning ordinance. 
Contracts Law> Types of Contracts> Covenants 
Environmental Law> Zoning & Land Use> Comprehensive & General Plans 
Environmental Law > Zoning & Land Use> Conditional Use Permits & Variances 
[HN8] Although there appears to be no impediment to an applicant entering into private covenants with other parties to 
lessen their opposition to an application, or to garner their support for it, such offerings cannot be made to the legislative 
body authorized to grant or deny the application. . 
COUNSEL: Gary Alexander (Alexander & Cleaver, P.A., on the brief), all of Fort Washington, Maryland, for appel-
lants. 
Russell W. Shipley (Meyers, Billingsley, Shipley, Curry, Rodbell & Rosenbaum, P.A., on the brief), all of Riverdale, 
Maryland, for appellee, Ammendale. 
Joyce Birkel Hope, Associate County Attorney (Michael P. Whalen, County Attorney, on the brief), both of Upper 
Marlboro, Maryland, for appellees, Prince George's County, Maryland, and the County Council. 
JUDGES: Gilbert, C.J., and Wilner, and Karwacki, JJ. 
OPINION BY: WILNER 
OPINION 
[*539] [**743] This appeal concerns the rezoning ofa 186.2-acre tract ofland in Prince George's County. The 
rezoning was approved by the County Council, sitting as the District Council, subject to certain specified conditions, 
and that action was afftrmed by the Circuit Court for Prince George's County. 
The property in question lies in the Beltsville area; [***2] it fronts on the west side of U.S. Route 1, about three 
miles north of the Capital Beltway. Known as the Ammendale Normal Institute, the property was used for many years 
by a religious order for the training of novitiates, but that use has ceased, and the buildings, some of which are included 
in the National Register of Historic Places, have fallen into disrepair. For purposes of this case, the property consists of 
three parcels: a 56.l-acre parcel fronting on U.S. Route 1; a 26.1 -acre parcel, which forms the center part of the tract 
79 Md. App. 531, *; 558 A.2d 742, **; 
1989 Md. App. LEXIS 120, *** 
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and contains most or all of the buildings; and a 104-acre parcel that was once used for sand and gravel mining and is 
largely undeveloped. 
The first of these parcels was placed in the E-I-A (Employment -- Institutional Areas) zone in 1976; the other two 
parcels have R-R (Rural-- Residential) zoning. In December, 1985, an application was made to place the entire tract in 
the E-J-A zone. With the application was a Basic Plan proposing the development of2.7 million square feet of institu-
tional, service, office, and commercial facilities. Construction would take place in two stages, over a period offrom six 
to 10 years. 
(I) The E-I-A Zone -- Approval [***3] Process 
The E-I-A zone is a comprehensive design zone provided for in § 27-499 of the Prince George's County Code. The 
essential purpose of the zone seems to be to U[p]rovide for a mix of employment, institutional, retail, and office uses in a 
manner which will retain the dominant employment and institutional character of the area. u@ § 27-499(a)(4). 
[*540] Because the E-I-A zone is a comprehensive design zone, full approval of the development occurs in three 
stages: 
First: approval by the District Council of a Basic Plan showing the kinds and amounts of proposed land uses as part 
of and as a precondition to approval of a zoning map amendment authorizing those land uses; 
Second: approval by the Plarming Board of a Comprehensive Design Plan showing the amounts and locations of 
the land uses and circulation systems and indicating the general schedule of development; and 
Third: approval by the Planning Board of Specific Design Plans for each portion of the development to be con-
structed within a particular time period. 
We are concerned here with the first of these three stages. 
Section 27-499 sets' out a number of standards or conditions which a Basic Plan must meet to qualify the [***4] 
property for E-I-A zoning. They are supplemented by other standards or conditions specified in § 27-195, dealing with 
map amendment approval of comprehensive design zones. [HNl J Section 27-1 95(b ) provides, in that regard, that: 
"( 1) Prior to the approval of the application and the Basic Plan, the applicant shall demonstrate to the 
satisfaction of the District Council that the entire development meets the following criteria: 
(A) The proposed Basic Plan shall either conform to: 
(i) The specific recommendation of a General Plan map, Area Master Plan map, or urban renewal 
plan map; including the principles and guidelines of the plan text which address the design and physical 
development of the property, the public facilities necessary to serve the proposed development, and the 
impact which the development may have on the environment and surrounding properties; or 
(ii) The principles and guidelines described in the plan (including the text) with respect to land use, 
the number [*541] of dwelling units, intensity of nonresidential buildings, and the location ofland uses. 
[**744] (B) The economic analysis submitted for a proposed retail commercial use shall ade-
quately justify a use of the size [***5] and scope shown on the Basic Plan; 
[HN2] (C) Transportation facilities (including public streets and public transit) which are existing, 
under construction, or for which construction funds are contained in either the frrstsix (6) years of the 
adopted County Capital Improvement Program or the first five (5) years of the adopted State Highway 
Administration Construction Program shall be adequate to carry anticipated traffic. The uses proposed 
shall not generate traffic which would lower the level of service anticipated by the land use and circula-
tion systems shown on approved General or Area Master Plans, or urban renewal plans; 
(D) Other existing or planned private and public facilities which are existing, under construction, or 
for which construction funds are contained in the first six (6) years ofthe adopted County Capital Im-
provement Program (such as schools, recreation areas, water and sewerage systems, libraries, and frre 
stations) shall be adequate for the uses proposed; 
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(E) Environmental relationships reflect compatibility between the proposed development and sur-
rounding land uses, so as to promote the health, safety, and welfare of the present and future inhabitants 
of the Regional [***6) District; and CDZ applications filed after October 31,1978. 
[HN3] (2) Notwithstanding Subparagraphs (C) and (D), above, where the application anticipates a 
construction schedule of more than six (6) years (Section ~7 -179), public facilities (existing or scheduled 
for construction within the first six (6) years) shall be adequate to serve the development proposed to oc-
cur within the first six (6) years. The Council shall also find that public facilities probably will be ade-
quately supplied for the remainder of the project. In considering the probability of future public facilities 
construction the Council may consider such things as [*542J existing plans for construction, budgetary 
constraints on providing public facilities, the public interest and public need for the particular develop-
ment, the relationship of the development to public transportation, or any other matter that indicates that 
public a [sicJ private funds will likely be expended for the necessary facilities." 
[HN4J Section 27-195(c)(l) authorizes the District Council, in approving a zoning map amendment, to 
"impose reasonable requirements and safeguards (in the form of conditions) which it finds are neces-
sary to either: [***7] 
(A) Protect surrounding properties from the adverse effects which might accrue from the Zoning 
Map Amendment; or 
(B) Further enhance the coordinated, harmonious, and systematic development of the Regional Dis-
trict. " 
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Section 27-195(c)(2), however, provides that U[iJn no case shall the conditions waive or lessen the requirements of, or 
prohibit uses allowed in, the approved zone." 
Finally, both State and county law require the District Council, in approving (or denying) a zoning map amendment 
over protest, to make specific findings off act, in writing. [HN5] Md.Ann.Code art. 28, § 8-123 states: "In Prince 
George's County, no application for a map amendment or special exception, which is contested, may be granted or de-
nied except upon written findings of basic facts and written conclusions."@ Similarly, § 27-141 of the County Code 
requires a final decision of the Council in any zoning matter to be "supported by specific written rmdings of basic facts 
and conclusions." 
(2) Procedural Background 
The instant application was first considered by the Technical Staff of the Maryland-National Capital Park and Plan-
ning Commission. In a report filed May 12, 1986, the Staff recommended that [***8J the application be denied. 
Among its findings of fact, the Staff stated: 
"7. The subject property is affected by two Master Plans: the Adopted and Approved Master Plan for 
[*543J Fairland-Beltsville and Vicinity (1968) and the Northwestern Area Plan (1975). 
[**745] 8. The Adopted and Approved Fairland-BeltsviIIe Master Plan proposed R-90/R-80 one-
family detached residential zone with a recreation center proposed for the center of the area. 
9. The Northwestern Area Plan designates E-I-A zoning for the 56.1+/- acres adjacent to u.S. Route 
1, public/quasi-public use for the Ammendale Normal Institute and suburban residential for the north-
west portion of the subject property. 
10. The Approved General Plan for Prince George's County (1982) identifies the eastern portion of 
the site as a 'Major Employment Area.' 
11. Prior to approval of the Basic Plan, it must be demonstrated to the District Council that the pro-
posed development is entirely compatible with this existing and propose·d development of the surround-
ingarea. 
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12. Both the Northwestern Area Plan and the Approved General Plan sets guidelines and policies for 
employment areas." 
The "Detenninations" of the Staff were as foHows: [***9] 
"1. The Basic Plan does not take the fuH development of the employment areas into account in fore-
casting the affect [sic] of the proposed use on roads and surrounding residential areas. 
2. The proposed use would significantly increase the flow of traffic through neighboring residential 
areas. 
3. The roads which will be in place in the vicinity of the proposed use wiH not be able to handle the 
amount of traffic which would be attracted to such use. 
4. Transportation Systems Management techniques may make some additional E-I-A Zone devel-
opment feasible. 
5. With the addition of automatic fire extinguishing systems, the existing and programmed public fa-
cilities will be adequate. 
[*544] 6. The proposed development does not confonn to guidelines set forth in the Northwestern 
Area Plan relating to traffic impact of employment areas on residential neighborhoods. 
7. The proposed E-I-A Zone development is not consistent with the recommendations of the Fair-
land-BeItsviHe Master Plan for suburban residential development in the R-80/R-90 Zones." 
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In the concluding paragraphs of its Report, the Staff opined that the road improvements proposed by the applicant 
or planned by the State [***10] Highway Administration "are not enough to adequately serve the proposed addition of 
2,168,000 square feet of institutional, office and commercial floor space."@ It was "unsure of how much additional 
traffic can be accommodated by the roads in the area," and it expressed concern about the diversion of traffic "through 
the residential areas west and south of the subject property" which "would have a negative impact on these residential 
areas." 
The Planning Board reached a different conclusion. In a Resolution adopted November 13,1986, it recommended 
approval of the application, subject to nine conditions relating principally to road improvements and the preservation of 
trees and historic buildings. It made no detailed fmdings of fact; indeed, aside from the conditions, the Resolution says 
no more than that 
"[TJhe Planning Board disagreed with the analysis and recommendation of the Technical Staff based 
on the following determinations: 
1. The publici quasi-public use of the subject property has been abandoned. The Northwestern Area 
Plan's recommendation for a public/quasi-public use for a portion of the subject property is therefore no 
longer appropriate. 
2. The proposed business [***11] park is compatible with existing and proposed development in 
the surrounding area. 
[*545J 3. Without proper controls, the traffic generated by the proposed use would exceed planned 
road capacities and result in unacceptable levels of service on roads in the area. 
4. The proposed business park should be approved in phases which take into [**746J account fu-
ture road improvements and the ability of area roads to accommodate additional traffic. 
5. With the addition of automatic fire extinguishing systems in aH buildings, the existing and pro-
grammed public facilities will be adequate." 
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The next stage in the process was a hearing before a Zoning Hearing Examiner. He arrived at a third recommenda-
tion -- that the Council retain the E-I-A zoning for the 56.1-acre parcel, rezone the middle 26.1 acres to E-I-A, and re-
tain the residential zoning on the balance (104 acres). The Examiner expressed two concerns over the rezoning of the 
104 acres. First, he pointed out that the area was in a suburban community and was designed to remain residential in the 
two Master Plans to which it is subject. Second, he concluded that, even without this rezoning, by reason of other ap-
proved developments in [***12) the immediate vicinity, there was going to be "a major congestion problem at U.S. Rt. 
1 and Powder Mill Road for a period of at least six years," and that, without some "mitigating affects [sic)", he could 
not find that "transportation facilities will be adequate to carry anticipated traffic." 
The District Council, of course, had before it all of these reports and recommendations when it met, in April, 1987, 
to consider the matter. The arguments made to the Council focused on three considerations: compatibility of the pro-
posed development with the neighboring residential communities; the traffic problems likely to be caused or exacer-
bated by the development; and, to a lesser extent, the apparent statutory requirement that the proposed land uses be con-
sistent with existing master plans. After listening to argument, the Council initially continued the hearing, without mak-
ing a decision, for 30 days, to allow the two sides an [*546) opportunity to try to resolve their differences through the 
development of "covenants" that would limit the uses to which the property could be put. 
On June 4, 1987 -- four days before the District Council's scheduled reconvening on the matter - the [***13) ap-
plicant informed the Council that it had met with the protestants to explore the possibility of entering into covenants "to 
exclude undesirable E-I-A uses" and that the protestants were "not willing to enter into any covenants whatsoever with 
the applicant."@ It therefore proposed "to fulfill the District Council's intentions" by voluntarily amending its Basic 
Plan to exclude certain uses otherwise expressly permitted in the E-I-A zone. Attached to its letter as an appendix was a 
proposed revision of the Basic Plan eliminating 15 categories of use. Aware of the strictures set forth in § 27-1 95( c )(2), 
the applicant hastened to assure the council that 
"this is not an offer on the applicant's part to have the Council conditionally zone the property, nor the 
proffer of additional evidence, but simply a designation by our Basic Plan that we are binding ourselves 
to limit or lessen that which would be otherwise permissible to the E-I-A zone. In this manner, it is 
hoped that the Council's April 27, 1987 wishes are fulfilled without any violations of the Prince George's 
County Zoning Ordinance. Further, this letter is intended to be in response to the dictate of the Council's 
motion [***14] of April 27, 1987." 
This amendment was apparently filed pursuant to § 27-181 of the county code, dealing with requests to amend an 
application. In relevant part, that section allows an applicant to request an amendment to an application at any time if 
the amendment concerns "an error, omission of fact, or other factual change not mentioned below in this Section .... "@ 
The two changes "mentioned below" were amendments that change the total area or configuration of the property and 
those changing the requested zoning classification, for both of which special conditions apply. 
[*547J When the District Council reconvened on June 8, it regarded the Basic Plan as having been amended as re-
quested by the applicant. After some further discussion, a motion was made to approve the application, as amended, 
subject to the conditions specified by the Planning Board. That motion failed. Several additional conditions [**747) 
were then proposed and approved, the two major ones being to require the development to proceed over a 10-year pe-
riod, limited to 20 acres/year, and to preclude nearly all development within the 1 OO-year flood plain without further 
approval by the Council. With those additional [***15J conditions, a motion to approve the application was adopted. 
The written decision of the Council, embodied in the Zoning Ordinance adopted by it, recited, in skeletal fashion, 
the procedural history of the application. The heart of the decision was in three "WHEREAS" clauses and in the 11 
conditions imposed. There were no specific findings of fact stated in the ordinance. All that was said in that regard was: 
"WHEREAS, having reviewed the record in this case, the District Council has determined that the sub-
ject property should be rezoned to the E-I-A Zone; and 
WHEREAS, in order to protect adjacent properties and the surrounding neighborhood, the rezoning 
herein is granted with conditions; and 
WHEREAS, as the basis for this action, the District Council adopts the recommendations of the 
Planning Board as its findings and conclusions in this case. 
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NOW, THEREFORE, BE IT ORDAINED AND ENACTED: [that the application is approved sub-
ject to the enumerated conditionsJ." 
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The applicant subsequently agreed fonnally to the conditions imposed by the Council, whereupon the Council 
adopted a fmal Resolution incorporating those conditions. 
In the circuit court, the opponents complained, as [***16J they complain here, that the District Council failed to 
make detailed findings of basic facts and conclusions as required [*548] by law, that its action was in violation of the 
existing area master plans, that its action was not based upon substantial evidence that the proposed land uses were 
compatible with existing uses in the surrounding areas, and that the approval by the Council of the Basic Plan as 
amended -- i.e., with some 15 permitted uses deleted -- constituted an unlawful conditional zoning. The court rejected 
these arguments, concluding that (1) by adopting the Planning Board's recommendations as its own findings, the Coun-
cil "ma[dJe the basis of their decision sufficiently clear," (2) there was sufficient evidence in the record to make the 
Council's decision fairly debatable, and (3) the Council's action did not constitute an unlawful conditional zoning. 
(3) Summary of Our Conclusions 
We think that the court (and the Council) erred in at least two respects. We do not believe that the District Coun-
cil's blanket adoption of the Planning Board's recommendations sufficed to comply with the clear requirements of art. 
28, § 8-123 of the State Code or § 27-141 of [***17J the County Code. Nor do we believe that the clear proscription 
of § 27 -195( c )(2) can be circumvented by the artifice of simply amending the Basic Plan to exclude uses that the Coun-
cil finds, or might find, objectionable but which are expressly permitted in the E-I-A zone. 
(4) Statement of Findings 
In Montgomery v. Bd. of Co. Comm'rs, 256 Md. 597, 261 A.2d 447 (1970), the Court was faced with a circumstance 
almost identical to that now before us. The District Council for Prince George's County approved a zoning map change, 
adopting as its findings the recommendations of the Technical Staff of the Planning Board. The Technical Staff Report, 
however, made no specific findings as to the defmition of the neighborhood, what changes had occurred since the last 
comprehensive rezoning, or whether any such changes resulted in a change in the character of the neighborhood. It sim-
ply concluded that the new zone was in confonnance with the area plan and that a proposed arterial highway, when 
completed, should alleviate any traffic problems. 
[*549J The Court of Appeals, citing the statutory requirement that the District Council make "the necessary fmd-
ings [*** 18J and conclusions and ... express them in writing," concluded that the Council had failed to make those 
findings and thus remanded the case "for compliance with the mandatory [**748J requirement of the statute."@ 256 
Md. at 603. 261 A.2d 447. In that regard, it noted, also at 603, 261 A.2d 447: 
"At the argument, counsel for the District Council indicated that the practice of the District Council in 
ruling on rezoning applications in which it agreed with the recommendations of the Planning Board or of 
the Technical Staff, as the case might be, was to adopt the findings in the report or recommendations re-
lied upon rather than to make specific findings in the order of the District Council, itself. Although this 
is not a practice to be encouraged, we are not prepared to rule, as a matter of law, that the District 
Council may not, in a specific case, comply with the statutory requirement to make written findings of 
basic facts and conclusions by incorporating into its order specific findings of basic facts and conclu-
sions of either the Planning Board or of the Technical Staff by specific reference to those findings. 
However, in the [*** 19J instant case it is clear that neither the Planning Board nor the Technical Staff 
made any such findings of the necessary basic facts or conclusions." 
(Emphasis added.) 
Although the issues here are not "change" or "mistake," as they were in Montgomery, the same principle applies. 
If, despite the Court's editorial comment, the Council wishes to continue the practice of incorporating or adopting by 
reference the findings of others as its own findings and conclusions, it must at least make certain that the findings it 
proposes to adopt comply with the statutory requirements of specificity. Here, as in Montgomery, they do not; and 
therein lies the problem. 
267 
79 Md. App. 537, *; 558 A.2d 742, **; 
1989 Md. App. LEXIS ] 20, *** 
Page 9 
As we observed, §§ 27-] 95(b)(I) and 27-499 set forth certain requirements that a Basic Plan must meet in order 
[*550] to qualifY the property for E-I-A zoning. Among those requirements are that (1) the Basic Plan conform either to 
the specific recommendations of the existing area plans or to the "principles and guidelines" described in those plans, 
(2) transportation facilities, existing, under construction, or funded for construction within a 5-6 year period, be ade-
quate, (3) the proposed uses not generate traffic [***20] that would lower the level of service anticipated in existing 
area plans, and (4) there be compatibility between the proposed development and surrounding land uses. 
Whether these or other required conditions are met depends on a host of subsidiary findings. It is not permissible 
for the Council, or any administrative body, simply to parrot general statutory requirements or rest on broad conclusory 
statements. As stated in Turner v. Hammond, 270 Md. 41, 56,310 A.2d 543 (1973), "citizens are entitled to something 
more than boiler-plate resolution."@SeealsoRedden v. Montgomery County, 270 Md. 668, 685,313 A.2d 481 (1974), 
and cases cited therein; Ocean Hideaway Condo. v. Boardwalk Plaza, 68 Md.App. 650, 515 A.2d 485 (1986). 
We have quoted in full the "determinations" of the Planning Board that the District Council adopted as its findings 
and conclusions. They do not suffice -- they do not even begin to suffice -- as "specific written findings of basic facts 
and conclusions."@ To the extent that they even address the statutory requirements for an E-I-A zone, they are wholly 
conclusory [***2]) and take no account whatever of the specific concerns and issues raised by the parties, the Techni-
cal Staff, or the Zoning Hearing Examiner. The area plans appear to call for the land within the 104-acre parcel to re-
main residential; if the myriad of uses permitted in the E-I-A zone are consistent with those plans or the "principles" of 
those plans, as §§ 27-499 and 27-1 95 (b) seem to require, the Council has not informed us, or anyone else, how that is 
so. If, unlike the technical staff or the zoning hearing examiner, the Council believed that, with the conditions [*55]) 
imposed by it, existing or anticipated traffic and transportation facilities will be adequate to handle the increased traffic 
from the proposed development, it has not explained the basis upon which it reached that conclusion. In short, the Dis-
trict Council is going to have to do a better job of it. 
[**749J Whether the evidence in the record suffices to support a rezoning of the tract, or any part of the tract, de-
pends, of course, on the specific findings of fact and conclusions underlying the zoning decision. Until those findings 
are made and clearly articulated, therefore, we cannot properly address that issue. [***22) Compare Floyd v. County 
Council o/P.G. Co., 55 Md.App. 246, 461 A.2d 76 (1983). 
(5) Conditional Zoning 
[HN6) "Conditional zoning," we said in Bd. o/Co. Comm'rs v. H Manny Holtz, Inc., 65 Md.App. 574,579,501 
A.2d 489 (1985) (quoting in part from Miller, The Current Status o/Conditional Zoning, Institute on Planning, Zoning 
& Eminent Domain 122 (1974», "is a zoning reclassification subject to conditions not generally applicable to land simi-
larly zoned. '[W)hen an area ofland is rezoned from one classification to another, and such change is not outright but 
subject to some type of conditions, then we are confronted with a conditional zoning problem.''' 
The early view of most courts was that conditional (or, as it is sometimes called, "contract") zoning was unlawful 
per se. As noted in Baylis v. City a/Baltimore, 219 Md. 164, 170, 148 A.2d 429 (1959), there seemed to be three chief 
reasons for this view: 
"that rezoning based on offers or agreements with the owners disrupts the basic plan, and thus is sub-
versive of the public policy reflected in the overall legislation, that [***23) the resulting 'contract' is 
nugatory because a municipality is not able to make agreements which inhibit its police powers, and that 
restrictions in a particular zone should not be left to extrinsic evidence." 
[*552) See also] P. Rohan, Zoning and Land Use Controls § 5.02[J} (1989); 2 A. and D. Ratbkopf, The Law o/Zon-
ing and Planning § 27.05 (1989). 
For some or all of these reasons, Maryland very clearly adopted this jaundiced view of conditional zoning, first in 
Wakefield v. Kraft, 202 Md. 136, 96 A.2d 27 (1953) and later in Baylis; and, while a number of commentators have 
urged a relaxation of this approach in favor of the flexibility allowed by conditional zoning, so far Maryland has contin-
ued to fmd the practice objectionable, at least in the absence of clear statutory authorization. In Mont. Co. v. Nat'l Capi-
tal Realty, 267 Md. 364, 373, 297 A.2d 675 (1972), the Court declared that "[t)he invalidity of conditional zoning in 
Maryland is not seriously open to question."@Seealso City o/Baltimore v. Crane, 277 Md. 198,205-06,352 A.2d 786 
(1976); Bd. o/Co. Comm'rs v. H Manny Holtz, supra, 65 Md.App. 574, 501 A.2d 489. [***24) 
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This general proscription against conditional zoning may, of course, be relaxed by statute, and, indeed, it has been 
to some extent. See, for example, Md.Ann. Code art. 66B, § 4.01 (b), applicable to non-charter counties. Section 27-
195(c)(I) of the Prince George's County Code constitutes a similar kind of relaxation; it pennits a limited scope of con-
ditional zoning -- generally of the type pennitted by art. 66B, § 4. 01 (b). But § 27-195(c)(2) makes explicit what, in H 
Manny Holtz we found implicit in § 4.01 -- that this limited authority does not allow conditions that prohibit specific 
uses otherwise permitted in the approved zone. 
Section 27-195(c)(2) seemingly addresses one of the concerns about conditional zoning not clearly articulated in 
Baylis, but which we alluded to in H Manny Holtz -- that [HN7] it is inconsistent with the principle that, while zoning 
regulations may vary from one district or classification to another, within a district or classification they should be uni-
form. Conditional zoning tends to destroy that uniformity; it subjects some land within a district or classification to 
restrictions that are not applicable to other land within the same [***25J district or classification and thus tends to cre-
ate [*553] unique mini-districts not provided for in the general zoning ordinance. 
To some extent, of course, this dis-unifonnity may be achieved in other ways -- through variances, special excep-
tions, and, increasingly, through floating or general development zones, such as the E-I-A zone at issue here, and the 
site plan review process that governs development in those [**750J zones. But, in terms of use restriction, those appear 
to be the only methods authorized; permitted uses cannot be excluded by contract with the zoning authority as part of 
the basic rezoning. 
The extent to which this specific prohibition can be circumvented by private agreement is very limited. [HN8J Al-
though there appears to be no impediment to an applicant entering into private covenants with other parties to lessen 
their opposition to an application, or to garner their support for it, such offerings cannot be made to the legislative body 
authorized to grant or deny the application. This was made clear in Mont. Co. v. Nat'l Capital Realty, supra, 267 Md. 
364,297 A.2d 675. There too the applicant, faced with substantial opposition, [***26J offered to enter into certain 
covenants restricting the use of the property to those shown on an attached site plan, contingent on approval of the ap-
plication. The Court saw that for the obvious subterfuge that it was. At 373,297 A.2d 675, it stated: 
"We think it clear that the covenants, coupled with the site plan attached thereto, if adopted as a basis 
for the requested reclassification, would have produced a form of conditional zoning ... , Had the Coun-
cil then granted the application on the strength of the covenants, ... it would have committed what we 
believe would have been a classic illustration of conditional zoning." 
The form here was slightly different -- an amendment to the Basic Plan -- but the effect was precisely the same. 
The applicant was offering a deal to the District Council: in order to induce the Council to approve its application for 
reclassification, the applicant would agree in advance to [*554J exclude from the scope of the approval certain uses 
expressly permitted in the approved zone. Whatever the general right of the applicant to amend the Basic Plan may be, 
that right cannot be exercised in such manner as to [***27] violate the clear restrictions of § 27-195(c)(2). We think 
that what occurred here was no different in either purpose or effect from what was done, and condemned, in Nat'l Capi-
tal Realty. Quite apart from the District Council's failure to articulate specific [mdings and conclusions, its action was 
invalid for this reason as well. 
(6) Conclusion 
As we indicated briefly above, it may well be that the evidence of record can support a decision to reclassify all or 
part of the land to an E-I-A zone. But such a decision must be made without regard to improper conditions and the 
Council will have to comply with the requirements of Md.Ann.Code art. 28, § 8-123 and Prince George's County Code, 
§ 27-141. 
JUDGMENT REVERSED; CASE REMANDED TO CIRCUIT COURT FOR PRINCE GEORGE'S COUNTY 
WITH INSTRUCTIONS TO VACATE ORDER OF DISTRICT COUNCIL AND REMAND TO DISTRICT 
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Sec. 75-3 sets forth the method of en-
fon:ement which includes service of writ-
ten notice by the commissioner of health 
whenever there has been a violation; hear-
ings before the commissioner which can be 
requested by H[a]ny person affected by any 
notice which has been issued in connection 
with the enforcement of any provision of 
this chapter * * * " ; empowering the 
commissioner of health, after a hearing, to 
sustain, modify or withdraw the notice; 
review by the circuit court by certiorari; 
and the power of the commissioner to issue 
subpoenas. In addition, sec. 75-18 sets 
forth penalties, including imprisonment, for 
the violation of any order of the com-
missioner of health based on the provisions 
of sections 75-1 through 75-18. 
These ordinances implement a method of 
enforcement based entirely upon orders 
issued by the commissioner of health. 
Holding that the housing code is implied in 
lease agreements would have more than a 
complementary effect-it would circumvent 
the existing enforcement procedures. In-
stead of the commissioner issuing an order 
to initiate enforcement, a tenant would 
withhold rent and the case would then be 
taken into court by the landlord for eject-
ment, nonpayment of rent, or both. Orders 
would be forthcoming, not from a com-
missioner but from a judge, and judicial 
4. For e:cample, 8ee: New York Real Prop-
erty Actions Law, McKinney Consol.Laws, 
ce. 81, 769 et seq.; Cal.Civ.Code sec. 
1942; N.Dak.Century Code sec. 47-16-
13. Bee also Peters v. Kelly (1968), 98 
N.J. Super. 441, 237 A.2d 635, which dis-
cusses n City of Newark ordinance en-
Some states recognize rent withholding 
in considering the problems of substandard 
housing; however, those states have done 
so by legislation.4 Neither the legislature 
nor the common council of Milwaukee has 
adopted any legislation from which this 
court can infer an intent that rent with-
holding under an oral month-to-month lease 
agreement be utilized as a means of en-
forcing the housing code. 
We are of the opinion that the defendant 
does not have an affirmative defense based 
upon alleged violations of the Milwaukee 
Housing Code; and there was, therefore, 
no prejudicial error committed by the trial 
court in refusing to admit evidence based 
upon that contention. 
Judgment affirmed. 
STATE ex rei. Joseph ZUPANCIC, 
Respondent, 
v. 
Mathias F. SCHIMENZ, Inspector of Build-
ings of the City of Milwaukee, 
et aI., Appellants, 
Sampson Enterprises, Inc., Defenda,nt. 
No. 51. 
Supreme Court of Wisconsin. 
March 3, 1970. 
Landowner's proceeding for mandamus 
to compel city and its building inspector to 
grant building permit to construct car wash. 
acted pursuant to N.J.S.A. 40 :48-2.12a 
et seq. which, inter alia, empowers a di-
rector, with the approval of the municipal 
council, to apply for the appointment of 
R. rent receiver for the purpose of col-
lecting the rents and applying the same 
to required repairs. 
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The city sought by counterclaim to enforce 
a declaration of restrictions and prayed for 
an Injunction. The Circuit Court, Mil-
waukee County, Robert M. Curley, J., dis-
missed the counterclaim and granted a writ 
requiring issuance of the permit, The city 
appealed. The Supreme Court, Hallows, C. 
J., held that a declaration of restrictions 
arising out of negotiations and an agree-
ment between homeowners and developers 
was not an illegal contract to which the 
city was a party merely because only the 
city could enforce restrictions; at most, the 
city was a third-party beneficiary pro-
tecting the public interest, and that the pur-
chase of the land was subject to the re-
corded restrictions and the purchaser ac-
cordingly was not entitled to a building 
permit merely because, after the permit 
was issued and before it was revoked, he 
made a $20,000 down payment on equip-
ment. 
Reversed with directions to deny writ 
and grant injunction enjoining construction 
of building in violation of restrictions. 
I. Municipal Corporations ~591 
Municipality may not surrender its 
g0vernmental powers and functions or thus 
inhibit exercise of its police or legislative 
powers. 
2. Zoning e::>1, 160 
Contract made by zoning authority to 
zone or rezone or not to zone is illegal and 
ordinance is void. 
3. Zoning ~160 
When city itself makes agreement with 
landowner to rezone, this is contract zon-
ing and contract is invalid, but if agreement 
is made by others than city to conform 
property in way or manner which makes 
it acceptable for requested rezoning and 
city is not committed to rezone, it is not 
contract zoning in true sense and is not 
vitiated if otherwise valid. 
4. Zoning e::>160 
"Conditional zoning" properly under-
stood involves only adopted zoning ordi-
nance which provides either that rezoning 
becomes effective immediately with auto-
matic repealer if specified conditions are 
not met within set time limit or that zoning 
becomes effective only upon conditions be-
ing met within time limit. 
See publication Words and Phrases 
for other judicial constructions and 
definitions. 
5. Zoning ~157, 160, 162 
Landowners may make contract which 
may legitimately be recognized by zoning 
authorities as motivation for rezoning, but 
such zoning must meet test of all valid 
zoning, i. e., must be for safety, welfare and 
health of community, and should not con-
stitute spot zoning. W.S.A. 62.23(7). 
6. Zoning e::>35 
Spot zoning is not per se illegal. 
7. Zoning e::>162 
Where rezoning was in public interest 
and not solely for benefit of developer, it 
was not illegal spot zoning. 
8. Zonl ng e::>35 
"Spot zoning" is usually understood 
to be zoning by which small area situated 
in larger zone is purportedly devoted to use 
inconsistent with use to which larger area is 
restricted. 
See publication Words and Phrases 
for other judicial constructions and 
definitions. 
9. Zoning e::>63 
Uniformity provIsIOn of zoning stat-
utes did not require district of any minimum 
size and did not require absolute uniformity 
with other similar districts but only uni-
formity within each district, and required 
reasonable uniformity rather than identical 
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10. Municipal Corporations €=>43 
Declaration of restrictions arising out 
of negotiations and agreement between 
homeowners and developers was not illegal 
contract to which city was party merely be-
cause only city could enforce restrictions; 
at most, city was third-party beneficiary 
protecting public interest. 
II. Zoning cg::::>63 
Flexibility in zoning may be attained 
by use of floating zones or overlay districts 
in zoning ordinances. 
12. Covenants €=>I03(3) 
Where deed restrictions which pre-
vented parcel owner from building car 
wash were of record when he purchased 
parcel, both owner and building inspector 
had constructive knowledge of deed restric-
tions but there was no waiver of enforce-
ment of restrictions by issuance of permit 
to construct car wash where inspector. had 
no authority or intent to waive enforcement. 
13. Covenants €=>103(3) 
Building inspector had no authority to 
waive enforcement of deed restrictions 
which city had power to enforce. 
14. Municipal Corporations €=>621 
Purchase of land was subject to re-
corded restrictions and where city had 
power to enforce same, purchaser was not 
entitled to building permit for violative 
lise merely because, after permit for car 
wash was issued and before it was revoked, 
he made $20,000 down payment on equip-
ment. 
• 
The respondent Joseph Zupancic sought 
a writ of mandamus to require the appel-
lants City of Milwaukee and its building 
inspector Mathias F. Schimenz to grant him 
a building permit to construct a car wash 
in the River Bend Shopping Center in the 
city of Milwaukee. The city defended on 
the ground a declaration of restrictions 
prohibited the use of the property for a car 
wash and on other grounds. It also sought 
in its counterclaim to enforce the restric-
tions and prayed for an injunction. After 
a hearing, the trial court dismissed the 
counterclaim and granted a peremptory writ 
requiring a building permit to be issued. 
The city appeals. 
John J. Fleming, City Atty., Wallace E. 
Zdun, John F. Cook, Asst. City Attys., Mil-
waukee, of counsel, for appellants. 
Peregrine, Schimenz, Marcuvitz & Cam-
eron, Hugh R. Braun, Milwaukee, for re-
spondent. 
HALLOWS, Chief Justice. 
The basic issue before the trial court and 
on this appeal is whether a declaration of 
restrictions limiting the use of the land in-
volved was a part of a contract to rezone 
the property and therefore was invalid. 
On May 11, 1955, the common council of 
the city of Milwaukee approved a plat of 
the River Bend Shopping Center and pro-
vided that any future division of the lots 
would be subject to its approval. Part of 
this area was zoned "neighborhood shop-
ping" and part "local business." In 1961 
the shopping-center developers desired a 
change of zoning from neighborhood shop-
ping to local business for a parcel of land 
210 by 200 feet in order to sell it for use as 
a bowling alley. The request for zoning 
was referred to the city plan commission of 
Milwaukee which held hearings thereon. 
The home owners to the south of this area 
were opposed to the change in zoning but 
not to a bowling alley. When these objec-
tions developed, the matter was laid over 
pending negotiations between the home 
owners and the developers. 
Out of these negotiations arose an agree-
ment that the developers would limit the use 
to a bowling alley of the land to be rezoned. 
A declaration of restrictions was drafted 
which provided that although the parcel 
was zoned local business, the only local 
business use permitted "shall be a bowling 
alley enterprise housed in a building not to 
? '11) I _ 
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exceed 42,000 square feet in area and to in-
clude a restaurant and cocktail lounge." 
Any other use of the land was limited to 
uses permitted under the then neighbor-
hood-shopping zoning. The declaration al-
so provided a buffer planting strip, certain 
structural requirements, the placement of 
air-conditioning equipment, and a fence 
to prevent pedestrian access to the shop-
ping center from Honey Creek Drive on 
the south. The declaration stated the re-
strictions were for the benefit of the city 
of Milwaukee, were to be enforced by the 
city by injunction, were to run with the 
land, and were binding until January 1, 
1982, a period of about 20 years. 
At the meeting before the city plan com-
mission, the attorney for neighbors ex-
pressing concern about the validity of the 
restrictions asked that the declaration be 
submitted to the city attorney for his opin-
ion. And, at the conclusion of the meet-
ing, the city plan commission recommend-
ed the passage of the rezoning ordinance 
which changed the zoning from neighbor-
hood shopping to local business. Two 
days later the declaration of restrictions 
was executed and on the following day the 
staff report of the commission recom-
mending passage was sent to the com-
mittee on streets-zoning of the common 
council. On August 2nd the declaration of 
restrictions was recorded and one week 
later on August 9th the rezoning ordinance 
became effective. 
A few weeks later on August 27th the 
common council by resolution divided a 
plated lot to create the desired parcel for 
the bowling alley. The resolution provided 
that compliance with the restrictions was a 
condition of the division which created from 
the rezoned 21O-by-200-foot area the parcel 
sold for the bowling alley and a surplus 
parcel of land approximately 190 feet north 
and south and 42 feet wide east and west. 
This smaller piece rezoned local business 
and restricted by the declaration became, 
with the land to the west zoned neighbor-
hood shopping, Parcel G which had a front-
age on the north of 107 odd feet and a depth 
varying from 175 to 190 feet to the south. 
On January 1st, 1968, the respondent and 
two others made an offer to purchase Par-
cel G which offer was accepted. The sale 
was conditioned upon the respondent's ob-
taining a permit to build a car wash on the 
east 42 feet of Parcel G zoned local busi-
ness which permitted a car wash. The 
offer to purchase was subject to deed 
restrictions of record. At the time, how-
ever, the respondent did not know of the 
deed restriction which would not permit a 
car wash; and seller did not remember it. 
On February 2d, 1968, the respondent 
applied to the appellant building inspector 
for a building permit to use the east 42 feet 
of Parcel G for a car wash and on February 
21st the permit was issued. Two days later 
the respondent entered into a $66,000 con-
tract to buy car-wash equipment and made 
a down payment of $20,000. About a week 
later on March 4th the building permit was 
revoked because the alderman of the ward 
wanted the common council to restudy the 
zoning of this small piece of land. On 
October 18th, 1968, the common council 
rezoned the east 42 feet of Parcel G from 
local business back to neighborhood shop-
ping upon the recommendation of the city 
plan commission. On November 27, 1968, 
the petition for a writ of mandamus in the 
circuit court was filed. 
The city argues the declaration of restric-
tions is valid because: (1) It is not an in-
cident of a contract for zoning or a con-
dition of rezoning, and (2) this type of con-
tract relating to zoning is not illegal as a 
matter of law. The city urges that for a 
declaration of restrictions to be an incident 
of zoning the municipal body which passes 
the zoning ordinance must be a party to the 
contract to zone and here the common 
council of Milwaukee only acted upon the 
recommendations of the planning commis-
sion. Zupancic argues the declaration ~s 
part of an illegal zoning contract and If 
valid, the city waived its rights to enforce 
the restriction. 
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[1, 2] A contract made by a zoning au- When a zoning authority does not make 
thority to zone or rezone or not to zone is an agreement to zone but is motivated to 
illegal and the ordinance is void because a zone by agreements as to lise of the land 
municipality may not surrender its gov- made by others or by voluntary restrictions 
ernmental powers and functions or thus running with the land although suggested 
inhibit the exercise of its police or legis- by the authority, the zoning ordinance in 
lative powers. 62 c.J.S. Municipal Cor- some jurisdictions is valid and not consid-
porations § 139, p. 281; Baylis v. City of ered to be contract or conditional zoning. 
Baltimore (1959), 219 Md. 164, 148 A.2d The leading case for this view is Church 
429; Midtown Properties, Inc. v. Township v. Town of Islip (1960), 8 N.Y.2d 254, 203 
of Madison (1961), 68 N.J.Super. 197, 172 N.Y.S.2d 866, 168 N.E.2d 680. While this 
A.2d 40, affirmed 78 N.J. Super. 471, 189 case has been criticized, it has in its home 
A.2d 226. See also Trager, Contract Zon- state been followed and expanded. Point 
ing (1963), 23 Md.L.Rev. 121; Comment, Lookout Civic Ass'n et al. v. Town of 
The Use and Abuse of Contract Zoning Hempstead (1960) , 12 A.D.2d 505, 207 N. 
(1965), 12 UCLA L.Rev. 897. In Houston Y.S.2d 121; Longdowd Corp. v. Straight 
Petroleum Co. v. Automotive Products Improvement Co. (1963), 39 Misc.2d 1005, 
Credit Association (1952), 9 N.J. 122, 87 242 N.Y.S.2d 260; Matter of City of New 
A.2d 319, the owner made an agreement York (Rosedale Avenue) (1963), 40 Misc. 
with the city to restrict the use of his land 2d 1076, 243 N.Y.S.2d 814; see also Walus 
if the city rezoned it so long as the rezon- v. Millington (1966), 49 Misc.2d 104, 266 
ing was effective. The court held the N.Y.S.2d 833. 
agreement void because it violated public 
policy. In Baylis the court held an ordi-
nance invalid which rezoned a parcel from 
residential to commercial use on the con-
dition the agreement between the owner 
and the city restricting the parcel to a 
funeral-horne use was executed and re-
corded so as to run with the land. Contract 
zoning is illegal not because of the result 
but because of the method. 
In the instant case, there is no agreement 
with the city. Neither its common council 
nor the city plan commission agreed to re-
zone. The facts give rise to an agree-
ment only between the developers and the 
home owners respecting the use of the prop-
erty if it was rezoned by the city. The 
rezoning per se did not require the con-
ditions demanded by the home owners. 
True, the developers and the home owners 
expected favorable action by the city plan 
commission but this was based on two fac-
tors: (1) No objection to the rezoning 
under the circumstances by the home 
owners, and (2) the proposed rezoning was 
good-land use and consistent with the de-
veloping character of the neighborhood. 
174 N.W.2<1-34V. 
The virtue of allowing private agree-
ments to underlie zoning is the flexibility 
and control of the development given to a 
municipality to meet the ever-increasing 
demands for rezoning in a rapidly chang-
ing area. A quite similar case sustaining 
the validity of such zoning is Sylvania 
Electric Products, Inc. v. City of Newton 
(1962), 344 Mass. 428, 183 N.E.2d 118, 
wherein the court although recognizing 
the close connection existing between vol-
untarily imposed restrictions and a re-
zoning ordinance held the rezoning was 
a legislative act without conditions and 
valid. 
The instant facts find almost their count-
erpart in Bucholz v. City of Omaha (1963), 
174 Neb. 862, 120 N.W.2d 270. The city 
of Omaha rezoned land from residential 
use to a commercial use so the owner 
could develop a shopping center. After 
the rezoning, the city approved a protec-
tive covenant limiting the use to which 
the property could be put. This agreement 
was sustained although the court intimated 
it was willing to strike down contract zon-
ing when the evidence showed a bargain 
f')
q 1 L / t . , 
-. 
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between the applicants and the city. In 
the view of the court the rezoning was 
not the result of an agreement but of as-
surances on the part of the landowner that 
he would restrict his land use if the prop-
erty were rezoned. In Maryland a valid 
distinction is made between cases where 
the contract is made between the developer 
and the zoning authority and cases where 
the contract is made between the developer 
and a city plan committee or a body which 
recommends zoning but does not have the 
authority to zone. City of Greenbelt v. 
Bresler (1967), 248 Md. 210, 236 A.2d 
1; Pressman v. City of Baltimore (1960), 
222 Md. 330, 160 A.2d 379; Town of 
Somerset v. County Council of Montgom-
ery County (1962), 229 Md. 42, 181 A.2d 
671. 
[3,4) We hold that when a city itself 
makes an agreement with a landowner to 
rezone the contract is invalid; this is 
contract zoning. However, when the 
agreement is made by others than the 
city to conform the property in a way 
or manner which makes it acceptable for 
the requested rezoning and the city is 
not committed to. rezone, it is not con-
tract zoning in the true sense and does 
not vitiate the zoning if it is otherwise 
valid. This latter situation is sometimes 
confused with conditional zoning. But 
conditional zoning properly understood in-
volves only an adopted zoning ordinance 
which provides either: (1) The rezoning 
becomes effective immediately with an 
automatic repealer if specified conditions 
are not met, within a set time limit, or 
(2) the zoning becomes effective only 
upon the conditions being met within the 
time limit. See Schaffer, Vol. 11, The 
Practical Lawyer, No.5, p. 43, Contract 
and Conditional Rezoning; 5 McQuillin, 
Municipal Corporations, sec. 15.41. But 
see, 1 Anderson, American Law of Zoning 
(1%8), sees. 820, 8.21. 
Some courts take the view advanced by 
Zupancic that the facts in the instant case 
give rise to a quid pro quo for rezoning al-
though no express contract with the zoning 
authorities can be proved. This "implied 
contract" arises from the fact the connec-
tion between rezoning and the recording 
of restrictions at or soon after the rezoning 
which condition the lands for rezoning and 
motivate the enacting authorities is suffi-
cient to render the rezoning and contract il-
legal. This view rests on a "but for" theory 
of a bargain. 
Rathkopf, in his work on zoning and 
planning, states: 
"Most courts take a practical view of 
such situation and hold that the execu-
tion and filing of such assumption of ad-
ditional restrictions were a quid pro quo 
for the rezoning, i. e., zoning by contract. 
The general rule in these jurisdictions 
in which the validity of such covenants 
has been litigated is that they are illegal. 
The basis of such rule is that the rezoning 
of a particular parcel of land upon condi-
tions not imposed by the zoning ordinance 
generally is the particular district into 
which the land has been rezoned is prima 
facie evidence of "spot zoning" in its 
most maleficent aspect, is not in ac-
cordance with a comprehensive plan and 
is beyond the power of the municipality. 
Legislative bodies must rezone in ac-
cordance with a comprehensive plan, and 
in amending the ordinance so as to confer 
upon a particular parcel a particular dis-
trict designation, it may not curtail or 
limit the uses and structures placed or to 
be placed upon the lands so rezoned dif-
ferently from those permitted upon other 
lands in the same district. Consequently, 
where there has been a concatinated re-
zoning and filing of a 'declaration of re-
strictions' the general view (where the 
question has been litigated) is that both 
the zoning amendment and the restrictive 
covenant are invalid for the reasons ex-
pressed above." Rathkopf, The Law of 
Zoning and Planning, 3rd Ed., Vol. 3, Ch. 
74-9, Deed Covenants and Restrictions-
Effect of Zoning Ordinance. 
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Wis. 539 
While this view of invalidity is taken by 
the courts in New Jersey,l Maryland,2 
Michigan,3 and Florida,' we think this is 
a too rigid view. At the other extreme we 
find State ex reI. Myhre v. City of Spokane 
(1967), 70 Wash.2d 207, 422 P.2d 790, 7%, 
taking the view "a zoning ordinance and 
a concomitant agreement should be declared 
invalid only if it can be shown that there 
was no valid reason for a change and that 
they are clearly arbitrary and unreasonable, 
and have no substantial relation to the 
public health, safety, morals, and general 
welfare, or if the city is using the con-
comitant agreement for bargaining and sale 
to the highest bidder or solely for the bene-
fit of private speculators." See also Hud-
son Oil Co. of Mo. v. City of Wichita 
(1964), 193 Kan. 623, 3% P.2d 27l. 
[5-8] We think landowners may make 
a contract which may legitimately be recog-
nized by the zoning authorities as a motiva-
tion for rezoning but such zoning must meet 
the test of all valid zoning, i. e., must be 
for tlle safety, welfare, health of the com-
munity, sec. 62.23(7), Stats., and it should 
not constitute spot zoning. Spot zoning per 
se is not illegal and we do not consider the 
rezoning in this case to be illegal spot 
zoning because it was in the public interest 
and not solely for the benefit of the de-
veloper. See Boerschinger v. Elkay Enter-
prises, Inc. (1966),32 Wis.2d 168, 145 N.W. 
2d 108; Cushman v. Racine (1967), 39 
Wis.2d 303, 159 N.W.2d 67. Besides, spot 
zoning is usually understood to be zoning 
"by which a small area situated in a larger 
zone is purportedly devoted to a use incon-
sistent with the use to which the larger area 
is restricted." Higbee v. Chicago, B. & Q. 
R. Co. (1940),235 Wis. 91, 292 N.W. 320, 
128 A.L.R. 734. The record does not show 
how the shopping-center area is zoned ex-
cept that part is neighborhood shopping and 
part local business. Without proof we can-
I. Houston Petroleum Co. v. Automotive 
Products Credit Ass'n, Inc. (1952), 9 
N.J. 122, 87 A.2d 319. 
2. Baylis v. City of Baltimore (1959), 219 
Md. 164, 148 A.2d 429. 
not say a .bowling alley-restaurant-cocktail 
lounge complex is inconsistent with a Red 
Owl Store, a gas filling station, and a 
Marc's Big Boy Restaurant in the shopping 
center. 
[9] Zupancic's argument that the zon-
ing violates sec. 62.23(7) (b), Stats., is also 
without merit. This section does not re-
quire a district of any minimum size. The 
uniformity provision does not require ab-
solute uniformity with other similar dis-
tricts but only uniformity within each dis-
trict. This requires reasonable uniformity, 
not identical similarity. 
[10] In recognizing the legality of what 
was done here, we caution that the proce-
dure might well lead to an agreement with 
the zoning authority which might be fatal. 
We do not consider the declaration of re-
strictions, which only the city can enforce, 
makes the city a party to the contract; at 
most, tlle city is a third-party beneficiary 
protecting the public interest. Where the 
imposition of conditions on land develop-
ment is desirable, it might better be done by 
uniform ordinances providing for special 
uses, special exceptions and overlaid dis-
tricts. As stated in Cutler, Zoning Law and 
Practice in Wisconsin, p. 27, sec. 8: "Con-
ditions imposed in such cases have a 
sounder legal basis because guidelines for 
their imposition are spelled out in the or-
dinance." 
[11] The instant case is not in effect 
much different than the cases of gasoline 
filling stations where the ordinance re-
quires special permission for a permit to be 
granted upon the meeting of certain stand-
ards established by a licensing or permit 
agency. See J & N Corp. v. Green Bay 
(1965), 28 Wis2d 583, 137 N.W.2d 434. 
This technique of authorizing in the zoning 
ordinance the plan commission or govern-
3. Sandenburgh v. Michigamme Oil Co. 
(1930), 249 Mich. 372, 228 N.W. 707. 
4. Hartnett v. Austin (1956), Fla., 93 So. 
2d 86. 
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ing body to grant "special uses and condi-
tional uses" on definite standards from the 
automatic permissive uses listed in the 
zoning ordinance is preferable to the meth-
od used in the instant case. The bound-
ary areas of zones generally present 
problems. The technique used in the in-
stant case is an attempt to soften or taper 
the periphery between differing automatic 
uses. Flexibility might also be attained by 
the use of floating zones or overlay dis-
tricts in zoning ordinances. See Cutler, 
supra; Anderson, supra, secs. 5.14-5.16; 
also State ex reI. American Oil Co. v. Bes-
sent (1965), 27 Wis.2d 537, 135 N.W.2d 
317. 
(12,13] Zupancic argues the city has 
waived its right to enforce the restrictions 
on the use of the parcel because it granted 
a building permit and he has changed his 
position relying thereon. At the time the 
permit was granted the deed restrictions 
prohibited Zupancic from building a car 
wash. These restrictions were not waived 
by the building inspector's granting a build-
ing permit in the first instance. The in-
spector had no authority or intention to 
waive enforcement of restrictions to con-
fine the use to a bowling alley or uses per-
mitted by neighborhood shopping for 20 
years. 
[14] It is claimed the building inspector 
should have known and he had constructive 
knowledge of the deed restrictions; but it 
is likewise true that the respondent should 
have known and had constructive knowl-
edge of the deed restrictions. His pur-
chase of the land was subject to recorded 
restrictions. Bump v. Dahl (1965), 26 
Wis.2d 607, 133 N.W.2d 295. Zupancic was 
no more misled by the building inspector's 
action than by his own ignorance and negli-
gence in not ascertaining what restrictions 
were on the land. He has made no im-
provements on the land and is not obligated 
to go through with the purchase if a build-
ing permit is denied him. It is true he made 
a $20,000 down payment on equipment but 
we do not think under the circumstances 
that calls for the issuance of the building 
permit. 
Judgment reversed, with directions to 
deny the peremptory writ and grant an in-
junction enjoining Zupancic from con-
structing any building in violation of the 
terms of the declaration of restrictions. 
AMERY MOTOR CO., Inc., et al., 
Plaintiffs, 
Y. 
Warren W. COREY et al., Defendants and 
Third-Party Plaintiffs-Appellants, 
I ndianhead Truck Line, I nc., Defendant, 
UNLIMITED OPPORTUNITIES, INC., 
Third-Party Defendant-Appellants, 
AGRICULTURAL INS. CO. et al., Third· 
Party Defendant-Respondents. 
Supreme Court of Wisconsin. 
March 6, 1970. 
Personal inj ury and property damage 
actions arising from an explosion and fire 
at a gasoline bulk plant. Owner-lessees. of 
bulk plant brought a third-party action 
against insurers of gasoline transporter al-
leging that they were additional insureds 
under policies. The Circuit Court, Polk 
County, Lewis J. Charles, J., entered judg-
ment for insurers, and owner-lessees ap-
pealed. The Supreme Court, Hallows, C. 
]., held that neither act of owner-lessees of 
bulk plant in furnishing a key to unlock 
pipes to tanks when no employee of pl~nt 
was present nor act of furnishing defectIve 
tanks and storage equipment which led. to 
gasoline explosion while truck belongtng 
to gasoline transporter was being unloaded 
constituted a "use of truck during unload-
i~g -operation" so as to make owner-Iesse~s 
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its product to the plaintiff, in effect has re-
sultcd in the appropriation of plaintiff's 
market for such product in violation of 
the principles of fair dealing which the 
statute was intended to prevent. 
[4] In support of this theory plain-
tiff attempts to read into the statute the ex-
planatory statement of the purpose of the 
legislation which was appended to the bill 
by the sponsor thereof at the time of its 
introduction in the Legislature. This state-
ment related that the purpose of the bill 
was: "* .. .. to insure an equitable basis 
for competition between all licensed whole-
salers of aJ.coholic beverages in N ew Jersey 
and to pre\'ent any monopolistic freezing 
out of one wholesaler by another by pre-
"enting the sale of certain products to 
him." It is well settled, however, that 
such a statement, not being in the nature 
of a preamble to a statute, is "not to be 
considered an index of legislative intent 
in judicial exposition of the enactment." 
Raymond v. Township of Teaneck, 118 
NIL. 109, 191 A. 480, 481, (E. & A. 1936) ; 
Flagg y. Johansen, 124 N.J.L. 456, 459, 12 
A.2d 374 (Sup.Ct. 1940); Keyport & M. 
P. Steamboat Co. v. Farmers Transporta-
tion Co., 18 N.J.Eq. 13, 24 (Ch. 1866), af-
firmed 18 N.J.Eq. at page 511 (E. & A. 
1866); cf. Bass v. AIIen Home Improve-
ment Co., 8 N.J. 219, 84 A.2d 720 (1951). 
namely, that what is prohibited by this 
legislation is an act of arbitrary discrimi-
nation between wholesalers by a distiIler 
in the sale of a nationally advertised prod-
uct and that in order to grant the relief 
provided for, the Director not only must 
find that the complaining wholesaler or 
distributor is able to pay for the product 
ordered but that the distiller's refusal to 
sell to him is discriminatory and arbitrary, 
and the inquiry must be limited solely to 
such considerations. 
[8] Has there be~n such discrimination 
here within the intendment of the statute? 
Vve think not. We see no evidence any-
where in the statute of an intention to pre-
vent a distiller, importer or rectifier from 
seIling its own product directly to re-
tailers if its business policy so dictates, pro-
vided it takes out a wholesale license pur-
suant to RS. 33 :1-2, 9, 11, N.].S.A. In 
the instant case Park & Tilford took out 
such a license, not because it desired to be 
an independent wholesaler, but because it 
could not otherwise, as a distiller, sell· its 
own product directly to retail liquor deal-
ers. 
[9,10] Nor do we find any purpose in 
the statute to prohibit such a producer 
from acting as the exclusive distributor 
or wholesaler of its own products. If a 
contrary purpose were intended it should 
[5,6] In any event, it is the legislative have been clearly expressed and not left 
intent lvhich ultimately controls and we to mere conjecture. "\Ve are enjoined to 
find nObhing in the act, nor for that matter interpret and enforce the legislative will 
in the aforesaid statement, revealing an as written, and not according to some sup-
intent to give to the Director the broad posed unexpressed intention." Camden v. 
sweep of power for which the plaintiff Local Government Board, 127 N.JL. 175, 
contends. The plaintiff, according to his liS, 21 A.2d 292, 294 (Sup.Ct. 1941); 
interpretation of the statute, would have Burnson v. Evans, 137 N.].L. 511, 514, 60 
the Director pass upon purported equitable, A.2d 891 (Sup.Ct. 1948). 
contractual and ethical obligations of the [11] TI f h . .. . 1e apparent scope 0 t e statute 
dIstIller to sell1ts product to vanous whole-. .. b f d' . 
. 111 questton IS to e oun 111 sectlOn 1 
salers and thus confer upon the DIrector th f h' h b "d' .. . . 
a duty and power to regulate the distribu- ereo W IC ars. ISCnm1l1atlOn 111 the 
t · f th d t f b d tl f sale of alcoholtc hquors by distillers, Ion 0 e pro uc ar eyon 1e scope a * * *. . " 
the terms of the statute itself. "of natlOn~lIy advertIsed brands 
[7] What, then, is the scope of the Di-
rector's power? We think the answer is 
to be found in the construction of the 
statute .contended for by the defendant, and 
adopted by the Director in the instant case, 
thereof to duly Itcensed wholesalers of 
alcoholic liquors * * *." Thus it is 
still open to the distiller to sell directly 
to retail dealers if licensed so to do. It 
may, of course, sell indirectly through the 
medium of duly licensed wholesalers, if 
r 
t 
V.F. ZAlIODIAKIN BNG. CORP. v. ZONING BOARD OF' ADJUST. 
Cite as 86 A..2d 127 N.J. 127 
it so chooses, but in the latter event it may the plaintiff's petition (complaint) is ac-
not discriminate between such wholesalers. cordingly affirmed. 
In this view it does not matter that here For affirmance: Chief Justice VAN-
the plaintiff, Hoffman, had developed a DERBILT, and Justices CASE, HEHER, 
market in the area before the distiller took OLIPHANT, WACHENFELD, BURL-
over; that was a matter for contractual ING and ACKERSON_7. 
protection and involves legal or equitable For reversal: None. 
remedies which, under the plain intent of 
the statute, the Director was without au-
thority to apply. 
[12, 13] Therefore, on the record be-
fore us, there was no discrimination within 
the intendment of the statute. The de-
fendant, Park & Tilford, made a policy de-
cision to resume its former practice of 
selling its product directly to retailers and 
eliminating entirely the use of distributors 
or wholesalers in the northern part of the 
State. Accordingly, it terminated the dis-
tributorship which it had given to the 
plaintiff in Hudson County on a trial basis 
and at the same time summarily terminated 
all other distributorships which it had 
created in the northern part of New Jer-
sey. The fact that the distiller, Park & 
Tilford, still operates t11rough wholesalers 
in the southern and. western parts of the 
State, whose authorizations are limited to 
such areas, does not make its action with 
respect to the crowded northern coullties, 
where retailers are closer together, and 
more easily reached, an arbitrary or unfair 
discr,[mination against its former distribu-
tors in suoh counties whose authorizations 
had been confined thereto. 
8 N.J. 386" 
V. F. ZAHODIAKIN ENGINEERING CORI 
v. ZONING BOARD OF ADJUSTMENT 
OF CITY OF SUMMIT et al. 
No. A-55. 
Supreme Court of New Jersey. 
Argued Nov. 26, 1951. 
Decided Jan. 21, 1952. 
PrOCeeding by V. F. Zahodlakln Engineer-
ing Corporation against Zoning Board of Ad-
justment of the City of Summit and another, 
In lieu of certiorari, to review a denial of a 
continuance of a zoning variance theretofore 
granted to plaintiff. The Superior Court, 
Law DiYislon, 14 N.J.Super. 53;, 82 A.2d 
493, entered an adverse judgment, the plain-
tiff appealed to the Superior Court, Appel-
late Division, and the case was certified on 
motion of tlte Supreme Court. The Supreme 
Court, Heher, J., held that the action of tile 
Zoning board of adjustment in granting the 
exceptioll on conditions was coram nOll ju-
dice and '·oid. 
Judgment afilrmed. 
[14] As the Director properly observed, 
we are not concerned here with possible 
remedies, if any, the plaintiff may have re-
lating to fair trade practices or breach of 
contract, our inquiry being limited solely 
to the applicability of the statute in ques-
tion. The arrangement between the parties 
hereto was on a trial basis and if the plain-
tiff desired a more substantial agreement 
to protect his initial investment he should 
have contracted therefor. 
These conclusions render it unnecessary 
to consider the questions raised by the de-
fendant with respect to the constitutionality 
of the aforesaid supplemental statute. 
I. MunIcipal Corporations ~621.14 
Function of statutory variance from 
zoning ordinance is relief against unneces-
sary and unjust invasion of right of private 
property which under special conditions 
and singular circumstances would ensue 
from burden of general rule. L 1949, c. 
242, § 1; RS. 40 :55-39, suM c, N.].S.A. 
, The order of the Director of the Division 
of Alcoholic Beverage Control dismissing 
2. MunicIpal Corporations ~621.40 
Power to authorize statutory variance 
from general regulation of zoning ordi-
nance is power to vary application of gen-
eral regulation to serve statutory policy to 
avoid unjust and unnecessary invasion of 
'128 N.J. 
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10. !\lrunlclpal Corporations <$:::>S2L40 
f'0 , 
'V 
right of private property. L. 1949, c. 242, 
§ 1; RS. 40 :55-39, subd. c, N.J.S.A. 
3. Municipal Corporations ~621.14 
Whatever duration of variance from 
zoning ordinance, whether for definite or 
an indefinite pedod, variance must ex ne-
cessitate be grounded in pelicy of statute. 
L. 1949, c. 242, § 1; RS. 40 :55-39, suoo. 
c, N.J.S.A. 
4. Municipal Corporations ~621.23 
Purported contract between zoning 
board of adjustment and landowner grant-
ing landowner Special privilege or exemp-
tion on condition to use premises under 
variance to general rule as to use restric-
tions binding upon all other landowners 
within zone was ultra vires and all proceed-
ings to effectuate' contract were coram non 
judice and void. L. 1949, c. 242, § 1; RS. 
40 :5S-39,subd. c, N.J.S.A. 
Variant use of property under zoning 
ordinance does not derive validity from 
mere time limitation. 
5. Municipal Corporations ~621.40 
Where zoning board. of adjustment 
made no pretense of adherence to statutory 
principle in granting variance, but intended 
to provide measure of relief outside of 
statute itself and in direct conflict with 
statutory terms, action of quasi judicial 
board of adjustment constituted excess of 
jurisdiction. L. 1949, c. 242, § 1; RS. 40: 
55-39, subd. C, N.J.S.A. 
6. Municipal corporations ~601(3) 
Zoning is exercise of police power to 
serve common good and general welfare. 
II. Municipal Corporations <$:::>621.40 
Where zoning bo-ard of adjustment 
contracted to permit variance on condition, 
which action effectuated contractual under-
taking for private benefit in disregard of 
zoning ordinance, and special hardship from 
unique circumstances within principle of 
statute permitting variance was not deter-
mined, and considerations outside statute 
controlled, proceedings of board did not 
constitute judicial inquiry and adjudication 
within frame of statute. L. 1949, c. 242, 
§ 1; R.S. 40:55-39, suDd. c, N.J.S.A. 
12. Certiorari <$:::>14 
Certiorari affords means of containing 
statutory tribunals within their jurisdiction. 
13. Municipal Carporations ~621.4B, 621.59 
7. Constitutional Law ~50 
Legislative function may not be sur-
rendered or cnrtailed by hargain or its ex-
ercise controlled by considerations which 
enter into law of contraCts. 
Where zoning board of adjustment 
lacked jurisdiction to enter into contract 
granting special exception on condition to 
zoning regulations and action of board did 
not constitute inquiry and adjudication 
within statutory limits, resolution of board 
purporting to authorize exception was ut-
terly void and subject to collateral attack 
at any time as well as direct review within 
time prescribed by law. L. 1949, c. 242, § 
1; R.S. 40 :55-39, subd. c, N.J,S.A. 
B. Municipal corporations ~601(9), 621.21 
Use restriction placed on property 
under zoning regulatio-n must have general 
application and power to grant variance 
may not be exerted to serve private interest 
merel y and requirement that use restric-
ti01.1 have general application to property of 
zoned district may not be subverted to that 
end. 
9. Municipal Corporations ~621.40 
It was not within authority of zoning 
board of adjustment to vest in landowner 
by contract special privilege or exemption 
on condition to use premises in violation 
of general use restriction }1I1der zoning 
regulations binding upon all other land-
owners within zone. L. 1949, c. 242, § 1; 
R.S. 40:55-39, subd. c, N.J.S.A. 
14. Municipal corporations <$=621.12 
Expenditure of moneys by landowner 
to render lands suitable for prohibited use 
does not operate to validate void grant by 
zoning hoard allegedly permitting such use. 
15. Municipal Corporations ~621.13 
Where zoning board of adjustment 
granted exception on certain conditions to 
terms of zoning ordinance and action of 
board was coram non judice and void and 
landowner was presumed to know of in-
V. F. ZAHODIAKIN ENG. CORP. v. ZONING BOARD OP ADJUST, N.J. 129 
Cite as 86 A..Zd 127 
validity of exception when he expended 
money to make lands suitable for prohibited 
use, want of fundamental power by board 
to grant variance could not be indirectly 
supplied by application of doctrine of estop-
pel in pais as elements of estoppel were 
wanting. 
16. Municipal Corporations <$:::>621.13 
Governmental zoning power may not 
be forfeited Iby action of local officers in 
disregard of statute and zoning ordinance. 
L. 1949, C. 242, § 1; R.S. 40 :55-39, subd. 
c, N.J.S.A. 
17. Municipal Corporations <Il=621.12 
Landowner, who contracted with zon-
ing board of adjustment for special exemp-
tion on condition from zoning regulation, 
would be presumed to have known of in-
validity of exception and to have acted at 
his peril. L. 1949, c. 242, § 1; RS. 40: 
55-39, subd. c, N.J.S.A. 
mit adopted June! 16, 1942 and July 7, 
1942 on the recommendation of the local 
board of adjustment, purporting to grant 
on certain terms and conditions an "excep-
tion" to the terms of the local zoning ord-
inance fOr the use of part of plaintiff's lands 
and the buildings thereon, remooeled or 
reconstructed as therein particularized, for 
the "proonction, finishing and assembling" 
of "small mechanical precision devices and 
instruments~ and the associated lahoratory 
for research and experimental purposes, 
and affirming <11e action of the local board 
of adjustment taken February 20, 1951 
refusing a continuance of the exception for 
this industrial use on the grounds (a) that 
such use "would be substantially detrimental 
to the public good and would impair the 
intent and purpose" of the local "zone plan 
and zoning ordinance," and (b) there was 
no showing of undue hardship. 
lB. Municipal Corporations <$:::>621.25 
Where landowner, who obtained special 
exception on condition from zoning regula-
tions, agreed that in event of sale or trans-
fer of lands to other than certain named 
parties or discontinuance of 'Permitted use 
subject to renewal by board of adjustment, 
exception should be automatically terminat-
ed, and landowner discontinued use, merely 
because refusal of extension of exception 
would prevent advantageous sale by land-
owner, refusal of extension was not arbi-
trary exercise of discretion by board. 
Stanley W. Greenfield, Elizabeth, argued 
the cause for appellant. 
Fred A. Lorentz, Newark, argued the 
cause for respondent (Peter C. Triolo, 
Summit, attorney). 
The opinion of the court was delivered by 
HEHER, J. 
The plaintiff landowner complains of the 
judgment of the Superior Court, in a civil 
proceeding at law in lieu of certiol·(J.I'i pUr-
suant to Rule 3 :81-2 of this court, adjudg-
ing as ultra. vires and void two resolutions 
of the governing body of the City of Sum-
86 A.2d-9 
The case is here by certification on our 
own motion of an appeal taken by plaintiff 
to the Appellate Division of the Superior 
Court. 
The locus comprises ill excess of 15 acres 
of land situate at the southwest corner of 
the Morris and Essex Turnpike and River 
Road in the City of Summit, bounded on 
the west Iby the Passaic River, in an "A-10 
Residential Zone" delineated by the local 
zoning ordinance for single-family dwell-
ings. The application for the exception 
was made by plaintiff, but titl e to the lands 
was not taken until June 25, 1942, presum-
ably under a contract of sale whose con-
summation was conditioned upen the prior 
allowance of a variance or exception in the 
terms indicated. The exception was con-
ditioned thus: "In the event of the bank-
ruptcy or judicial determination of insol-
vency of the grantee, or the sale or transfer 
of the premises to any person other than 
the present stockholders of the grantee, 
their personal representatives, heirs at law 
and next of kin, legatees and devisees or a 
transferee by operation of law," or "in the 
event that use of the premises for the labo-
ratory and business activities of the grantee 
as described a:bove or such future labora-
tory and business activities as may be ne-
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the right to use the premises for the non-
residential purposes set forth in this para-
graph shall terminate; provided, however, 
that such use may be continued thereafter 
copy of a deed of conveyance of the lands 
to plaintiff "embodying the foregoing cov-
enants and restrictions," and that it be re-
quired that the property "be landscaped and 
maintaine<i as a. park, as agreed by" plain-
tiff. The governing body, by resolution 
adopted June 16, 1942, approved the rec-
ommendation of an exception to plaintiff 
thus made "subject to limitations, restric-
tions and agreements" as therein set down. 
The resolution of July 7 ensuing approved 
an amendment recommended by the board 
of adjustment to provide for the incorpora-
tion of the foregoing terms and conditions 
in the deed of conveyance as "covenants 
and restrictions," an<i for the landscaping 
and maintenance of the "property ... * * 
in such a way as to give it the appearance 
of a private park," in keeping with plain-
tiff's undertaking. The conveyance to 
plaintiff was conditioned accordingly. 
to the extent, in the manner and for the 
period authorized by" the local board of 
adj ustment "in its discretion, reasonably 
exercised, and may be continued without 
such authorization if the premises are at 
that time situated in a district designated 
by" the zoning ordinance "as a business or 
industrial district." There were require-
ments that the plaintiff corporation or the 
"occupant of the p, emises," as the case 
may be, submit to the local board of adjust-
ment written bi-annual reports "describing 
the nature of its business and industrial 
operations on" the premises "and certi fy-
ing * * * that the foregoing restrictions 
and limitations are being adhered to," and 
also that the deed of conveyance to the 
plaintiff corporation thereafter to be made 
contain the foregoing conditions as coven-
ants and agreements ;by the grantee, for 
itself, its successors and assigns, "and for 
the benefit of the grantor, the City of Sum-
mit, N ew Jersey, the owners of residential 
properties abutting the premises and neigh-
boring residential properties, situated in the 
area of Summit, New Jersey, known as the 
'Canoe Brook Parkway' area, their heirs, 
personal representatives, successors and 
assigns;" also these further conditions: 
that for a period of 20 years from the date 
of the delivery of the deed of cOlFcyance 
to the plaintiff corporation, except as pro-
vided in the granted exception, no building 
then on the premises or thereafter erected 
thereon shall be used for any purpose other 
than as a detached one-family private resi-
dence or as a garage used in connection 
with such residence; and that in case of 
subdivision the lots and buildings shall meet 
the minima as to size and floor area therein 
prescribed, and no building or structure 
shall ,be ere·cted on the premises "within 
200 feet easterly of the east bank of the 
Passaic River" without the written approval 
of the board of adjustment. The board of 
adjustment also recommended that no build-
ing permit be issued to plaintiff until there 
was filed with the city derk a certified 
The grava-nen of the complaint is that, 
in reliance upon the "variance" so pro-
vided, plaintiff acquired title to the lands, 
and thereafter, in 1943, under permits 
issued by the local authority, erected a 
brick building thereon "especially designed 
for its laboratory, industrial and manufac-
turing purposes" and a building providing 
facilities for its employees, and has since 
made such use of the premises, amI the 
refusal of a continuance of the Val ;ance 
would defeat an advantageous sale of the 
lands presently made by plaintiff condition-
~d upon its continuance and in the circum-
stances is capricious, arbitrary and unrea-
sonable. One of the conditions attached 
to the variance is in part a restraint upon 
alienation; and its excision is prayed 011 
that account. The City of Summit was 
given leave to intervene as a party defend-
ant. The board of adjustment and the city 
each filed an answer and counterclaim 
praying that the resoilltion of the board of 
adjustment purporting to grant the variance 
in qnestion and the approving resolutions 
of the governing body be adjudged null and 
void as excesses of power, and, at all 
events, that the variance be adjudged ter-
minated by reason of the discontinuance 
on January I, 1950, of plaintiff's "industrial 
and business activities" on the premises, a.nd 
V. r. ZAHODIAKIN ENG. OORP. v. ZONING BOARD OF, ADJUST. 
Cite as 8'6 A.2d 127 
N.J. 131 
for violations of the conditions in certain 
particulars which need not be stated. The 
cessation of the permitted variant use is 
established ;by the proofs. Indeed, that 
seems to be conceded. Plaintiff had more 
than 200 employees in the prosecution of 
the enterprise at the time of the grant of 
the variance, but only three or four in May, 
1950 and thereafter. Manufacturing was 
discontinued. 
The mere recital of the circumstances 
demonstrates the vice of the purported ex-
ception cited by the landowner. The ac-
tion thus taken was COra11t IW,. ju.dice and 
void. The local authority di<i not under-
take to grant a variance from the terms 
of the ordinance grounded in the statutory 
consideration of "unnecessary hardship," 
or an exception according to a standard 
set by the ordinance in keeping with the 
statutory policy (e. g. Schnell v. Township 
Committee of Ocean, 120 N.J.L. 194, 198 
A. 759 (Sup.Ct. 1938)), but rather to confer 
an exception extra the statute and the ordi-
nance to serve the interests of the land 
owner in matters foreign to the principle 
and policy of zoning as declared by the 
statute and invoked thy the ordinance. The 
action constituted a special exemption from 
the operation of the zoning regulation for 
a limited period pursuant to an agreement 
made between plaintiff and the local au-
thority prior to the conveyance of the lands 
under the cited contract providing for a 
transfer of the title only in the event of the 
grant of a variance permitting the forbid-
den use. There was no finding of undue 
hardship. Indeed, the action under review 
was not professed to be an exercise of the 
statutory power to authorize a variance 
from the general regulation where, due to 
"special conditions a literal enforcement 
of the zoning ordinance would result in 
unnecessary hardship." R.S. 40 :55-39, c,l 
N.J.S.A. 
[1-5J The function of the statutory 
variance is relief against the unnecessary 
and unjust invasion of the right of private 
property which under the special condi-
I. The present pl'o;ision is designed to re-
lieve against "peculiar and exceptional 
tions and singular circumstances would 
ensue from the burden of the general rule. 
The power is to vary in such circumstances 
the application of the general regulation to 
serve the statutory policy. Brandon v. 
Montclair, 124 N.J.L. 135, 11 A.2d 304 
(Sup.Ct. 1940), affirmed 125 N.J.L. 367, 15 
A.2d 598 (E. & A. 1940); Potts v. Board 
of Adjustment of Princeton, 133 N.J.L. 
230,43 A.2d 850 (Sup.Ct. 1945). Whatever 
the duration of the variance, whether for a 
definite or an indefinite period, it must ex 
necessitate be grounded in the policy of the 
statute. It is axiomatic that a variant 
does not derive validity from a mere 
limitation. Lynch v. Hillsdale, 136 N. 
129, 54 A.2d 723 (Sup.Ct. 1947), affirmed 
137 N.J.L. 280, 59 A.2d 622 (E. & A. 
1948); Berdan v. City of Paterson, 1 N. 
J. 199,62 A.2d 680 (19+9). Where, as here, 
there is no pretense of adherence to the 
statutory principle, but a design to provide 
a measure of relief outside of the statute 
itself and in direct conflict with its terms, 
the action of the qll.(!si-judicial agency con-
stitutes an excess of jurisdiction. 
[6-10] Zoning is an exercise of the 
police power to serve the common good and 
general welfare. It is elementary that the 
legislative function may not be surrendered 
or curtailed by bargain or its exercise con-
trolled by the considerations which enter 
into the law of contracts. The use restric-
tion must needs have general applicatic 
The power may not be exerted to serve 
vate interests merely, nor may the 
pie be subverted to that end. Brandon v. 
Montclair, supra; Appley v. Township 
Committee of the T01.\'11ship of Bernards, 
128 N.J,L. 195,24 A,2d B05 (Sup.Ct. 1942), 
affirmed 129 N.J.L. 73, 28 A.2d 177 (E. & 
A. 1942); CoIl ins v. Board of Adjust-
ment of Margate City, 3 N.J. 200, 69 A.2d 
708 (1949); Speakman v. Mayor and 
Council of North Plainfield, 8 N.J. 250, 84 
A.2d 715 (1951). It was not within the 
province of the local authori ty here to vest 
in the landowner by contract a special priv-
ilege or exemption to use its premises in 
practical difficulties" and "exceptional and 
undue hardship". L.1949, c. 242, p. 779. 
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violation of the general rule binding upon 
all other landowners within the zone. 
Lynch v. Hillsdale, cited supra; Beckman 
v. Township of Teaneck, 6 N.J. 530, 79 A. 
2d 301 (1951). The purported contract was 
"lI.ra vires and alI proceedings to effectuate 
it were coram lion judice and utterly void. 
Bauer v. City of Newark, 7 N.J. 426, 81 A. 
2d 727 (1951). 
licers in disregard of the statute and the· 
ordinance. The public has an interest in 
zoning that cannot thus be set at naught. 
The plaintiff landowner is presumed to-
have known of the invalidity of the excep-
tion and to have acted at his periJ. 
[11,12] Here, the action taken was not 
a mere irregular exercise of the quasi-
judicial function residing in the local au-
thority. The proceeding was wholly be-
yond the statute. It was not designed to 
advance the statutory policy, but to ef-
fectuate a contractual undertaking for pri-
vate benefit in disregard of it. It consti-
tuted an arrogation of authority in de-
fiance of the statute and the ordinance. 
Special hardship from unique circum-
stances within the principle of the statute 
and the ordinance was concededly not a 
point of inquiry. Considerations dehors 
the statute controlled. There was no pre-
tense of the exercise of the statutory func-
tion. Whim and caprice rather than the 
reason and spirit of the statute determined 
the course taken. There was a deliberate 
breach of jurisdiction. The proceeding did 
not constitute a judicial inquiry and ad-
judication within the frame of the statute. 
Compare Hen dey v. Ackerman, 103 N.J.L. 
305, 136 A. 733 (Sup.Ct. 1927); Petersen 
v. Falzarano, 6 N.J. 447, 79 A.2d 50 (1951). 
Certiorari affords the means of containing 
statutory tribunals within their jurisdic-
tion. 
[13-17] Thus, for want of jurisdiction 
Df the subject matter, the resolution pur-
porting to authorize the exception was ut-
:erly void and subject to colIateral attack 
it any time as well as a direct review with-
.n the time prescribed by law. It is a corol-
ary to this that the expenditure of moneys 
.0 render the lands suitable for the pro-
libited use does not operate to validate the 
'oid grant. The w.ant of fundamental 
lower cannot be indirectly supplied by the 
. pplication of the doctrine of estoppel in 
'a·is. The elements of estoppel are want-
l1g. The governmental zoning power may 
.ot be forfeited by the action of local of-
[18] Even under the purported excep-
tion, the landowner cannot complain on 
this score. As we have seen, it was agreed 
tha.t in the event of the sale or tnnsfer of 
the lands other than to a stockholder of the 
plaintiff corporation, or the legal represen-
tatives of a stockholder, or a transfer by 
operation of la.w, or the discontinuance of 
the permitted use on the lands, the excep-
tion should automatically terminate, sub-
ject to renewal by the board of adjustment 
"to the extent, in the manner and for the 
period authorized" by the board "in its 
discretion, reasonably exercised." In the 
circumstances, the refusal of an extension 
of the exception cannot be said to be an ar-
bitrary exercise of discretion. The pro-
viso, related to the contextual design even-
tually to restore the residential character of 
the area, contemplated a temporary rather 
than an indefinite continuance during the 
subsistence of the general rule; and it 
would seem, according to the letter, that 
once an extension was granted, however 
short the period, the power would be ex-
hausted. And the use itself was also made 
subject to modification. There is no 'basis, 
not even the slightest, for branding the ac-
tion as capricious. It is of no moment that 
the lands will bring a substantially greater 
price if the non-conforming use be con-
tinued. The landowner was well aware of 
the limitations of the exception. I.t did not 
improve the lands on the faith of a promise 
by the municipality to prolong the excep-
tion in the event of a sale. Quite the con-
trary. The plant was organized to supply 
the Navy with mechanical devices and in-
struments during World War II Pre-
sumably, the business was capitalized on 
the basis of this limited user-so long as 
plaintiff retained ownership and devoted 
the lands to the stated use . 
It suffices to add that the application for 
a continuance of the variance was ground-
ed, not in the statutory principle of un-
SCHLICHTING v. WINTER N. J. 133 
Cite as 86 A.2d 133 
necessary hardship, but rather in the agree- 4. InJunction <$=>58 
ment embodied in the original resolution Where right of a complainant to relief 
and the covenants and conditions of the by enforcement of a restrictive covenant 
subsequent deed of convey·ance. is doubtful, an injunction to restrain vio-
The judgment is affirmed. lation of covenant will be denied. 
For affirmance: Chief Justice VAN-
DERBILT and Justices CASE, HEHER, 
OLIPHANT, WACHENFELD, BUR-
LING and ACKERSON-7. 
For reversal: None. 
1/ N.J. Super. 395 
SCHLICHTING v. WINTER et al. 
No. C-136. 
SUperior Court of New Jersey 
Chancery Division. 
Jan. 8, 1952. 
Charles B. Schlichting brought action 
against Myrtle E, Winter and George P. 
Winter to enjoin alleged violation of restrie-
ti ve covenant. The Superior Court, Chan. 
cery Division, Grimshaw, J. S. C., held that 
violation by plaintiff of the very covenant 
which he sought to have enforced against 
defendants, was sufficient ground for deny-
ing relief sought by plalntiff. 
Complaint dismissed. 
I. Injunction <$=>109 
The violation by plaintiff of the very 
restrictive covenant which he sought to 
have enforced against defendants, was of 
itself sufficient ground for denying injunc-
tive relief to enjoin defendants from violat-
ing the restrictive covenant. 
2. Covenants e=>51(2) 
Restrictive covenant against erection 
of a builDing within 35 feet of front or 
street line of realty, did not apply to line 
of street at side of Corner lot in addition 
to line of street on which the lot fronted. 
3. Injunction <$=>62(1) 
Equity will not aid one person to re-
strict another person in uses to which he 
may lawfully put his realty, unless the right 
to snch aid is clear. 
Joseph H. Galldielle, Hackensack, for 
plaintiff. 
Sidney Cohn, Palisades Park, for de-
fendants. 
GRIMSHA W, J. s. C. 
This matter was before me on an ap-
plication for an interlocutory injunction. 
In the memorandum filed at that time 15 
N.J.Super. 600, 83 A.2d 807, most of the 
essential facts of the controversy were set 
forth. I found that the plaintiff had failed 
to establish the existence of a neighborhood 
scheme of development and that his right 
to relief was based upon his position as a 
subsequent grantee from the common 
grantor. 
(1] At the final hearing it appeared 
that the plaintiff Schlichting had violated 
the very covenant which he seeks to have 
enforced against the defendants. This of 
itself is sufficient ground for denying the 
relief which he seeks. DeGray v. Mon-
mouth Beach allb House Co., 50 N.}.Eq. 
329, 24 A. 388 (Ch. 1892); Roberts v. 
Scull, 58 N.}.Eq. 396,43 A. 583 (Ch. 1899). 
[2] There is, however, a further point 
which requires comment at this time. In 
the memorandum filed in connection with 
the application for an interlocutory injunc-
tion, on the authority of Waters v. Collins, 
70 A. 984 eCho 1895), affirmed without 
opinion by the Court of Errors and Ap-
peals, I held that a restriction against the 
erection of a building within 35 feet of the 
front or street line of the property, in-
cluded, in the case of a corner lot, the line 
of the street at the side of the lot as weI! 
as the line of the street on which the lot 
fronted. After further consideration, I am 
now of the opinion that that conclusion 
was erroneous. Were it not for the fact 
that the defendants' lot is on a corner, there 
would be no difficulty. Defendants' lot 
fronts on Broad A venue and, under the re-
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What they need, if they are to prevail, is for us to rewrite the 
, contract so that the town will agree to exempt the subject land from 
any subsequent zoning legislation changing a multi-family dwelling 
from a permissible to a conditionally permissible use in any and all R·3 
residential zones in the town. But nothing either in the record before 
us or in plaintiffs' arguments suggests that the addition of such a 
provision is "indispensable to effectuate the intention of the parties," 4 
Williston Contracts § 610B at 533 (3d edt 1961); accord, Adkins v. 
Adams, 152 F.2d 489, 492 (7th Cir. 1945); Marini v. Ireland, 56 N.J. 
130, 143, 265 A.2d 526, 533 (1970), or that it was omitted by reason of 
sheer inadvertence or because it was so obvious as to need no expres-
sion. And without that kind of showing we are unwarranted in impos-
ing a contractual obligation upon the town by implication. Refinery 
Employees' Union V. Continental Oil Co., 160 F.Supp. 723, 731 
(W.n.La. 1958); Lippman v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 44 Cal.2d 136, 280 
P.2d 775 (955); Bromer v. Florida Power & Light Co., 45 So.2d 658 
(Fla.19S0); Palisades Properties, Inc. v. Brunetti, 44 NJ. 117, 130, 207 
A.2d 522, 531 (1965). 
This is not to say that in an appropriate case we might not read into 
a contract a provision which, although not expressed within the four 
corners of the document, was nonetheless obviously contemplated by 
the parties when they made their bargain and is necessary to carry their 
intentions into effect. In that situation, and subject to the parol 
evidence strictures described in Golden Gate Corp. v. Barrington 
College, 98 R.L 35, 199 A.2d 586 (1964), it is sometimes permissible 
to remedy an inadvertent and clearly apparent omission by reading into 
an otherwise integrated written contract what must have been intended 
if the writing is to reflect the entire agreement of the parties. Myron V. 
Union R.R., 19 R.1. 125,32 A. 165 (l895). But that is impermissible in 
this case. 
The conclusion we reach makes it unnecessary for us to consider 
plaintiffs' further contentions that the February 1970 amendment to the 
Westerly zoning ordinance impaired the obligations of their contract in 
violation of art. 1, sec. 10 of the Federal Constitution, or that the town 
should be estopped from contesting the validity of what under our 
decision is a nonexistent provision of the May 1968 agreement. 
The plaintiffs' appeal is denied and dismissed and the judgment 
appealed from is affirmed. 







VALIDITY, CONSTRUCfION, AND EFFECT OF AGREEMENT 
TO REZONE, OR AMENDMENT TO ZONING ORDINANCE, 
CREATING SPECIAL RESTRICTIONS OR CONDITIONS NOT 
APPLICABLE TO OTHER PROPERTY SIMILARLY ZONED 
by 
James D. Lawlor,J.D. 
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§ 2[b] REZONING-SPECIAL RESTRICTIONS 
70 ALR3d 125 
70 ALR3d 
adopted ordinance as permissible 
upon stated criteria after approval by 
the local governing body. Such 
amendments may be adopted only if 
development at the proposed location 
is essential or especially appropriate 
in view of the available alternatives 
within or without the jurisdiction, or 
the development is development of 
regional benefit, or could have been 
granted a special permit, or there was 
a mistake in the original ordinance in 
regard to the property.47 The result of 
these provisions, taken together, 
would seem to be to make small-area 
rezoning, or rezoning at the request 
of the developer generally, more diffi-
cult to obtain. 
II. Agreements 
A. Validity 
§ 3. Contracting away governmental 
powers 
[a] Held valid 
In the following case, an agreement 
between property owners and a city 
in which the property owners agreed 
to dedicate portions of their lands for 
a street system in return for the city's 
rezoning their property for commer-
cial use was held valid, the court 
stating that an agreement concomi-
tant to a rezoning should be held 
invalid only if it could be shown that 
there was no valid reason for a 
change. 
. tural, a street system' would be re-
quired for the internal circulation of 
traffic, and that to facilitate the estab-
lishment of such a street system they 
would deed and dedicate such por-
tion or portions of their property as 
necessary for the establishment of 
such streets, to the city for street and 
highway purposes when requested to 
do so, provided that the area was 
rezoned to medium commercial uses, 
the court affirming a decree ordering 
a defendant landowner to specifically 
perform his agreement to convey cer-
tain of his property for street pur-
poses to the city. The court said that 
the findings of fact of the lower court 
showed that the property owners,. in-
cluding the defendant, were desirous 
of rezoning their unimproved prop-
erty from agricultural to medium 
commercial, a rezoning consistent 
with the comprehensive plan previ-
ously adopted by the city, and that 
the city, after the signing but prior to 
the filing of the rezoning petition by 
the landowners, insisted that as a 
condition of rezoning, the owners 
agree to the city's proposed street 
system plan and further agree, upon 
the city's request, to deed and dedi-
cate certain of their lands to the city 
to help put the plan into effect. The 
agreement in form did not expressly 
require the city to rezone, however, 
nor provide as to how and when the 
street improvements would be in-
stalled and at whose expense. The In Redmond v Kezner (1973) 10 
Wash App 332, 517 P2d 625, the 
court held valid an agreement be-
tween several property owners and 
the city in which the property owners 
agreed that in order to facilitate com-
mercial development of their land, 
which was at the time zoned agricul-
agreement, including the owner's ob-
ligations as set forth therein, was, 
however, expressly conditioned upon 
the area being rezoned. The court 
declared that the agreement concomi-
tant with the rezoning in the case 
before it was one to neutralize any 
possible negative impact of the pro-
posed use of the property, rather 
than one seeking to extract some col-
47. Model Land Development Code, 
Proposed Official Draft No. I, § 2-312. 
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lateral benefit from the property 
owner. As such, the court declared 
that an amendment to a zoning ordi-
nance and a concomitant agreement 
should be declared invalid only if it 
can be shown that there was no valid 
reason for a change and that they 
were clearly arbitrary and unreasona-
ble, or if the city was using the con-
comitant agreement for bargaining 
and sale to the highest bidder." 
[b] Held invalid 
In the following cases, agreements 
to rezone property were held invalid 
as attempts to illegally contract away 
the zoning authority's governmental 
powers. 
An agreement to rezone condi-
tioned upon the landowner's acquies-
cence in certain restrictive covenants 
was held invalid and thus unenforcea-
ble in Houston Petroleum Co. v Au-
tomotive Products Credit Ass'n 
(1952) 9 NJ 122, 87 A2d 319, the 
court reversing an intermediate ap-
pellate decision and reinstating the 
trial court's judgment dismissing a 
complaint seeking to enforce the re-
strictive covenant by if1junction. The 
common grantor of both plaintiff and 
defendant had entered into an agree-
ment with the city in 1947, whereby 
in return for the city's reclassifying 
the premises from a zoning classifica-
tion unstated in the agreement to a 
light industrial district, the grantor 
would make the land subject to cove-
nants and restrictions, including a 75-
foot setback from the highway, and a 
provision that the setback area be 
seeded and suitably planted, except-
ing such part of the area, not to 
exceed 50 percent, as should be con-
structed for driveways and parking 
space. The agreement also provided 
that the covenants and restrictions 
48. Here, the court is applying the 
reasoning of State ex reI. Myhre v Spo-
were to continue in effect so long as 
the premises remained so zoned or 
until 1977, provided that the cove-
nants might be released or modified 
at any time by an agreement between 
the city and the owner or owners of 
all or portions of the premises. Sub-
sequently, an owner of the tract 
agreed with the city to modify the 
agreement as to 300 feet of the front-
age on the state highway so as 
relieve that portion of the trae 
setback and seeding and 
strictions. Still later, the 
tion of the tract plus another 
subject to the restrictions was con-
veyed to the petroleum company, 
while an unreleased portion of the 
tract was conveyed to the credit asso-
ciation. Nevertheless, a building per-
mit was issued to the association for 
the construction of a gasoline service 
station in conformity with plans show-
ing that the credit association in-
tended to seed and plant less than 10 
percent of the land area in the set-
back area, and to pave the balance of 
the setback area, in violation of the 
covenants and restrictions of record. 
Among other objections to the com-
plaint seeking if1junction, the credit 
association asserted that the cove-
nants were unenforceable 
they were an illegal contract 
city. The court noted at the 
its discussion that it was clear 
the evidence introduced at the trial 
that the rezoning was effected 011 
consideration of the making of thf 
agreement for restrictive covenants 
The court pointed out that it hac 
previously held that the zoning powel 
may not be exerted to serve privatI 
interests merely, nor may the princi 
pie be subverted to that end, so tha 
a purported contract so made wa 
kane (1967) 70 Wash 2d 207, 422 P2, 
790, infra § 12[a]. 
13 
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ultra vires and all proceedings to ef-
fectuate it were utterly void. A munic-
ipality cannot act as an individual 
does, the court said. It must proceed 
in conformity with the statutes, or in 
the absence of statute, agreeably to 
the common law, by ordinance or 
resolution or motion, the court ex-
plained. Contracts thus have no place 
in a zoning plan, the court said, and a 
contract between a municipality and a 
property owner should not enter into 
the enactment or enforcement of zon-
ing regulations. The court pointed 
out that the covenants in question not 
only were imposed on the land for 
the purpose of obtaining its rezoning, 
but were themselves limited in dura-
tion to the period of time during 
which the premises remained zoned 
for light industry, so that they seemed 
related not to the benefit of individ-
ual portions of the tract, but to zon-
ing for the entire tract. In addition, 
the couit noted that the recorded 
agreement provided for release or 
modification of the covenants at any 
time by an agreement to which the 
city was made a necessary party, a 
provision again referable to· zoning. 
Thus, it could be concluded, the 
court said, that the covenants in 
themselves exhibited a plan in contra-
vention of the public policy incorpo-
rated in the constitutional and statu-
tory provisions relating to zoning. 
Such a contract, the court concluded, 
being violative of the public policy of 





An agreement providing for rezon-
ing and subdivision of property in 
return for the developer's agreement 
to certain conditions was held invalid 
in Midtown Properties, Inc. v Madi-
son (1961) 68 NJ Super 197,172 
A2d 40, affd 78 NJ Super 471, 189 
A2d 226, the court denying a motion 
to specifically enforce a previously 
140 
entered consent judgment embodying 
the terms of the contract. The land in 
question comprised about 1,475 acres 
of land in the township, which com-
prised about 40.2 square miles. Previ-
ously, the landowner had applied to 
the planning board for subdivision of 
its entire tract, which application was 
approved by the planning board and 
the township committee upon compli-
ance with certain conditions pertain-
ing to sewage, roads, and in addition, 
that the developer furnish land and 
certain school facilities to the town. 
Subsequently, the township changed 
its ordinance governing lot sizes to 
increase the size of lots in the area in 
which the developer's lands were lo-
cated, and final approval of some 129 
lots was denied on the ground that 
the developer had failed to meet the 
conditions concerning the furnishing 
of school facilities and sewage re-
quirements. The developer filed suit 
to compel final approval of the lots in 
question, but this action was not 
tried, the developer and the town 
instead entering into a written con-
tract setting forth the terms under 
which the developer could proceed 
with his development. This contract 
became the basis on which a consent 
judgment was entered, and in reliance 
upon which the developer spent ap-
proximately $200,000 to redesign its 
development, mostly in engineering 
fees. At that point, when the develop-
ment plat was filed for final approval, 
the planning board and the township 
committee refused to grant final ap-
proval on the ground that the consent 
judgment was illegal and void. The 
contract between the town and the 
developer bound the developer either 
to pay certain moneys or to erect a 
certain number of schoolrooms for 
the board of education, not to erect 
more than 1,350 homes in one year, 
and to donate to the township two 
70 ALR3d REZONING-SPECIAL RESTRICTIONS § 3tb1 
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locations for the erection of fire- which destroyed the master plan and 
houses, police stations, and first aid resulted in haphazard or piecemeal 
squads. In return, the town agreed zoning; the township surrendered its 
that the terms of the contract were to inherent power, right, and duty to 
constitute the approved subdivision keep its zoning and planning ordi-
plan, and that the township would nances mutable by making necessary 
adopt in the future the necessary or- amendments or changes for the ben-
dinances to implement and conform efit of the public; the township cast 
to the contract and legalize the au tho- aside the statutory and ardinance re-
rized uses, that the township would quirements applicable to all persons, 
designate certain areas within the in order to make a special deal with 
tract as residential, certain areas for the plaintiff; the parties to the con-
garden apartments, certain areas for tract attempted to create special zon-
light and heavy industry, and certain ing benefits for the developer con-
areas for commercial uses, that the trary to law and the public good; and 
procedure for obtaining final ap- the contract recited that the township 
pro val for the plat was that set forth had passed appropriate resolutions 
in the contract, the developer being authorizing the making of a contract 
required only to comply with existing when in fact no such resolution had 
township ordinances and planning been adopted. The court observed 
board regulations. that the town that the zoning power is an exercise 
would not pass any regulations or of police power which the state has 
ordinances in any way changing the granted to all municipalities, but 
terms of the contract, nor would it which must be exercised in a reasona-
change the building code require- ble manner and not arbitrarily, dis-
ments, that to the extent that the criminatorily, or capriciously. Further. 
contract was in conflict with any stat- more, the court said that the zoning 
ute, rule. ordinance, or regulation, power must be exercised so as to 
the contract would govern. that the secure the public health, safety, mor-
town would be bound by the contract als, and welfare. In exercising the 
for a period of 7 years, and would not power delegated to a municipality. it 
amend or change any of its ordi- must act within such delegated power 
nances or regulations in that period and cannot go beyond it, the court 
of time, and that the contract would noted. So, the court said, where the 
take the place of the statutory tenta- statute sets forth the procedure to be 
tive approval. The court declared that followed, no governing body or sub-
the agreement was illegal and void on division thereof has the power to 
its face, as an intent to do by contract adopt any other method of proce-
what could only be done by following dure. The contract in question was an 
statutory procedure. The court casti- attempt to subdivide the developer's 
gated the agreement as the prostitu- property, to rezone it, and to bargain 
tion of the zoning power delegated to away the township's delegated legisla-
the township officials for the special tive function contrary to Jaw, the 
benefit of the developer. The evil court declared. Such a contract. in 
which the court discerned in the con- attempting to give the developer spe-
tract it summarized as follows: the cial benefits and privileges. was ultra 
township. having adopted a master vires. void. and contrary to public 
plan, could only amend it in accord- policy. the court said. If the contract 
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held valid, the court would be putting accordance with the landowner's pro-
its stamp of approval upon what was posal, and 5 years later demanded 
obviously an unauthorized and illegal conveyance of the property to it for 
exercise of the township's zoning park purposes, as provided in the 
power, permitting special rules to be agreement preceding the rezoning. 
established for the developer as The current owner of the land re-
against all other developers, and al- sis ted, on the ground that the agree-
lowing the parties to circumvent the ment procuring the rezoning was an 
state law as well as the township's illegal one, and hence unenforceable, 
own ordinances and regulations. In and the court agreed. The court sum-
conclusion, the court declared that it marized the exchange of letters be-
was well established that while a pub- tween the landowner and the city as 
lic body may make contracts, it can an offer to dedicate at a future date 
only do so within its expressed or certain property in the city to public 
implied powers, and that those who park purposes, or to convey it to the 
deal with a municipality are charged city for such purposes on condition 
with notice of the limitations imposed that the city amend its zoning ordi-
by law upon the exercise of that ,nance, a police measure, so as to 
power. meet the wishes of the offeror. Upon 
An agreement by a city to rezone receipt of this offer the city council 
property in consideration of a portion did amend its zoning ordinance so as 
of the land so rezoned being re- to meet those wishes, the court con-
stricted to park purposes, with the tinued, saying that there seemed to 
city having an option to demand con- be no escape from the conclusion that 
veyance of the strip at any time for a the exchange of letters constituted a 
50-year period after the rezoning, was contract made for the purpose of 
held invalid. In Knoxville v Ambrister unduly controlling or affecting official 
(1953) 196 Tenn 1, 263 SW2d 528, conduct, and as such was plainly op-
the court affirmed an order sustaining posed to public policy. Such agree-
a demurrer to the city's bill for a ments, the court said, strike at the 
decree requiring the landowner to very foundations of government and 
convey the land in question to it. An tend to destroy that confidence in the 
exchange of letters between an attor- integrity and discretion of public ac-
ney for the previous landowner and tion which is essential to the preser-
the city indicated that as an induce- vation of civilized society. Such an 
ment in having the city council re- agreement, the court said, being ille-
zone the land in question to a zone gal as against public policy, would not 
permitting multiple-unit apartment be enforced at the instance of the 
buildings, the landowner would main- city, which was a party to it. 
tain a portion of the land for a period Where the builder of an apartment 
of 50 years as a grassed plot or lawn developer entered into an agreement 
area for recreational purposes, and with a city's board of zoning appeals, 
the landowner further agreed that that if the board would rezone the 
upon demand of the city within that property to permit the construction 
50-year period, the land could be of apartments, the developer would 
conveyed to the city for park or recre- covenant to leave a buffer zone of 
ational purposes for the use of the vacant property 200 feet wide be-
public. The city immediately thereaf- tween the apartment development 
ter amended the zoni~g ordinance in and the nearest property owner, such 
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covenant to run with the land and 
bind subsequent owners not bo build 
apartments on the buffer strip, and 
the developer's successors in title, 
apparently ignorant of the covenant, 
despite having conducted a profes-
sional title search, made application 
the other, attempting to enforce a 
covenant which was in derogation of 
the city's zoning ordinance. The city 
could not maintain conflicting posi-
tions, the court said, that is, on the 
one hand, covenanting with private 
parties to maintain certain zoning on 
the property, and on the other hand, 
subsequently and within the time cov-
enanted, enacting an ordinance con-
trary to the covenant. Contracts made 
for the purpose of unduly controlling 
or affecting official conduct in the 
exercise of legislative, administrative, 
and judicial functions were plainly 
opposed to public policy, the court 
declared. The court noted that the 
consensus among other jurisdictions 
which had considered the question 
was that contracts entered into in 
consideration of concessions made or 
to be made favoring the applicant 
were frowned upon as being against 
public policy, which dictated that zon-
ing was an instrument of public au-
thority to be used only for the com-
mon welfare of all the people. 
to the board to reduce the buffer 
strip to 100 feet to permit the con-
struction of additional apartments, 
and, a new board having subsequently 
taken office, the board was also igno-
rant of the existence of the covenant, 
and permitted an amendment reduc-
ing the buffer zone from 200 feet to 
100 feet, it was held that both the 
covenant and the ordinance passed in 
consideration of it were void and un-
enforceable, in Haymon v Chatta-
nooga (1973, Tenn App) 513 SW2d 
185, the court affirming an order dis-
missing an action seeking to enjoin 
the city from enforcing a stop work 
order against construction of more 
apartments on the land in question. 
The court recited the facts, including 
the fact that the successor in title to 
the original developer apparently had 
at least constructive notice of the 
covenant, since it was duly recorded, 
and that he was advised by the build-
ing inspector that there might be 
such a covenant in existence, but nev-
ertheless proceeded to have plans 
drawn and lay foundations for new 
apartments in the former buffer zone, 
at a cost of approximately $35,000 at 
the point that the city became aware 
of the existing covenant and revoked 
the building permit issued pursuant 
to the amended zoning ordinance. 
The court said that it agreed with the 
opinion of the trial court that the city 
had placed itself in the untenable 
position of, on the one hand, finding 
that the property should be rezoned 
to allow further construction, and on 
In State ex reI. Zupancic v Schi-
menz (1970) 46 Wis 2d 22, 174 
NW2d 533, an agreement between 
the city itself and a landowner to 
rezone would be invalid, it was held, 
the court, however, reversing a judg-
ment granting a writ to require issu-
.ance of a building permit for land 
covered by a declaration of restric-
tions executed prior to rezoning, on 
other grounds.49 In essence, the court 
declared that while the agreement 
before it, being an agre~ment be-
tween a developer and neighboring 
landowners, made enforceable by the 
city by injunction, was enforceable 
because the agreement itself did not 
directly involve the city, a contract 
made by a zoning authority to zone 
or rezone or not to zone would be 
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illegal, and the ordinance void, be-
cause a municipality may not surren-
der its governmental powers and 
functions or thus inhibit the exercise 
of its police or legislative powers. 
Contract zoning is illegal, the court 
declared, not because of the result, 
but because of the method. 
• See Griffin v County of Marin 
(1958) 157 Cal App 2d 507, 321 P2d 
148, where, in an action by the land-
owners against the county to have an 
amendment to the zoning ordinance 
rezoning their property from light 
industrial to single-family residence 
zone declared invalid, it was held that 
the trial court properly refused to 
admit evidence to the effect that when 
the landowners purchased the prop-
erty and the board of supervisors 
rezoned it, the landowners had repre-
sented that they intended to use the 
properly for a woodworking furniture 
shop and that they would reside on 
the premises and would use it for no 
other purpose, the court affirming the 
trial court's decision declaring the 
ordinance to be invalid as arbitrary 
and discriminatory. The court de-
clared that the police power to zone 
property may not be limited by pri-
vate agreement, nor could the board 
of supervisors properly show that the 
ordinance rezoning the property to 
light industrial was conditioned upon 
a secret agreement with the property 
owner, since such an agreement 
would be illegal and against public 
policy. Recognition of the county's 
defense of unclean hands, based on 
the landowner's apparent effort to 
change the use under such circum-
stances, would result in the enforce-
ment of an illegal agreement, and for 
those reasons, the court concluded, 
the evidence was properly excluded. 
§ 4. Agreements with governmental 
bodies, persons, or organiza-
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tions not possessing final zon-
ing authority 
[a] Held valid 
In the following cases, agreements 
between landowners and government 
bodies or organizations not having 
final zoning authority, restricting the 
use of land proposed for rezoning, 
were held valid as not involving an 
impermissible contract by the govern-
mental body having the final authority 
in zoning matters. 
A set of agreements between a city 
and a developer, whereby the city 
agreed to recommend rezoning to the 
county zoning authorities, in return 
for the developer's agreement to limit 
the development density of the re-
zoned land, as well as an agreement 
to donate a 3.33-acre lot to the city 
for use as a park and recreational 
area, were held valid in Greenbelt v 
Bresler (1967) 248 Md 210, 236 A2d 
I, the court, however, affirming a 
lower court order that the city was 
estopped' from seeking injunctive re-
lief under the contract because it had 
failed to institute proceedings within 
the 30-day period after receiving no-
tice of breach provided for in the 
contract. The owner of a 50-acre tract 
of land, as an inducement to obtain-
ing a favorable recommendation from 
the city to the county zoning author-
ity on his application to have the land 
rezoned from rural residential plan-
ned community zone to medium den-
sity garden apartment zone, agreed to 
limit the number of dwelling units to 
seven per acre for the entire tract, 
thus limiting the permissible number 
of dwelling units in the tract from 
817 to 353, and also agreed, by an-
other instrument, to donate a lot con-
taining 3.33 acres to the city for ex-
clusive use as a park and recreational 
area, and to deliver a deed conveying 
the property within 2 years. This 
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agreement was expressly conditioned 
upon the granting of the requested 
rezoning. In due course, the rezoning 
was obtained, and the agreement to 
convey was recorded, although the 3-
acre tract of land was not conveyed to 
the city. Three years later, the owner 
applied for and received a building 
permit from the county for construc-
tion of an eight-story apartment 
house containing 178 units on a 9-
acre parcel. Although the building 
conformed to the zoning reclassifica-
tion, it violated the density covenant 
of the declaration of covenants filed 
by the owner, and notice of such was 
sent by the owner by registered letter 
to the city manager. Some 3 months 
after the notice was filed, the city 
sued to erU0in construction of the 
apartment house. In addition to 
pleading the city'S failure to meet the 
notice requirements of the contract, 
the owner also contended that if the 
declaration of covenants was to be 
construed as additional consideration 
for the agreement entered into with 
the city, it would be invalid as con-
trary to public policy. The court 
pointed out that the applicable state 
statute provided that in Montgomery 
County and Prince George's County, 
before the district council of either 
county may reclassify the zoning 
within any municipality, the proposed 
change must be referred to the gov-
erning body of the municipality for its 
recommendation, but the statute also 
provided that in Prince George's 
County, such a recommendation was 
of an advisory nature only and not 
binding on the district council. The 
rule that zoning by contract, or upon 
condition, or by agreement, acquires 
no validity when involving a munici-
pality, applies to contracts with the 
deciding authority, that is, the agency 
having final control over the granting 
or denial of the requested zoning 
reclassification, the court continued. 
The court said that there was a signif-
icant distinction between those cases 
where the contract is made between 
the developer and the zoning author-
ity, and those cases involving a con-
tract entered into in good faith be-
tween the developer and a municipal-
ity which does not have control over 
the classification and whose authority 
is limited to recommendation. The 
court also said that in one other Mar-
yland casellO the contract, though 
made on behalf of the city by the 
planning commission, was approved 
as to form and legal sufficiency by the 
acting city solicitor and purported to 
be made with the mayor and city 
council, the deciding authority. In the 
case before it, the court continued, 
the district council of the county, the 
deciding agency, was in no manner a 
party to the contract. In the instant 
case, the court concluded, the con-
tract being a valid one, the city 
should be bound by its provisions. 
The court pointed out that for the 
same reasons the agreement by the 
landowner to donate land to the city 
for park purposes in return for the 
city's promise to recommend rezon-
ing was valid and enforceable. 
An agreement between a municipal-
ity and a developer whereby the de-
veloper would subject part of its land 
to a scenic and conservation easement 
in return for the town's agreement to 
recommend rezoning was held valid 
in Funger v Somerset (1968) 249 Md 
311, 239 A2d 748, the court revers-
ing an order dismissing the develop-
er's counterclaim for rescission of the 
contract on the basis that the town by 
its actions had made it impossible for 
the developer to build. In addition to 
50. Pressman v Baltimore (1960) 222 
Md 330, 160 A2d 379, infra § 4[bJ. 
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the scenic and conservation easement, 
the developer agreed, in considera-
tion of the town recommending high-
rise residential zoning for 18 acres of 
the developer's 30-acre tract, to limit 
the development of the tract for a 
period of 20 years till the density 
permitted on a tract of 16 acres, to 
donate to the town 2 acres of park-
land immediately, and 8 additional 
acres in annual increments of 2 acres 
each, and to grant an option to the 
town to purchase an additional 2-acre 
tract. Inter alia, the court declared 
that this agreement between the de-
veloper and the township was valid 
and not contract zoning, the court 
referring to the reasoning in Green-
belt v Bresler (1967) 248 Md 210, 
236 A2d I, supra, as support for its 
declaration. 
In State ex reI. Zupancic v Schi-
menz (1970) 46 Wis 2d 22, 174 
NW2d 533, an agreement between a 
developer and neighboring homeown-
ers restricting the use of business-
zoned land to a particular use, and 
providing for enforcement of the re-
strictions by the city, was held valid, 
the court reversing a judgment grant-
ing a writ requiring issuance of a 
building permit for a use on the land 
not permitted by the declaration of 
restrictions. In 1955, the city'S com-
mon council approved a plat for a 
shopping center and provided that 
any future division of the lots would 
be subject to its approval. Part of the 
area was zoned "neighborhood shop-
ping" and part "local business." In 
1961, the shopping center developers 
desired to change a parcel of land 
from neighborhood shopping to the 
local business zone in order to sell it 
for use as a bowling alley, but it was 
'" found that the neighboring home-
:c owners were opposed to the change 
)0 in zoning but not to the bowling 
alley. The developer and the neigh-
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bors then negotiated an agreement 
that the developer would limit the use 
of the rezoned land to a bowling 
alley, and a declaration of restrictions 
was drafted providing that although 
the parcel was zoned local business, 
the only use permitted would be a 
bowling alley, and any other use of 
the land was to be limited' to uses 
permitted under existing neighbor-
hood shopping zoning. The declara-
tion also provided for a buffer plant-
ing strip, certain structural require-
ments, the placement of air-condi-
tioning equipment, and a fence to 
prevent pedestrian access to the 
shopping center from the housing 
development to the south, and then 
stated that the restrictions were for 
the benefit of the city, were to run 
with the land, were binding for a 20-
year period, and were to be enforced 
by the city by injunction. Subse-
quently to the execution of the decla-
ration of restrictions, the property 
was rezoned. Later still, the common 
council divided a platted lot to create 
the desired parcel for the bowling 
alley, creating from the rezoned 210-
by-200-foot area the parcel sold for 
the bowling alley and a surplus parcel 
of land approximately 190 by 42 feet, 
which was also rezoned local busi-
ness, and restricted by the declara-
tion. In 1968, this smaller parcel was 
sold to a person who desired to build 
a carwash on the parcel. While the 
offer to purchase was subject to deed 
restrictions of record, and was condi-
tional upon the buyer's obtaining a 
permit to build a carwash, the buyer 
apparently did not realize that the 
deed restriction would not permit a 
carwash, and the seller did not re-
member it. A building permit was 
duly issued, and the buyer paid a 
$20,000 down payment on a $66,000 
contract to buy carwash equipment, 
whereupon the building permit was 
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the zoning ordinance in other juris-
dictions has been held valid and not 
considered to be contract or condi-
tional zoning, the court observed. 
The virtue of allowing private agree-
ments to underlie zoning, the court 
said, is the flexibility and control of 
the development given to a munici-
pality to meet the ever-increasing de-
mands for rezoning in a rapidly 
changing area. When an agreement is 
made by persons other than the city 
to conform the property in a way or 
manner which makes it acceptable for 
requested zoning and the city is not 
committed to rezoning, such an 
agreement is not contract zoning in 
the true sense and does not vitiate 
the zoning if it is otherwise valid, the 
court declared. The court said that it 
was a too rigid view to consider that 
situations like the case before it give 
rise to a quid pro quo for rezoning, 
even though no express contract with 
the zoning authorities can be proved. 
On the other hand, the court said 
that it found too extreme a view in 
the other direction the contention 
that a zoning ordinance and its con-
comitant agreement should be de-
clared invalid only if it can be shown 
that there was no valid reason for a 
change and that the change was 
clearly arbitrary and unreasonable 
and had no substantial relation to the 
public health, safety, morals, and gen-
eral welfare, or if the city was using 
the agreement for bargaining and sale 
to the highest bidder, or solely for 
the benefit of private speculators. The 
court declared that landowners may 
make a contract which may legiti-
mately be recognized by the zoning 
authorities as a motivation for rezon-
ing, but such zoning must meet the 
revoked, and the common council 
then rezoned the 42-foot-wide parcel 
back from local business to neighbor-
hood shopping. A writ of mandamus 
was then filed to require the issuance 
of a building permit, and the city 
sought by counterclaim to enforce the 
declaration of restrictions by iJ1iunc-
tion. In answer to the charge by the 
carwash owner that the declaration of 
restrictions was an illegal zoning con-
tract, the court acknowledged that a 
contract made by a zoning authority 
to zone or rezone or not to zone 
would be illegal and the ordinance 
enacted pursuant thereto void, be-
cause a municipality may not surren-
der its governmental powers and 
functions or thus inhibit the exercise 
of its police or legislative powers. 
However, in the instant case, there 
was no agreement with the city, the 
court declared. Neither the common 
council nor the city planning commis-
sion agreed' to rezone, the court ob-
served, and said that the facts gave 
rise to an agreement only between 
the developer and the homeowners 
respecting the use of the property if it 
was rezoned by the city. The rezoning 
per se did not require the conditions 
demanded by the homeowners, the 
court noted. True, the court contin-
ued, the developers and the home-
owners expected favorable action by 
the city planning commission, but this 
expectation was based on two factors: 
first, no objection to the rezoning 
under the circumstances by the home-
owners, and second, the proposed 
rezoning being good land use and 
consistent with the developing charac-
ter of the neighborhood. When a 
zoning authority does not make an 
agreement to zone but is motivated to 
zone by agreements as to USe of the 
land made by others, or by voluntary 
restrictions running with the land al-
though suggested by the authority, 
test of all valid zoning, that it, must 
be for the safety, welfare, and health 
of the community, and should not 
constitute spot zoning. 
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[b) Held invalid 
. In the following case, conditions 
imposed by the city's planning com-
mission in order to recommend re-
zoning of the land from residential to 
commercial use were held invalid, the 
court taking the position that imposi-
tion of such conditions was beyond 
the commission's power. 
In Pressman v Baltimore (1960) 
222 Md 330, 160 A2d 379, conditions 
imposed by the city planning commis-
sion in recommending the rezoning 
of certain land from residential to 
commercial use were held invalid, the 
court, however, affirming the dis-
missal of an action seeking to declare 
the ordinance rezoning the property 
invalid. The land in question had 
been strip-zoned to a depth of 150 
feet for commercial use, with the re-
mainder zoned as residential, and the 
landowner sought to have the resi-
dential part of his lots rezoned com-
mercial, to permit the building of a 
regional shopping center and its at-
tendant parking areas. The proposed 
rezoning ordinance was referred to 
the planning commission, which con-
ditioned its approval upon an agree-
ment being entered into between the 
developer of the property and the city 
providing that if it were subsequently 
determined that the project could not 
be carried out as substantially pro-
posed and the city took action to 
repeal-the rezoning ordinance so that 
the property would revert to its exist-
ing use, the developer would not in-
terpose any objection to the passage 
of the repeal ordinance, and that the 
developer also agreed to layout and 
51. The court went on to point out, 
however, that the city council, the legisla-
tive body, was not bound by the recom-
J mendations of the planning commission, 
...... and did not undertake or attempt to in-
."'" corporate the invalid conditions in its 
:::> rezoning ordinance, not even referring to 
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develop the property as a shopping 
center in accordance with plans ap-
proved by the planning commission. 
The court said that no matter how 
moderate, reasonable, or even desira-
ble these conditions might be, it 
found no authority for their imposi-
tion by the planning commission. The 
state's enabling act authorized a zon-
ing board to approve buildings, and 
uses limited as to location under such 
rules and regulations as might be 
provided by local ordinance, but no 
such authorization extended to the 
planning commission, nor does the 
city zoning ordinance undertake to 
confer power to impose such condi-
tions, in a case like the one before 
the court, upon the planning commis-
sion even\ if it could do so, the court 
declared. Thus, the court concluded, 
the planning commission sought to 
impose conditions that it was not 
authorized to exact and were there-
fore invalid.51 
§ 5, Conditional rezoning authorized 
by ordinance 
An agreement requiring the land-
owner requesting rezoning to con-
form to certain conditions was held 
valid in the following case, where the 
county's zoning ordinance provided 
that the board of supervisors could 
impose conditions on the zoning re-
classification of property where it 
found that conditions must be im-
posed so as not to create problems 
inimical to the public health, safety, 
and general welfare. 
An agreement concomitant with a 
requested rezoning requiring the 
them. Thus, the court concluded that 
while the conditions imposed by the plan-
ning commission were invalid, the invalid 
conditions did not affect the validity of 
the rezoning ordinance ,itself. See Press-
man v Baltimore (1960) 222 Md 330, 160 
A2d 379, infra § 20. 
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landowner requesting rezoning to 
conform to certain conditions was 
held valid in Scrutton v County of 
Sacramento (l969) 275 Cal App 2d 
412, 79 Cal Rptr 872, the court, how-
ever, reversing on other grounds a 
summary judgment for the county 
denying the landowner's petition for 
police power to zone and rezone may 
not be restricted by contract, the 
court said that the phrase "contract 
zoning" in itself had no legal signifi-
cance, and simply referred to a reclas-
sification of land use in which the 
landowner agreed to perform condi-
tions not imposed on other land in 
the same classification. The court 
noted that all contracts are made with 
reference to possible exercises of the 
police power and with the possibility 
of its exercise as an implied term 
thereof. Here, the court noted, the 
county itself did not become party to 
an express contract, though the court 
granted that when the zoning agency 
exacts a concomitant contract from 
the landowner, it holds out an im-
plied or moral assurance that it will 
not quickly reverse or alter its deci-
sion. In a sense, the court continued, 
this assurance tends to freeze the 
property's status, but the suspension 
of continuing police power is theoret-
ical rather than real. The court noted 
that approval of the landowner's ap-
plication in the first instance repre-
sented spot zoning of an individual 
parcel, which, however, was valid 
where long-term changes in the 
neighborhood created conditions 
compatible with the proposed new 
use. Thus, the very basis for the ac-
tion, neighborhood change, provided 
the reclassification with a practical 
assurance of stability, the court de-
clared. The investments made on the 
strength of rezoning had precisely the 
same protection against later arbitrary 
a declaratory judgment declaring the 
agreement invalid. The county's zon-
ing ordinance provided' that the 
board of supervisors could impose 
conditions on the zoning reclassifica-
tion of property where it found that 
the conditions must be imposed so as 
not to create problems inimical to the 
public health, safety, and general wel-
fare of the county. When the land-
owner petitioned for the rezoning 
from agricultural to multiple-family 
residential uses of her property front-
ing on a boulevard and bounded on 
one side by a partially improved 
street, the board decided to exact, as 
conditions precedent to the rezoning, 
an agreement from the landowner 
requiring her to dedicate a 10-foot 
right of way for widening and improv-
ing the boulevard on which her prop-
erty fronted, and to dedicate a 27-
foot strip on the side of her property 
to form the west half of the partially 
improved street bounding the prop-
erty on that side, as well as to pay for 
the improvements to that street. The 
contract also provided that any failure 
on the part of the landowner to com-
ply with the conditions imposed 
would cause the property's reversion 
to agricultural zoning. The landowner 
objected to the provision that she be 
required to pave the street bordering 
the side of her property at her own 
expense, and attacked the county's 
action as invalid contract zoning by 
which the county, in exchange for the 
landowner's covenants, would bargain 
away a portion of its future power 
over zoning. While agreeing that the 
action as any other property invest-
ment, the court said, noting that a 
zoning ordinance may not immedi-
ately suppress or force removal of an 
otherwise lawful business or use, all 
such uses being shielded from arbi-
trariness and all being vulnerable to 
reasonable exercises of the police 
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cedure pursued entailed neither a for-
mal nor a practical surrender of the 
police power, the court concluded 
that it was valid. 
§ 6. Reversion provisions 
In the following case, the inclusion 
of a provision in an agreement by a 
landowner to certain conditions to be 
imposed concomitant with requested 
rezoning, that upon breach of any of 
the conditions imposed, the zoning 
would revert from the requested zon-
ing to the former zone, rendered the 
agreement invalid. 
In Scrutton v County of Sacra-
mento (1969) 275 Cal App 2d 412, 
79 Cal Rptr 872, the provision in a 
proposed agreement by a landowner 
to certain conditions to be imposed 
concomitant with a requested rezon-
ing, that the breach of any of the 
conditions would result in the rever-
sion of the zoning from the requested 
multiple-family residence zone to the 
former agricultural zoning, was held 
improper, the court reversing a sum-
mary judgment denying the landown-
er's petition for a declaratory judg-
ment declaring the agreement invalid. 
The county's zoning ordinance pro-
vided that the board of supervisors 
might impose conditions on a zoning 
reclassification where it found that 
such conditions must be imposed so 
as not to create problems inimical to 
the public health, safety, and general 
welfare, and the board, pursuant to 
its usual procedures, offered the land-
owner seeking rezoning of her prop-
erty from agricultural to multiple-
family use a proposed contract re-
quiring her to dedicate portions of 
her property for public ways and pay 
for the improvement thereof, as con-
ditions upon which the rezoning 
would depend, and also providing 
that breach of the conditions would 
cause the property to revert to agri-
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cultural zoning. The court pointed 
out that such an automatic reversion 
would amount to a second rezoning 
in violation of the procedural direc-
tions of state law demanding that 
rezoning be accomplished through 
notice, hearings, and planning com-
mission inquiry. Even if procedural 
directions were followed, the court 
continued, the reversion would vio-
late substantive limitations upon the 
supervisors' legislative power. The 
board has power to rezone an individ-
ual parcel when changed community 
conditions have rendered the former 
classification unsuitable and the new 
one is consistent with the public in-
terest, the court observed. Although 
courts do not ordinarily inquire into 
legislative motivation, the court said, 
in this case the proceedings on their 
face would characterize the reversion 
ordinance as a forfeiture rather than a 
legislative decision on land use. An 
ordinance so conceived, the court 
concluded, is not a valid exercise of 
the zoning power. 
B. Construction and effect 
§ 7. Relationship between conditions 
imposed and use of land 
In the following case, it was held 
that conditions exacted from a land-
owner in return for rezoning of her 
property required that the conditions 
exacted be related in some way to the 
use proposed by the landowner, the 
exaction of conditions unrelated to 
the proposed use being said to be an 
improper exercise of the zoning 
power. 
The exaction of a condition from a 
landowner seeking rezoning of her 
property which did not show a rela-
tionship between the condition ex-
acted and the use proposed by the 
landowner was improper, it was held 
in Scrutton v County of Sacramento 
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(1969) 275 Cal App 2d 412, 79 Cal lack of relationship between the exac-
Rptr 872, the court re:versing a sum- tion and the proposed use. This rela-
mary judgment denying the land- tionship, the court continued, pre-
owner a declaratory judgment declar- sents a factual inquiry for the trial 
ing the conditions imposed on her court, which can seldom, if ever, be 
requested rezoning invalid. The land- resolved without taking evidence. In 
owner sought to have the property in the case before it, the court said that 
question, which fronted on an arterial the landowner's claim of arbitrary im-
boulevard and was bounded on one position required that kind of inquiry 
side by a partially improved street, by the trial court, and in addition the 
rezoned from agricultural to multiple- county's affidavits supporting its mo-
family residential use, to permit the tion for summary judgment fell short 
erection of apartment buildings. As a of showing that the proposed apart-
condition to the requested rezoning, ment project would generate traffic or 
the county board of supervisors of- other conditions reasonably necessi-
fered the landowner a contract tating improving the street adjoining 
whereby she would oblige herself to her property at her expense. Rather, 
dedicate rights of way along the two the court said, the affidavit sought to 
streets, as well as bearing the cost of demonstrate that the landowner's 
improving one of the streets, to which dedication of land to the proposed 
latter proposal she objected. The street and her expenditure for paving 
contract also contained a provision it would benefit her proposed devel-
that failure to abide by ,the covenants opment. While acknowledging that 
contained therein would cause the some courts have justified such exac-
property's reversion to agricultural tions not only for the fulfilment of 
zoning. The court noted that while public needs caused by the proposed 
the police power permitted the impo- development, but also for the benefit 
sidon of reasonable conditions upon to the landowner financially, the court 
a proposal for rezoning, just as in declared that standing alone, the 
connection with the approval of sub- landowner's economic benefit sup-
divisions, building permits, and vari- plied inadequate underpinning for 
ances, not all conditions are valid. the exaction. The police power 
Generally speaking, the court said, formed the exaction's constitutional 
conditions imposed on the grant of foundation, the court continued, and 
land-use applications are valid if rea- that power is aimed at public need 
sonably conceived to fulfil public rather than private profit. The land-
needs emanating from the landown- owner should be free to reject the 
er's proposed use. Two ~inds of need paternalism which forces him into an 
have been found to eXIst, the court exaction conceived for his personal 
pointed out: the community's need benefit, the court declared~ Rather, 
for protection against potentially de- the court concluded, the fulfilment of 
leterious effects from the landowner's public needs emanating from the pro-
propos~l: .and the commun~ty's ne.ed posed land use is the sine qua non of 
for faCIlIties to meet publIc servIce the exaction's reasonableness. 
demands created by the proposal. De-
cisions invalidating the exaction of 
conditions rely upon theories of con-
stitutional invasion, the court ob-
served, but their springboard is the 
§ 8. Specific performance 
In the following case, a city was 
held entitled to specific performance 
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f it is unjustified.1 The 
) not bear alike on all 
mditions and circum-
ro sustain a claim of 
ting the zoning action 
.er is restricted to an-
. body must show that 
discriminatory.3 That 
lsufficient alone to es-
Y'does not violate the 
:ontained in its zoning 
e suspect classifica-
er the rational-basis 
;imate governmental 
1, zoning commissions 
.se permits to accom-
'esource conservation. Secu· 
Jorp. v. Baltimore County, 
234, 655 A.2d 1326 (1995). 
imposing landscaping and 
nts to mostly undeveloped 
r commercial use along a 
street extension, without 
uirements to other streets 
violate the equal protection 
mer, in light of the clas-
basis related to the legiti· 
lSuring that the area of the 
developed in a manner that 
etyand aesthetics. Craft v. 
, 335 Ark. 417, 984 S. W.2d 
visors v. McDonald's Corp., 
E.2d 334 (2001). 
1. City of St. Charles, Mo., 
. 1993). 
'. City of St. Charles, Mo., 
1993). 
" capricious, and reason· 
35. 
Tammany Parish Police 
17 (La. 1999). 
ZONING AND PLANNING § 41 
The wording in zoning ordinances must be clear and unambiguous so that 
persons of ordinary intellect need not guess at its meaning. 1 When an 
ordinance is challenged as unconstitutionally vague, a court's inquiry turns 
not on whether the ordinance could have provided more specific guidance to 
applicants by defining every term in the ordinance, but on whether the 
ordinance contains sufficient qualitative standards to guide an applicant and 
limit a zoning board's discretion. 2 A failure to define a term in a zoning 
ordinance does not render the ordinance unconstitutionally vague.3 
When exercising discretion, a local zoning board must be guided by stan-
dards which are specific in order to prevent an ordinance from being invalid 
and arbitrary.4 So, subdivision regulations upon which a local zoning com-
mission, acting administratively, should rule must contain known and fixed 
standards applying to all cases of a like nature.5 
In determining whether a zoning ordinance is void for vagueness, on the 
grounds that it has been arbitrarily enforced, a court will not engage in 
speculation to find instances in which the statute might be arbitrarily ap-
plied, but will rather consider only a history of actual alleged arbitrary 
enforcement, and will find unconstitutionality only if the language of the 
statute is so conflicting and confused that arbitrary enforcement is inevitable.6 
A site-review standard that is too vague is void.7 
§ 41 Contract zoning 
Research References 
West's Key Number Digest, Zoning and Planning e:041, 43 
Validity, construction, and effect of agreement to rezone, or amendment to zoning ordinance, 
creating special restrictions or conditions not applicable to other property similarly zoned, 70 
A.L.R. 3d 125 
A local government is generally prohibited from contracting away the 
exercise of the zoning power or obligating itself by an advance contract to 
provide a particular zoning.' A contract made by the zoning authorities to 
[Section 40] 
1State, Tp. of Pennsauken v. Schad, 160 
N.J. 156, 733 A.2d 1159 (1999). 
The use of the terms "structurally un-
sound" and "dilapidated" in a zoning ordinance 
requiring the removal of nonconforming bill· 
boards that become structurally unsound or 
dilapidated was not impermissibly vague or 
ambiguous. Ex parte City of Orange Beach 
Bd. of Adjustment, 2001 WL 1591304 (Ala. 
2001). 
2Britton v. Town of York, 673 A.2d 1322 
(Me. 1996). 
Developers are entitled to know with rea-
sonable clarity what they must do under state 
or local land use control laws to obtain the 
permits or approvals they seek. Kosalka v. 
Town of Georgetown, 2000 ME 106, 752 A.2d 
183 (Me. 2000). 
3Britton v. Town of York, 673 A.2d 1322 
(Me. 1996). 
4Peterson Outdoor Advertising v. City of 
Myrtle Beach, 327 S.C. 230, 489 S.E.2d 630 
(1997). 
6Harris v. Zoning Com'n of Town of New 
Milford, 259 Conn. 402,788 A.2d 1239 (2002). 
6Lazy Mountain Land Club v. Matanuska-
Susitna Borough Bd. of Adjustment & 
Appeals, 904 P.2d 373 (Alaska 1995) . 
7Bragdon v. Town of Vassalboro, 2001 ME 
137,780 A.2d 299 (Me. 2001). 
[Section 41] 
1Montgomery County v. Revere Nat. Corp., 
Inc., 341 Md. 366, 671 A.2d 1 (1996). 
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zone or rezone for the benefit of a private landowner is generally illegaF and 
is denounced as "contract zoning"3 and as an ultra vires bargaining away of 
police power,4 
• Practice Guide: In order to sustain a claim of zoning by contract there 
must be a clear indication of an agreement binding upon the parties and a 
bargaining away of legislative power by the village board.5 
It does not follow, however, that all agreements between municipalities 
and private landowners concerning zoning matters are necessarily invalid,S 
Zoning amendments enacted pursuant to a contract to purchase planned low~ 
income housing under the "turnkey" program of the Department of Housing 
and Urban Development is not contract zoning,1 
B. PRESUMPTIONS AND BURDEN OF PROOF 
Research References 
West's Digest References 
Zoning and Planning ¢::>27, 38, 672, 681, 683 
Annotation References 
AL.R Digest: Zoning and Land Controls § 28 
AL.R. Index: Presumptions and Burden of Proof; Zoning 
Trial Strategy References 
Zoning: Proof of Inverse Condemnation from Excessive Land Use Regulation, 31 Am. Jur. Proof 
of Facts 3d 563 
Zoning-Circumstances Warranting Expansion of a Nonconforming Use, 26 Am. Jur. Proof of 
Facts 3d 467 
Zoning-Circumstances Warranting Relief from Zoning Ordinance, 25 Am. Jur. Proof of Facts 
3d 541 
Zoning-Invalidity of Single-Family Zoning Ordinance, 24 Am. Jur. Proof of Facts 3d 543 
§ 42 Presumption of constitutionality 
Research References 
West's Key Number Digest, Zoning and Planning ¢::>27, 38,672,681,683 
2Haymon v. City of Chattanooga, 513 
S.W.2d 185 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1973); State ex 
reI. Zupancic v. Schimenz, 46 Wis. 2d 22,174 
N.W.2d 533 (1970). 
3Ford Leasing Development Co. v. Board of 
County Com'rs of Jefferson County, 186 Colo. 
418, 528 P.2d 237 (1974). 
4Ford Leasing Development Co. v. Board of 
County Com'rs of Jefferson County, 186 Colo. 
418, 528 P.2d 237 (1974); Suski v. Mayor and 
Com'rs of Borough of Beach Haven, 132 N.J. 
Super. 158, 333 A2d 25 (App. Div. 1975). 
5Century Circuit, Inc. v. Ott, 65 Misc. 2d 
250, 317 N.Y.S.2d 468 (Sup 1970), judgment 
affd, 37 AD.2d 1044, 327 N.Y.S.2d 829 (2d 
Dep't 1971). 
84 
6Funger v. Mayor and Council of To",n of 
Somerset, 249 Md. 311, 239 A2d 748 (1968). 
A settlement agreement between a county 
and a billboard company, allowing the bill-
board company to maintain its existing bill-
boards for 10 years after which the county 
would be able to fully implement a total zon-
ing ban against the billboards, was not an in-
valid attempt to obligate the district council 
by an advance contract for a particular zoning, 
as the agreement contemplated no action 
whatsoever by the district council. 
Montgomery County v. Revere Nat. Corp., 
Inc., 341 Md. 366, 671 A2d 1 (1996). 
7Marino v. Town of Ramapo, 68 Misc. 2d 
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§ 9.21 AMERICAN LAW OF ZONING 
§ 9.21. Contract zoning. 
Where a zoning amendment authorizes a particular use only iJ 
the landowner enters into a covenant to restrict the use in certain 
ways, or where a zoning amendment is adopted only after the 
owner of the affected land executes and files a covenant restrict-
ing the use of such land, an attack on the validity of the measure 
may be based on the contention that it constitutes zoning by 
contract. Persons who think themselves aggrieved by the amend-
ment may argue that the municipal legislative authority has 
contracted away a portion of its police power, without authority 
and in violation of constitutional rights. 
It is clear that if conditional zoning of the kind described above 
is "contract zoning" in the sense that the municipality has 
bargained away a portion of its zoning power, such zoning is 
unlawful except in the unusual situation where a statute 
authorizes agreements between governmental units. The power 
to regulate land use through zoning ordinances is vested in mu-
nicipal legislatures, and its use is limited by the enabling acts. 
Except for the intergovernmental transactions which will be 
considered later, these acts do not expressly or impliedly autho-
rize the bargaining away of the police power or any segment of 
it.SO 
Before the cases dealing with the contract zoning problem are 
80. "The power to regulate land use 
through zoning ordinances is vested in 
municipal legislatures and they can-
not bargain away this power." Davis v 
IPima County, 121 Ariz 343, 590 P2d 459 (1978, App), cert den 442 US 942, 61 L Ed 2d 312, 99 S Ct 2885, citing 'Anderson, American Law of Zoning 
!2nd ed) § 9.21. . 
Municipality has no authority to 
enter into a private contract with a 
property owner for amendment of a 
zoning ordinance subject to various 
covenants and restrictions in a collat-
eral deed or agreement when such 
agreement results in the contracting 
away of police powers. There is no 
contracting away of police powers, 
however, where a party seeks a vari-
ance and not a change in the ordi-
nance. J. C. Vereen & Sons, Inc. v Mi-
ami, 397 So 2d 979 (1981, Fla App D3). 
174 
An agreement between a city and a 
developer to limit the city's power to 
impose conditions on a development 
in order to further the health, safety 
and welfare of the community is in-
valid and unenforceable. Miller v Port 
Angeles, 38 Wash App 904, 691 P2d 
229 (1984), review den 103 Wash2d 
1024 (1985). 
See also Bartsch v Planning & Zon-
ing Com., 6 Conn App 686, 506 A2d 
1093 (1986) (conditional zoning inval-
id); Board of County Comrs. v Manny 
Holtz, Inc., 65 Md App 574, 501 A2d 
489 (1985). But cf. People's Counsel for 
Baltimore County v Mockard, 73 Md 
App 340, 533 A2d 1344 (1987) (and 
cases cited therein). And see Chrismon 
v Guilford County, 322 NC 611, 370 
SE2d 579 (1988) (distinguishing illegal 
contract zoning from rezoning with 
conditions); Benton v City of Chat-
§ 9:20 ANDERSON'S A¥ERICAN LAW OF ZONING 
area of the [proposed] development. This evidence of reasonableness presented 
by the Board was sufficient to rebut [the] contention that the Board effectively 
imposed a proffer requirement on [the] rezoning application." Id. at 354. 
§ 9:21 Contract zonin.g 
n.80. 
Add to note 80: 
United States: See League of Residential Neighborhood Advocates v. City of 
Los Angeles, 498 F.3d 1052 (9th Cir. 2007). An application for a conditional use 
permit and variances by an Orthodox Jewish congregation to operate a syna-
gogue in a residential district was denied following neighbors' objections. 
Subsequent to the filing of a lawsuit by the congregation, RLlITPA was enacted .. 
Because the city was concerned about the force of RLUIPA and further litiga-
tion, the city entered into a settlement agreement with the congregation allow-
ing it to operate the synagogue under certain conditions. Neighbors brought the 
current lawsuit, alleging that the city violated state law, provisions of the city 
code, and their right to due process by entering into a settlement agreement 
without providing notice and a hearing to the affected community. The Ninth 
Circuit Court of Appeals agreed that the city violated state law by failing to 
provide notice and an opportunity to be heard. The court also found that the 
city had bargained away its right to exercise its police power over the property. 
n.84. 
Add to note 84: 
Massachusetts: An otherwise valid rezoning that allowed a utility to build a 
power plant was not invalidated by·the fact that the utility had offered to donate 
$8 million to the town if the rezoning was approved. Durand v. IDC Belling~ 
ham, LLC, 440 Mass. 45, 793 N.E.2d 359 (2003). The Supreme Judicial Court of 
Massachusetts held that a "voluntary offer of public benefits, is not, standing 
alone, an adequate ground on which to set aside an otherwise·valid legislative 
act." 793 N.E.2d at 368. The court rejected the argument asserted by neighbor-
ing landowners that the rezoning was invalid because it was "contract zoning." 
The court stated that "labels such as 'contract zoning' may not be helpful or 
determinative in resolving the validity of a zoning enactment." 793 N.E.2d at 
367. The court found that proper procedures had been followed, and the rezon-
ing was not arbitrary or irrational. "In general, there is no reason to invalidate 
a legislative act on the basis of an 'extraneous consideration,' because we defer 
to legislative findings and choices without regard to motive. We ... find no 
persuasive authority for the proposition that an otherwise valid zoning enact-
ment is invalid if it is in any way prompted or encouraged by a public benefit 
voluntarily offered." 793 N.E.2d at 369. 





Residential districts, generally-Exclusion of 
commercial uses 
Add to note 62: 
Michigan: See also Soupal v. Shady View, Inc., 469 Mich. 458, 672 N.W.2d 
171 (2003). A zoning ordinance did not allow property zoned for single-family 
use to be used by a multiple-family association for the operation of a marina 
containing 20, boat slips. Furthermore, the court concluded that because the use 
of the property as a marina was in violation of the zoning ordinance, it was a 
nuisance per se. 
30 
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483 (1998). The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania 
~ taking does not result from a zoning ordinance 
ralid." The case involved an ordinance which had 
:ause of its exclusion of quarrying as a permitted 
Jccessfully challenged the ordinance now argued 
as unconstitutional it automatically effected a 
;0 taking of the landowner's property. The state 
oncluded that an exclusionary zoning ordinance 
Icing. "Here, the property was zoned residential. 
Ted Miller of the use of quarrying, other viable 
more, the court found that the U.S. Supreme 
.glish case was inapplicable for several reasons: 
'l{!lish . . . Miller was not denied all use of its prop· 
Ilied the use of quarrying. Second, First English did 
1 unconstitutional zoning ordinance. The landowners 
the ordinance but merely sought damages pursuant 
glish does not support the conclusion reached by the 
rivalid zoning ordinance effects a per se temporary 
rt erroneously confused the legal concepts applicable 
ryplidity issues. Finally, the decision in First English 
$ presented. 
v'' , 
• P1P.~tllOI1!!, Enterprises, L.P. v. Zoning Hearing 
Env:tl. L. Re~. 20218 (3d Cir. 2003), cert. 
'which a zorung board denied a variance 
_'.~"'''D tower in a residential area. The 
Circuit Court of Appeals that the 
and w;tlawful under Pennsylvania 
" neIther facially nor de facto 
IIIIO;~Ll~g board, it did not totally ban 
had twice granted vari-
1i.W~."""'" district of the township. 
. .. showing that no telecom-
m the township. The Third 
' . , based on the .relatively 
. 'The relevant mquiry is 
Showing that the need of 
[Citations omitted.] 
the needs of their 
F.3d at 394. 
. township cannot ' 
then refuse to 
729N.W.2d 
TYPES OF ZONING REGULATION § 9:20 
The Court of Appeals of Michigan held that the township's zoning plan was 
facially exclusionary because the township acknowledged that the heavy 
industrial use was permissible but still failed to designate any property for that 
use. Further, the court found that the township's action in amending its zoning 
ordinance to designate property as heavy industrial did not defeat the plaintiffs' 
claim of exclusionary zoning. Rather, the court found that such action showed 
that the township recognized the need for heavy industrial zoning. 
n. 24. , 
Add to note 24: 
Michigan: But cf. Adams Outdoor Advertising, Inc. v. City of Holland, 463 
Mich. 675, 625 N.W.2d 377 (2001). A city zoning ordinance prohibiting billboardE 
and advertising signs did not constitute unlawful exclusionary zoning under thE 
Michigan City and Village Zoning Act. Although the ordinance prohibited neVI 
billboards and signs, and the expansion of existing billboards and signs, j 1 
expressly permitted billboard owners to maintain and repair existing signs a: 
nonconforming uses. The court therefore held that even though the ordinancl 
limited the number of billboards within the city, it was not a total prohibitiOI 
on billboards. Under the Michigan statute, anything less than a complete city 




Add to note 58: 
Virginia: It was unlawful for a county board of supervisors to condition 
rezoning upon a proffer of a cash paym.ent by the developer. Under Virginia' 
conditional zoning statutes, "a county is not empowered to require a specifie 
proffer as a condition precedent to a rezoning. The statute clearly states thE 
proffers of conditions by a zoning applicant must be made voluntarily." Th 
court therefore concluded that the board had improperly denied the rezoning a 
ter the developer refused to pay the fee "recommended" by the board "to hel 
defray costs of capital facilities related to new development." Board of Sup'rs . 
Powhatan County v. Reed's Landing Corp., 250 Va. 397, 463 S.E.2d 668 (1995 
A Virginia party unsuccessfully challenged the refusal of a county board 
supervisors to rezone his property from agricultural to residential. Gregory 
Board of Sup/rs of Chesterfield County, 257 Va. 530, 514 S.E.2d 350 (1999). Tl 
applicant unsuccessfully claimed that the board had impermissibly required 
cash proffer as a condition for the requested rezoning. "The Board responded 
this evidence of unreasonableness with evidence that cash proffers were n 
required as a condition precedent to a rezoning, and that the rezoning request' 
. . . would adversely impact public health, safety, and welfare in the area of t 
[proposed] development. This evidence of reasonableness presented by the Boa 
was sufficient to rebut [the] contention that the Board effectively imposed 
proffer requirement on [the] rezoning application." Id. at 354. 
n. 62. 
Add to note 62: 
Virginia: A Virginia party unsuccessfully challenged the refusal of aCOUI 
board of supervisors to rezone his property from agricultural to residenti 
Gregory v. Board of Sup'rs of Chesterfield County, 257 Va. 530, 514 S.E.2d :: 
(1999). The applicant unsuccessfully claimed that the board had impermissi 
required 'a cash proffer as a condition for the requested rezoning. "The BOI 
responded to this evidence of unreasonableness with evidence that cash proff 
were not required as a condition precedent to a rezoning, and that the rezon 
requested . .. would adversely impact public health, safety, and welfare in 
297 
'pportunity for 
ct adjacent or 
permi tted Use. 
e and the site 
ribe condition; 
lided in their 
~he opinion of 






pe of his use 
zoning ordi-
~s are being 
number and 
necessarily 
















I TYPES OF ZONING REGULATION § 9.20 
jrized to issue building permits, or an administrative board may 
/
' be given jurisdiction to hear and decide applications for excep-
tions. In either case, the determination commonly is one of fact; 
I rarely is the matter committed to the discretion of an officer or 
/ 
board. Consequently, the exception is a device which, in its most 
common form, gives relief to a property owner who is disadvan-I taged by a zoning restriction, without affording protection to ~and 
I adjacent to the excepted use. 
I 
I 
Exceptions pose an administrative problem which is considered 
in later sections.47 The device is briefly noted here, because it is a 
1\ method of relieving the imperfections which necessarily result 
from the kind of Euclidian zoning ordinance which is used in 
( some degree by all municipalities. 
§ 9.20. Conditional zoning. 
A zoning amendment which permits a use of particular prop-
erty in a zoning district subject to restrictions other than those 
applicable to all land similarly classified is sometimes referred to 
as conditional zoning. Such regulations assume a variety of forms. 
Where a landowner requests that his property be rezoned to al-
Iowa use not permitted under existing restrictions, he may be 
advised that his land will be reclassified if he first executes and 
files a covenant which limits the use of his parcel in specific ways 
not common to other property similarly classified. When this has 
been accomplished, the land is rezoned without overt reference to 
the covenant. Nevertheless, the zoning amendment enacted only. 
after the covenant was made is sometimes described as condi-
tional zoning.48 
Less common, but occasionally used, is the amendment of a 
zoning ordinance to permit certain uses on condition that the 
landowner covenant to use the land subject to certain conditions 
not generally applicable to other land in the same district, or in 
districts of the same class.49 
47. See Chapter 21 in Volume 3. 
48. "Conditional zoning" involves 
only adopted zoning ordinances which 
provide either that rezoning becomes 
effective immediately with an auto-
matic repealer if the specified condi-
tions are not met, or that the zoning 
becomes effective only upon conditions 
being met within a certain time. State 
ex reI. Zupancic v Schimenz, 46 Wis 
2d 22, 174 NW2d 533 (1970); citing 
Anderson, American Law of Zoning 
(1st ed) §§ 8.20, 8.21. 
49. Where the official public minutes 
of the board of commissioners shows 
that the board rezoned certain prop-
167 
§ 9.20 AMERICAN LAW OF ZONING 
Finally, land may be reclassified subject to conditions not ap-
plicable to other property in the same or similar districts. 60 
As noted briefly in an earlier section,5) conditional zoning is a 
device employed to bring some flexibility to an otherwise rigid 
system of land-use contro1.52 The need for flexibility in general is 
too obvious to require extended comment, but two situations il-
lustrate more clearly than most that some flexibility in the 
imposition of land-use controls can be of critical importance. Zon-
erty "pursuant with stipulations pre- , 
sented by" the then owner and ap-
plicant for rezoning, which 
stipulations were incorporated in the 
minutes, this amounted to a condi-
tional rezoning, Ervin Co. v Brown, 
228 Ga 14, 183 SE2d 743 (1971). 
50. Conditional zoning is a phrase 
used to describe a zoning change 
granted to an owner subject to condi-
tions generally not applicable to land 
similarly zoned. Scrutton v County of 
Sacramento, 275 Cal App 2d 412, 79 
Cal Rptr 872 (1969, 3d Dist); citing 
Anderson, American Law of Zoning 
(1st ed). Where zoning ordinance pro-
vides that auto service stations may 
be permitted in district if their loca-
tion conforms to the objectives of the 
master plan, planning commission has 
considerable discretion in determining 
whether proposed use subserves the . 
master plan's basic objectives, and a ' 
city does not abuse its discretion by 
adopting zone classifications with 
specific standards and requirements 
even though applicant met minimum 
standards of the basic zoning ordi-
nance. Van Sicklen v Browne, 15 Cal 
App 3d 122, 92 Cal Rptr 786 (1971 1st 
Dist). 
A zoning ordinance is valid that 
permits a car rental subagency to 
operate at hotels with 100 or more 
guest rooms, under the condition that 
none of the cars be stored at the hotel 
unless under hire, and that while 
parked there no servicing or repairs 
be made. Miami Beach v Eason, 194 
So 2d 652 (1967, Fla App D3). 
168 
Where a zone change was condi-
tioned to permit commercial develop-
ment of the property only if the entire 
parcel were developed, the planning 
board properly denied approval of a 
plan to construct a free standing res-
taurant. Dowd v Dowley, 126 Misc 2d 
741 , 483 NYS2d 884 (1984). 
See generally. Land Use-Goffinet v 
County of Christian «(Ill) 357 NE2d 
442): New Flexibility In Illinois Zon-
ing Law, 8 Loyola U L J (Chicago) 642 
(1977); Strine, Use of Condition in 
Land-Use Control, 67 Dick L Rev p 109 
(1963); Trager, Contract Zoning, 23 
Maryland L Rev p 121 (1963); Com-
ment, The Use and Abuse of Contract 
Zoning, 12 UCLA L Rev p 897 (1965); 
Comment, Zoning Amendments and 
Variances Subject to Conditions, 12 
Syracuse L Rev p 230 (1960). 
51. See § 9.17, supra. 
52. Templeton v County Council of 
Prince George's County, 21 Md App 
636, 321 A2d 778 (1974), adhered to 23 
Md App 596, 329 A2d 428; citing 
Anderson, American Law of Zoning 
(1st ed) § 8.20. 
See generally, Discretionary Land 
Use Controls, 1971 Planning, Zoning 
and Eminent Dom lnst 1 (1971); Status 
of Conditional Rezoning in Illi-
nois-An Argument to Sustain a Flex-
ible Zoning Tool. 63 Illinois BJ 132 
(1974). 
f') t'J Q \', L , / 
ns not ap-
:ts.50 
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TYPES OF ZONING REGULATION § 9.20 
ing presumes the division of a community into fixed districts 
marked out by boundaries. Uses are permitted in designated 
districts because they ar~ thought to be compatible with other 
uses permitted in such district. Unavoidably, districts with un-
like restrictions abut one another. Given this kind of arrange-
ment, it follows that land on the periphery of a highly restricted 
zone will feel the impact of uses maintained in an adjacent and 
less restricted zone. More importantly, the effect of incompatible 
adjacent use will fall more heavily upon some property in the 
highly restricted district than it does upon other land in the 
same district. This unequal hardship finally results in pressure 
for reclassification of land lying on the borderline of a district. If 
reclassification is permitted without special attention to the 
impact upon land abutting the new boundary, the process of 
hardship, petition, and relief begins again. Conditional zoning is 
a method of giving special attention to such potential impact. 53 
The second situation in which a flexible, tailor-made restriction 
is of singular importance is one in which space is needed in a 
particular district for a use not permitted there, and presumably 
incompatible with the uses which are allowed. As indicated in 
other places, this end may be served through the administrative 
devices of special permits,54 exceptions,55 or variances.56 In addi-
tion, it may be accomplished legislatively through use of the 
floating zone,s' or by conditional zoning. Where the latter method 
is employed, serious legal difficulties may be encountered. These 
are discussed in the remainder of this section, and in the next. 
Miscellaneous objections to conditional zoning, including the 
propriety of certain conditions, the effect of the uniformity 
requirement, and the spot zoning challenge, are reviewed below. 
Objections to conditional zoning on the ground that it constitutes 
"contract zoning" are discussed in § 9.21, infra. 
In general, zoning enabling acts do not specifically authorize 
zoning subject to conditions.58 In most states, if such authority ex~ 
ists, it must be inferred from the general delegation of zoning 
53. Conditions imposed are designed 
to protect adjacent land from the loss 
of use value which might occur if the 
newly authorized use were permitted 
without restraint of any kind. Temple-
ton v County Council of Prince 
George's County, 21 Md App 636, 321 
A2d 778 (1974), adhered to 23 Md App 
596, 329 A2d 428. 
54. See § 9.18, supra. 
55. See § 9.19, supra. 
56. See Chapter 20 in Volume 2. 
57. See Chapter 11 in Volume 2. 
58. In some states, there may be 
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power. One writer has observed that while the enabling statutes 
do not contain language authorizing the imposition of conditions 
neither do they expressly negate such authority.59 ' 
In Church v Islip,60 the New York Court of Appeals reviewed 
an ordinance which permitted certain land to be used for bUsi-
ness purposes on the following conditions: 
1. The buildings shall not total more than 25% of the area. 
2. An anchor post fence, or equal, six feet high, is to be erected 
five feet within the boundary line of the property. 
3. Live shrubbery, three feet high either within or outside of 
the fence is to be planted, and allowed to grow to the height of 
the fence. 
4. The above must be performed or put in operation before car-
rying on any retail business on the property. 
Authority to impose conditions was inferred from the author-
ity to reclassify land without such conditions. Reclassification 
subject to certain restrictions was regarded. as an exercise of a 
lesser amount of power contained in the larger delegation of 
power to reclassify without such limitations upon use. More 
recently, the same court observed: "The standards for judging 
the validity of conditional zoning are no different from the stan-
dards used to judge whether unconditional zoning is illegal. If 
modification .to a less restrictive zoning classification is war-
ranted, then a fortiori conditions imposed by a local legislature 
to minimize conflicts among 'districts should not in and of 
themselves violate any prohibition against spot zoning."61 
express statutory authority for rezon-
ing with conditions under certain cir-
cumstances. See Ziegler, Rathkopfs 
The Law of Zoning & Planning at 
Chapter 29A. 
59. Strine, Use of Condition in Land-
Use Control, 67 Dick L Rev p 109 
(1963). 
60. Church v Islip, 8 NY2d 254, 203 
NYS2d 866, 168 NE2d 680 (1960). 
61. Collard v Flower Hill, 52 NY2d 
594, 439 NYS2d 326, 421 NE2d 818 
(1981), iaterproceeding (2d Dept) 99 
App Div 2d 687, 471 NYS2d 731, app 
den 62 NY2d 606,472 NE2d 327, later 
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proceeding (ED NY) 604 F Supp 1318, 
affd (CA2 NY) 759 F2d 205, cert den 
(US) 88 L Ed 2d 72, 106 S Ct 88. 
"Conditional zoning is a means of 
achieving some degree of flexibility in 
land use control by minimizing the 
potentially deleterious effect of a zone 
change on neighboring properties; rea-
sonably conceived. conditions harmo-
nize the landowner's need for rezon-
ing with the public interest and 
certainly fall within the spirit of the 
enabling legislation." Collard v Flower 
Hill, 52 NY2d 594, 439 NYS2d 326, 
421 NE2d 818 (1981), later proceeding 
(2d Dept) 99 App Div 2d 687, 471 
NYS2d 731, app den 62 NY2d 606, 472 
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The conditions generally imposed are those designed to protect 
adjacent land from the loss of use value which might occur if the 
newly permitted use were permitted without restraint of any 
kind. Undoubtedly, conditions which are imposed must be rea-
sonably related to some legitimate objective of zoning.62 
Conditions have been approved which prohibited outdoor stor-
age,63 required offstreet parking and limited hours of operation,64 
NE2d 327, later proceeding (ED NY) 
604 F Supp 1318, affd (CA2 NY) 759 
F2d 205, cert den (US) 88 L Ed 2d 72, 
106 S Ct 88. 
A municipality has the power to at-
tach reasonable conditions to its zon-
ing reclassifications. D'Angelo v Di 
Bernardo, 106 Mise 2d 735, 435 NYS2d 
206 (1980); citing Anderson, New York 
Zoning Law and Practice (2nd ed) 
§ 8.13. 
See also Chrismon v Guilford 
County, 322 NC 611, 370 SE2d 579 
(1988) (holding that conditional zon-
ing, "when carried out properly," is 
an approved practice in North Caroli-
na). 
See generally Trager, Contract Zon-
ing, 23 Maryland L Rev p 121 (1963). 
62. In Georgia, conditional zoning 
will be sustained where the conditions 
are designed to protect the neighbor-
hood from the impact of the zoning 
amendment. Warshaw v Atlanta, 250 
Ga 535, 299 SE2d 552 (1983). 
Rezoning of property was valid con-
ditional rezoning and not invalid con-
tract rezoning where the rezoning was 
based on several conditions which 
were imposed to protect neighboring 
property owners from the effects of the 
zoning change. Johnson v Glenn, 246 
Ga 685, 273 SE2d 1 (1980). 
The party challenging the condi-
tional zoning has the burden of over-
coming the presumption of its valid-
ity. Dekalb County v Graham, 251 Ga 
423. 306 SE2d 270 (1983). 
The grant of a special use permit 
within an agricultural district, pursu-
ant to a statute that authorizes the 
exercise of discretion to condition a 
special use permit with protective 
restrictions, may be characterized as 
"conditional zoning". Generally, such 
conditional actions will be upheld 
when they are imposed for protection 
or benefit of neighbors and ameliorate 
the effects of zoning change. Perry v 
Planning Com. of County of Hawaii, 
62· Hawaii 666, 619 P2d 95 (1980). 
Rezoning a residential area to a 
business use, on the condition that the 
area rezoned be used exclusively for 
the business use named in the applica-
tion, constituted a rezoning without 
regard to public health, safety and 
welfare and was invalid. Oury v Gre-
any, 107 RI 427, 267 A2d 700 (1970). 
The conditional standards appli-
cable to auto wrecking yards and 
referring to construction of a sight-
obscuring fence did not authorize the 
expansion of the wrecking yard by 
construction of a new building to 
house the disassembly operation. Bartz 
v Board of Adjustment, 5 Wash App 
497,487 P2d 782 (1971), revd on other 
grounds 80 Wash 2d 209, 492 P2d 
1374. 
63. Cohalan v Lechtrecker, 84 App 
Div 2d 775, 443 NYS2d 892 (1981, 2d 
Dept), affd 56 NY2d 861, 453 NYS2d 
427,438 NE2d 1142. 
64. Warshaw v Atlanta, 250 Ga 535, 
299 SE2d 552 (1983). 
171 
§ 9.20 AMERICAN LAW OF ZONING 
and required road improvements.65 Some courts have subjected 
conditional zoning to special scrutiny.66 Conditions which 
restricted access67 and required the dedication of land have been 
held invalid.68 A challenge to conditional zoning may not be 
mounted by a landowner who has benefited from the condition.59 
Conditional zoning is vulnerable to the objection that it offends 
the requirement that all zoning regulations "shall be uniform for 
each class or kind of building throughout each district. "70 It is 
reasoned by exponents of this position that property subject to 
conditions is treated differently than other property in the same 
district, or in districts with the same designation.7I Judicial 
construction of the uniformity requirement is reviewed in an-
other place,72 but it should be observed here that this attack is 
rarely mounted where conditional zoning is in issue, and that it 
has not been notably successfup3 
Conditional zoning ordinances have been held invalid where 
the performance or nonperformance of the landowner might 
65. Cross v Hall County, 238 Ga 709, 
235 SE2d 379 (1977). 
66. Nolan v Taylorville, 95 III App 
3d 1099, 51 III Dec 479, 420 NE2d 1037 
(1981, 5th Dist). 
67. Wood Bros. Homes, Inc.·v Colo-
rado Springs, 42 Colo App 15, 592 P2d 
1336 (1978). 
68. Board of Supervisors v Rowe, 216 
Va 128, 216 SE2d 199 (1975). 
Conditions requiring an easement 
or dedication of land may raise special 
constitutional issues under the Fifth 
and Fourteenth Amendments. See 
Chapter 3A, supra. 
69. As long as conditional zoning is 
otherwise valid, neighbors of the zoned 
property cannot successfully attack 
the conditions that have been imposed 
for their own welfare. Cross v Hall 
County, 238 Ga 709, 235 SE2d 379 
(1977). 
See also Cedar Rapids v McConnell-
Stevely-Anderson, 423 NW2d 17 (1988, 
Iowa) (property owner who had re-
quested, and benefitted from, ordi-
172 
nance was estopped from challenging 
its validity). 
70. Standard State Zoning Enabling 
Act § 2 (1926); see generally, Anderson 
& Roswig, Planning, Zoning & Subdivi-
sion: A Summary of Statutory Law in 
the 50 States, Chart No 4 p 194 (1966). 
71. See generally Comment, Zoning 
Amendments and Variances Subject 
to Conditions, 12 Syracuse L Rev p 230 
(1960). 
72. See § 5.25, supra in Volume 1. 
73. See, for example, Church v Islip, 
8 NY2d 254, 203 NYS2d 866, 168 NE2d 
680 (1960). 
Uniformity provisions apply to a 
legislative enactment but do not serve 
to invalidate a condition arising from 
a consensual agreement to refrain 
from the use or sale of alcoholic bever-
ages on a particular premises even 
where similar restrictions are not ap-
plied within the same zoning district. 
J-Marion Co. v County of Sacramento, 
76 Cal App 3d 517, 142 Cal Rptr 723 
(1977, 3d Dist). 
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result in a reclassification of the land by force of private conduct. 
Such an automatic reversion feature was disapproved by a Cali-
fornia court.74 A New York court reached the same conclusion 
where the ordinance rezoned land on condition "that the grade of 
the entire parcel shall be brought down to approximately the 
grade of Brush Hollow Road in accordance with grades and 
specificiations approved by the Town Engineer."75 But reverter 
provisions have been sustained in Pennsylvania,76 Illinois,77 and 
Maryland. 78 
Conditional zoning measures ordinarily apply to small parcels. 
Accordingly, it is frequently asserted in litigation involving 
conditional zoning that the amendment is not in accordance with 
a comprehensive plan, and that it is invalid as spot zoning. The 
bulk of Chapter 5 is devoted to this problem, so it will not be 
reviewed here. 79 
But see Bartsch v Planning & ZOn-
ing Com., 6 Conn App 686, 506 A2d 
1093 (1986) (conditional zoning inval-
id); Board of County Comrs. v Manny 
Holtz, Inc., 65 Md App 574, 501 A2d 
489 (1985). And cf. People's Counsel 
for Baltimore County v Mockard, 73 
Md App 340, 533 A2d 1344 (1987) (and 
cases cited therein). 
74. The automatic reversion feature 
in a conditional zoning grant was void 
as it would amount to a second rezon-
ing and would violate the procedural 
directions of the state law. Scrutton v 
County of Sacramento, 275 Cal App 
2d 412, 79 Cal Rptr 872 (1969, 3d Dist); 
citing Anderson, American Law of 
Zoning (1st ed). . 
75. Levine v Oyster Bay, 46 Misc 2d 
106,259 NYS2d 247 (1964) . 
76. When a township Zoning Admin-
istrator cancels approval of a zone 
change, for failure to . build the pro-
posed use within 6 months of the ap-
proval, the parcel reverts to the zon-
ing status it had prior to the grant of 
zoning approval. A trial court cannot 
extend the time period. Inn Manage-
ment Services, Inc. v Upper St. Clair, 
52 Pa Cmwlth 46, 415 A2d 915 (1980). 
77. "Rezoning land from agricul-
tural to heavy industrial classification 
on condition that it be used for syn· 
thetic gas production plant and that 
upon removal the rezoning should 
revert to agricultural use was valid 
conditional zoning." Where shift to 
industrial use was recognized in com-
prehensive plan and such use of the 
236-acre tract would not decrease the 
value of adjacent land and would ben-
efit the public, the rezoning was not 
invalid spot zoning. Goffinet v County 
of Christian, 30 III App 3d 1089, 333 
NE2d 731 (1975, 5th Dist), affd 65 III 
2d 40, 2 III Dec 275, 357 NE2d 442 
(1976). 
78. A provlslOn in an ordinance 
whereby land would revert to prior 
classification if time requirements as 
to site plans, building permits, and 
actual construction were not met was 
not conditional zoning since the provi-
sion applied to all land, not specific 
property. Colwell v Howard County, 
31 Md App 8, 354 A2d 210 (1976) . 
79. See generally Comment, 12 Syr-
acuse L Rev pp 230, 240 (1960). 
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examined, it should be noted that municipal action which is 
properly taken may limit municipal power to adopt and enforce 
police power regulations. For example, in some jurisdictions, ap-
proval of a subdivision plat at the request of a landowner results 
in the temporary suspension of municipal authority to impose 
more stringent minimum lot area requirements upon the land 
covered by the approved plat. 81 While this is not land-use · control 
by contract, it contains as many features of agreement with a 
landowner as are present in some conditional zoning transac-
tions. Perhaps more closely allied to contracts is a sale of munic-
ipalland for a known purpose. It has been held that a municipal-
ity may not perfect the sale or lease and then proceed to prohibit 
the purpose for which the land was, to the knowledge of the 
municipality, purchased and sold.82 Similarly, a municipality may 
not receive a grant of land in return for restrictive covenants on 
such land and then authorize use inconsistent with the cove-
nants_83 While these decisions are not directly relevant to the 
contract zoning issue, they suggest that municipal police power is 
not totally insulated from the effect of municipal conduct. 
The courts of a growing number of states have upheld zoning 
ordinances which were either preceded by the filing of a cove-
nant restricting use, or were followed by such a covenant. In 
Massachusetts, a zoning amendment was adopted after the owner 
of the rezoned land had filed a covenant, and had given the 
municipality a 30-year option to purchase a tract which was to 
remain as a park to provide a buffer between the new uses and 
tanooga, __ , slip op (1988, Tenn App) 
(same). 
Annotation: Validity, construction, 
and effect of agreement to rezone, or 
amendment to zoning ordinance creat-
ing special restrictions or conditions 
not applicable to other property simi-
larly zoned. 70 ALR3d 125. 
81. See Anderson, New York Zoning 
Law and Practice (3rd ed) § 21.21. 
82. Where a town leased island prop-
erty for use as a hotel, marina, and 
yacht club, including the maintenance 
of gasoline facilities, it was without 
power to prohibit the reconstruction 
of gasoline pumps destroyed by a hur-
ricane. To prohibit the lessee from 
maintaining gasoline facilities would 
be to impair the obligation of a con-
tract. Wa-Wa-Yanda, Inc. v Dickerson, 
18 App Div 2d 251, 239 NYS2d 473 
(1963, 2d Dept). 
83. Palisades Properties, Inc. v Bru-
netti, 44 NJ 117, 207 A2d 522 (1965). 
But compare American Land Co. v 
Keene, 41 F2d 484 (1930, CAl NH). A 
written agreement whereby a town 
promised to recommend to a county 
council the rezoning of about 18 acres 
to permit the construction of apart-
ments, in consideration of a builder's 
promise to donate a prescribed scenic 
easement, to limit development for 20 
years, and to donate certain park land, 
is not contract zoning. Funger v Som-
erset, 249 Md 311, 239 A2d 748 (1968). 
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nearby land. The court fixed its attention on the ordinance and 
found it to be untainted by the remainder of the transaction.84 
The same result was reached by the Supreme Court of Nebraska 
where the owner-applicant, at the direction . of the legislative 
body, filed a covenant before his land was reclassified.85 An Ohio 
court approved an ordinance which rezoned certain land on condi-
tion that a restrictive covenant against strip mining be filed. 86 A 
California court described "contract zoning" as a phrase having 
no legal significance but simply referring to a reclassification of 
land in which the owner agrees to certain conditions not imposed 
on other land of the same classification.87 
In New York, conditional zoning has been upheld,88 and the 
courts have declined to admit proof of the connection between 
the filing of the covenant and the enactment of a zoning amend-
ment affecting the same property.89·In fact, New York has upheld 
a zoning ordinance which was preceded by the filing of a declara-
tion of restrictions which could not be amended without the 
concurrence of the town board, the court saying that the restric-
tions were voluntary and that the zoning regulations were not 
conditioned upon the declaration. 90 Further, a lower New York 
court has held that zoning amendments enacted pursuant to a 
84. Sylvania Electric Products, Inc. 
v Newton, 344 Mass 428, 183 NE2d 
118 (1962). 
85. Bucholz v Omaha, 174 Neb 862, 
120 NW2d 270 (1963). 
86. Johnson v Griffiths, 74 Ohio L 
Abs 482, 141 NE2d 774 (1955, App, 
Mahoning Co), app dismd for want of 
debat q 164 Ohio St 393, 58 Ohio Ops 
188,131 NE2d 397. 
87. Scrutton v County of Sacra-
mento, 275 Cal App 2d 412, 79 Cal 
Rptr 872 (1969, 3d Dist), citing Ander-
son, American Law of Zoning (1st ed). 
But cf. Delucchi v County of Santa 
Cruz, 179 Cal App 3d 814, 225 Cal Rptr 
43 (1986), cert den and app dismd 479 
US 803, 107 S Ct 46 (1986) (if agree-
ment between landowner and county 
to preserve agricultural land were 
interpreted to prevent application of 
future land use restrictions, the agree-
176 
ment would constitute illegal contract 
zoning). 
88. Church v Islip, 8 NY2d 254, 203 
NYS2d 866, 168 NE2d 680 (1960), 
discussed in Court of Appeals, 1959 
Term-Zoning, 10 Buffalo L Rev p 245 
(1960-61). . 
89. Point Lookout Civic Asso., Inc. v 
Hempstead, 22 Misc 2d 757, 200 
NYS2d 925 (1960), affd (2d Dept) 12 
App Div 2d 505, 207 NYS2d 121, affd 
9 NY2d 961, 217 NYS2d 227, 176 NE2d 
203. . 
90. Schachter v Burns, 24 Misc 2d 
60, 203 NYS2d 499 (1960). Where a 
zoning ordinance was enacted after a 
landowner had signed an agreement 
that in the event of condemnation his 
claim would be limited to the residen-
tial value of the land, although the 
amended ordinance permitted com-
mercial use, the court held that the 
30h 
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contract to purchase planned low-income housing under the 
"turnkey" program of the Department of Housing and Urban 
Development was not contract zoning at all .91 In Maryland, the 
courts have upheld a zoning amendment which was preceded by 
the filing of a covenant restricting use, where the covenant was 
not referred to in the ordinance and apparently was not relied 
upon by the legislative body.92 The same result was reached where 
the legislative body affirmatively spelled out that it neither 
imposed conditions nor made them the basis for its action. 93 
However, the Maryland courts disapproved a zoning ordinance 
which reclassified land on condition that the owners enter into 
an agreement with the city to develop the land in a particular 
way,94 and detected lack of uniformity in a conditional zoning 
agreement was enforceable that the 
enactment was not invalid as contract 
zoning. Re Rosedale Ave., 40 Misc 2d 
1076, 243 NYS2d 814 (1963). An infe-
rior New York court held that a zon-
ing ordinance is invalid which changes 
the classification of land on condition 
that "the grade of the entire parcel 
shall be brought down to approxi-
mately the grade of Brush Hollow 
Road in accordance with the grades 
and specifications to be approved by 
the Town Engineer." Such conditional 
rezoning "in future" contingent on the 
performance of certain acts by the 
owners is contract zoning. and is there-
fore invalid. Levine v Oyster Bay, 46 
Misc 2d 106, 259 NYS2d 247 (1964). In 
order to sustain a claim of zoning by 
contract there must be a clear indica-
tion of an agreement binding upon the 
parties and a bargaining away of legis-
lative power by the village board. A 
mere offer to convey a lot owned by 
the defendants (adjacent to a lot on 
which they sought a building permit) 
and needed by the village to widen a 
cross street and a subsequent convey-
ance of the lot to the village and issu-
ance of a building permit after the vil-
lage board amended the zoning 
ordinance does not sustain a claim of 
zoning by contract, where the village 
could have enacted the amendment at 
any time. Century Circuit, Inc. v Ott, 
65 Misc 2d 250, 317 NYS2d 468 (1970), 
affd 37 App Div 2d 1044, 327 NYS2d 
829. A municipality is without author-
ity to diminish its legislative power by 
entering a settlement agreement in a 
zoning action which gives a landowner 
a vested right to use his land in a 
specified way, without regard to subse-
quent changes in the zoning regula-
tions. Andgar Associates, Inc. v Board 
of Zoning Appeals, 30 App Div 2d 672, 
291 NYS2d 991 (1968, 2d Dept). 
91. Marino v Ramapo, 68 Misc 2d 44, 
326 NYS2d 162 (1971), citing Ander-
son, New York Zoning Law and Prac-
tice (lst ed) ~ 8.14; Anderson, Ameri-
can Law of Zoning (2nd ed) § 8.21. 
92. Pressman v Baltimore, 222 Md 
330, 160 A2d 379 (1960). 
The purchase by a municipality of a 
parcel of land from a developer pursu-
ant to a zoning ordinance did not con-
stitute contract zoning since any bene-
fit to the developer was available to 
all other landowners under the ordi-
nance. Baltimore v Crane, 277 Md 198, 
352 A2d 786 (1976); 
93. Somerset v County Council for 
Montgomery County, 229 Md 42, 181 
A2d 671 (1962). 
94. Baylis v Baltimore, 219 Md 164, 
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amendment. 95 Zoning amendments encumbered by restrictions 
have been upheld by the courts of Alabama,96 Georgia,97 Illinois,98 
and Wisconsin.99 A Florida court did not detect contract zoning 
where a legislative refusal to rezone was influenced by represen-
tatives of the land in issue.) 
95. Carole Highlands Citizens Asso. 
v Board of County Comrs., 222 Md 44, 
158 A2d 663 (1960). 
cr. Board of County Comrs. v Manny 
Holtz, Inc., 65 Md App 574, 501 A2d 
489 (1985); People's Counsel for Balti-
more County v Mockard, 73 Md App 
340, 533 A2d 1344 (1987) (and cases 
cited therein). 
96. A zoning ordinance which pro-
vided that the ordinance was subject 
to a reservation of a right-of-way for a 
parkway and that a second means of 
ingress and egress would be provided 
to the proposed parkway, was held by 
the reviewing court as not invalid on 
the ground that it constituted contract 
zoning, since the requirements were 
reasonable measures in light of antici-
pated traffic conditions. Haas v Mobile, 
2B9 Ala 16,265 So 2d 564 (1972). 
97. Rezoning by city council was not 
illegal contract zoning even though 
council voted to compromise with 
landowner who alleged their failure to 
rezone was an unconstitutional depri-
vation of his property and 4 months 
later council voted to rezone his land. 
Each council member testified the 
votes were independent of each other 
and procedures required for rezoning 
were complied with. Marietta v Tra-
ton Corp., 253 Ga 64, 316 SE2d 461 
(1984). 
Rezoning of residential land to in-
dustrial to permit a rock quarry on 
condition that the property owner 
would make improvements on the 
road leading to the quarry was condi-
tional zoning and valid. It was not 
contract zoning. Citing Anderson, 
American Law of Zoning (2nd ed) 
178 
§§ B.20, 8.21. Cross v Hall County, 238 
Ga 709, 235 SE2d 379 (1977). 
See also City of Powder Springs v 
WMM Properties, Inc., 253 Ga 753, 
325 SE2d 155 (1985) (agreement to 
provide access to sewer system up-
held). 
98. "Ordinance which rezoned land 
to CUD was not invalid as contract 
zoning by reasons of negotiations and 
conf~rences between amusement park 
developers and development commit-
tee." Rutland Environmental Protec-
tion Asso. v Kane County, 31 III App 
3d B2, 334 NE2d 215 (1975, 2d Dist), 
cert den 425 US 913, 47 L Ed 2d 764, 
96 S Ct 1510. 
99. An ordinance that effects a zon-
ing change not on the effective date of 
the ordinance but on the date certain 
conditions spelled out in the ordinance 
are met is a lawful exercise of the po-
lice power and does "not amount to 
contract zoning. Konkel v Common 
Council, Delafield, 6B Wis 2d 574, 229 
NW2d 606 (1975). 
Where a zoning authority does not 
make an agreement to zone but is 
mot,ivated to do so by agreements 
made between others or by voluntary 
restrictions running with the land, the 
ordinance is valid and is not consid-
ered conditional or contract zoning. 
State ex reI. Zupancic v Schimenz, 46 
Wis 2d 22, 174 NW2d 533 (1970), cit-
ing Anderson, American Law of Zon-
ing (1st ed). 
1. Walberg v Metropolitan Dade 
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TYPES OF ZONING REGULATION § 9.21 
Zoning amendments related to covenants executed prior to the 
enactment of the amendment,2 or subsequent thereto,S have been 
disapproved by some courts. A New Jersey court held invalid 
restrictions which purported to become effective when certain 
land was reclassified as a light industrial zone. The land was 
reclassified, but the court detected the relationship between the 
covenants and the amendment and declared both to be invalid. 
The entire proceedings were said to be· ultra vires. The court 
stated: "Contracts thus have no place in a zoning plan and a I 
contract between a municipality and a property owner should 
not enter into the enactment or enforcement of zoning regula-
tions."4 
The New Jersey courts view this kind of conditional zoning as i 
an improper bargaining away of legislative power which involves 
a hazard that private, rather than public, interests will be served. 
In V. F. Zahodiakin Corp. v Zoning Board of Adjustment, the 
court said: "Zoning is an exercise of the police power to serve the 
common good and general welfare. It is elementary that the 
2. Houston Petroleum Co. v Automo-
tive Products Credit Ass'n, 9 NJ 122, 
87 A2d 319 (1952). 
The rezoning of an area on the basis 
of assurances by the owner of the tract 
that it would be developed in accor-
dance with restrictive, already ap-
proved plans, was not permissible 
where the restrictions were not re-
quired or contemplated; in enacting 
an ordinance a municipality is en-
gaged in legislating not conti-acting. 
Allred v Raleigh, 277 NC 530, 178 
SE2d 432 (1971). 
An ordinance, requiring property 
owners to agree that should their peti-
tion for rezoning be granted, and the 
property subsequently not be used for 
the purpose then permitted it shall 
revert to the more restrictive clas-
sification, constituted contract zoning 
and as such was invalid. Hausmann & 
Johnson, Inc. v Berea Bd. of Bldg. Code 
Appeals, 40 Ohio App 2d 432, 69 Ohio 
Ops 2d 379, 320 NE2d 685 (1974, Cuya-
hoga Co) citing Anderson, American 
Law of Zoning (1st ed) §§ 14.56 et seq., 
and § 15.61. 
3. Hartnett v Austin, 93 So 2d 86 
(1956, Fla). 
4. Houston Petroleum Co. v Automo-
tive Products Credit Ass'n, 9 NJ 122, 
87 A2d 319 (1952). 
An attempt to escape the effect of a 
valid zoning ordinance by agreement 
between the borough and a property 
owner was on its face illegal, void and 
ultra vires. Suski v Mayor & Comrs. of 
Beach Haven, 132 NJ Super .158, 333 
A2d 25 (1975). 
A property owner was not bound by 
restrictive covenants executed by con-
tiguous landowners merely because 
his land was rezoned and that the self-
imposition of an equitable servitude 
had been a condition precedent to 
reclassification. An equitable servitude 
is an interest in land within the Stat-
ute of Frauds. Therefore, a written 
instrument must be signed by the 
owner. Gunnell v Hurst Lumber Co., 
30 Utah 2d 209, 515 P2d 1274 (1973). 
179 
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legislative function may not be surrendered or curtailed by 
bargain or its exercise controlled by the considerations which 
enter into the law of contracts. The use restriction must needs 
have general application. The power may not be exerted to serve 
private interests merely, nor may the principle be subverted to 
that end. . . . It was not within the province of the local author-
ity here to vest in the landowner by contract a special privilege 
or exemption to use its premises in violation of the general rule 
binding upon all other landowners within the zone .... The 
purported contract was ultra vires and all proceedings to effectu-
ate it were coram non judice and utterly void."5 
A Florida court found similar defects in a conditional zoning 
amendment which permitted certain uses subject to restrictions 
to be included in a collateral deed or agreement.s Similar disap-
proval has been registered by the courts in other states.7 
5. V. F. Zahodiakin Engineering 
Corp. v Zoning Board of Adjustment, 8 
NJ 336, 86 A2d 127 (1951). 
6. Hartnett v Austin, 93 So 2d 86 
(1956, Fla). 
7. Transamerica Title Ins. Co. v 
Tucson, 23 Ariz App 385,533 P2d 693 
(1975). 
Contract zoning is a concept held il-
legal in most states as an ultra vires 
bargaining away of the police power. 
Ford Leasing Development Co. v Board 
of County Comrs., 186 Colo 418, 528 
P2d 237 (1974), citing Anderson,Amer-
ican Law of Zoning (1st ed) § 8.20. 
Rezoning is legislative in nature and 
one county commission cannot deprive 
or restrict a succeeding commission in 
the exercise of its legislative power by 
entering into a contract or agreement 
purporting to limit the authority of 
the county commission. Barton v At-
kinson, 228 Ga 733, 187 SE2d 835 
(1972); County of Ada by Board of 
County Comrs. v Walter, 96 Idaho 630, 
533 P2d 1199 (1975). 
Ordinance which reclassified five 
acres of farmland from agricultural to 
180 
a B-3 commercial use to permit defen-
dant to build and operate a dance hall 
tavern allowed plaintiff to establish a 
prima facie case that zoning amend-
ment was passed in exchange for re-
strictive covenant which limited use 
of defendant's land and which dedi-
cated certain land to the county. This 
constituted invalid conditional zoning. 
Ziemer v County of Peoria, 33 III App 
3d 612, 338 NE2d 145 (1975, 3d Dist). 
Where the record contained no rep-
resentation by petitioner regarding 
their specific plans for development of 
the subject property, there was no 
unlawful contract zoning involved in 
adopting an ordinance which rezoned 
a 30 acre parcel. Graham v Raleigh, 
55 NC App 107,284 SE2d 742, peti-
tion den 305 NC 299, 290 SE2d 702. 
See also Chrismon v Guilford County, 
322 NC 611, 370 SE2d 579 (1988) (dis-
tinguishing illegal contract zoning 
from rezoning with conditions). 
As contract zoning is invalid, an 
agreement between a municipality 
and a landowner to rezone property 
on· the condition that there be no ac-
cess road, has no effect. Carlino v 
Whitpain Investors, Whitpain Town-
ship, 52 Pa Cmwlth 145, 415 A2d 461 
(1980), affd 499 Pa 498, 453 A2d 1385. 
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TYPES OF ZONING REGULATION § 9.22 
§ 9.22. -Statutory authority. 
In some jurisdictions specific kinds of contract zoning are au-
thorized by statute.8 An Indiana statute,9 for example, authorizes 
a planning commission, in connection with a petition for an 
amendment to the zoning ordinance, to require or allow the land-
owner to make . written commitments relative to the use or 
development of the parcel. Such commitments are recorded and 
take effect when the zoning amendment is adopted. The commit-
ments bind the owner and subsequent owners, and there is a pro-
cedure for modification or termination. The filing of a commit-
ment by a landowner does not obligate the municipality to make 
the zone change in issue. 
Perhaps the nearest thing to contract zoning in a literal sense 
is a zoning amendment enacted by a municipal legislature pursu-
ant to an agreement with a housing authority. Such agreements 
have been approved by the courts notwithstanding that the 
municipality agrees to rezone, and does so pursuant to the agree-
Restrictive covenants entered in 
consideration. of the adoption of a zon-
ing ordinance are not enforceable. Car-
lino v Whitpain Investors, 499Pa 498, 
453 A2d 1385 (1982). 
A covenant by property owners to 
maintain a buffer zone between apart-
ments on their land and the nearest 
property owner and a promise by the 
zoning board to rezone the land in 
return were void as against public 
policy. Haymon v Chattanooga, 513 
SW2d 185 (1973, Tenn App). Cf. Ben-
ton v City of Chattanooga, slip op 
(1988, Tenn App) (distinguishing ille-
gal contract zoning from rezoning with 
conditions). 
An amendment to the zoning ordi-
nance which required the developer 
prior to site plan approval to pledge to 
devote 15% of the lots to low-income 
housing as defined by H.U.D. was in-
valid as ultra vires. The legislature did 
not intend to permit socio-economic 
zoning. Secondly, the amendment, in 
establishing maximum rental and sale 
prices attempts to control compensa-
tion for the use of the land. Board of 
Supervisors v De Groff Enterprises, 
Inc., 214 Va 235, 198 SE2d 600, 62 
ALR3d 874 (1973). 
A contract made by the zoning au-
thorities to zone or rezone is illegal 
and the ordinance involved is void 
because a municipality 'may not sur-
render its governmental powers or 
functions. State ex reI. Zupancic v 
Schimenz, 46 Wis 2d 22, 174 NW2d 
533 (1970), citing Anderson, American 
Law of Zoning (1st ed). 
See generally, Contract and Condi-
tional Zoning: A Tool for Zoning Flex-
ibility. 23 Hastings LJ 825 (1972); 
Contract Zoning: A Flexible Technique 
for Protecting Maine Municipalities. 
24 Maine L Rev 263 (1972); "Contract 
Zoning" Method and Public Policy. 
1972 Urban L Ann 219 (1972). 
Comment, "Use and Abuse of Con-
tract Zoning". 12 UCLA L Rev 897 
(1965). 
8. See generally Ziegler, Rathkopfs 
The Law of Zoning & Planning at 
Chapter 29A. 
9. § 36-7-4-607, Ind Stat Ann. 
181 
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ment.10 Where two public agencies are involved, the likelihood of 
solely private benefit is reduced, and the problem of authority to 
enter into the contract may be solved by legislation specifically 
authorizing the contract. For example, in New York a state loan 
for public housing cannot be made unless the municipality in 
which the housing project is to be located has enacted, or agreed 
to enact, zoning regulations which will protect the siteY To 
permit compliance with this requirement, municipalities are au-
thorized by statute to enter into an agreement with an "author-
ity, housing company or a government" to zone or rezone an area 
to protect a proposed housing project.12 It is clear, therefore, that 
the legislative authority of a New York municipality has power 
to enter into such an agreement, and that such an agreement 
does not offend the enabling legislation of the state. IS 
It should not be concluded that agreements to impose zoning 
10. See, for example, Passaic Junior 
Chamber of Commerce v Housing Au-
thority of Passaic, 45 NJ Super 381, 
132 A2d 813 (1957); St. Stephen's Club 
v Youngstown Metropolitan Housing 
Authority, 164 Ohio St 194, 52 Ohio 
Ops 3, 115 NE2d 385 (1953). 
Property owners and town council 
entered into a rezoning contract which 
obligated the town to rezone owner's 
land to permit construction of multi-
family dwellings thereon, but did not 
expressly prohibit the town from at 
anytime rescinding or amending its 
rezoning of subject property. Where 
the town two years later amended said 
ordinance so that a multi-family dwell-
ing became a conditionally permitted 
use and available only if authorized 
by the zoning board as a special excep-
tion, the court found it could not read 
into the contract a provision that the 
town would agree to exempt subject 
land from any subsequent zoning legis-
lation changing a multi-family dwell-
ing from a permitted use. Nicholson v 
Tourtellotte, 110 RI 411, 293 A2d 909, 
70 ALR3d 118 (1972). 
Where restaurant operators at-
tempted to rectify a deficiency in off-
street parking by a zoning variance 
and subsequently entered into an 
182 
agreement. with the village whereby 
neighboring structure would be demol-
ished and the resulting vacant lot 
converted into off-street parking 
spaces, plaintiffs by accepting the ben-
efit thereof for approximately three 
years could not rescind or repUdiate 
their contract and attempt to reliti-
gate the issues upon which the agree-
ment was originally predicated. Psy-
hogios v Skokie, 4 III App 3d 186, 280 
NE2d 552 (1972, 1st Dist). 
11. NY Pub Housing Law § 71. 
12. NY Pub Housing Law § 99. 
13. Chase v Glen Cove, 34 Misc 2d 
810, 227 NYS2d 131 (1962). 
Where petitioners, tax-paying resi-
dents, argued that the zoning changes 
enacted by the town to enable the 
construction of a federally financed 
low income housing development in 
the vicinity of their property consti-
tuted illegal spot zoning, it was found 
that the amendments did not offend 
the state constitution nor did it consti-
tute impermissible "contract zoning." 
Marino v Ramapo, 68 Misc 2d 44, 326 
NYS2d 162 (1971), citing Anderson, 
New York Zoning Law and Practice 
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TYPES OF ZONING REGULATION § 9.23 
restrictions are valid simply because they are between two public 
agencies. A Florida court held invalid an agreement between a 
city and the state whereby the city promised to adopt certain re-
strictive zoning regulations. The purpose of the regulation was to 
prevent the improvement of the land which the state planned to 
acquire for a public purpose. The court's opinion was grounded 
on its disapproval of the contract aspect of the transaction, as 
well as the confiscatory effect of the whole scheme. 14 Absent a 
scheme with confiscatory impact, a Florida court held that an 
agreement between a city and a public housing authority, 
whereby the city agreed to make specified zoning changes to 
protect a housing project, was not unlawfu1. 1s 
§ 9.23. Incentive zoning. 
The common zoning ordinance has a basically negative impact . 
It prohibits certain uses in certain districts, and imposes area 
restrictions in terms of yard, setback, .size of lot, frontage and the 
like. Recent ordinances contain a growing number of affirmative 
provisions which require the construction of fences to conceal 
unsightly uses, the building of screens to protect residential users 
from glare, or the planting of trees and shrubs to enhance the ap-
pearance of the area. Even these provisions have minimal effect 
in guiding the development of the community into channels 
regarded as desirable. 
Incentive zoning (sometimes referred to as bonus zoning) 
undertakes to add an affirmative thrust to the land use regula-
tions by encouraging the establishment of uses regarded as desir-
able, or by inducing developers to add certain amenities when 
new construction is carried out. It is a carrot-and-stick technique 
which employs administrative concessions to induce needed 
construction or desired features thereof.16 
The incentive zoning technique can be illustrated by describing 
(1st ed) § 8.14; 1 Anderson, American 
Law of Zoning (1st ed) § 8.2l. 
14. Board of Comrs. of State Institu-
tions v Tallahassee Bank & Trust Co., 
108 So 2d 74 (1958, Fla App D1), cert 
quashed (Fla) 116 So 2d 762. 
15. Housing Authority of Melbourne 
v Richardson, 196 So 2d 489 (1967, Fla 
App D4). 
16. See generally, Marcus and 
Groves, The New Zoning: Legal, Ad-
ministrative, and Economic Concepts 
and Techniques, p 200 (1970); Bonus 
or Incentive Zoning-Legal Implica-
tions. 21 Syracuse L Rev 895 (1970). 
See also Ziegler, Rathkopf's The 
Law of Zoning & Planning at Chapter 
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ditionaI facts, such as a change in conditions 
or other considerations materially affecting 
the merits, have intervened since the adop-
tion of the regulations.13 
A change in zoning should be in accord with 
the statutory purposes or the general scheme 
of a comprehensive zoning plan.14 Spot zoning 
which is not in harmony with an existing 
comprehensive plan 15 or ordinance16 is invalid. 
On the other hand, where the zoning amend-
ment is part of a comprehensive plan or is in 
conformity therewith, it is not illegal spot 
zoning. 17 The fact that a zoning ordinance may 
allow spot zoning does not make the ordinance 
bad; the question instead is whether particu-
lar zoning or rezoning is done for reasons 
other than the general welfare.18 Consider-
ations of public health, safety, and welfare 
may sometimes justify such a change as part 
of a comprehensive, well-considered plan in 
the public interest. 19 
§ 76 Contracts for amendments; 
conditional rezoning 
A municipality generally does not have 
authority to enter into a contract with a 
property owner for the reclassification or 
rezoning of property or the enactment of 
13Cal.-Scrutton v. Sacramento County, 275 Cal. App. 
2d 412, 79 Cal. Rptr. 872 (3d Dist. 1969). 
Miss.-Jitney-Jungle, Inc. v. City of Brookhaven, 311 
So. 2d 652 (Miss. 1975). 
As to a change of conditions or mistake as a neces-
sary basis for rezoning, generally, see § 73. 
14Conn.-Zandri v. Zoning Commission of Town of 
Ridgefield, 150 Conn. 646, 192 A.2d 876 (1963). 
Ind.-Penn v. Metropolitan Plan Commission of 
Marion County, 141 Ind. App. 387, 228 N.E.2d 25 (Div. 2 
1967). 
As to comprehensive zoning plans, generally, see § 39. 
15Mass.-Board of Appeals of Hanover v. Housing Ap-
peals Committee in Dept. of Community Affairs, 363 
Mass. 339, 294 N.E.2d 393 (1973). 
Tex.-McWhorter v. City of Winnsboro, 525 S.W.2d 
701 (Tex. Civ. App. Tyler 1975), writ refused n.r.e., (Oct. 
1, 1975). 
16Miss.-McKibben v. City of Jackson, 193 So. 2d 741 
(Miss. 1967). 
17 Ala.-Grund v. Jefferson County, 291 Ala. 29, 277 So. 
2d 334 (1973). 
Conn.-Lathrop v. Planning and Zoning Commission 
of Town of Trumbull, 164 Conn. 215, 319 A.2d 376 (1973). 
18Mo.-Treme v. St. Louis County, 609 S.W.2d 706 
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amendments to the zoning law. 
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A municipality generally does not have 
authority to enter into a contract with a prop-
erty owner for the reclassification or rezoning 
of property or the enactment of amendments 
to the zoning law. 1 Such a contract ordinarily 
is in contravention of the public policy embod-
ied in the constitutional and statutory provi-
sions relating to zoning.2 
The term "contract zoning" refers to an 
agreement between a property owner and a 
local government whereby the owner agrees to 
certain conditions in return for the govern-
ment's rezoning or enforceable promise to 
rezone. 3 Zoning, however, must be done 
through the exercise of legislative power 
rather than by special arrangements with the 
owner of a particular piece of property, and 
therefore, contract zoning is invalid because a 
local government surrenders its authority to 
determine proper land use and bypasses the 
entire legislative process.4 The illegal aspect 
of contract zoning appears when a zoning 
authority binds itself to enact a zoning amend-
(Mo. Ct. App. E.D. 1980). 
19Conn.-Malafronte v. Planning and Zoning Bd. of 
City of Milford, 155 Conn. 205, 230 A.2d 606 (1967). 
Wis.-State ex reI. Zupancic v. Schimenz, 46 Wis. 2d 
22,174 N.W.2d 533 (1970). 
[Section 76J 
1Colo.-Ford Leasing Development Co. v. Board of 
County Com'rs of Jefferson County, 186 Colo. 418, 528 
P.2d 237 (1974). 
N.C.-Blades v. City of Raleigh, 280 N.C. 531, 187 
S.E.2d 35 (1972). 
Ohio-Hausmann & Johnson, Inc. v. Berea Bd. of 
Bldg. Code Appeals, 40 Ohio App. 2d 432, 69 Ohio Op. 2d 
379,320 N.E.2d 685 (8th Dist. Cuyahoga County 1974). 
Wis.-State ex reI. Zupancic v. Schimenz, 46 Wis. 2d 
22, 174 N.W.2d 533 (1970). 
20hio-Hausmann & Johnson, Inc. v. Berea Bd. of 
Bldg. Code Appeals, 40 Ohio App. 2d 432, 69 Ohio Op. 2d 
379, 320 N.E.2d 685 (8th Dist. Cuyahoga County 1974). 
As to statutory and constitutional sources of zoning 
power, see § 8. 
3Ark.-Murphy v. City of West Memphis, 352 Ark. 
315, 101 S.W.3d 221 (2003). 
~ex.-Super Wash, Inc. v. City of White Settlement, 
131 S.W.3d 249 (Tex. App. Fort Worth 2004), petition for 
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ZONING AND LAND PLANNING 
ment and agrees not to alter a zoning change 
for a specified period of time; when a zoning 
authority takes such a step and curtails its in-
dependent legislative power, it acts ultra vires 
and the rezoning is therefore a nullity.5 Where 
the record shows that the zoning action would 
not have taken place but for the understand-
ing that impermissible conditions would be in 
operation, the impermissible conditional use 
zoning will be struck down, even if the imper-
missible influence is not explicit.6 However, a 
municipality may be authorized by statute to 
make an agreement, prior to annexation of an 
area, with property owners in the area with 
respect to the zoning regulations to be applied 
to the owners' land.7 
Grant of change on conditions. 
Generally, zone changes may be condition-
ally granted only when regulations authorize 
conditions to be imposed in specific circum-
stances and when those regulations are uni-
formly applied.B In the absence of such autho-
rization, the granting of a zoning change on 
conditions, or subject to the recording of re-
strictive covenants, may be an unauthorized 
5N.C.-Dale v. Town of Columbus, NC, 101 N.C. App. 
335, 399 S.E.2d 350 (1991). 
6Md.-Mayor and Council of Rockville v. Rylyns 
Enterprises, Inc., 372 Md. 514, 814 A.2d 469 (2002). 
7Ill.-Union Nat. Bank v. Village of Glenwood, 38 TIl. 
App. 3d 469, 348 N.E.2d 226 (1st Dist. 1976). 
Md.-Mayor and Council of Rockville v. Brookeville 
Turnpike Const. Co., 246 Md. 117, 228 A.2d 263 (1967). 
BConn.-Kaufman v. Zoning Com'n of City of 
Danbury, 232 Conn. 122,653 A.2d 798 (1995). 
9Md.-Montgomery County v. National Capital Realty 
Corp., 267 Md. 364, 297 A.2d 675 (1972). 
Miss.-Lewis v. City of Jackson, 184 So. 2d 384 
(Miss. 1966). 
N.C.-Allred v. City of Raleigh, 277 N.C. 530, 178 
S.E.2d 432 (1971). 
Objections to conditional zoning 
The primary objection to conditional zoning is that it 
per~its the use of a particular property in a zoning 
distnct subject to restrictions other than those applicable 
to all land similarly classified; the evils inherent in 
conditional zoning agreements are not inherent in a 
regulation which applies equally to all rezoned properties. 
Md.-Colwell v. Howard County, 31 Md. App. 8, 354 
A.2d 210 (1976). 
As to police power as a basis for zoning, see § 8. 
§ 76 
exercise of the police power delegated to the 
municipality.9 On the other hand, conditional 
rezoning is not invalid per se,10 and the 
imposition of reasonable conditions on rezon-
ing may be a lawful exercise of the police 
power in some circumstances.11 
In the broadest of senses, both "contract 
zoning" and "conditional zoning" involve some 
sort of understanding between a governmental 
unit and developer, whereby the doing of 
certain acts by the developer will result in 
favorable rezoning treatment by the govern-
mental unit. 12 However, in the context of 
conditional use zoning, a local zoning author-
ity maintains its independent decisionmaking 
authority, whereas in the contract zoning sce-
nario, it abandons that authority by binding 
itself contractually with a landowner seeking 
a zoning amendment. 13 Permissible condi-
tional use zoning occurs when a governmental 
body, without committing its own authority, 
secures a given property owner's agreement to 
limit the use of his or her property to a partic-
ular use or to subject his or her tract to certain 
restrictions as a precondition to any 
rezoning. 14 
The practice of conditional use zoning is an 
As to the relationship of zoning to police power, see 
§ 19. 
. 10m.-Goffinet v. Christian County, 65 lll. 2d 40, 2 Ill. 
Dec. 275, 357 N.E.2d 442 (1976). 
N.Y.-Levine v. Town of Oyster Bay, 26 A.D.2d 583, 
272 N.Y.S.2d 171 (2d Dep't 1966). 
11Ariz.-Transamerica Title Ins. Co. v. City of Tucson, 
23 Ariz. App. 385, 533 P .2d 693 (Div. 2 1975). 
Colo.-King'S Mill Homeowners Ass'n, Inc. v. City of 
Westminster, 192 Colo. 305, 557 P .2d 1186 (1976). 
Ill.-Goffinet v . Christian County, 30 Ill. App. 3d 
1089, 333 N.E.2d 731 (5th Dist. 1975), judgment aff'd, 65 
Ill. 2d 40, 2 Ill. Dec. 275, 357 N.E.2d 442 (1976). 
N.Y.-Dexter v. Town Bd. of Town of Gates, 36 
N.Y.2d 102,365 N.Y.S.2d 506, 324 N.E.2d 870 (1975). 
R.I.-Sweetman v. Town of Cumberland, 117 R.I. 
134, 364 A.2d 1277 (1976). 
12Md.-People's Counsel for Baltimore County v . 
Beachwood I Ltd. Partnership, 107 Md. App. 627, 670 
A.2d 484 (1995). 
13N.C.-Chrismon v. Guilford County, 322 N .C. 611, 
370 S.E.2d 579 (1988). 
14N.C.-Westminster Homes, Inc. v. Town of Cary Zon· 
ing Bd. of Adjustment, 354 N.C. 298, 554 S.E.2d 634 
(2001). 




approved practice, in some jurisdictions, so 
long as the action of a local zoning authority 
in accomplishing zoning is reasonable, neither 
arbitrary, nor unduly discriminatory, and so 
long as it is in the public interest.15 The valid-
ity of conditions thus may depend on whether 
they are reasonably conceived and are nondis-
criminatory,16 and an arbitrarily conceived 
exaction, imposed by a zoning authority upon 
a landowner as a prerequisite to the grant of 
rezoning, is invalid.17 
The grant of a public privilege such as a zon-
ing change may not be conditioned upon dep-
rivation of constitutional protections.18 
§ 77 Other circumstances and 
conditions to be considered 
The necessity or advisability of changes 
in zoning regulations must be determined 
after consideration of alJ relevant circum-
stances and conditions, and consideration 
should be given to the nature of present and 
A city council did not engage in illegal "contract zon-
ing" by approving rezoning contingent upon the meeting 
of 23 conditions relating to a planned unit development, 
which served as a helpful tool in ensuring that the 
concerns of many of the area residents were met. 
Miss.-Old Canton Hills Homeowners Ass'n v. Mayor 
and City Council of City of Jackson, 749 So. 2d 54 (Miss. 
1999). 
15N.C.-Chrismon v. Guilford County, 322 N.C. 611, 
370 S.E.2d 579 (1988). 
Amelioration of effects of zoning change 
Conditional zoning is permissible and will be upheld 
when imposed pursuant to the police power for the protec-
tion or benefit of neighbors, in order to ameliorate the ef-
fects of a zoning change. 
Ga.-Warshaw v. City of Atlanta, 250 Ga. 535, 299 
S.E.2d 552 (1983). 
As to the prohibition against discrimination in zoning 
matters, see § 24. 
16Ariz.-Transamerica Title Ins. Co. v . City of Tucson, 
23 Ariz. App. 385, 533 P.2d 693 (Div. 2 1975). 
Colo.-King's Mill Homeowners Ass'n, Inc. v. City of 
Westminster, 192 Colo. 305, 557 P.2d 1186 (1976). 
Va.-City of Richmond v. Randall, 215 Va. 506, 211 
S .E.2d 56 (1975). 
17Cal.-Scrutton v. Sacramento County, 275 Cal. App. 
2d 412, 79 Cal. Rptr. 872 (3d Dist. 1969). 
18Cal.-Scrutton v. Sacramento County, 275 Cal. App. 
2d 412, 79 Cal. Rptr. 872 (3d Dist. 1969). 
[Section 77] 
lD.C.-Lewis v. District of Columbia, 190 F .2d 25 
(D.C. Cir. 1951). 
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potential uses of the area in question, as 
well as to future concerns such as the effect 
on property values and traffic conditions. 
Research References 
West's Key Number Digest, Zoning and Land Planning 
e:=>154, 163 to 166 
The necessity or advisability of making a 
change or amendment in zoning regulations, l 
and the propriety thereof,2 must be deter-
mined in the light of all relevant circum-
stances and conditions existing at the time of 
its enactment.3 Matters which are required to 
be considered in making the original zoning 
regulations must also be considered in mak-
ing changes in such regulations.4 
It is appropriate, in considering a zoning 
change, to view the municipality as a whole 
and to plan for the future. 5 The existing loca-
tion of the boundaries of a zoning district is a 
circumstance to be weighed in determining 
Ill.-Duggan v. Cook County, 60 Ill. 2d 107, 324 
N.E.2d 406 (1975). 
Population concentration 
Prevention of undue population concentration in a 
given area is a factor to be considered in changing a zon-
ing classification. 
Kan.-Hukle v. City of Kansas City, 212 Kan. 627, 
512 P.2d 457 (1973). 
2Fla.-MiIes v. Dade County by Board of County 
Com'rs, 260 So. 2d 553 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 3d Dist. 1972). 
Ill.-Duggan v. Cook County, 60 Ill. 2d 107, 324 
N.E.2d 406 (1975). 
N.C.-Allred v. City of Raleigh, 277 N.C. 530, 178 
S.E.2d 432 (1971). 
30hio-White v. City of Cincinnati, 101 Ohio App. 
160, 1 Ohio Op. 2d 92, 138 N.E.2d 412 (1st Dist. Hamil-
ton County 1956). 
4Conn.-Mallory v. Town of West Hartford, 138 Conn. 
497, 86 A.2d 668 (1952). 
D.C.-c-Prentiss v. American University, 214 F.2d 282 
(D.C. Cir. 1954). 
Ill.-Garner v. City of Carmi, 28 Ill . 2d 560, 192 
N.E.2d 816 (1963). 
As to matters to be considered in original zoning 
enactments, generally, see § 17. 
5D.C.-W. C. & A." N. Miller Development Co. v. 
District of Columbia Zoning Commission, 340 A.2d 420 
(D.C. 1975). 
Md.-Jacobs v. County Bd. of Appeals for Baltimore 
County, 234 Md. 242, 198 A.2d 900 (1964). 
Mass.-Rosko v. City of Marlborough, 355 Mass. 51, 
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ZONING AND LAND PLANNING 
proposed chaD;ges, ~ but the fact ~hat the prop-
erty in questIOn IS on the perImeter of the 
district rather than in the center thereof does 
not necessarily make it more subject to 
rezoning. 7 
In making zoning changes, consideration 
may and should be given to the nature of the 
existing uses in the area,8 and what would be 
an appropriate use of the properties in 
question.9 A change of zoning for a requested 
use not compatible with existing uses should 
ordinarily be refused. 10 However, conditions 
may be such as to support a rezoning of a tract 
to a classification different from that of adjoin-
ing property.11 
Effect on property values. 
Incidental benefit or detriment to the own-
ers, either ofthe property sought to be rezoned 
or of neighborhood property, is generally of no 
Choice between two reasonable uses 
A legislative body presented with two property uses, 
both reasonable, could choose to retain the use permitted 
under present rezoning, even though the proposed use 
might have been more appropriate or even the most ap-
propriate use for the land. 
Va.-Board of Sup'rs of Roanoke County v. 
International Funeral Services, Inc., 221 Va. 840, 275 
S.E.2d 586 (1981). 
6Mass.-Canteen Corp. v. City of Pittsfield, 4 Mass. 
App. Ct. 289,·346 N.E.2d 732 (1976). 
7Fla.-Dade County v. Miller, 325 So. 2d 418 (Fla. 
Dist. Ct. App. 3d Dist. 1976). 
Ill.-Littlestone Co. v. Cook County, 19 TIL App. 3d 
222,311 N.E.2d 268 (1st Dist. 1974). 
Tex.-Hunt v. City of San Antonio, 462 S.W.2d 536 
(Tex. 1971). 
8Ill.-Duggan v. Cook County, 60 Ill. 2d 107, 324 
N.E.2d 406 (1975). 
Md.-Boyce v. Sembly, 25 Md. App. 43, 334 A.2d 137 
(1975). 
Preservation of residential area as valid goal 
In considering a rezoning request, preserving an 
existing residential area is a valid goal. 
Miss.-Saunders v. City of Jackson, 511 So. 2d 902 
(Miss. 1987). 
9Conn.-Wade v. Town Plan and Zoning Commission 
of Town of Hamden, 145 Conn. 592,145 A.2d 597 (1958). 
1oMinn._N. R. Fairbanks Co. v. City of Blaine, 308 
Minn. 315, 242 N.W.2d 99 (1976). 
110kla._City of Tulsa v. Mobley, 1969 OK 85, 454 P.2d 
901 (Okla. 1969). 
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direct consequence in determining the validity 
of rezoning legislation.12 Thus, the fact that 
hardship may result from retention of an 
existing use is not of itself sufficient to justify 
a rezoning.13 Similarly, rezoning cannot be jus-
tified solely on grounds that it is necessary to 
allow the most remunerative use of a tract of 
land.14 On the other hand, in determining the 
validity of a zoning amendment or the applica-
tion therefor, the extent to which the value of 
property is affected thereby generally may be 
considered. 15 Likewise, the fact that a prop-
erty for which rezoning is sought has itself 
changed so that the property can no longer 
reasonably be put to the principal use for 
which it had previously been zoned is a factor 
which can properly be considered in determin-
ing whether the standards for rezoning have 
been met.16 
A city may have the right to deny a zoning 
change request if it has a reasonable basis to 
Pa.-Clawson v. Harborcreek Tp. Zoning Hearing 
Bd., 9 Pa. Commw. 124, 304 A.2d 184 (1973). 
12Conn.-Zelvin v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals of Town of 
Windsor, 30 Conn. Supp. 157,306 A.2d 151 (C.P. 1973). 
N.Y.-Humble Oil & Refining Co. v. Dekdebrun, 38 
A.D.2d 46, 326 N.Y.S.2d 444 (4th Dep't 1971). 
13Md.-Cabin John Limited Partnership v. 
Montgomery County Council, 259 Md. 661, 271 A.2d 174 
(1970). 
Projection of financial loss insufficient 
Where one seeks to change the basic use of his or her 
property from one zoning classification to another, a mere 
projection of financial loss under the less advantageous 
classification, without more, will not justify the change. 
Ala.-Hall v. Jefferson County, 450 So. 2d 792 (Ala. 
1984). 
14Ark._City of Little Rock v. Breeding, 273 Ark. 437, 
619 S.W.2d 664 (1981). 
No unconstitutional taking 
The fact that property would have been more valu-
able if rezoned, or the fact that it would have been more 
difficult to develop the property as zoned than if rezoned, 
failed to show such a significant detriment in existing 
zoning as would amount to an unconstitutional taking of 
property and was insufficient to warrant rezoning. 
Ga.-Delta Cascade Partners, II v. Fulton County, 
260 Ga. 99, 390 S.E.2d 45 (1990). 
As to the constitutional prohibition against the tak-
ing of property without compensation, see § 23. 
15IlI.-Duggan v. Cook County, 60 Ill. 2d 107, 324 
N.E.2d 406 (1975). 
16Miss.-Thrash v. Mayor and Com'rs of City of 
Jackson, 498 So. 2d 801 (Miss. 1986). 
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believe that it will conserve the values of other 
properties and encourage the most appropri-
ate use thereof.17 However, the mere fact that 
a rezoning will depreciate the value of sur-
rounding property does not establish that the 
rezoning is illegal. 18 
Traffic conditions. 
Traffic conditions in an area involved in an 
amendment or change in zoning regulations 
or classification, and the effect of such change 
on the traffic conditions, must be given 
consideration.19 Traffic problems are matters 
rezoning authorities are required to consider 
to weigh and balance with and against all 
other relevant factors or interests in determin-
ing the propriety of a zoning reclassification. 20 
However, traffic conditions and problems are 
not always controlling as against other consid-
erations involved in a change of zoning,21 es-
pecially where they might otherwise be dealt 
with by the public authorities.22 
17Utah-Bradley v. Payson City Corp., 2003 UT 16, 70 
P.3d 47 (Utah 2003). . 
18Neb.-Giger v. City of Omaha, 232 Neb. 676, 442 
N.W.2d 182 (1989). 
1IiMd.-Bigenho v. Montgomery County Council, 248 
Md. 386, 237 A.2d 53 (1968). 
Utah-Gayland v. Salt Lake County, 11 Utah 2d 307, 
358 P.2d 633 (1961). 
2oMiss.-Woodland Hills Conservation Ass'n, Inc. v. 
City of Jackson, 443 So. 2d 1173 (Miss. 1983). 
Slight increase in traffic insufficient 
A slight increase in traffic on an already busy thor-
oughfare is not a sufficient objection to prevent rezoning 
for commercial development. 
Kan.-Taco Bell v. City of Mission, 234 Kan. 879, 678 
P.2d 133 (1984). 
Creation of particular problem due to increase in 
traffic 
While generally an increase of traffic is not given 
great weight in determining whether to rezone a prop-
erty, creation of a particular traffic problem connected to 
a particular use at a particular location could be, in and 
of itself, a sufficient reason for a denial of that use at that 
location. 
Ill.-Amalgamated Trust and Say. Bank v. Cook 
County, 82 TIL App. 3d 370, 37 Ill. Dec. 717,402 N.E.2d 
719 (1st Dist. 1980). 
21Ark.-Lindsey v. City of Fayetteville, 256 Ark. 352, 
507 S.W.2d 101 (1974). 
Md.-Bigenho v. Montgomery County Council, 248 
Md. 386, 237 A.2d 53 (1968). 
22N.Y.-Board of Ed., Union Free School Dist. No. 14, 
136 
CORPUS JURIS SECUNDUM 
§ 78 Regulations as to particular 
uses or restrictions 
Particular amendments and changes have 
been considered, including changes effect-
ing a rezoning of property from residential 
to business, commercial, or industrial use, 
and vice versa. 
Research References 
West's Key Number Digest, Zoning and Land Planning 
€=>167.1 to 170 
Where an amendment or change in the 
regulations is reasonable under the circum-
stances and justified by considerations of the 
public welfare, property may be rezoned with 
respect to various uses or restrictions,1 such 
as from residential to business or commercial 
use,2 or from a residential classification to an 
Town of Hempstead, Nassau County v. Town of 
Hempstead, 202 N.Y.S.2d 629 (Sup 1960). 
[Section 78] 
1Conn.-Jablon v. Town Planning & Zoning Commis-
sion of Town of Newtown, 157 Conn. 434, 254 A.2d 914 
(1969). 
Mass.-Woodland Estates, Inc. v. Building Inspector 
of Methuen, 4 Mass. App. Ct. 757, 358 N.E.2d 468 (1976). 
N.J.-Hyland v. Mayor and Tp. Committee of Morris 
Tp., 130 N.J. Super. 470, 327 A.2d 675 (App. Div. 1974), 
judgment afi'd, 66 N.J. 31, 327 A.2d 657 (1974). 
2Ga.-Pendley v. Lake Harbin Civic Ass'n, 230 Ga. 
631, 198 S.E.2d 503 (1973). 
La.-Carlo Ditta, Inc. v. Jefferson Parish, 315 So. 2d 
361 (La. Ct. App. 4th Cir. 1975), writ denied, 320 So. 2d 
559 (La. 1975) and writ denied, 320 So. 2d 560 (La. 1975). 
N.J.-Wallington Home Owners Ass'n v. Borough of 
Wallington, 130 N.J. Super. 461,327 A.2d 669 (App. Div. 
1974), judgment affd, 66 N.J. 30,327 A.2d 657 (1974). 
&~ning not arbitrary or capricious 
(1) A city ordinance rezoning a lot from a residential 
to a business classification was not arbitrary and capri-
cious, where it was at least fairly debatable that the 
character and use of property in the neighborhood was 
changing to business and professional offices. 
Ala.-City of Gadsden v. Downs, 412 So. 2d 267 (Ala. 
1982). 
(2) A decision of city council to rezone property from 
multifamily residential and single-family residential to 
residential offices was not unreasonable, arbitrary, or 
capricious, and was at least fairly debatable, where there 
was evidence of change in the neighborhood, and a land 
3'\ 9 I . _ 
,<..N 
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448 MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS § 237 
repealed, as respects a particular municipality, or as respects all 
municipalities, laws of a general nature, elsewhere in force throughout 
the State; yet a charter or special act passed subsequent to the gen-
eral law, and plainly irreconcilable with it, will to the extent of the 
conflict operate a repeal of the latter by implication. But by a well-
known rule, founded on solid reasons, such repeals are not favored' 
and the principle of implied repeals ought to be applied with extrem~ 
caution.' 
§ 237 (89). Extent of Power; Llmita.tions; Oa.nons of Construc_ 
tion. - It is a general and undisputed proposition of law that 
I See cases cited to last preceding 
section; also St. Louis v. Alexander, 23 
Mo. 483; Baldwin v. Green, 10 Mo. 410; 
State v. Binder, 38 Mo. 450, 451; State 
v. Young (intoxicating liquors), 17 
Kan. 414 (where the Kansas cases on 
the subject are discussed by Ho,·ton, 
C. J.); State v. Clarke. 25 N. J. L. 54; 
State v. Douglass, 33 N. J. 1. 363; 
State v. Mills. 34 N. J. L. 177, 180; 
Montezuma t'. Minor, 70 Ga. 191; St. 
Johnsbury v. Thompson, 59 Vt. 300. 
The case of State v. Clarke, 54 Mo. 
Ii, and of State t'. De Bar, 58 Mo. 395, 
relating to the social evil powers of the 
city of St. Louis, are highly instructive 
on the question on the effect of a special 
act upon the general law. In each case 
the defendant was indicted under the 
general criminal code of the State, 
which prohibited the keeping of bawdy 
houses. In the first case the defendant 
pleaded a license from the city to keep 
such a house. In 1870 the charter of 
the city was amended, and the previous 
power to "suppress" such houses was 
changed to the power "to pass ordi-
nances, not inconsistent with any law of 
the State, to regulate or suppress" such 
houses. Under this power to regulate, 
the city regulated such houses by pass-
ing an order licensing them; and such 
a.n ordinance was held to be valid not-
withstanding the general law. and to 
hsxe the effect to prevent the enforce-
ment of the general criminal law of the 
Stat.e within the city of St. Louis. The 
question was a close one, but the ma-
jority opinion of Napton, J., in ;-iew of 
the legislation recited in it, seems to be 
sound. State v. Clark, 54 Mo. 17. The 
next year, 1874, in consequence of the 
decision, the chart'er of the city was 
amended in this respect, by substitut-
ing the words "to suppress, but not 
to license, bawdy houses." After this 
act went into effect, State v. De Bar 
supra, arose. The defendant was in~ 
dicted under the general law of the 
State for keeping such a house. There 
was another provision in the general 
law, that the repeal of a law shall not 
by implication revive a former law. 
And it was held by a mltjority of the 
court that the amendment of 18H 
which repealed the former amendment 
of 1870, did not thereby revive the gen-
eral criminal statute in the city of St. 
Louis, and, as a. consequence, that the 
defendant could not be convicted. 
This last decision seems to the author 
to be erroneous, on the ground that the 
Act of 1870 did not ipso facto repeal the 
general law in the city, but such repeal, 
or suspension rather, was only effected 
when the city passed the ordinance. If 
so, a repeal of the ordinance by the 
council, without the Act of 1874, would 
have left the general law of the State in 
force within the city, and its repeal by 
the Act of 1874 would have precisely the 
same effect. These cases may be use-
fully consulted on the nature and scope 
of the power to "regulate." See also 
Givens t'. Van Studdiford, 86 Mo. 149. 
General power in a municipal charter 
held not to repeal by implIcation the 
chartered rights of a railroad company. 
State v. Jersey City, 29 N. J. 1. 170. Or 
to interfere with vested rights. State v. 
Jersey City, 34 N. J. L. 32, 33. 
A charter which confers exc/usi"e 
jurisdiction upon municipal authori-
ties operates to repeal the general Ia~ 
on the same subject within the municI· 
pality; not so ordinarily when.the cha~­
ter confers concurrent authOrIty. SeI-
bold v. People, 86 Ill. 33. As to repeal 
of special provisions by general laws, 
and vice versa, see ante, § 167. 
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a m.unicipal corporation possesses and can exercise the following 
powers, and no others: First, those granted in express words; second, 
those necessarily or fairly implied in or incident to the powers ex-
pressly granted; third, those essential to the accomplishment of the 
declared objects and purposes of the corporation, - not simply 
convenient, but indispensable.! Any fair, reasonable, substantial 
I Smith t'. Newbern, 70 N. Car. 14. 62; Chicago v. Norton Milling Co., 196 
Referrin" to the text, McAllister, J., in Ill. 580, aff'g 97 III. App. 651; Ladd v. 
People ~. Howard, not officiaily re- Jones, 61 Ill. App. 584; Pittsburgh, 
orted says: "It is the best summary &c. R. Co. v. Crown Point, 146 Ind. 421; 
~f all the decisions upon that point to Walker v. Towle, 156 Ind. 639; McAI-
be found in all the books." Text cited len v. Hamblin, 129 Iowa, 329; Ander-
and approved in the following cases: son v. Wellington, 40 Ran. 173, 176: 
Cool' Co. ". McCree.. 93 Ill. ~36; Ottawa In re Pryor, 55 Ran. 724: Hender-
v. Carey, 108 U. S. 110; helly v. Town son v. Covington, 14 Bush (Ky.), 
of Milan, 21 Fed. Rep. 842; Scott v. 312; Nelson v. Homer, 48 La. An. 
Shreveport, 20 Fed. Rep. 714: Des- 258; Mayo v. Dover & Foxcroft Vil-
mond v. City of Jefferson, 19 Fed. Rep. lage Fire Co.,96 Me. 539; Foster v. 
483; InreLeeTong. 18 Fed. Rep. 253; Worcester, 164 Mass. 419; Taylor v. 
Eufaula v. McNab, 67 Ala. 588; Henke Bay City St. R. Co., 80 Mich. 7i; Peo-
v. McCord, 55 Iowa, 378: Ravenna pIe v. Holly, 119 Mich. 637; Leach v. 
v. Pennsylvania Co., 45 Ohio St. 118; Cargill, 60 Mo. 316; State v. Butler, 
Corvalis v. Carlile, 10 Oreg. 13\); Dn.n- 178 Mo. 2i2, approving text; Joplin v. 
ville v. Shelton, 76 Va. 325; Bell v. Leckie, 78 Mo. App. 8; Kirkwood v. 
Platteville, 71 Wis. 139; Gilman v. Meramec Highlands Co .. 94 Mo. App. 
Milwaukee, 61 Wis. 588; Blake v. 637; Christensen v. Fremont, 45 Neb. 
Walker, 23 S. Car. 5li; Charleston 1!. 160; State v. Webber, 107 N. Car. 962; 
Reed, 27 W. Va. 681; Kansas v. Swope, State v. Eason, 114 N. Car. 787, citing 
79 Mo. 446; Portland v. Schmidt, 13 text; Love v. Raleigh, 116 N. Car. 296; 
Oreg. 17; Levy v. Salt Lake City, 3 State v. Higgs. 126 N. Car. 1014; Ra-
Utah, 63; Richmond v. McGirr, 78 venna t'. Pennsylvania Co., 45 Ohio St. 
Ind. 192, 197. 118; Markley v. Mineral City, 58 Ohio 
The doctrine stated in the text is also St. 430; Mcintosh v. Charleston, 45 
followed, approved, applied, and ilIus- S. Car. 584; Ysleta v. Babbitt, 8 Tex. 
trated jn the following cases: Barne~t Civ. App. 43~; Ogden City v. Bear 
v. DenIson, 145 U. S. 135; DetroIt Lake, <Icc. Img. Co., 16 Utah, 440; 
Citizens St. Ry. Co. v. Detroit Ry., 171 Winchester v. Redmond, 93 Va. 711; 
U. S. 48; s. c. 22 U. S. App. 570, 590; Lynchburg & R. St. R. Co. v. Dameron, 
Grand Rapids El., &c. Co. v. Grand 95 Va. 545; Duncan v. Lynchburg 
Rapids, &c. Co., 33 Fed. Rep. 659; (Va.). 34 S. E. Rep. 964: Donable 
Detroit v. Detroit City Ry. Co., 56 Fed. tl. Harrisonburg, 104 Va. 533; Tacoma 
R~p. 867; Andrews v. Nat. Foundry & Gas & Elec. Li!:?ht Co. v. Tacoma, 
Pipe Works, 61 Fed. Rep. 782; Los 14 Wash. 288; l'arwell v. Seattle. 43 
An~eles City Water Co. v. Los Angeles, Wash. 141; Trester v. Sheboygan, 87 
88 ~'ed. Rep. 720; Fort Scott v. Eads Wis. 496; Schneider v. Menasha, 118 
Brokerage Co., 117 Fed. Rep. 51; New Wis. 298; Lewis v. Alexander, 24 
Decatur v. Berry, 90 Ala. 432; Gambill Canada S, C. R. 551. 
v. Erdrich, 143 Ala. 506; Cleveland Implied power to appropriate money 
School Fum. Co. t'. Greenville. 146 Ala. out of eity treasury to assist in the 
559; San Pedro v. Southern Pac. Ry. maintenance of national guard denied. 
Co., 101 Cal. 333; Durango v. Reins- Knapp v. Kansas City, 48 Mo. App. 
berg, 16 Colo. 327; Hayward v. Red 485. But the general "'clfare clause tn 
Cliff Trustees, 20 Colo. 33: Bridgeport charter was held to authorize pensions 
v. Housatonic R. Co., 15 Conn. 475; to members of the police force. Com-
Crofut v. Danbury, 65 Conn. 294; monwealth v. Walton. 182 Pa. 373. 
Jacksonville Electric 1. Co. v. Jackson- Where an act authorized existing cor-
ville; 36 Fla. 229; Porter v. Vinzant, 49 porations by vote of their members 
Fla. 213; Keen v. Waycross, 101 Ga. to aller, change, and amend the charters, 
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doubt concerning the existence of power is resolved by the courts 
against the corporation, and the power is denied. I Of every munici_ 
pal corporation the charter or statute by which it is created is its 
organic act. Neither the corporation nor its officers can do any act 
or make any contract, or incur any liability, not authorized thereby' 
or by some legislative act applicable thereto. All acts beyond th~ 
scope of the powers granted are void.' Much less can any power 
be exercised, or any act done, which is forbidden by charter or 
statute. These principles are of transcendent importance, and lie at 
the foundation of the law of municipal corporations. Their reason_ 
ableness, their necessity, and their salutary character have been often 
vindicated, but never more forcibly than by the learned Chief Justice 
Shaw, who, speaking of municipal and public corporations, says: 
the power to incorporate within its 74 N. Y. 338; State v. Passaic 41 N J 
charter any grant of any privilege not L.90; Perrine v. Farr, 22 N. 1. L. 356: 
extsting in the original. charter, it was Carron v. Martin, 26 N. J. L. 594' Stat~ 
beld that the power to establish a public v. Hudson, 29 N. J. L. 104; State v 
school could not be inferred from any Marion Co., 21 Ran. 419; Green v' 
power necessary for municipal exist- Cape May, 41 N. J. L. 45; Lord v' 
ence, and that there was no authority Oconto, 47 ·Wis. 386; Garvey, In r; 
under the act for tbe corporation to so 77 N. Y. 523; Smitb v. Newbura 77 
amend its charter as to authorize the N. Y. 130; Allen v. Galveston, 51'1rcx. levying of a tax for the maintenance of 302; Dore v. Milwaukee, 42 Wis. 18' 
a bigh scbool, or for any other educa- Butler v. Nevin, 88 Ill. 575; Rans~ 
tional purpose. Nelson v. Homer, 48 City v. Flanagan, 69 Mo. 22; Bentlm-
La. An. 258. v. County Com'rs, 25 Minn. 259; Fur. 
I Text quoted with approval. WiI- ton v. Lincoln, 9 Neb. 358; Hurford v. 
Iiams v. Davidson, 43 Tex. 33; Bren- Omaha, 4 Neb. 336, 350; Reis v. Graff, 
ham t'. Water Co., 67 Tex. 542; Hanger 51 Cal. 86. Text cited with approval in 
v. Des Moines, 52 Iowa, 193; City of Cook Co. v. McCrea, 93 IlL 236; Blr-
Corvalis v. Carlile, 10 Oreg. 139; Kirk- mingham & Pratt M. Ry. Co. v. Bir-
ham v. Russell, 76 Va. 956; Tax Col- mingham Street Ry. Co., 79 Ala. 465; 
lector v. Dendinger, 38 La. An. 261; Davenport v. Kleinschmidt, 6 Mont. 
Merrill v. Monticello, 138 U. S. 673; 502; Heiskell v. Baltimore, 65 Md. 125; 
Hart t'. Buckner, 2 D. S. App. 488; Dwyerv. City of Brenham, 65 Tex. 526; 
Los Angeles City Water Co. v. Los St. Johnsbury v. Thompson, 59 Vt. 300; 
Angeles, 88 Fed. Rep. 720; Ex parte Christie v. Malden, 23 W. Va. 667; 
Florence, 78 Ala. 419; Newport v. Spengler v. Trowbridge, 62 Miss. 46 (an 
Batesville & B. Railway Co., 58 Ark. appropriation to pay expenses of a com-
270; Von Schmidt v. Wiber, 105 Cal. mittee in endeavoring to obtain legisla-
151; St. Louis v. Bell Tel. Co., 96 Mo. tion from Congress held illegal, and 
623; Knapp v. Kansas City, 48 Mo. payment enjoined); Gas Co. v. Par-
App. 485; Joplin v. Leckie, i8 Mo. kersburg, 30 W. Va. 435. The citizens 
App. 8; Meday v. Rutherford, 65 N. J. of a city cannot confer upon its com-
L. 645. mon council powers not granted by 
, McCann v. Otoe Co., 9 Neb. 324; charter. Torrent v. Muskegon, 47 
Stewart v. Otoe Co., 2 Neb. 177; Sioux Mich. 115. Applying the rule in tbe 
City & P. R. R. Co. v.Washin~ton text, an act authorizing the sale of mu-
County, 3 Neb. 30, 42; Somerville v. nicipal bonds at not less than par was 
Bickerman, 127 Mass. 272; Boylston help not to warrant the allowance of a 
Market v. Boston, 113 Mass. 528; Har- commission to a purchaser of the bonds 
vard College v. Boston, 104 Mass. 470; from the city at par. Whelen's Ap-
Brimmer v. Boston, 102 Mass. 19; Peo- peal, 108 Pa. St. 162, 197. Post, 
pie v. Weber, 89 Ill. 347 i Bryan v. chapter on Municipal Bonds. 





§ 238 CONSTRUCTION OF POWERS 451 
" They can exercise no powers but those which are conferred upon 
them by the act by which they are constituted, or such as are neces-
sary to the exercise of their corporate powers, the performance of 
their corporate duties, and the accomplishment of the purposes of 
their association. This principle is derived from the nature of cor-
porations, the mode in which they are organized, and in which their 
affairs must be conducted." 
§ 238 (90). Same Subject. - "In aggregate corporations, as a 
general rule," continues Chief Justice Shaw, "the act and will of a 
majority is deemed in law the act and will of the whole, - as the 
act of the corporate body. The consequence is that a minority must 
be bound not only without, but against, their consent. Such an 
obligation may extend to every onerous duty, - to pay money to an 
unlimited amount, to perform services, to surrender lands, and the 
like. It is obvious, therefore, that if this liability were to extend to 
unlimited and indefinite objects, the citizen, by being a member of a 
corporation, might be deprived oj' his most valuable personal rights 
and liberties. The sec:lrity against this danger is in a steady adher-
ence to the principle stated, viz., that corporations can only exercise 
their powers over their respective memhers, for the accompli,'ihment of 
limited and defined object,,<;. Ann if this principle is important, as a 
general rule of social right and municipal law, it is of the highest 
importance in these States, where corporations have been extended 
and multiplied so as to embrace almost every object of human con-
cern." 1 The language of another learned judge on this subject is 
1 Per Shaw, C. J., in Spaulding v. v. Mobile (market-hou8e case), 5 Port. 
Lowell, 23 Pick. (Mas3.) 71, 74; Bangs (Ala.) 279; Head v. Ins. Co., 2 Cranch, 
v. Snow, 1 Mass. 181; Stetson v. Kemp- 127; DeRussy v. Davis (sale of ferry 
ton, 13 Mass. 272; Willard v. New- lease), 13 La. An. 468; People v. 
buryport, 12 Pick. (Mass.) 227; Reyes Oakland County Bank, &c .. 1 Doug. 
tJ. Westford, 17 Pick. 273, 279; Com. (Mich.) 282; Montgomer! v. Montgom-
v. Turner, 1 Cush. (Mass.) 493, 495; ery & W. Plank Road Co., 31 Ala. 76; 
Cooley v. Granville, 10 Cush. 56, 57; Burnett, in re, 30 Ala. 461, and cases 
Merriam v. Moody, 25 Iowa, 163; Min- cited; Le Couteulx v. Buffalo, 33 N. Y. 
turn v. Larue, 23 How. (D. S.) 435; 333; Hayes v. Appleton, 24 Wis. 544; 
Lafayette v. Cox, 5 Ind. 38; Paine v. People v. River Raisin & L. E. R. Co., 
Spratley, 5 Kan. 525; Vincent v. Nan- 12 Mich. 389; Vance v. Little Rock, 30 
tucket, 12 Cush. (Mass.) 103,105; Clark Ark. 435; Indianapolis v. Indianapolis 
v. Davenport, 14 Iowa, 494; Mays v. Gas Co., 66 Ind. 396. Text approved in 
Cincinnati, 1 Ohio St. 268; GaJlia Co. the following cases; Noyes v. Mason, 
v. Holcomb, 7 Ohio, part L, 232; Ham- 53 Iowa, 418; Frank. In re, .52 CaL 
ilton County Com'rs v. Mighels, 7 Ohio 606; Green I'. Cape l\hy, 41 N .. J. L. 4,). 
St. 109; Fitch v. Pinckard (taxing "The powers of all corporations are 
power), 5 Ill. 78: Caldwell v. Alton l"mited by the grants in their charlers, 
(market ordinance), 33 Ill. 416; Jack- and cannot extend beyond them." Per 
sonville, &c v. McConnel, 12 Ill. 138, Breese, J., Petersburg v. Metzker, 21 
140; Louisiana Stat.e Bank v. New 111.205. "Corporations have only such 
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§ 6.62 Contract and Conditional Zoning. 
Contract or conditional zoning is another zoning technique that provides more 
flexibility in the administration of the zoning ordinance. Contract zoning is used 
because of problems created by the zoning district system. In the typical zoning 
ordinance, each zoning district allows a wide range of permitted uses. An example 
is a neighborhood commercial zone, which may allow a wide variety of 
neighborhood commercial uses. 
Adjacent property owners may object to a rezoning because the landowner 
may use his land for any of the uses permitted in the new zone, not just the 
use he contemplates. In contract zoning, the landowner agrees to restrict the use 
of his land to the use for which he seeks the zoning amendment. The landowner 
may agree to other protective conditions, such as a landscaped buffer adjacent 
to the residential dwellings. Municipalities may also use contract zoning to secure 
street widening or other contributions from the landowner. 
Contract zoning can take several forms. One frequently used classification 
distinguishes between unilateral and bilateral contract zoning. In unilateral 
contract zoning, the landowner unilaterally agrees to impose restrictions on his 
land in a written document, which he records. The municipal governing body 
or planning commission indicates the restrictions it wants the landowner to adopt 
but does not formally agree to a rezoning if the landowner complies. In bilateral 
contract zoning, a landowner and the municipality execute a bilateral contract 
in which the municipality promises to rezone in return for the landowner's 
promise to record a document that contains the restrictions the municipality 
requires. A landowner can also execute a bilateral contract with adjacent 
landowners. 
Some courts refer to the case in which a landowner imposes restrictions on 
his land unilaterally as conditional zoning. They apply the term "contract zoning" 
only to a true bilateral contract between a landowner and a municipality. This 
text uses all of these terms interchangeably. 
Contract zoning advocates defend it as an appropriate zoning technique that 
tailors land development to its environment and assures its compatibility with 
adjacent land uses. The objections to contract zoning are similar to those raised 
against floating zones. Contract zoning is claimed to be invalid because it is 
~nauthorized by the zoning statute, because it is arbitrary spot zoning and an 
Illegal bargaining away of the zoning power, and because it violates the statutory 
provision that requires uniform land use regulations within zoning districts. 
~eral states now authorize contract zoning. 1 
lA O 
m. Rev. Stal. Ann. § 11-83 . Idaho Code § 67-651lA, Md. Code Ann. art. 66B, § 4.01(c)(1); 
R.I. Gen. Laws. § 45-24-53(h); Va. Code Ann. . - 3, 15.2-2297. See Sweetman v. Town 
of Cumberland, 364 A.2d 1277 (R.I. 1977) (statute held constitutional). 
(5th Ed.-02103) 




§ 6.63 LAND USE LAW 6-76 
The case law on contract and conditional zoning is mixed, although most of 
the more recent decisions approve this technique. Whether the conditions on 
development are imposed bilaterally or unilaterally makes a difference. The 
courts usually disapprove bilateral contract zoning but approve conditions on 
development that are imposed unilaterally. 
Despite growing judicial approval of conditional zoning, its use by municipali_ 
ties is unwise. Individually negotiated zoning agreements undercut the unifOrmity 
of the land use regulations imposed by the zoning ordinance. The proliferation 
of a large number of zoning agreements throughout a municipality complicates 
zoning enforcement. Although a municipality may be able to amend the zoning 
ordinance to impose restrictions that conflict with a rezoning agreement, this 
problem is also troublesome. 2 Detailed control over land development is possible 
under acceptable zoning techniques that impose development standards subject 
to approval by the zoning agency. Floating zones and site plan review are two 
examples. 
The terminology used by the courts in the "contract" zoning cases is not clear, 
and it is difficult to find accepted terms that describe the results in the cases . 
The discussion that follows divides the cases into the "bilateral" and "unilateral" 
categories, but the text indicates that the courts have different views of these 
terms. One court has adopted the term "concomitant agreement zoning" for this 
zoning device. 3 
The Nebraska court upheld a rezoning for a mixed use development that 
included four agreements executed by the city and the developer incorporating 
the development plan. 4 The court held that the distinction between contract and 
conditional zoning was irrelevant and that the critical question was whether the 
conditions on the rezoning advanced the public health, safety and general welfare. 
The court held that the city was entitled to make agreements with developers 
requiring them to follow their plans, because otherwise these plans are difficult 
to enforce. 
§ 6.(i3 Bilateral. 
A number of cases have held bilateral contract zoning invalid. 1 In these cases 
the municipality and the developer executed a bilateral contract, or the ordinance 
2 Delucchi v. County of Santa Cruz, 225 Cal. Rptr. 43 (Cal. App. 1986); Nicholson v. Tourtel-
lotte, 293 A.2d 909 (R.I. 1972). 
3 State ex reI. Myhre v. City of Spokane, 422 P.2d 790 (Wash. 1967). 
4 Giger v. City of Omaha, 442 N.W.2d 182 (Neb. 1989) (court also found no bargaining away 
of police power). See also Bradley v. City of Trussville, 527 So. 2d 1303 (Ala. Civ. App. 1988) 
adelegation of legislative power) . . " 1 ale v. Osborn Coal Enters. , Inc., 729 So.2d 853 (Ala. Civ. App. 1997); Hartman v. Bucks~n, A.2d 694 (Del. Ch. 1983); Hartnett v. Austin, 93 So. 2d 86 (Fla. 1956); Cederberg v. CIty 
(5'· Ed.-02i03l 
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that adopted the rezoning included the terms of a bilateral agreement. Houston 
Petroleum Co. v. Automotive Prods. Credit Ass'n2 best expresses the reasoning 
these cases adopt. The court held invalid an agreement in which the developer 
agreed to impose site development restrictions and stated: 
Contracts thus have no place in a zoning plan and a contract between a 
municipality and a property owner should not enter into the enactment or 
enforcement of zoning regulations. 3 
The purpose of a rezoning agreement may make it invalid. Municipalities 
sometimes insist on "reverter" agreements under which the land reverts to its 
initial zoning classification if the landowner does not begin development in a 
reasonable period of time. The cases hold these agreements invalid because they 
accomplish a rezoning without recourse to the usual notice and hearing require-
ments that apply to zoning amendments. 4 
A court may uphold a bilateral agreement when it is made with third parties, 
such as neighbors. In State ex rei. Zupancic v. SchimenZ,5 an applicant for a 
zoning change executed an agreement with neighbors that restricted the site to 
a specified use and imposed site development restrictions. The agreement was 
executed and recorded after the neighbors expressed concern about the rezoning 
at a plan commission meeting. 
The court upheld the rezoning and noted that there was no agreement with 
the city and no agreement to rezone. A rezoning is not invalid contract zoning 
when "a zoning authority . . . is motivated to zone by agreements as to use of 
the land made by others." Private agreements that "underlie" zoning provide the 
"flexibility and control" that allow "a municipality to meet the ever-increasing 
demands for rezoning in a rapidly changing area."6 The court also held that the 
rezoning must be "otherwise valid" and suggested that the imposition of 
of Rockford, 291 N.E.2d 249 (Ill. App. 1972); Baylis v. City of Baltimore, 148 A.2d 429 (Md. 
1959); Rodriguez v. Prince George's Cty., 558 A.2d 742 (Md. App. 1989); Carlino v. Whitpain 
Invs., 453 A.2d 1385 (Pa. 1982). See also Chung v. Sarasota County, 686 So.2d 1358 (Fla. App. 
1996) (settlement agreement). But see Broward County v. Griffey, 366 So. 2d 869 (Fla. App. 1979). 
See generally 70 A.L.R.3d 125 (1976). 
287 A.2d 319 (N.J. 1952). 
(3id. at 32~ 
~unty of Sacramento, 79 Cal. Rptr. 872 (Cal. App. 1969); Hausmann & Johnson, 
Inc. Y. Berea Bd. of Bldg. Code Appeals, 320 N.E.2d 685 (Ohio App. 1974). But see Goffmet 
Y. County of Christian, 357 N.E.2d 442 (Ill. 1976); Colwell v. Howard County, 354 A.2d 210 
(Md. App. 1976). See also Dexter v. Town Bd., 324 N.E.2d 870 (N.Y. 1975). Contra, Beyer v. 
Burns, 567 N.Y.S.2d 599 (Sup. Ct. '1991) (in floating zone ordinance). 
5174 N.W.2d 533 (Wis. 1970). 
6 See also City of Greenbelt v. Bresler, 236 A.2d I (Md. 1967); Pressman v. City of Baltimore, 
160 A.2d 379 (Md. 1960). 
(5'" Ed.-02/03) 
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§ 6.64 LAND USE LAW 6-78 
conditions on land development "might better be done by uniform ordinances 
providing for special uses, special exceptions and overlaid districts." 
§ 6.64 Unilateral. 
A growing number of cases uphold contract zoning when the restrictions on 
the rezoned property are imposed unilaterally by the landowner. 1 Courts 
sometimes refer to this type of zoning as conditional zoning. In these cases there 
was no evidence of a bilateral contract between the landowner and the municipal-
ity, although the rezoning ordinance may have contained the restrictions the 
landowner imposed on the land. 2 The cases emphasized the protective function 
of restrictions unilaterally imposed on the land that avoided or mitigated the 
adverse impacts of the development on adjacent property owners. In other cases 
the municipality executed a contract with the developer, concurrent with the 
rezoning, in which he agreed to dedicate land or make a contribution to street 
widenings and other improvements. Some cases upheld these agreements, 
emphasizing that the municipality did not agree to rezone and that the improve-
ments to which the owner contributed were reasonably required by the develop-
ment. 3 
The favorable judicial view of conditional zoning was expressed in extensive 
dictum in Collard v. Incorporated Village of Flower Hill.4 The court indicated 
conditional zoning is not objectionable as a form of spot zoning. It held that, 
if a zoning change is proper, it is not automatically invalid simply because 
conditions are imposed. The court pointed out that "imposing limiting conditions 
while benefitting surrounding properties, normally adversely affects the premises 
on which the conditions are imposed." 
The court held that conditional zoning is not an improper bargaining away 
of the police power "absent proof of a contract purporting to bind the local 
legislature in advance." It held the zoning act did not prohibit conditional zoning, 
1 Haas v. City of Mobile, 265 So.2d 564 (Ala. 1972); I-Marion Co. v. County of Sacramento, 
142 Cal. Rptr. 723 (Cal. App. 1977); Martin v. Hatfield, 308 S.E.2d 833 (Ga. 1983); Ogden v. 
Premier Props., USA, Inc., 755 N.E.2d 661 (Ind. App. 2001); Sylvania E1ec. Prods., Inc. v. City 
of Newton, 183 N.E.2d 118 (Mass. 1962); Rando v. Town of North Attleboro, 692 N.E.2d 544 
(Mass. App. 1998); Bucholz v. City of Omaha, 120 N.W.2d 270 (Neb. 1963); Church v. Town 
of Islip, 168 N.E.2d 680 (N.Y. 1960); Chrismon v. Guilford Cty., 370 S.E.2d 579 (N.C. 1988) 
(citing this treatise); Hall v. City of Durham, 372 S.E.2d 564 (N.C. 1988) (same). 
2 King's Mill Homeowners Ass'n v. City of Westminster, 557 P.2d 1186 (Colo. 1976). 
3 Scrotton v. County of Sacramento, 79 Cal. Rptr. 872 (Cal. App. 1969); Gladwyne Colony, 
Inc. v. Township of Lower Merion, 187 A.2d 549 (Pa. 1963); State ex reI. Myhre v. City of Spokane, 
422 P.2d 790 (Wash. 1967). But see Transamerica Title Ins. Co. v. City of Tucson, 533 P.2d 693 
(Ariz. App. 1975). See also §§ 9.11-9.15. 
4421 N.E.2d 818 (N.Y. 1981). Accord DePaolo v. Town 6f Ithaca, 694 N.Y.S.2d 235 (App· 
. Div. 1999). See also Chrismon v. Guilford Cty., 370 S.E.2d 579 (N.C. 1988) (reviewing benefits 
of conditional zoning; citing this treatise); 
(5" Ed._ 02I03) 
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§ 6.66 
hich was "within the spirit" of the enabling legislation as a means of harmoniz-:g "the landowner's need for rezoning with the public interest." It added that 
I reventing the legislative body from imposing conditions that protect adjacent 
~roperty would not be "in the best interests of the public." 
some courts do not approve unilateral conditional zoning. In Bartsch v. 
Planning & Zoning Comm 'n, 5 a municipality conditioned a rezoning on the filing 
of a restrictive covenant that limited the use of the land to a medical office 
building. The court held the covenant was a "blatant violation" of the "strict" 
statutory provision that requires uniform regulations within zoning districts. 
§ 6.65 Proper Purpose View . 
Collard l represents a judicial view which holds that unilateral conditions do 
not necessarily invalidate a rezoning if they serve proper zoning purposes and 
jf the rezoning is valid under the usual zoning map amendment tests. This point 
of view is illustrated by Cross v. Hall County,2 which held that neighbors cannot 
attack conditions imposed for their "benefit and protection ... to ameliorate 
the effects of the zoning change." Goffinet v. County of Christian 3 is a similar 
case. The county imposed site development conditions on a rezoning for a 
synthetic gas production facility. The court held that the conditions "are not of 
such a nature as to constitute an abrupt departure from the comprehensive zoning 
plan ... , which emphasizes substantial industrial development for the future." 
Tne court reviewed and upheld the rezoning under its traditional zoning tests 
and rejected a spot zoning objection to the zoning amendment. 
These cases treat zoning conditions as a neutral factor in their review of zoning 
map amendments. They take the reasonable view that neighbors should not be 
allowed to complain of zoning conditions imposed for their benefit. Some courts 
still show concern over possible abuses of the conditional zoning process. 4 
§ 6.66 Site Plan Review. 
Site plan review is a zoning technique that allows municipalities to exercise 
control over the site details of a development. In the typical site plan review 
procedure, the applicant for an amendment, conditional use, variance, or building 
permit submits a detailed site plan to the plan commission, zoning board, or 
5506 A.2d 1093 (Conn. App. 1986). Accord Board of County Comm'rs v. H. Manny Holtz, 
Inc., 501 A.2d 489 (Md. App. 1985); Dacy v. Village of Ruidoso, 845 P.2d 793 (N.M. 1992) 
(municipality promised to rezone). 
1 § 6.64. 
2235 S.E.2d 379 (Ga. 1977). 
3357 N.E.2d 442 (Ill. 1976). See Thornber v. Village of N. Barrington, 747 N.E.2d 513 (Ill . 
App. 2001) (contract zoning nol found). 
4 Nolan v. City of Taylorville, 420 N.E.2d 1037 (III. App. 1981). 
(5" Ed.--mlll3) 
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§ 29:10 MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS 
make a fill on land, fix fences, and indemnify him agains 
risks in moving the building as to persons and propertyt 
since it cannot engage in the work of moving and repairin ' 
buildings of another nor can it carry casualty and indemnit~ 
risks for individuals or other corporations. 27 
§ 29:11 Contracts prohibited-Contracts limiting 
legislative power 
Research References 
West's Key Number Digest, Municipal Corporations ~246; Zoning 
and Planning e=>160 
Am. Jur. 2d, Public Contacts § 14 
The officers of a municipal corporation cannot confer public 
powers upon others, nor delegate legislative powers; nor can 
powers conferred upon, or which appertain, or properly 
belong, to any office or department be surrendered or 
transferred and be performed by others.1 These principles 
apply to all municipal contracts. No part of any power 
27Mich.-Wheeler v. City of Sault Ste. Marie, 164 Mich. 338, 129 
N.W. 685 (1911). 
[Section 29:11] 
1Ark.-Paving Imp. Dist. No. 105 of Pine Bluff v. Wright, 181 Ark. 
919, 28 S.W.2d 1062 (1930). 
Colo.-Crossroads West Limited Liability Co. v. Town of Parker, 
929 P2d 63 (Colo App 1996). 
Fla.-County of Volusia v. City of Deltona, 925 So. 2d 340 (Fla. 
Dist. Ct. App. 5th Dist. 2006). 
Iowa-Marco Development Corp. v. City of Cedar Falls, 473 N.W.2d 
41 (Iowa 1991). 
Kan.-Red Dog Saloon v. Sedgwick County Bd. of Com'rs, 29 Kan. 
App. 2d 928, 33 P.3d 869 (2001). 
Md.-Mayor and Council of Rockville v. Rylyns Enterprises, Inc., 
372 Md. 514, 814 A.2d 469 (2002). 
N.J.-Contract of municipal corporation will not be construed to 
waive or surrender right of corporation to act with freedom with reference 
to its revenues unless intention, as well as power, to do so clearly appears. 
Curtiss-Wright Corp. v. Passaic Val. Water Commission, 89 N.J. Super. 
111, 214 A.2d 36, 62 Pub. Util. Rep. 3d (PUR) 37 (App. Div. 1965). 
N.Y.-Belden v. City of Niagara Falls, 230 A.D. 601, 245 N.Y.S. 510 
(4th Dep't 1930). 
- N.C.-McGuinn v. City of High Point, 217 N.C. 449,8 S.E.2d 462, 
128 A.L.R. 608 (1940). 
Dr.-Morris v. City of Salem, 179 Or. 666, 174 P.2d 192 (1946) (cit-
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nferred upon the corporation can be transferred or 
~~legated to other persons,2 nor can the city or ~own, thr?ugh 
its officers, gra~t ~w.ay by contract o~ otherwIse to pnvate 
rporations or mdividuals the authonty to control the pow-
c~s and functions properly pertaining to the municipal 
:overnment.3 This rule ~s well-illus.tratedJn the cases relat-
ing to granting franchIses of varIOUS kmds, market, and 
ing this treatise). 
Vt.-Larkin v. City of Burlington, 172 Vt. 566, 772 A.2d 553 (2001). 
Va.-Concerned Residents of Gloucester County v. Board of Sup'rs 
of Gloucester County, 248 Va. 488, 449 S.E.2d 787 (1994) (no delegation of 
power). 
See also §§ 10:1 et seq. 
2Cal.-San Diego County v. California Water & Tel. Co., 30 Cal. 2d 
817, 186 P.2d 124, 175 A.L.R. 747 (1947) (citing this treatise). 
Colo.-Crossroads West Limited Liability Co. v. Town of Parker, 
929 P2d 63 (Colo App 1996). 
Fla.-County of Volusia v. City of Deltona, 925 So. 2d 340 (Fla. 
Dist. Ct. App. 5th Dist. 2006). 
Iowa-Marco Development Corp. v. City of Cedar Falls, 473 N.W.2d 
41 (Iowa 1991). 
La.-Hudson v. City of Bossier City, 930 So. 2d 881 (La. 2006). 
Miss.-Smith v. Mitchell, 190 Miss. 819, 1 So. 2d 765 (1941). 
Mo.-Contract to pay for maintenance of fire patrol serv~ce by 
revenue derived from insurance license tax held not a delegatIOn of 
municipal power to tax. State ex rel. Kansas City Ins. Agent's Ass'n v. 
Kansas City, 319 Mo. 386, 4 S.W.2d 427 (1928). 
N.C.-Rockingham Square Shopping Center, Inc. v. Town of 
Madison, 45 N.C. App. 249, 262 S.E.2d 705 (1980) (citing this treatise). 
Va.-Concerned Residents of Gloucester County v. Board of Sup'rs 
of Gloucester County, 248 Va. 488, 449 S.E.2d 787 (1994) (no delegation of 
power). 
3Colo.-Crossroads West Limited Liability Co. v. Town of Parker, 
929 P2d 63 (Colo App 1996). 
Fla.-County of Volusia v. City of Deltona, 925 So. 2d 340 (Fla. 
Dist. Ct. App. 5th Dist. 2006). 
Iowa-Marco Development Corp. v. City of Cedar Falls, 473 N.W.2d 
41 (Iowa 1991). 
Ky.-City of Middlesboro v. Kentucky Utilities Co., 284 Ky. 833, 
146 S.W.2d 48 (1940) Oackofpower of municipal electric utility to contract 
with federal agency for term of 20 years as to purchase and distribution of 
current). 
Mo.-Aquamsi Land Co. v. City of Cape Girardeau, 346 Mo. 524, 
142 S.W.2d 332 (1940) (park construction agreement giving federal agency 
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§ 29:11 MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS 
other privileges, which may result in a monopoly or COnsti_ 
tute exclusive rights in the grantee which will prevent or 
hamper the municipal authorities in providing the proper lo-
cal regulations.4 A governmental function is one undertaken 
because of a duty imposed upon the municipality for the 
welfare or protection of its citizens.s 
The established rule is that municipal corporations have 
no power to make contracts which will control them in the 
performance of their legislative powers and duties.6 Accord-
ingly, the law is well-settled that a city cannot by contract 
Neb.-Seidel v . City of Seward, 178 Neb. 345 , 133 N.W.2d 390 
(1965). 
N.J.-Beckmann v . Teaneck Tp. , 6 N.J. 530, 79 A.2d 301 (1951) 
(citing this treatise) (lack of power of municipality to bind itself in contract 
to rezone an area) . 
N.Y.-Where the council has authority to acquire a waterworks 
system, it cannot, before the city has acquired any water system at all, 
enter into a contract with an engineer by which he is to have charge for 
an indefinite period of the additions to be made to the plant if purchased. 
Witmer v. City of Jamestown, 125 A.D. 43, 109 N.Y.8. 269 (4th Dep't 
1908), aff'd, 196 N.Y. 553, 90 N.E. 1167 (1909). 
Tex.-City of Farmers Branch v. City of Addison, 694 S.W.2d 94 
(Tex. App. Dallas 1985), writ refusedn.r .e., (July 10, 1985). 
Vt.-Larkin v. City of Burlington, 172 Vt. 566, 772 A.2d 553 (2001). 
Va.-Concerned Residents of Gloucester County v. Board of Sup'rs 
of Gloucester County, 248 Va. 488, 449 S.E.2d 787 (1994) (no delegation of 
power). 
4ya.-Concerned Residents of Gloucester County v. Board of Sup'rs 
of Gloucester County, 248 Va. 488, 449 S.E.2d 787 (1994) (no delegation of 
power). 
See §§ 34:1 et seq. 
5Ariz.-Copper Country Mobile Home Park v. City of Globe, 131 
Ariz. 329, 641 P .2d 243 (Ct. App. Div. 2 1981) (provision of sewer service 
to nonresidents of municipality as being a proprietary function). 
Iowa-Marco Development Corp. v. City of Cedar Falls, 473 N.W.2d 
41 (Iowa 1991). 
6U.S.-Byrd v. Martin, Hopkins, Lemon and Carter, P .C. , 564 F. 
Supp. 1425 (W.D. Va. 1983), judgment affd, 740 F.2d 961 (4th Cir. 1984). 
Cal.-Wills v. City of Los Angeles, 209 Cal. 448, 287 P . 962, 69 
AL.R. 1044 (1930). 
Fla.-County of Volusia v. City of Deltona, 925 So. 2d 340 (Fla. 
Dist. Ct. App. 5th Dist. 2006). 
Ill.-Selby v. Village of Winfield, 255 Ill. App. 67, 1929 WL 3387 
(2d Dist. 1929). 
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CONTRACTS IN GENERAL § 29:11 
deprive itself of any of its legislative powers7 or governmental 
--;iliiiC officials for purpose of influencing exercise of discretion vested in 
~em by law, as to manner in which they shall perform public duties, is 
oid as against public policy even though consideration for it inures to 
~enefit of public. Pippenger v. City of Mishawaka, 119 Ind. App. 397, 88 
N.E.2d 168 (1949). 
Kan.-Red Dog Saloon v. Sedgwick County Bd. of Com'rs, 29 Kan. 
App. 2d 928, 33 P.3d 869 (2001); Landau v. City of Leawood, 214 Kan. 
104, 519 P.2d 676 (1974) (covenant limiting assessment for use of city 
sewer as unenforceable). 
La.-Hudson v. City of Bossier City, 930 So. 2d 881 (La. 2006). 
Md.-Mayor and Council of Rockville v. Rylyns Enterprises, Inc., 
372 Md. 514, 814 A.2d 469 (2002). Although a contract or agreement to 
zone, where made between a developer and the zoning authority, is 
invalid, a contract entered into in good faith between the developer and a 
municipality which does not have control over the classification and whose 
authority is limited to recommendation is valid. City of Greenbelt v. 
Bresler, 248 Md. 210, 236 A.2d 1 (1967). 
Minn.-A contract by a city with a railway company to maintain 
for all future time a bridge used by the railroad company and the public 
and restore it to its former condition of usefulness is invalid on this 
ground. State ex reI. City of St. Paul v. Minnesota Transfer Ry. Co., 80 
Minn. 108, 83 N.W. 32 (1900). 
N.Y.-Andgar Associates, Inc. v. Board of Zoning Appeals of 
Incorporated Village of Port Washington North, 30 A.D.2d 672, 291 
N.Y.S.2d 991 (2d Dep't 1968); City of New York v. Second Ave. R. Co., 32 
N.Y. 261, 1865 WL 3959 (1865). 
Ohio-State ex reI. Gordon v. Taylor, 149 Ohio St. 427, 37 Ohio 
Op. 112, 79 N.E.2d 127 (1948) . 
S.D.-Ericksen v. City of Sioux Falls, 70 S.D. 40, 14 N.W.2d 89 
(1944) (bargaining away police powers with respect to sewers). 
Tex.-Fidelity Land & Trust Co. of Texas v. City of West University 
Place, 496 S.W.2d 116 (Tex. Civ. App. Houston 14th Dist. 1973), writ 
refused n.r.e., (Sept. 25, 1973). 
Va.-Concerned Residents of Gloucester County v. Board of Sup'rs 
of Gloucester County, 248 Va. 488, 449 S.E.2d 787 (1994) (no delegation of 
power). 
7Cal.-Morrison Homes Corp. v. City of Pleasanton, 58 Cal. App. 3d 
724, 130 Cal. Rptr. 196 (1st Dist. 1976) (citing this treatise). 
Colo.-Adams County School Dist. No. 50 v. Dickey, 791 P.2d 688, 
60 Ed. Law Rep. 964 (Colo. 1990) (school tennination policy handbook as 
not binding subsequent school boards). 
N.M.-There is a distinction between contracts which merely 
involve a city's proprietary or business functions and those attempting to 
curtail or prohibit its legislative or administrative authority; the former 
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powers.S Hence, a municipality cannot agree that a sidewalk 
shall not be graded beyond a certain depth,9 that a street or 
public way shall be vacated10 or that a boulevard shall be 
constructed.ll Nor maya municipality bind itself to assist in 
securing zoning changes and in other matters requiring local 
94 N.M. 199, 608 P.2d 511 (1980). 
N.Y.-Britton v. City of New York, 12 Abb. Pro 367, 21 How. Pro 
251, 1843 WL 4913 (N.Y. 1843); Britton V. City of New York, 12 Abb. Pro 
367,21 How. Pro 251, 1843 WL 4913 (N.Y. 1843). 
Tex.-City of Marshall V . Allen, 115 S.W. 849 (Tex. Civ. App. 1909), 
writ refused; Waterbury V. City of Laredo, 68 Tex. 565, 5 S.W. 81 (1887) 
(contract divesting city of legislative power as void). 
Vt.-Larkin V. City of Burlington, 172 Vt. 566, 772 A2d 553 (2001). 
8U.S.-Joleewu, Ltd. V. City of Austin, 916 F.2d 250 (5th Cir. 1990), 
opinion vacated in part, 934 F.2d 621 (5th Cir. 1991) (Texas law); Joleewu, 
Ltd. v. City of Austin, 916 F.2d 250 (5th Cir. 1990), opinion vacated in 
part, 934 F.2d 621 (5th Cir. 1991) (timing of acquisition of property). 
Cal.-Morrison Homes Corp. v. City of Pleasanton, 58 Cal. App. 3d 
724, 130 Cal. Rptr. 196 (1st Dist. 1976) (citing this treatise). 
Colo.-Wheat Ridge Urban Renewal Authority v. Cornerstone 
Group XXII, L.L.C., 176 P.3d 737 (Colo. 2007). 
Kan.-Red Dog Saloon v. Sedgwick County Bd. of Com'rs, 29 Kan. 
App. 2d 928, 33 P.3d 869 (2001). 
Minn.-Western States Utilities Co. v. City of Waseca, 242 Minn. 
302, 65 N.W.2d 255, 6 Pub. Util. Rep. 3d (PUR) 324 (1954). 
Tex.-8outhwestern Bell Tel. Co. v. City of Port Arthur, 491 S.W.2d 
187 (Tex. Civ. App. Beaumont 1973), writ refused n.r.e., (July 3, 1973) (by 
franchise) . 
Vt.-Larkin v. City of Burlington, 172 Vt. 566, 772 A2d 553 (2001). 
9Tex.-City of Marshall v. Allen, 115 S .W. 849 (Tex. Civ. App. 1909), 
writ refused. 
lOCal._An agreement by local officials to abandon, vacate, or sell a 
road is void because it constitutes an improper attempt by local officials to 
bind themselves in advance as to the exercise of their judgment in the 
future and because the receipt of the agreed consideration might influence 
their future decision, which is to be made primarily upon considerations of 
public necessity for highway purposes. San Diego County V. California 
Water & Tel. Co., 30 Cal. 2d 817, 186 P.2d 124, 175 AL.R. 747 (1947). 
llInd.-Pippenger v. City of Mishawaka, 119 Ind. App. 397, 88 
N.E.2d 168 (1949) (vacation of streets). 
Mo.-Thompson v. City of St. Louis, 253 S .W. 969 (Mo. 1923). 
N.C.-Bessemer Imp. Co. v. City of Greensboro, 247 N.C. 549, 101 
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§ 29:11 
ernmental approval. 12 Such an agreement has been held 
gO~d as against public policy since it not only creates the pos-
V?~ilitY of future conflicts of interest but also obligates the 
~unicipality to create future legislation.13 
Where a city has the right to lease a part of its wharf for 
the purpose of a warehouse and grain elevator, it must 
reserve the right to terminate such lease whenever the public 
interest demands such action. 14 Also, municipal authorities 
cannot bargain away the right to make reasonable laws and 
to exercise the police power whenever it becomes necessary 
to conserve or promote the health, safety or welfare of the 
community.15 So, power conferred upon a city to contract 
12Ky._City of Louisville V. Fiscal Court of Jefferson County, 623 
S.W.2d 219 (Ky. 1981). 
Md.-Mayor and Council of Rockville v. Rylyns Enterprises, Inc., 
372 Md. 514, 814 A.2d 469 (2002). 
13Ky._City of Louisville v. Fiscal Court of Jefferson County, 623 
S.W.2d 219 (Ky. 1981). 
14Mo.-Belcher Sugar Refining Co. v. St. Louis Grain Elevator Co., 
101 Mo. 192, 13 S.W. 822 (1890). 
See also §§ 28:1 et seq. 
15Cal.-City's contract to make sewer connections on certain premises 
free of charge in exchange for sewer line right-of-way over such premises 
was not assailable on ground that it constituted a bargaining of city's 
police power to regulate charges for sewerage, since premises involved 
were outside city limits and not subject to police jurisdiction of city. Trons-
lin V. City of Sonora, 144 Cal. App. 2d 735, 301 P.2d 891 (3d Dist. 1956). 
Colo.-Crossroads West Limited Liability Co. v. Town of Parker, 
929 P2d 63 (Colo App 1996). 
Fla.-Housing Authority of City of Melbourne v. Richardson, 196 
So. 2d 489 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 4th Dist. 1967) (agreement where city 
agreed to cooperate with public housing authority, and, insofar as it might 
lawfully do so, make such changes in any zoning of the site and surround-
ing territory as were reasonable and necessary for the development and 
protection of the project and surrounding territory was not illegal on the 
ground that it constituted an unlawful delegation of the city's power to 
zone); Florida East Coast Ry. Co. v. City of Miami, 76 Fla. 277, 79 So. 682, 
1 AL.R. 303 (1918) (power of city to compel a railway to put in, maintain, 
and operate safety gates at crossing of its railway and a street which had 
been dedicated by the railway for street purposes, where a contract 
between the city and railway was involved, which granted to the city a 
right-of-way over the property of the railway in consideration of the city 
bearing the expense of the safety gates, etc., was not a bartering away of 
the city's police power). 






respecting a particular matter does not confer powe 
implication, so to contract with reference to it as to r, 
rass and interfere with its future control over the matte 
the public interests may require. '6 Hence, all contracts r, 
interfere with the legislative or governmental function 
the municipality are absolutely void. '7 B 
487, 87 N.E. 1084 (1909). 
Kan.-Red Dog Saloon v. Sedgwick County Bd. of Com'rs, 29 
App. 2d 928, 33 P.3d 869 (2001). 
Ky.-A contract to .keep a pavement in repair for 10 years is 
beyond the power of a city to make on the ground that it amounts to an 
abrogation by the city of a governmental function or of its police power 
Barber Asphalt Pav. Co. v. City of Louisville, 123 Ky. 687, 29 Ky. L. Rptr' 
1255, 97 S.W. 31, 29 (1906). . 
Or.-The installation of parking meters is not a bartering away or ' 
surrendering of the city's police power. On the contrary, it is an exercise of 
that power. Morris v. City of Salem, 179 Or. 666, 174 P .2d 192 (1946)., 
Pa.-Contract with two universities relating to the operation 
management, and control of the city's general hospital was not an unlaw: 
ful delegation of a city's powers and responsibilities. Robinson v. City of 
Philadelphia, 400 Pa. 80, 161 A.2d 1, 1 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 14, 1 
Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 478, 46 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2922, 1 Empl. Prac. 
Dec. (CCH) P 9664, 40 Lab. Cas. (CCH) P 66539 (1960). 
16U.S.-Scofield Engineering Co. v. City of Danville, 35 F. Supp. 668 
(WD. Va. 1940), judgment affd, 126 F.2d 942 (C.C.A. 4th Cir. 1942). 
Kan.-Red Dog Saloon v. Sedgwick County Bd. of Com'rs, 29 Kan. 
App. 2d 928, 33 P .3d 869 (2001). 
N.M.-City contract with homeowners barring city from erecting 
five-foot fence around city golf course and providing for lower fencing 
specifications was not void as against public policy inasmuch as mainte-
nance of golf course was proprietary rather than governmental function. 
Spray v. City of Albuquerque, 94 N.M. 199, 608 P.2d 511 (1980). 
Tex.-City of Brenham v. Brenham Water Co., 67 Tex. 542, 4 S.W. 
143 (1887). 
Municipal contracts with grantees of franchises to use streets, see 
§§ 34:1 et seq. 
17U.S.-Contract between county and developer to install sewer in 
area of proposed shopping center concerned governmental function and 
was beyond powers of county since future county governing bodies would 
have been bound by agreement as to location of sewer and agreement was 
made irrespective of financia l ability of county to complete sewer 
construction. Byrd v. Martin, Hopkins, Lemon and Carter, P.C., 564 F. 
Supp. 1425 (W.D. Va. 1983), judgment aff'd, 740 F.2d 961 (4th Cir. 1984). 
Ark.-Lamar Bath House Co. v. City of Hot Springs , 229 Ark. 214, 
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The reserved powers doctrine rests on a fundamental in-
ability of sovereign governments to contract away essential 
attributes of their sovereignty.18 Certain core governmental 
powers, like the power of eminent domain and the police 
power, are reserved to the sovereign and cannot be abdicated 
or surrendered by contract,19 and any attempt to do so is 
simply unenforceable. 20 Thus, contracts surrendering the 
power of eminent domain are void.21 However, the doctrine 
Colo.-Crossroads West Limited Liability Co. v. Town of Parker, 
929 P2d 63 (Colo App 1996); Adams County School Dist. No. 50 v. Dickey, 
791 P.2d 688, 60 Ed. Law Rep. 964 (Colo. 1990) (school termination policy 
handbook as not binding subsequent school boards). 
Ga.-Barr v. City Council of Augusta, 206 Ga. 750, 58 S.E.2d 820 
(1950) (city agreement to furnish sewer services throughout county as be-
ing invalid). 
Kan.-Red Dog Saloon v. Sedgwick County Bd. of Com'rs, 29 Kan. 
App. 2d 928, 33 P.3d 869 (2001). 
Nev.-Agreement between city and power company to place electric 
wires above ground in violation of ordinance requiring underground 
circuits was void. City of Las Vegas v. Cragin Industries, Inc., 86 Nev. 
933, 478 P.2d 585 (1970) (disapproved of by, Sandy Valley Associates v. 
Sky Ranch Estate Owners Ass'n, 117 Nev. 948, 35 P.3d 964 (2001» . 
N.Y.-Atlantic Beach Property Owners' Ass'n v. Town of Hempstead, 
3 N.Y.2d 434, 165 N.Y.S.2d 737, 144 N.E.2d 409 (1957) (citing this 
treatise). 
N.C.-Contract between a city director of utilities and persons who 
laid out water lines beyond the corporate limits, where those persons 
would be reimbursed the amount expended in constructing the lines if and 
when the corporate boundaries were enlarged and the lines included 
within the new boundaries, was void. Styers v. City of Gastonia, 252 N.C. 
572, 114 S.E.2d 348 (1960) . 
Tenn.-An agreement to dedicate land for public park purposes 
provided that the city amend a zoning ordinance was unenforceable. City 
of Knoxville v. Ambrister, 196 Tenn. 1,263 S.W.2d 528 (1953). 
Tex.-Bowers v . City of Taylor, 16 S.W.2d 520 (Tex. Comm'n App. 
1929). 
Utah.-Warm Springs Co. v. Salt Lake City, 50 Utah 58, 165 P. 
788 (1917) (quoting this treatise). 
18Colo._Wheat Ridge Urban Renewal Authority v. Cornerston'e 
Group XXII, L.L.C., 176 P.3d 737 (Colo. 2007). 
19Colo.-Wheat Ridge Urban Renewal Authority v. Cornerstone 
Group XXII, L.L.C., 176 P.3d 737 (Colo. 2007). 
2°Colo.-Wheat Ridge Urban Renewal Authority v. Cornerstone 
Group XXII, L.L.C., 176 P.3d 737 (Colo. 2007). 
21Colo.-Wheat Ridge Urban Renewal Authority v. Cornerstone 
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§ 29:11 MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS 
implies nothing about the ability of governments to otherwise 
enter into contracts involving the exercise of their sovereign 
powers.22 A contract with a governmental unit is not 
rendered void merely by the fact that it includes a commit_ 
ment to exercise a core governmental power. 23 
§ 29:12 Contracts prohibited-Contract to perform 
public duty 
Research References 
West's Key Number Digest, Municipal Corporations e=>246 
Am. Jur. 2d, Public Contacts § 14 
A city may not enter into a contract under which it exacts 
compensation from a citizen for the performance of a public 
duty imposed on it by law, either expressly or by implication.1 
For example, a city could not, for compensation, agree to 
keep a street open and unobstructed2 to furnish within the 
municipal limits police or fire protection3 or sewerage 
service.4 A contract by county commissioners with a guard-
ian of a mentally ill person to take care of him or her in the 
Group XXII, L.L.C., 176 P.3d 737 (Colo. 2007). 
22Colo.-Wheat Ridge Urban Renewal Authority v. Cornerstone 
Group XXII, L.L.C., 176 P.3d 737 (Colo. 2007). 
23Colo.-Wheat Ridge Urban Renewal Authority v. Cornerstone 
Group XXII, L.L.C., 176 P.3d 737 (Colo. 2007). 
[Section 29:12] 
1Ky.-Holbrook v. Letcher County, 223 Ky. 597,4 S.W.2d 382 (1928). 
Miss.-Fitzgerald v. Town of Magnolia, 183 Miss. 334, 184 So. 59 
(1938). 
N.Y.-Brown v. Ward, 246 N.Y. 400, 159 N.E. 184 (1927). 
S.C.-Green v. City of Rock Hill, 149 S.C. 234,147 S.E. 346 (1929). 
2Me.-Penley v. City of Auburn, 85 Me. 278, 27 A. 158 (1893). 
3U.S._"I suppose a city can make no contract for the discharge of a 
purely public duty; such a contract as in case of performance it can enforce 
compensation for, or for nonperformance expose itself to liability. It can-
not use public funds in any such direction. A city cannot contract with me 
to put out a fire in my building, and then exact a compensation from. m.e 
for the extinguishing of that fire, nor thus expose itself to liability If It 
failed to put out that fire. It is discharging a purely public duty." The 
Maggie P. , 25 F. 202 (C.C.E.D. Mo. 1885). 
4DI.-Where a residential subdivision, in which property owners had 
covenanted to pay certain charges for maintenance services to ~e 
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186 ZONING 
rights transferred by "permitting a greater than normal intensity of develop-
ment of the transferee or 'receiving' property. " 349 Development rights not used 
by the transferor can be sold to the transferee, compensating the transferor for 
the loss caused by the original restriction. 
The Supreme Court has never ruled directly on the constitutional validity 
of TDRs, but in Penn Central Transportation Company v. New York City, the court 
did mention that TORs should be considered in a taking analysis. "While 
these rights [TDRs] may well not have constituted 'just compensation' if a 
'taking' had occurred, the rights nevertheless undoubtedly mitigate whatever 
financial burdens the lot has imposed on appellants and, for that reason, are 
to be taken into account in considering the impact of regulation."350 Because 
the court held that New York City's Landmarks Preservation Law as applied 
to Grand Central Terminal was not a taking, the court did not have to rule 
directly on the validity of TORs as compensation. Some state courts, however, 
have invalidated the use of TORs as compensation.351 
In Suitum v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency, the Supreme Court discussed 
TDRs in the context of a ripeness question.352 All nine justices agreed that a 
challenge to the Tahoe agency's decision that an undeveloped lot near Lake 
Tahoe was ineligible for development was a "final decision" and thus ripe for 
review.353 Justice Souter writing for a six-justice majority considered the facts 
that the landowner was entitled to TORs under the applicable regulation and 
that no discretionary decision was necessary before she could sell her TORs as 
evidence that a "final decision" had been reached.354 
Justice Scalia, writing a concurring opinion joined by Justices O'Connor 
and Thomas, objected strongly to the notion that TORs should be considered 
"on the taking rather than the just compensation side of the equation." 
Because TORs have nothing to do with the use of the property being regu-
lated, they are not relevant to the taking question, he asserted: 
I do not mean to suggest that there is anything undesirable or devious about 
TORs themselves. To the contrary, TORs can serve a commendable purpose 
in mitigating the economic loss suffered by an individual whose property 
use is restricted, and property value diminished, but not so substantially as 
to produce a compensable taking. They may also form a proper part, or 
indeed the entirety, of the full compensation accorded a landowner when 
his property is taken .... I suggest only that the relevance of TORs is lim-
ited to the compensation side of the takings analysis, and that taking them 
into account in determining whether a taking has occurred will render 
much of our regulatory takings jurisprudence a nullity.355 
Conditional Zoning 
Municipalities, developers, and affected neighbors compromise many land 
use controversies by adding conditions to approval of the particular project. 
In a leading case, the Court of Appeals of New York upheld a municipality'S 
decision to condition an amendment to its zoning ordinance on the execution 
of a declaration of conveyance by the developer that provided in part that "no 
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construction may occur on the property so rezoned without the consent of the 
municipality."356 An application to enlarge and extend an existing structure on 
the premises was later denied. In upholding the condition against the charge 
that it was arbitrary and capricious, the court made the following comments 
about conditional zoning: 
Probably the principal objection to conditional rezoning is that it consti-
tutes illegal spot zoning, thus violating the legislative mandate requiring 
that there be a comprehensive plan for, and that all conditions be uni-
formed within, a given zoning district. When courts have considered the 
issue, the assumptions have been made that conditional zoning benefits 
particular land owners rather than the community as a whole and that it 
undermines the foundation upon which comprehensive zoning depends, 
by destroying uniformity within used districts. Such unexamined 
assumptions are· questionable. First, it is a downward change to a less 
restrictive zoning classification that benefits the property rezoned and not 
the opposite imposition of greater restrictions on land use. Indeed, impos-
ing limiting conditions, while benefitting surrounding properties, nor-
mally adversely affects the premises on which the conditions are 
imposed. Second, zoning is not invalid per se, mainly because only a sin-
gle parcel is involved or benefitted; the real test for spot zoning is whether 
the change is other than part of a well considered and comprehensive 
plan calculated to serve the general welfare of the community. Such a 
determination, in turn, depends on the reasonableness of the rezoning in 
relation to neighboring uses-an inquiry required regardless of whether 
the change in zone is conditional in form. Third, if it is initially proper to 
change a zoning classification without the imposition of restrictive condi-
tions notwithstanding that such change may depart from uniformity, then 
no reason exists why accomplishing that change, subject to condition 
should automatically be classified as impermissible spot zoning. . . . 
Another fault commonly voiced in disapproval of conditional zoning is 
that it constitutes an illegal bargaining away of a local government's 
police power .... The imposition of conditions on property sought to be 
rezoned may not be classified as a prospective commitment on the part of 
the municipality to zone as requested if the conditions are met; nor would 
the municipality necessarily be precluded on this account from later 
reversing or altering its decision. . . . Conditional rezoning is a means of 
achieving some degree of flexibility in land use control by minimizing the 
potentially deleterious effect of a zoning change on neighboring proper-
ties; reasonably conceived conditions harmonize the landowners' need 
for rezoning with the public interest, and certainly fall within the spirit of 
the neighboring Ie i ~._ ~.u ______ ~. 
Development Agreements ~d Contract zo~ 
Because of the uncertainty 0 e more flexible review processes described 
previously, developers often seek "developer agreements," authorized in sev-
342 
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eral states, to set the "rules of the game" for the review process.358 More sig-
nificantly, however, the developer may want assurance on substantive zoning 
issues. The rise in incentive-based urban and suburban redevelopment has 
given way to the issue of "contract zoning" -a conclusion that the govern-
ment has illegally bargained away its legislative obligation to independently 
engage in land use zoning and regulation. In virtually all urban and redevel-
opment projects, the developer and city enter into a development agreement 
or redevelopment agreement. The essence of such agreements, which are true 
legal agreements, is a promise by the city to provide economic incentives and 
often eminent domain rights to the developer in exchange for a promise by the 
developer to acquire and develop the property. 
In most such agreements, subsequent land use approvals by the very 
entity that is a party to the agreement is assumed, but not necessarily con-
tractual. Thus the agreement is entered into, but the developer may not legally 
bind the city to a promise to grant subseqent rezonings or subdivision 
approvals. The developer will always reserve such items as contingencies, 
however. Given the universal validity and use of development agreements, 
there is a new relevance to the issue of contract zoning, which involves the 
duality of the city's identity as both a private business party or even "partner" 
with the developer and as the government, with power and statutory obliga-
tion to regulate, independent of its contractual promises. 
The states vary in their scrutiny of city commitments or promises to grant 
or "cooperate" in approvals. Thus, in one recent case, a Florida court held that 
an agreement by a county to "support and expeditiously process" a rezoning 
application was unenforceable.359 The issue of contract zoning is related to the 
issue of the government's power to grant, or as detractors would say, "sell to 
the highest bidder" its condemnation rights, and the condemnation issue of 
what use is public, as discussed in chapter 3.360 
Another species of the development agreement is specifically designed to 
protect the developer from changes in land use ordinances over the course of 
a long-term project and has been specifically validated as not amounting to 
contract zoning. Thus California has enacted legislation vesting rights by 
enforceable development agreements between city and developer, limiting the 
power of the city to apply new ordinances to pending developments.361 Such 
agreements have survived contract zoning challenges, provided that the city 
has not "surrendered control of all of its land use authority," in a case in which 
the court affirmed an award of $727,500 in damages to an apartment devel-
oper when the city reduced the approved density from 140 to 55 units by 
amending the zoning after entering into a development agreement with the 
developer.362 At least ten other states have enacted similar development agree-
ment legislation.363 Florida has also enacted development agreement legisla-
tion but takes a different view regarding the issue of contract zoning. In one 
case, a Florida court invalidated as contract zoning, a development agreement 
in which the city had agreed to "support and expeditiously process" a rezon-
ing application, even though the statute expressly permits development 
agreements establishing vested rights.364 
§ 6.60 2008 SUPPLEMENT 
F. FLEXIBLE ZONING. 
§ 6.60 Role and Function 
Page 6-72, note 1, add: 
See also Town of Rhine v. ~izzell, 751 N.W.2d 780 (Wis. 2008) (discussing 
form based zoning and mixed use zoning). 
§ 6.62 . Contract and Conditional Zoning. 
Page 6~75, note 1, add: 
Md. Code Ann. art. 66B. § 4.01(c)(2). See generally Town of Rhine v. 
Bizzell, 751 N.W.2d 780 (Wis. 2008) (discussing and contrasting 
conditional-use district zoning and conditional zoning), quoting this 
Treatise. 
Page 6-76, note 4, add.; 
Durand v. IDC Bellingham, LLC, 793 N.E.2d 359 (Mass. 2003) (not 
contract zoning when utility voluntarily gave eight million to town for high 
school so town would rezone property). 
Page 6-76, note 1, add: 
Mayor & Council v. Rylns Enters., 814 A.2d 469 (Md. 2002) (zoning 
agreement in annexation agreement held invalid) (subsequent statutory 
authorization enacted at Md. Code Ann. art. 66B. § 4.01 (c)(2». 
§ 6.64 m ateral. 
Page 6-78, note 1, add: 
McLean Hosp. Corp. v. Town of Belmont, 778 N.E.2d 1016 (Mass. App. 
2002) (cannot dispute legality of agreements because received benefit of 
agreement); Super Wash, Inc. v. City of White Settlement, 131S.W.3d 249 
(Tex. App. 2004), rev'd in part, 198 S.W.3d 770 (Tex. 2006) (en other 
grounds) (upholds ordinance requiring fence on car wash as unilateral, 
strikes down reversionary clause). 
§ 6.66 Site Plan Review. 
Page 6-81, note 6, add: 
Smith v. T~wn of Mendon, 771 N.Y.S.2d 781 (App. Div. 2004) (conser-
vation easement in site plan review not an exaction), aff'd 820 N.E.2d 281 
(NY 2004). 
Page 6-81, note 7, add: 
See also Castle Hill Apartments Ltd. Partnership v. Planning Board of 
Holyoke, 844 N.E.2d 1098 (Mass. Ct. App. 2006) (site plan review cannot 
be based on strictly on aesthetic grounds). 
Page 6-81, note 10, add to Compare: 
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COMES NOW, PetitionerslPlaintiffs, LINDA CISZEK, et al (collectively "CISZEK") by 
and through their attorneys, Wetzel, Wetzel & Holt, P.L.L.C., and hereby presents this 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF DECLARATORY JUDGMENT. 
THE REMEDY 
A petition for declaratory judgment is appropriate when the validity of a zoning 
ordinance is challenged. CISZEK challenges the validity of Kootenai County Ordinance No. 417 
adopted August 13,2008 rezoning Lots 1 and 2 of Block 3 and Lots 3 and 4 of Block 4 of 
Stepping Stones Subdivision, a copy of which is attached hereto as Exhibit "A". CISZEK 
complains that the method followed by the Kootenai County Board of Commissioners ("BOCC") 
in swap zoning two separate parcels of property is in excess of the authority of the BOCC and is 
confiscatory, arbitrary, unreasonable and capricious. A petition for declaratory judgment is the 
appropriate remedy in this case. I CISZEK must prove her case by clear and convincing 
evidence.2 A zoning ordinance enacted without complying with the law is void.3 
THE FACTS 
On January 16, 2008 the Kootenai County Planning Department accepted4 an application 
from Coeur d' Alene Paving ("CDA Paving") requesting a concurrent zone change for two 
properties which was later explained by CDA Paving as an application requesting that the BOCC 
I Burns v. Madison County Board ofCoulllY Commissioners, 09.10 ISCR 528 (2009) amended opinion 09.I5.ISCR 162 (2009). 
Black Labrador Investing, LLC v. Kuna City Council, 09.8 ISCR 363 (2009). Neighborsfor Responsible Growth v. Kootenai 
County, 09.8 ISCR 389 (2009). McCuskey v. Canyon County, 123 Idaho 657, 851 P.2d 953 (1993). Jerome COl/illy v. Holloway, 
118 Idaho 681, 799 P.2d 969 (1990). Burt v. City of Idaho Falls, 105 Idaho 65, 665 P.2d 1075 (1983). Schneider v. Howe 142 
Idaho 767, 133 P.3d 1232 (2006). 
2 Estes v. City of Moscow, 96 Idaho 922, 539 P.2d 275 (1975). Cole Col/ister Fire Protection Dist. v. City of Boise, 93 Idaho 558, 
468 P.2d 290 (1979). 
3 McCliskey v. Canyon Co., v 123 Idaho 657,85 I P.2d 953 (1993). 
4 AR. V. I p. 2003. 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF DECLARATORY JUDGMENT - 6 
rezone both properties at the same time by swapping the Mining Zoning on one parcel for the 
Agricultural Zone on the other parcel. 5 
The Planning Department forthwith set this swap zoning request for public hearing and 
sent out notices to various affected agencies. The official notice stated in part: 
The Applicant is requesting to change the zoning classification on 
approximately twenty (20) acres of land from Mining to 
Agricultural. This property is no longer contiguous to current 
mining activities, and also to change the zoning classification of 
approximately twenty (20) acres from Agricultural to Mining. 
This property is adjacent to current mining activity.,,6 
The Planning Department also sent notices of the impending public hearing to 
surrounding property owners which explained the nature ofthe swap and published the same 
notice in the official newspaper. 7 The staff report prepared by the Planning Department and 
presented at the hearing before the Hearing Examiner also described the benefits of swapping 
zones.8 
The first public hearing was held on March 6, 2008 before the Kootenai County Hearing 
Examiner. The Hearing Examiner recommended that the application be denied. 9 Following the 
recommendation for denial entered by the Hearing Examiner, the swap zone was set for hearing 
5 AR V. I p. 0002, pp. 0005-0006. 
6 AR V. I p. 0072. 
7 The official public notice states in part: " .... Case No. ZONOS-OOOI, a request by Coeur d' Alene Paving to change the zoning 
classification of approximately 20 acres from Mining to Agricultural and approximately 20 acres from Agricultural to Mining. 
(AR V. I p.00S7). 
8 CDA Paving's narrative states that they are swapping Mining and Agricultural zoning so that the Mining zoned property will be 
closer to the existing mining operations in the area and to surrender Mining zoned property back to Agricultural on property that 
is further away from current mining operations and if approved, the mining operations will continue to utilize the current access 
and not impact the private roads the area. (AR V.I p.0097). 
9 The Hearing Examiner's recommendation for denial states in part that the proposed zoning amendment from Agricultural to 
Mining does not appear to be "reasonably necessary or appropriate", given the rural residential character and density of 
development of the adjacent property, and testimony received regarding the incompatibility of the requested rezone of 
Agricultural land to Mining with the adjacent residential uses. While the proposed zone change results in no net increase in lands 
zoned for Mining, it appears to directly benefit one property owner at the expense of others ..... The requested zone change 
appears to be inconsistent with the future land use plan contained within the Kootenai County Comprehensive Plan, which 
designates the area as Rural Residential. The proposed zone change also appears to be inconsistent with Comprehensive Plan 
Goal 9, as detailed in Section V of this report, based upon finding listed in 5.01 and 5.02 above, which do not find the request to 
be "reasonably necessary" or "in th~ best interest of the public." (AR V. I p. 0420 -0421). 
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before the BOCC on May 8, 2008 .. The public hearing took 4 hours and 45 minutes. Twenty six 
(26) people submitted comment sheets, 6 were in favor of the swap zone and 16 were against. IO 
The BOCC voted 2 to I in favor of the swap zone and set the case for an additional public 
hearing since the action was a material change to the recommendation issued by the Hearing 
Examiner. The second public hearing before the BOCC was held June 26, 2008. At the public 
hearing 20 comment sheets were presented, 39 were opposed to the swap zone and 2 were in 
favor. Two comment sheets were group representations: One with 14 opposed and one with 13 
opposed. II The BOCC deliberated on the outcome of the public hearing on July 10, 2008, and 
again voted 2 to 1 to approve the swap zone. On August 7, 2008 the BOCC signed the Order of 
Decision and Ordinance No. 417 rezoning the properties. Ordinance No. 417 was published on 
August 13,2008. 
THE SWAP 
CDA Paving sought to rezone two parcels. Both parcels are approximately 20 acres each 
made up of2 ten acre tracts. One parcel is located on Highway 53 and is adjoined by a 
residential neighborhood and a mining pit owned by CDA Paving. The parcel on Highway 53 is 
identified as Lots 1 and 2 of Block 3 of Stepping Stones Subdivision and has always been zoned 
Agricultural. 
The other parcel is landlocked and surrounded by small residential tracts. The landlocked 
parcel is identified as Lots 3 and 4 of Block 4 of Stepping Stones Subdivision. 12 The landlocked 
parcel was zoned Mining at the time of the application but had originally been zoned 
Agricultural as part ofthe Stepping Stones Subdivision. All of the parcels are identified on the 
JO AR V. 2 p. 0425. 
liAR V. 2 p. 0456. 
12AR V. I p. 0097. 
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Kootenai County Comprehensive Plan Map as Rural Residential 13 and the continuing 
development of the land in the area is residential. 14 
The landlocked parcel is isolated from CDA Paving's current mining operations and 
CDA Paving's testimony describes how difficult it would be to mine the parcel. CDA Paving 
testified that the parcel had no existing road access except an undefined easement that was never 
produced in the record. CDA Paving portrayed mining on this landlocked parcel as 
devastating. IS Building an access road along this easement would greatly impact the established 
residential acreages that surrounded this parcel. The new road CDA Paving would construct in 
the alleged easement would empty out onto unpaved rural roads which had not been designed or 
built for heavy traffic. Additionally, CDA Paving testified that during the mining operations, 
mined material would be trucked along these rural roads to the current mining operation on 
Highway 53 to be weighed before shipment. 16 Because the public access roads that would be 
used for transportation of these heavy materials were not designed for heavy truck access and 
included a blind intersection, 17 the Lakes Highway District and the Idaho Transportation 
Department were also anxious to prevent using this potential route. 18 Finally, CDA Paving 
13 AR V. I p. 0202, AR V. 2 p. 0412. 
14 TR. p. 0102 lines 14-22, p. 0046 lines '20-23, AR. V. I p. 0420-0421. 
15 Mr. Cozad testified: We could devastate the property. Tear down the trees for the easement and strip the land. (TR. p. 0143 
lines 7 -13) He also testified that in order for us to mine this we have to go down. It's just gonna create a hole out in the middle 
of nowhere. (TR. p. 0005 lines 18-20). 
16 AR. V. I p. 0200, CDA Paving described this truck traffic as significant (AR. V. 2 p. 0413) and Ms. Young estimated that the 
average traffic would be 50 to 100 trucks per day (Tr. p. 0022 lines 19-23. 
17 AR. V. I p. 0200. 
18 Joseph Wuest of Lakes Highway District stated in the letter to the Commissioners: .... The Board has no objections to the 
request of Phil Weist of Coeur d'Alene Paving, to switch the zoning from Agricultural to Mining on two (2) twenty (20) acre 
parcels located between Ramsey and Atlas Roads on the south side of Hwy 53. If the zone change is not granted, ingress and 
egress for the current lots (lots 3 & 4 of Stepping Stones Subdivision) zoned for mining, would be via a private easement onto 
Atlas Road. The amount of truck traffic generated by the mining operation would greatly impact Atlas Road as it is not built to 
commercial standards and would not withstand the additional traffic. Therefore, Lakes Highway District is in favor of the zone 
change as this would allow the current access for the business to remain on Hwy 53. (AR V. 2 p. 0253). Donald Davis, Senior 
Transportation Planner of the Idaho Transportation Department sent an email supporting the proposed rezones stating: It has 
come to our attention through Lakes Highway District that the zone change request was not recommended for approval by the 
Hearing Examiner and is coming before the County Commission for public hearing this evening (May 8, 2008). The Idaho 
Transportation Department, District I, expresses the same concern as did the Lake Highway District if the zone change is not 
approved. Mining operations on the parcels as presently zoned would result in truck/mining related traffic on various private 
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explained how disruptive the dust and noise would be to the surrounding neighbors l9 and the 
negative impact to the neighbors when the topsoil was stripped from this landlocked parcel in 
order to get to the depth where the mining materials were located.2o 
The zoning for the parcel on Highway 53 was Agricultural at the time of the application. 
This parcel is surrounded by residential neighborhoods except for the boundary that it shares 
with the current CDA mining pit. CDA Paving described this parcel as the perfect place to 
locate mining activities. Although this parcel also adjoins residential acreages, this site was 
promoted in the application and during the public hearings as a site where mining activities 
would affect fewer residential neighbors by a ratio of2 to 11.21 Even the dust and noise from 
mining activities would be better at this site because CDA Mining could access the mining 
materials from the existing pit on their adjoining site which would reduce the amount of topsoil 
stripping activity .. Traffic would, of course, be reduced and the rural roads surrounding the 
landlocked parcel would not be impacted. 
Actual testimony and evidence supporting the rezoning for the Highway 53 parcel to 
Mining is harder to find in the record. The narrative describes the benefits for Coeur d'Alene 
Paving if the swap zone for the Highway 53 parcel was approved as follows: 
By having this zone changed there will be contiguous mining 
parcels, the traffic will retain the same truck traffic routes through 
the existing pit. ... By having the mining parcels contiguous, the 
land use would have less impact on surrounding property owners. 
This zone change would allow for more materials in the 
marketplace at a lower price for the benefit of all through increased 
competition.22 
easements between the sites and Atlas Road then between Atlas and Coeur d' Alene Paving's main operation on State Highway 
53. It seems, from the access and circulation standpoint, that it would be appropriate to keep the mining operation on contiguous 
p.arcels. (AR V. 2 p.0430). 
9 AR V. I p. 0005. 
20 AR V. I p. 0200. Sandy Young testified that they would begin mining at ground level by mobilizing heavy equipment onto the 
~arcel and begin to mine to reach a depth of 40 feet which would take several years. TR. p. 0021 lines 24-25, p. 0022 lines 1-2. 
I AR V. I p. 0199. 
22 AR. V. I p.0005. 
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So, the swap was set. As Seth Molding stated at the public hearing" .. , in short, I think 
that Coeur d' Alene is running a bluff. They're not going to mine the property that is zoned 
mining and it only benefits them if they get the swap.'.23 CDA Paving convinced the BOCC that 
the Highway 53 parcel had to be rezoned Mining because mining on the landlocked parcel would 
be very bad for everyone.24 One zone change could not be considered without the other. 
23 TR. p. 0 I 07 lines 24-25, p. 25 lines 1-2. See also testimony of Paul Franz TR. p. 0053 lines 11-15. 
24 Representing the Applicant, Sandy Young presented the reasons to support the rezones as follows: The request before you 
tonight is for a zone change that is two-fold. This request takes two ten acre parcels that are zoned agricultural and request to 
change their classification to mining and in exchange takes two ten acre parcels that are mining and converts them to agricultural 
land ..... My client, Coeur d'Alene Paving, wishes to expand their area of mining .... Option - so I'm going to kind of break it 
down into two options tonight. And option one is for them to um be granted the zone change so that they can move forward and 
the pit can continue in this area. The option two is to move to this 20 acres to the west and the south and to - to start mining 
those so already zoned mining - they can start their operations there tomorrow. The downside to that is that they start at grade. 
That's downside number one. Number two is they don't have access to these parcels from here. So they create a new access and 
they begin at ground surface. Beginning at ground level means mobilizing heavy equipment to the 20 acres and leaving that 
equipment in place as they begin to mine. Reaching a depth of 40 feet with today's demand would take several years. . .. just uh 
the visual obstruction of having heavy equipment at ground surfaces is certainly going to be more obtrusive than if they stayed in 
the pit on this site. '" Mining that 20 acres um of course means the access is cut in ... that traffic would .. , trucks carrying 
material would be coming out here onto Atlas ... 50 to 100 trucks a day during a busy peak season day. Revising option one to 
grant the zone change to this contiguous portion - no new accesses need to be created. All mining operations remain in the pit. 
Noise levels and dust levels do not increase. They stay at the current levels. I'd gone into Building and Planning several times to 
look at the file and one thing I didn't find was any letter of comment from Lakes Highway District. And so I was at the Lakes 
Highway District's meeting ... I brought up that fact to them. Why hadn't they commented on this when certainly after I had 
driven the site, I knew they would have a very definite opinion about that many trucks using Atlas Road ... I did the same 
presentation for them, then they were surprised ... they did not realize that that new access would need to be created and the 
trucks would access onto - directly onto Atlas Road. They are opposed to - to that idea and they wrote a stronger letter yesterday 
which I will submit to you that basically says they support this zone change ..... So then I called lTD and talked to Don Davis ... 
He stated that he was fully in support of the zone change for that reason and he submitted written documentation today that 
shows !DT's support of the project. (TR. p. 0019Iines7-25, p. 0020 lines 1-25, p. 0022 lines 1-25, p. 0023 lines 1-20). The 
Hearing Examiner summarized the negative impacts that CDA Paving had described in the public hearing as follows: Mark 
Mussman introduced the case .... He testified that the applicants were seeking a zone change from Mining to Agricultural on 20 
acres ofland, and requesting at the same time that 20 acres ofland zoned Agricultural be re-zoned to Mining. He testified that 
the Comprehensive Plan identified that future land use in the area to be rural residential. (AR. V .2 p. 0412). Phil Weist, 
applicant's representative, testified that the applicants were trying to essentially trade zoning designations so that an expansion of 
their mining operation could remain contiguous with the existing operation, and allow them to utilize their existing driveway 
access to Highway 53 ... , He testified that II properties will be negatively effected if the applicants expand their mining 
operations on the twenty acres currently requested to be re-zoned Agricultural, while only 2 property owner will be impact if the 
zone change is approved, thus allowing them to expand their mining operation to the area that is requested to be rezoned from 
Agricultural to Mining. (AR. V. 2 p. 0412). Craig Conrad, applicant's representative, also testified that the applicant's proposal 
would keep the mining operations closer to Highway 53, and generally keep the mining operations in a more concentric area, thus 
minimizing impacts ..... He also testified that ifthe mining expansion occurred in the area currently zoned Mining it would 
require excavation to begin at the level of existing homes in the immediate vicinity. (AR. V. 2 p. 0413). Todd Kauffman, 
applicant's representative, testified that expansion into the parcels that are currently zoned for mining would result in 
significantly amounts of excavated materials being transported around Atlas Road to Highway 53, to the existing mining 
operation in order to weigh the materials prior to shipment. (AR. V. 2 p. 0413). Phil Weist testified that II properties will be 
negatively effected if the applicants expand their mining operations on the twenty acres currently requested to be re-zoned 
Agricultural, while only 2 property owners will be impacted if the zone change is approved, thus allowing them to expand their 
mining operation to the area that is requested to be rezoned from Agricultural to Mining. (AR. V. 2 p. 0412) .. , Craig Conrad, 
applicant's representative, also testified in rebuttal. He stated if they don't get the zone change approved, they will expand their 
operation in the area currently zone Mining, which will impact more people, and be closer to neighboring houses. (AR. V. 2 p. 
0423). 
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THE LAW 
1. SWAP ZONING IS IN EXCESS OF STATUTORY AUTHORITY 
There is no statement in The Land Use Planning Act (LLUPA) or in the Kootenai County 
Zoning Ordinance that directly authorizes swap zones as an approved method for rezoning 
property. There is no language that even infers that swapping the zone on two separate parcels 
of property is an approved method for zoning property. The Idaho Supreme Court has 
specifically stated that zoning districts can only be established by specifically prescribed 
procedures. 
The legislature clearly intended that the authority to enact 
comprehensive plans, establish zoning districts and adopt 
amendatory ordinances be exercised exclusively by city and county 
legislative or governing bodies and pursuant to specific prescribed 
procedures.25 
The comprehensive statutory procedures mandated by LLUP A must be followed in enacting and 
amending local zoning ordinances. 
Probably before the ink even dried on the final draft of the Constitution of the State of 
Idaho, Idaho could have been called a "Dillon's Rule" state.26 There was never any question in 
the judicial branch of the government that legislative authority would be strictly construed and 
that local governments, cities and counties would only exercise such powers as were expressly 
granted to them or necessarily implied. The Idaho Courts have ruled consistently that: 
Legislative grants of power to municipal corporations must be 
strictly construed to operate as a surrender ofthe sovereignty of the 
state no further than is expressly declared by the language 
thereof. 27 
25 Gumprect v. City of Coeur D'Alene, 104 Idaho 615, 661 P.2d 1214, p. 618 (1983). 
26 Dillian's rule is a limitation upon municipal powers. It provides that "a municipal corporation possesses and can exercise the 
following powers and no others: first, those granted in express words; second, those necessarily or fairly implied in or incident to 
the powers expressly granted; third, those essential to the accomplishment of the declared objects and purposes of the 
corporation, not simply convenient, but indispensable" John F. Dillon, Commentaries on the Law of Municipal Corporations, § 
237 (51h ed. 1911). 
27 Boise City, Idaho v. Boise Artesian Hat & Cold Water Co., 186 F. 705 (1911). 
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A municipal corporation possesses and can exercise only those 
powers granted in express words, those necessarily or fairly 
implied or incidental to the powers expressly granted, and those 
essential to the declared objects and purposes of the corporation.28 
Municipalities may exercise only those powers granted to them or 
necessarily implied from the powers granted, and if there is a fair, 
reasonable, substantial doubt as to the existence of a power, the 
doubt must be resolved against the city.29 
There is no provision under the general laws governing counties or in LLUP A that 
expressly or implicitly grants authority to zone property by pre-agreeing to swap zones. In fact 
the extraordinary measures for public notice and public hearings provided for in LLUP A to zone 
and rezone property underscore the importance of public involvement and legislative discretion 
in zoning property. Kootenai County cannot just make up authority to rezone by swapping the 
zone on two separate parcels of property, no matter how convenient the authority might be under 
the circumstances. The BOCC acted without authority and the action is void. 
2. SWAP ZONING DENIES DUE PROCESS 
The testimony and the evidence recited at the public hearings demonstrate the vice of the 
swap zone process. The BOCC did not undertake to rezone each parcel to promote the health, 
safety, and general welfare of the people of the state ofIdaho separately based upon the public 
benefit and burden of each parcel and each zone as required under LLUP A. 30 CISZEK was 
denied the opportunity to present evidence regarding the propriety of zoning the Highway 53 
parcel Mining because every statement opposing the extension of Mining into this residential 
area was rebutted with evidence that mining activity on this parcel would be better than mining 
28 State v. Frederic, 28 Idaho 709, 155 P. 977 (191 6). 
29 Plummer v. City of Fruitland, 140 Idaho I, 89 P.3d 841 (2003) see also 0 'Bryant v. City of Idaho Falls, 78 Idaho 3 I 3, 303 
P.2d 672 (1956). 
30 Idaho Code §67-6502. 
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activity on the landlocked parcel. 3 I Mining activity on the landlocked parcel was not relevant to 
the decision of extending mining activity into the Highway 53 parcel. Zoning is not intended to 
be a quid pro quo decision. It is about measuring the rules and regulations established in the 
local zoning ordinance, comprehensive plan, and the policies and procedures set forth in LLUPA 
against each rezone to determine ifthe rezone requested for a particular parcel would not be 
detrimental to the neighboring property owners and would be beneficial to and promote the 
health, safety, and general welfare of the citizens of Kootenai County as a whole. Each rezone 
request is to be independently analyzed. 
The swap zone process prevents an independent analysis because one rezone request is 
always compared against another rezone request and no rezone can occur unless both rezones 
occur. Under the facts at bar it is clear that the neighbors and the BOCC would want the 
landlocked parcel rezoned from Mining to Agricultural. A mining zone on a landlocked parcel 
surrounded by residences does not make any sense as CDA Paving pointed out over and over in 
their testimony. It is also clear that extending mining activity anywhere in this residential area 
no longer makes sense. 32 The BOCC discussed this fact and it is evident in the discussion of 
their motion to approve the swap zone that they were reluctant to add more mining in this area.33 
The BOCC never had the discretion to rezone the landlocked parcel independently. The BOCC 
clearly understood that in order to remove the Mining zoning from the landlocked parcel, it had 
to add a Mining zone to the Highway 53 parcel. In this zoning decision the BOCC had no 
discretion at all. 
31 Notice and an opportunity to present and to rebut evidence comprise the common core of procedural due process requirements 
constitutionally mandated in all cases in which zoning authorities are requested to change land use. Gay v. County Com 'rs 0/ 
Bonneville County, 103 Idaho 626,651 P.2d 560 (1982). Cooper v. Board o/County Com 'rs 0/ Ada COlillty, 10 I Idaho 407,614 
P.2d 947 (1980). 
32 PTR. p. 0003 lines 1-2, p. 0004 lines 13-15. 
33 PTR. p. 0004 lines 3-25, p. 0005 lines 1-25. 
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A swap zone is like a "Blue Light Special". It is only available to property owners who 
have the advantage of: 1) owing two parcels of land; 2) owning parcels with different zoning 
classifications; and 3) if the property owner is really lucky, at least one parcel she owns has an 
outdated zoning classification. Then the property owner has the zoning special of the century. 
The property owner does not have to suffer the uncertainty of having each property rezoned 
independently, the property owner just trades. The uncertainty of rezoning is gone because the 
discretion of the BOCC is limited to only one choice and it is the choice that the property owner 
controls. What a special! But courts have recognized that this "zoning special" denies due 
process. As stated in a New Mexico case: 
A contract in which a municipality promises to zone property in a 
specified manner is illegal because, in making such a promise, a 
municipality preempts the power of the zoning authority to zone 
the property according to prescribed legislative procedures. Our 
statutes require notice and a public hearing prior to passage, 
amendment, supplement, or repeal of any zoning regulations. 
(citation omitted) The statutes also grant to citizens and parties in 
interest the opportunity to be heard at the hearing. By making a 
promise to zone before a zoning hearing occurs, a municipality 
denigrates the statutory process because it purports to commit itself 
to certain action before listening to the public's comments on that 
action. Enforcement of such a promise allows a municipality to 
circumvent established statutory requirements to the possible 
detriment of affected landowners and the community as a whole. 34 
In support of this statement, the New Mexico Supreme Court cited an Idaho case, County 
of Ada v. Walter, 98 Idaho 630,533 P.2d 1199 (1975), noting that the Ada County Zoning 
Ordinance was designed to protect the rights of all affected property owners and the general 
welfare ofthe State ofIdaho. Our Supreme Court in Ada held that "commissioners do not have 
the authority to enter into an agreement which would constitute a change in zoning.,,35 
CISZEK really had nothing she could say about this "Blue Light Special." CISZEK'S 
34 Dacy v. Village of Ruidoso. 114 N.M. 699, 845 P.2d 793 at 797 (1992). 
35 County 0/ Ada Board O/COUllly Com 'rs v. Walter, 96 Idaho 630 at 632, 533 P.2d 1199 (1975). 
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testimony that mining should not be extended into Highway 53 parcel was meaningless because 
she had no opportunity to persuade the BOCC to rezone one property but not the other property. 
The BOCC had agreed in advance that it must rezone both properties as part of the swap zone. 
The BOCC had no discretion under this agreement to consider each parcel independently. 
CISZEK was effectively prevented from presenting evidence on each parcel independently. 
CISZEK'S right to due process under LLUPA was denied in this swap zone process. By 
accepting the rezone application and performing the rezoning of properties pursuant to the 
limited terms of the application, the BOCC also denied CISZEK equal protection under the 
law.36 The process is illegal, arbitrary and capricious and the action of the BOCC is void.37 
3. SWAP ZONING LIMITS LEGISLATIVE DISCRETION 
The BOCC was deprived oflegislative powers by pre-agreeing that it had the right to 
rezone one property "Agricultural" only ifit agreed to rezone another property "Mining".38 The 
often cited legal authority on this issue is Houston Petroleum Co. v. Automotive Prod. C. Ass 'n, 
87 A.2d 319 (1952) discussing the imposition of conditions proffered by the property owner for 
the purpose of obtaining a rezone. The court stated that the conditions sought to be imposed 
" ... constituted an abuse of the zoning power by the City, and were therefore ultra vires, illegal 
and void." Relying on another well known case the court stated: 
The latest exposition of the law applicable to the foregoing 
conclusion is contained in V.F. Zahodiakin39 '" that the zoning 
power may not be exerted to serve private interests merely nor may 
the principal be subverted to that end, that a purported contract so 
made was ultra vires and all proceedings to effectuate it were 
36 The equal protection clause is designed to ensure that those persons similarly situated with respect to a governmental action 
should be treated similarly. Primary Health Network, Inc. v. State, Dept. of Admin., 137 Idaho 663, 52 P.3d 663, rehearing 
denied (2002). 
37 Hartman v. Buckson 467 A.2d 694 (DeI.Ch. 1983). The League of Residential Neighborhood Advocates v. City of Los Angeles, 
498 F.3d 1052 (2007). Montgomery County v. Revere 671 A.2d I (Md 1996). 
38 The enactment of zoning plans and ordinances is legislative action. Cooper id. at 409 
39 v.F. Zahodiakin, etc., Corp. v. Zoning Board of Adjustment of City of Summit, 8 N.J. 386, 86 A.2d 127 (1952). 
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coram non judice and utterly void.4o ••. A municipality cannot act 
as an individual does. It must proceed in conformity with the 
statutes or in the absence of statute agreeably to the common law, 
by ordinance or resolution or motion .... Contracts thus have no 
place in a zoning plan and a contract between a municipality and a 
property owner should not enter into the enactment or enforcement 
of zoning regulations.41 
The authority to zone property is recognized as part of the police powers of 
municipalities.42 A municipality may not contract its zoning power any more than it can contract 
its police power. The court in V. F. Zahodiakin eloquently explained this point: 
Zoning is an exercise of the police power to serve the common 
good and general welfare. It is elementary that the legislative 
function may not be surrendered or curtailed by bargain or its 
exercise controlled by the considerations which enter into the law 
of contracts. The use restriction must needs have general 
application. The power may not be exerted to serve private interest 
merely, nor may the principle be subverted to that end.43 
Under the terms of CDA Paving's application for a rezone that the BOCC accepted, the 
BOCC agreed that it could not grant a rezone for one property and deny the rezone for the other 
property. This private agreement between the BOCC and a property owner limited the authority 
of the BOCC to independently analyze and approve or deny a request to rezone property. The 
BOCC impermissibly limited its legislative authority to rezone property by private agreement. 
Courts reviewing a zoning decision which is produced by an agreement by a governmental body 
with a private landowner to rezone property uniformly hold that the zoning decision 
impermissibly limits legislative authority and is void.44 
40 Citing Beckmann v. Township a/Teaneck, 6 N.J. 530 (1951) and Anschelewitz v. Borough a/Be/mar, 2 N.J. 178,65 A.2d 825 
(1949). 
41 HOllston id. at 322. 
42 Dawson Enterprises, inc. v. Blaine Co., 98 Idaho 506, 567 P.2d 1257 (1997). Gumprecht v. City a/Coeur d'Alene, 104 Idaho 
615,661 P.2d 1214(1983) 
43 V. F. Zahodiakin supra at 8 N.J. 386, 86 A.2d 127, 131. 
44 Atlantic Beach Property Owners' Association, inc., et al. v. Town o/Hempsted, 3 N.Y.2.ed, 144 N.E. 2.ed (1957). State Ex ReI. 
Zupancic v. Schimenz, 174 N.W.2d 533 (1970), Ford Leasing Develop. Co. v. Board a/County Com 'rs 528 P.2d 237 (1974). 
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A municipality has no authority to enter into a private contract 
with a property owner for the amendment of a zoning ordinance 
..... Any contrary rule would condone a violation of the long 
established principle that a municipality cannot contract away the 
exercise of its police powers.45 
The BOCC is a public body organized for the governing of the county and the securing of 
the common interest of the people of Kootenai County and the State of Idaho. These are public 
officers and their statutory powers cannot be abrogated or curtailed by private agreement. 
Consequently, the ordinance approving the swap zoning of the properties at issue is void because 
it limits the power of the BOCC to rezone property in the county in the interest of the whole 
community. An agreement to swap zones is an illegal bargaining away of the zoning power of 
the BOCC. 
Certain core governmental powers, like the power of eminent 
domain and the police power, are reserved to the sovereign and 
cannot be abdicated or surrendered by contract, and any attempt to 
do so is simply unenforceable.46 
Numerous courts have criticized contract zoning and declared it invalid per se.47 
The New Mexico Supreme Court presented a lengthy analysis of contract zoning: 
While these courts have advanced several grounds for 
disapproving contract zoning, the most common rationale is that 
contract zoning is inherently flawed as a "problematic blend of 
contract and police powers. (citation omitted) Their opinions 
typically condemn contract zoning as an illegal bargaining away or 
abrogation of the police power.48 
Haymon v. Cit yo/Chattanooga, 513 S.W.2d 185 (1974). Carlino v. Whipain Investors, 453 A.2d 1385 (Pa. 1982). 
Altman/Glazer P.B. Company v. Mayor and Aldermen 0/ Annapolis 314 Md. 675; 552 A.2d 1277 (1989). Rodriguez, et al. v. 
Prince George's County, 79 Md. App.537; 558 A.2d 742 (1989). Alderman v. Chatham Co. 366 S.E.2d 885 (N.C. App. 1988). 
Chung c. Sarasota Co., 686 So.2d 1358 (Fla. App. 2 Dst. 1996). Dacy v. Village 0/ Ruidoso, 114 N.M. 699, 845 P .2d 793 
(1992). League 0/ Residential Neighborhood Advocates v. City 0/ Los Angeles, 498 F.3d 1052 (2007). 
45 Morgran Co .. Inc. v. Orange County 818 So.2d 640 at 643 (2002) citing Hart/net v Austin 93 So.2d 86 (1956). 
46 Eugene McQuillin, The Law of Municipal Corporations section (2009 Revised Volume) § 29: 11, p. 365. Daniel R. Mandelker 
Land Use Law (Fifth Edition) The Zoning Process § 6.62-6.64. 
47 Judith W. Wegner, Moving Toward the Bargaining Table: Contract Zoning, Development Agreement. and the Theoretical 
Foundations o/Government Land Use Deals, 65 N.C.L.Rev. 976, 892-982 (1987). 
48 Dacy v. Village 0/ Ruidoso 114, N.M. 699,845 P.2d 793 at 797 (1992). 
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The BOCC bargained away its police powers and by doing so acted without authority. 
The approval of Ordinance No. 417 was ulta vires, arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, 
and contrary to public policy. Ordinance No. 417 is void. 
ATTORNEY FEES 
The BOCC was correctly advised by legal counsel that conditions could not be put on a 
zone change.49 The same legal authorities that propound that conditions cannot be placed on 
zone changes also condemn contracts or promise to zone as illegal. 50 It is therefore very difficult 
to understand why the BOCC would believe that rezoning by swapping zones would be legal. 
The BOCC and county attorneys had been warned by respectable attorneys that a swap zone was 
illegal. 51 The BOCC and its legal staff should be thoroughly cognizant that statutory authority is 
required before a novel procedure such as swap zoning can be implemented. Swap zoning is not 
authorized in Kootenai County Ordinances or Idaho statutes or discussed in any cases cited from 
Idaho courts. In all of the research completed by Mr. Duncan and Mr. Wetzel which was 
presented to the BOCC, they could not find any reference in zoning treatises, statutes or case law 
to rezoning through a procedure of exchanging zones. No reference was ever found in the 
extensive review ofthe law required in this Memorandum. It is inexcusable for the BOCC to 
assume that a zoning procedure, however convenient, can just be made up out of thin air. It is 
unjust that ordinary citizens like CISZEK are required to incur substantial attorney fees and costs 
49 PTR. p. 0005 lines 13-16, p. 0006. 
50 83 Am. Jur. 2d Zoning and Planning § 42. 10 Corpus Juris Secundum Zoning and Land Planning § 76.2. 2 Anderson, 
American Law of Zoning §§ 9.21-9.20 (3fd ed.). 10 Eugene McQuillin, The Law of Municipal Corporations § 29: 11, p. 365, 
(2009 Revised Volume). Daniel R. Mandelker, Land Use Law § 6.62-6.64 (Fifth Edition). Salsich Jr. & Tryniecki Land Use 
Regulation: A Legal Analysis & Practical Application of Land Use Law (Second Edition, Section of Real Property, Probate and 
Trust Law American Bar Association) pp. 186-188. v. 65 p. 957-1038. 70 ALR3d. §§ 3,4,5, pp.139-150, James D. Lawlor, J.D. 
Annotation: Validly, Constructioll, and effect of Agreement to Rezone, or Amendment to Zoning Ordinance, Creating Special 
Restrictions or Conditions Not Applicable to Other Property Similarly Zones. 
51 TR. p. 0118 line 25; p.0119 lines 1 -25 p. 0121 lines 22 -25; p. lines 1 - II. p. 0125 lines 2 -12. 
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to correct an action taken by the BOCC that had no basis in fact or law. CISZEK is entitled to 
attorney's fees under Idaho Code § 12-117.52 
DATED this ~ fay of August, 2009. 
WETZEL, WETZEL 
& HOLT, P.L.L.C. 
a L. Rayborn Wetzel 
mey for Petitioners/Plaintiffs 
52 In re Daniel W., _ Idaho _ 183 P.3d 765 (2008). The purpose of 12-117 is to deter groundless or arbitrary action and to 
provide a remedy for persons who have borne unfair and unjustified financial burdens defending against groundless charges or 
attempting to correct mistakes agencies should never have made. CanallNorcrestiColumbus Action Committee v. City of Boise, 
136 Idaho 666, 671 39 P.3d 606,611 (2001). Rincover v. State, 132 Idaho 547, 549, 976 P.2d 473, 475 (1999). Bonner County 
v. Bonner County Sheriff Search and Rescue, Inc. 142 Idaho 788, 134 P.3d 639 (2003). 
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Jethelyn H. Harrington 
Kootenai County Department of Legal 
Services 
P.O. Box 9000 
Coeur d'Alene, Idaho 83816-9000 
Attorney for Defondant 
Michael Ryan Chapman 
Chapman Law Office, PLLC Services 
P.O. Box 1600 
Coeur d' Alene, Idaho 83816 
Attorney for Coeur d' Alene Paving 
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STATE OF IDAHO }SS 
COUNTY OF KOOTENAI 
FILED: ~ - :; - 0 q 
AT ::< : OOUCLOCK [) M 
G~T~ 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI 
LINDA CISZEK, et al., 
Petitioners/Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS, 
KOOTENAI COUNTY, STATE OF IDAHO, 
RespondentlDefenda nt, 
and, 
COEUR D'ALENE PAVING, INC., 
Defendant. 
Case No. CV-08-7074 
ORDER TO AMEND BRIEFING 
SCHEDULE 
WHEREAS, the parties having filed a Stipulation to Amend the Briefing Schedule 
in the above captioned matter, and the Court having reviewed said stipulation, as well 
as the existing court file, and the Court being fully advised in the matter, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the briefing schedule in Case No. CV OB-70"ILj be 
amended and set out to a ti e convenient to this Court. 
/" 
DATED this j da 
C~A)CDQQ .' r--
Charles . osack, Dlstrrct Judge 
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CLERK'S CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
1 hereby certify that on this 5 day Of~ 2009, I caused to be served a true 
and correct copy of the foregoing by the method indicated below, and addressed to the 
following: 
[ ] U.S. Mail 
[ J HAND DELIVERED 
[ ] OVERNIGHT MAIL 
[ ] TELEFAX(FAX) 
Steven C. Wetzel 
Kevin B. Holt 
WETZEL, WETZEL & HOLT, PLLC 
1322 Kathleen Avenue, Suite 2 
Coeur d'Alene, 10 83815 
Fax: (208) 664-6741 9=r-tf 
[ ] U.S. Mail 
[ ] HAND DELIVERED 
[ ] OVERNIGHT MAIL 
[ ] TELEFAX(FAX) 
Michael R. Chapman 
Chapman Law Office, PLLC Services 
P.O. Box 1600 
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83816 
Fax: (208) 667-7625 ~ 
-;:)o3~ 
[ ] U.S. Mail 
[ ] HAND DELIVERED 
[ ] OVERNIGHT MAIL 
[.] TELEFAX (FAX) 
Jethelyn Harrington, Civil Deputy 
Kootenai County Prosecuting Att. 
Civil Division 
P.O. Box 9000 
Coeur d'Alene, ID 8381q 
Fax: (208) 446-1621 ~ 
Daniel English, Clerk of the District Court 
Deputy Clerk 
ORDER TO AMEND BRIEFING SCHEDULES - 2 
H:\Building and Planning\Planning\CDA Paving\Dist. Ct. CV-OB-7074 - ZONOB-001 Ciszek\Order to Amend Briefing 
Schedules.doc 
STATE OF IDAHO ) 
County of Kootenai J SS 
FILED l?' G - oCj 
AT :2 : 00 O'clock-.J)A 
CLERK, DISTRICT COURTP 
~A-L~ 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
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KOOTENAI COUNTY BOARD ) 






COEUR D'ALENE PAVING, INC., ) 
Defendant. ) 
------------------------) 
CASE NO. CV2008-7074 
AMENDED ORDER ESTABLISHING 
BRIEFING SCHEDULE 
The above matter having been assigned to Judge Hosack to address the matter 
on Appeal, and the Notice of Settlement and Filing of Transcript and Agency Record 
having settled the transcript on May 7, 2009; and parties having stipulated to amend the 
previously entered Briefing Schedule, now, therefore; 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Petitioner shall file their opening Brief no later 
than September 10, 2009, at 5:00 p.m. 
Amended Order Establishing Briefing Schedule 
CV2008-7074 
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IT IS FURTHER ORDERED the Respondent shall file their reply Brief no later 
than October 8, 2009, at 5:00 p.m. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any final Brief from the Petitioner shall be filed 
no later than October 29,2009, at 5:00 p.m. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that in addition to any original brief or memorandum 
lodged with the Clerk of Court, counsel shall also provide the Court with a copy that is 
labeled the Court's copy. To the extent counsel rely on legal authorities not contained 
in the Idaho reports; a copy of each case cited shall be attached to the Court's copy of 
the brief or memorandum. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that upon completion of all briefing, this matter shall 
be set for hearing at a time convenient to both the Court and counsel. 
DATED this day of August, 20h 
~0CLQQ" 
Amended Order Establishing Briefing Schedule 
CV2008-7074 
Charles W. Hosack, District Judge 
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Clerk's Certificate of Mailing 
I hereby certify that on the 5 day of August, 2009, that a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing was mailed/delivered by regular U.S. Mail, postage prepaid, Interoffice Mail, Hand 
Delivered or Faxed to: 
~ Steven Wetzel (fax: 208-664-6741) 
~ Michael Chapman (fax: 208-667-7625) 
-#cr Kootenai County Department of Legal Services (fax: 208-446-1621) 
~03'6 
DANIEL J. ENGLISH 
CLERK OF THE DISTRICT COURT 
Amended Order Establishing Briefing Schedule 
CV2008-7074 
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